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INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHY 



BiW ©bfiitat : 

J. F. SOLLIER, S.T.D., 



Provincial S.M. 



^Trnprtmatur : 

^ JOHN CARDINAL FARLEY, 

Archbishop of New York. 



February 7th, 191 2. 



INTRODUCTORY 
PHILOSOPHY 



A TEXT-BOOK 

FOR COLLEGES AND 

HIGH SCHOOLS 



BY 

CHARLES A. BUB RAY, S.M., Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE 
MARIST COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 



LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 

FOURTH AVENUE & 30th STREET, NEW YORK 
LONDON, BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA 

1912 



f^.^% 



COPYRIGHT, I912, BY 
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 



ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



THE'PLIMPTON -PRESS 

[ \V • D • O ] 
NORWOOD«MASS«U'S-A 



C:C1.A310I24 



PREFACE 

The efforts which have been made in recent years to provide 
the beginner in philosophy with a text -book suited to his needs 
are justified both by the importance of the subject and by the 
requirements of educational method. It is obvious that an intro- 
duction should really introduce, in other words that it should 
present philosophy in such a way as to arouse the student's interest, 
give him a firm grasp of essentials, and encourage him to further 
study. But how these results are to be secured is still an open 
question. The books that have so far appeared have, each from 
its own point of view, distinct advantages either as outlining the 
history of philosophical problems, or as setting forth the claims of 
rival systems, or as explaining the principles which serve as the 
foundation of some special system and a basis of criticism in dis- 
cussing variant theories. An introduction that will combine these 
several utilities seems to be our present need. 

Dr. Dubray's aim in this volume is to lead the student by easy 
approaches into the field of philosophy and to show him its divisions 
with their several problems and the solutions which these have 
received. In accordance with the principles of correct method, 
the knowledge which the student has already acquired is made to 
serve as the starting-point, and from this he is led on to the con- 
sideration of more abstract philosophical concepts and theories. 
These again are presented in clear statement and orderly sequence, 
with sufficient indication of outstanding questions, yet without the 
excess of detail which sometimes destroys proportion or results in 
narrowness of view. At the same time, definite conclusions are 
presented with the evidence on which they rest, so that the student 
may get from his use of the book not merely a lot of vague question- 
ings, but a certain amount of positive knowledge and critical 
direction for later investigation. 



VI PREFACE 

Students of Catholic philosophy will appreciate both the form 
and the content of this manual. While adhering to the principles 
of Scholasticism, the author has kept steadily in view the develop- 
ment of .modem philosophy and the recent advances of science. 
It is not possible of course to effect a concihation all along the Kne 
where the aim is rather to open up the whole subject. But impor- 
tant service can be rendered by illustrating the method by which 
the old and the new may be combined. This feature of the book 
is the more helpful because the student, working simultaneously in 
other departments of knowledge, is sure to come upon problems 
which lead up to philosophy. This is true not only of the physical 
and biological sciences, but also of the social and historical. In 
each of these, whatever be the special subject of study, there is 
needed a certain seasoning of philosophical principle and method 
in order that the student may see scientific facts, not in their first 
crudeness or isolation, but as parts of a larger truth. In this way 
he will not only give to each item of knowledge its proportionate 
value, but will also form the habit of philosophical thinking, which 
in itself is the best result that can be derived from an introductory 
course. 

In Catholic colleges, importance has always been attached to 
the study of philosophy both as a means of culture and as a source 
of information regarding the great truths which are influential in 
supporting Christian belief and in shaping character. It is rightly 
considered essential for every graduate to have a training in logic 
and in the fundamentals of psychology, ethics, and metaphysics. 
But if this training is to be successful, philosophy must be presented 
not as a complex of abstruse speculations on far-off inaccessible 
topics, but as a system of truths that enter with vital consequence 
into our ordinary thinking and our everyday conduct. For be- 
ginners especially it is not the best plan to take up first the science 
and art of reasoning where the formal treatment predominates. 
On the other hand, the study of logic itself becomes more attractive 
when it follows that of ethics or psychology. There is yet consider- 
able difference of opinion as to which of the philosophical disciplines 
should have precedence; but if the choice is to be made with due 
regard to the scientific subjects which have previously been studied, 



PREFACE Vll 

psychology would seem to have the strongest claim. The recogni- 
tion of the value of its empirical methods is quite compatible with 
the philosophical discussion of its central problems, and its own 
conclusions find numerous applications in other fields of research. 

Teachers of philosophy realize that the difficulties encountered 
in an introductory course can, in part at least, be overcome by the 
use of a suitable text-book. As it is not desirable that the student 
should memorize a set of formula for the purpose of recitation or 
examination, it is also unwise to expand each topic in such lengthy 
fulness that no margin is left for individual thinking. The con- 
ciseness that marked the writings of the great Schoolmen is an 
art that may yet be revived. It leaves the teacher scope to de- 
velop the text, to suggest new points of view, and to select special 
topics for discussion. The best features of the lecture method may 
in this way be added to the ordinary class exercise and the student 
be gradually led on to examine each statement in the light of 
established principles and with a single eye for the truth — which 
is the attitude and temper of the really critical mind. 

Dr. Dubray has profited by his experience as a teacher, and in 
this volume he offers the results with the hope that they may be 
useful to others. He has certainly contributed his share toward 
encouraging the beginner in philosophy and has indicated a line 
of approach which is neither too steep nor too easy. If it smoothes 
out some of the hard places, it leaves ample room for hard thinking. 

Edward A. Pace 
The Catholic University of America 
March 7, 1912 



CONTENTS 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

I. The Nature of Philosophy 3 

1. What has been done already 3 

2. What remains to be done 4 

'^3. Definition of philosophy . . 7 

^ 4. Division of philosophy . . . . . ^T : ; — : T . . . g 

5. Method of philosophy 11 

II. General View of the World and of Man 13 

1. The self and the not-self 13 

2. The not-self and its obvious characteristics 15 

3. Relations of the self with the external world 17 

4. Obvious characteristics of the self 19 



PSYCHOLOGY, OR THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
THE MIND 

INTRODUCTION 

I. The Nature of Psychology 22 

1. Definition and subject-matter 22 

2. Method of psychology 26 

3. Division of mental processes 27 

II. The General Laws of the Mind . . .• 29 

1. A danger to be avoided 29 

2. General processes and attitudes of the mind 31 

3. General laws of the mind 35 

CHAPTER I 

KNOWLEDGE 

Preliminary Remarks 40 

Article I. Sense Presentation 

I. Sensation 44 

1. Sensation in general , . 44 

2. Internal or general sensations 46 

iz 



X CONTENTS 

3. External sensations 46 

(a) Smell and taste 47 

(6) Touch 49 

(c) Hearing 51 

(d) Vision 52 

4. Number and comparison of the senses 53 

5. Psychophysics and psychophysiology 56 

II. Perception 62 

1. Analysis and genesis of sense-perception 62 

2. Perceptions of smell and taste 64 

3. Auditory perceptions 65 

4. Tactual perceptions 66 

5. Visual perceptions 67 

Article II. Sense Representation 

I. The Mental Image 71 

1. Nature of the image 71 

2. Properties of the image 73 

3. Association and its laws 76 

II. Imagination 78 

1. Nature of imagination 78 

2. Importance of imagination 79 

3. Training of the imagination 81 

III. Memory 83 

1. Nature of memory 83 

2. Qualities and conditions of a good memory 85 

3. Culture of memory 86 

4. Time-perception 88 

IV. Illusions of the Senses 89 

1. Nature of illusions and hallucinations 89 

2. Main causes of illusions and hallucinations 90 

Article III. Conception 

I. Characteristics of the Concept 92 

1. Various terms explained 92 

2. The essential characteristics of the concept 94 

II. Genesis of the Concept 98 

1. Various proposed systems 98 

2. Discussion of the systems 102 

Article IV. Judgment 

I. Nature of the Judgment 107 

1. The psychological process 107 

2. Various kinds of judgments 108 



CONTENTS XI 

II. Genesis of the Judgment no 

1. General no 

2. Genesis of necessary judgments 112 

3. Genesis of mediate judgments. Inference. Reasoning , . . 115 

4. The processes of judging and reasoning in ordinary life . . . 117 

Article V. Language 

I. The Function of Language 122 

1. Signs in general. Signs of mental processes 122 

2. Special signs of intellectual ideas. Language 124 

II. Language and Thought 126 

1. In the speaker or writer 126 

2. In the hearer or reader 128 

Closing Remarks on this Chapter 129 

1. General conspectus of cognitive faculties 129 

2. Genesis of some ideas and principles 131 

3. Development of intellectual cognition 133 



CHAPTER II 

FEELING 

Introductory Remarks 137 

Article I. Feelings of Pleasure and Pain 

I. Nature and Laws of these Feelings 139 

1. Nature of the feelings . . . . . 139 

2, Laws of feelings 140 

II. Importance of Feelings 142 

Article II. Emotions 

I. Self-Regarding Emotions 145 

II. Altruistic Emotions 148 

Article III. Sentiments 

I. Intellectual Sentiments 153 

II. Esthetic Sentiments . 155 

III. Moral Sentiments 157 

IV. Religious Sentiments 158 

Conclusion. Importance and Cultltre of Affectfv'e Life . . . 160 

1. Importance of affective life 160 

2. Cultivation of affective life 163 



XU CONTENTS 

CHAPTER III 

ACTING AND WILLING 
Article I. Action and Modes of Action 

I. Introduction i66 

1. Meaning of action i66 

2. General modes of action 167 

II. NoN- Volitional Action 169 

1. Random, automatic, and reflex movements 169 

2. Impulsive and instinctive movements 171 

III. Volitional Action 173 

IV. Habit 175 

Article II. Determinants and Freedom of the Will 

1. Determinants and motors of the will 177 

2. Freedom of the will 178 

Conclusion. Cultivation of the Will 185 

1. The qualities and defects of the will 185 

2. Some principles to be used in will-culture 187 

CHAPTER IV 

SUPPLEMENTARY — SOME SPECIAL RELATIONS AND 
MODES OF MENTAL PROCESSES 

I. Mind and Organism 190 

1. Mutual relations of dependence and influence 190 

2. Cerebral localization 192 

II. Some Special Mental Conditions 194 

Conclusion of Psychology — Character and Personality . . . 203 



LOGIC, OR THE NORMATIVE SCIENCE OF 

THE INTELLECT 

Introduction 205 

CHAPTER I 

REASONING 

Article I. The Idea 

I. Nature of Ideas 208 

I. The idea in logic 208 



CONTENTS xiii 

2. Intension and extension of ideas and terms 2ii 

3. Division of ideas and terms 212 

II. Definition and Division 215 

1. Definition 215 

2. Division 217 

Article II. The Jtidgment 

1. Nature of the judgment and proposition 219 

2. Division of judgments and propositions 219 

3. Related propositions 222 

Article III. Reasoning 

I. The Perfect Syllogism 226 

1. Nature of the syllogism 226 

2. Figures and moods of the syllogism 227 

3. Rules of the syllogism 228 

II. Various Kinds of Arguments 230 

III. Principles of the Syllogism 233 



CHAPTER II 

METHOD 

Object of this Chapter 237 

Article I. The Termini 

I. The End to be Reached 238 

1. The nature of science 238 

2. Classification of sciences 240 

II. The Starting-Point 243 

Article II. The Progress 

I. The Value of the Arguments 244 

1. Demonstration 244 

2. Probable arguments 246 

II. The Two General Methods 250 

1. Induction 251 

2. Deduction 254 

III. Obstacles 256 

1. Fallacies 256 

2. Error 260 

Conclusion of Logic 262 



XIV CONTENTS 

ESTHETICS, OR THE NORMATIVE SCIENCE OF 
THE FEELINGS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 

Introduction 265 

1. What is aesthetics? 265 

2. The place of aesthetics 266 

CHAPTER I 

BEAUTY 

1. Subjective aspect 270 

2. Objective conditions 271 

CHAPTER II 
THE FINE ARTS 

1. Nature of the fine arts 275 

2. Art and nature 276 

3. The production of works of art 277 

4. Classification of the fine arts 279 



ETHICS, OR THE NORMATIVE SCIENCE OF 
THE WILL 

INTRODUCTION 

I. The Meaning of Ethical Science 281 

1. Facts 281 

2. The science of ethics 284 

II. Psychological Conditions of Morality 287 

1. Knowledge 287 

2. Feelings 288 

3. Will 289 

CHAPTER I 

FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS 

Article I. The Moral Norms or Laws 

I. Law 292 

I. Definition and divisions 292 



CONTENTS XV 

2. Characteristics of the moral law .......... 294 

3. Existence of the moral law 295 

II. Conscience 299 

1. Nature of conscience 299 

2. Value of conscience as the rule of actions 300 

Article II. The Moral Standard 

I. The Question Stated 303 

1. The object of the present article 303 

2. Dififerent views classified 304 

II. The Question Discussed 306 

1. Positive determination of the moral good 306 

2. Morality based on a special sentiment 309 

3. Morahty relative to pleasure and utility \ . 313 

4. Morality dependent on reason 319 

5. The ultimate foundation of the moral law 323 

6. Conclusion 326 

CHAPTER II 
APPLIED ETHICS 

Right and Duty . 328 

Article I. Personal Ethics or Duties toward Oneself 

Existence of Duties toward Oneself • • 33i 

I. Duties Referring Chiefly to the Mind 332 

1. Personal dignity ' 332 

2. InteUigence 333 

3- Will 334 

4. Conclusion 336 

II. Duties Referring Chiefly to the Body -337 

1. Negative duties 337 

2. Positive duties 341 

Article II. Social Ethics or Duties of Man toward 
Other Men 

Existence and Nature of these Duties . . 341 

I. Duties toward Individual Men 344 

1. Duties toward the person of others 344 

2. Duties toward the property of others 347 

II. Social Duties 352 

1. The family . . . . 353 

2. The state 354 

Conclusion of Ethics 360 



XVI CONTENTS 

EPISTEMOLOGY, OR THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 

INTRODUCTION 

I. The Nature of Epistemology 362 

II. Facts and Problems 364 

1. Facts 364 

2. Problems 368 

III. Method 369 

CHAPTER I 

IS CERTITUDE JUSTIFIED? 

1. Scepticism 373 

2. Agnosticism 376 

3. Dogmatism 377 

CHAPTER II 

CERTITUDES 

1. Facts 380 

2. Empiricism 382 

3. Rationalism ; 383 

CHAPTER III 

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 

I. Fact of Knowledge 385 

II. Value of the Representative Aspect of Knowledge . . . 386 

1. In general 386 

2. The external world 389 

3. Ideal truths 395 

4. Summary and corollaries 399 

CHAPTER IV 
THE CRITERIA OF VALID KNOWLEDGE 

I. The Ultimate Criterion 403 

I. Theories of a criterion extrinsic to both the knowing mind and 

the object known by this mind 403 



CONTENTS XVli 

2. Theories of a subjective criterion, intrinsic to the knower, but 

extrinsic to the object 405 

3. Theory of a criterion intrinsic to the object and, in a certain 

sense, also to the knower 411 

II. Derivative Criteria 414 

1. Personal faculties coming in direct contact with the known object 414 

2. Indirect relation of the mind with the known object 417 

Conclusion of Epistemology 421 



COSMOLOGY, OR THE METAPHYSICAL STUDY OF 
THE PHYSICAL WORLD 

Introduction 422 



CHAPTER I 

INORGANIC SUBSTANCES 

I. Properties 425 

II. Constitution 426 

1. The question stated 426 

2. Discussion of the systems 428 

CHAPTER n 

LIVING BEINGS 

I. The Characteristics of Life 432 

1. In general 432 

2. Manifestations of life 434 

II. Nature of the Living Being 436 

1. Theories 436 

2. Discussion 436 

CHAPTER III 

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION 

I. The Question Stated 439 

II. The Inorganic World 441 

III. The Organic World 441 

1. The origin of Ufe 442 

2. The origin of the various forms of hfe 443 



XVUl CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 
THE COSMOS 

Introductory 448 

I. Space and Time 449 

1. Space 449 

2. Time 451 

II. The Laws of Nature 452 

I. Meaning and properties 452 

^ 2. Efficiency and teleology 454 

yCONCLUSION OF COSMOLOGY 457 

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, OR PHILOSOPHY OF ' 
THE HUMAN MIND 

Introduction 458 

CHAPTER I 

SUBSTANTIALITY 

1. Meaning of substantiality 460 

2. Proofs of the substantiality 461 

3. Phenomenalism 463 

4. Multiple personality 465 

CHAPTER II 

SPIRITUALITY 

1. The question stated 469 

2. The simplicity of the soul 470 

Spirituality of the Human Soul 471 

1. Specific human activities . 471 

2. Spirituality of the human soul 474 

3. Psychological materialism 476 

CHAPTER III 

THE UNION OF THE SOUL V/ITH THE BODY 

I. The Union Itself 480 

1. The question stated 480 

2. Man, one composite substance 483 

II. Consequences of the Union 487 



CONTENTS XIX 

CHAPTER IV 

ORIGIN OF THE SOUL AND OF MAN 

I. The Human Organism 4qo 

1. The evidence 490 

2. Conclusions 491 

II. The Human Soul 492 

1. The first human soul 492 

2. Subsequent human souls 493 

III. Mankind 495 

1. Specific unity of mankind 495 

2. Antiquity of man 496 

CHAPTER V 

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 

I. The Question Stated 498 

1. Death 498 

2. The question of immortality 500 

II. Possibility and Fact of Immortality 501 

1. Possibility 501 

2. Proofs of immortality 503 

Conclusion of the Philosophy of Mind. Human Personality . 509 



THEODICY, OR THE STUDY OF GOD 

Introduction 511 

CHAPTER I 
THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD 

I. Existence of God 514 

1. The question stated 514 

2. The argument 516 

11. The Nature of God 521 

1. Distinction of God from the world 521 

2. Fundamental or primary attributes 525 

3. Derived or secondary attributes 528 

4. Value of these conclusions 529 



XX CONTENTS 

CHAPTER II 

GOD AND THE WORLD 

I. God in Relation to the World 534 

II. The World in its Relation to God 538 

1. The universe 538 

2. Man 538 

Conclusion of Theodicy 541 

OUTLINES OF HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

Introduction 542 

CHAPTER I 

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 

I. Oriental Philosophy 544 

jP^II. Greek Philosophy 548 

1. Pre-Socratic schools 548 

2. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle 551 

3. Post-Aristotelian philosophy 555 

III. Greco-Oriental Philosophy 557 

CHAPTER II 

MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 

Transition. Patristic Philosophy 559 

I. First Period 561 

1. Beginnings 561 

2. The problem of universals 562 

^ 3. Mysticism and pantheism 565 

4. Oriental philosophy 565 

II. Second Period 567 

1. General 567 

2. Philosophy in the earlier part of the thirteenth century . . . 568 

3. Thomistic philosophy 5^8 

4. Scotistic philosophy 570 

5. Other schools and philosophers 570 

III. Third Period 571 



CONTENTS xxi 

CHAPTER III 

MODERN PHILOSOPHY 

Transition. Renaissance 574 

I. First Period 577 

1. Bacon and Descartes 577 

2. Development of British empiricism 579 

3. Development of Cartesian rationalism 582 

II. Second Period 584 

1. German philosophy 584 

2. Scottish philosophy 588 

3. French philosophy 589 

4. Italian and Spanish philosophy 590 

5. English and American philosophy 591 

Conclusion of the History of Philosophy 593 

GENERAL CONCLUSION 

1. The universe 595 

2. Man S97 

3- God 597 

APPENDIX 601 

INDEX 613 



INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHY 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION 



I. THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 

AS the study of philosophy takes place at the end of the 
college course, it will be useful to outHne the relations of 
philosophy to the knowledge already acquired by the student. 

I. What Has Been Done Already 

I. Special Results. — During the college years numerous studies 
have been pursued, and Httle by Httle the physical universe has 
unfolded its secrets. 

(a) Chemistry has reduced material substances to their finest 
elements and revealed the laws by which their various combina- 
tions are governed. Biology has manifested the special properties 
of hving beings, and the human organism has been the special 
subject-matter of anatomy and physiology. The whole earth has 
been described in the sciences of geography and geology, while 
astronomy pointed to millions of other worlds which, in their con- 
stitution and evolution, bear a striking resemblance to the world 
which we inhabit. From physics we also know that, however 
near or distant they may be, all the beings of the universe 
are ruled by natural laws which all obey and which produce 
order and harmony in the world. 

(b) Mathematical and geometrical sciences deal with the prop- 
erties and laws of quantity; namely of numbers, surfaces, and 
volumes. Wherever applied, these relations, once ascertained, 
will always be verified. 

(c) Events of the past recorded in history have also been memo- 
rized, and from the comparison of the present with the past the 
mind is now able to draw useful lessons. We know the deeds of 
great men in war and peace, and we are able to follow the succes- 

3 



4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

sive steps by which nations have reached their actual standing in 
the world. 

(d) Not only knowledge has been acquired, but also the apti- 
tude to express it by speech and writing. The study of grammar 
and of the various languages and literatures enables man not only 
to manifest his own thoughts to others, but also to profit by the 
thoughts of other men and to admire the beauties found in the 
various forms of Uterature. 

(e) Religious science has taught us how to revere and serve 
God. The principles of morality are the guides of himian actions 
and behavior. 

2. More General Results. — In addition to the mastering of 
the various sciences, another result has been attained. Gymnastic 
exercises do not merely develop one muscle or another; their 
purpose is not only to make man go through a certain series of 
motions, but chiefly to strengthen and develop the whole organism. 
So also the mental efiforts made in the different studies have con- 
tributed to the general and harmonious growth of the mind. Mem- 
ory is stronger; the power of attention has been increased; habits 
of study and reflection have been developed. The faculties of 
judgment and reasoning have been strengthened. The discipline 
of college life, the obligation to follow a rule, the constant relations 
with other students, have been important factors in the formation 
of character and the acquisition of social virtues. 

Hence if we had to summarize in a few words the mental results 
of college years, we might say that the mind has been furnished 
with a numerous array of facts grouped and classified, and that 
it has grown or increased in power and energy. 

II. What Remains to be Done 

Great and important as it is, the knowledge acquired so far is 
insufficient. Certain things have been neglected altogether and 
the knowledge of the others needs a complement. 

I. New EZnowledge to be Acqmred. — (a) There is a whole 
world, as varied and as complex as the physical world, which has 
been left aside almost completely, or, at least, has not been the 



NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 5 

object of any systematic study. It is the inner world of the self^ 
of our own mind, with its constant changes, its successive states, 
its growth and development, and its conditions of activity. You 
have learned your lessons, but what is it to learn? What is the 
power of acquiring knowledge with which the mind is endowed, 
and how is such a power exercised? How should it be exercised? 
What is knowledge itself? And when judgments and conclusions 
are called true or false, questions are suggested immediately con- 
cerning the nature of truth, the possibiHty of reaching it and of 
distinguishing it from error, and the method of doing this most 
effectively. 

{b) In your studies you made use of your memory, judgment, 
reasoning, reflection, etc., so many words which now call for further 
explanation, and which suggest numerous problems concerning 
the functions of the senses, the memory, and the intellect. Fre- 
quently you have reUed on the testimony of others; you have 
learned a text-book and taken it for granted that the author was 
right. How could you do otherwise, for instance, for historical 
or geographical statements? But this method, which was the only 
possible one, must not now lead to an exaggerated reverence for 
all that is found in books or newspapers. For, how many errors 
are published and how many fallacies are taken for truths simply 
because they appear in print, or even because they are spoken in 
brilliant language accompanied by fine gestures. It is necessary to 
learn how to use one's own reason and to practise the difficult art of 
criticism so as to distinguish truth from falsity, and thus to become 
able to steer one's own mental life, to think for oneself, and no 
longer depend too exclusively on the thinking of others. 

(c) Other questions may be raised which so far have received 
no answer. You have made eforts and acted for the best: herein 
are included such notions as those of end, purpose, motive, choice, 
activity, habit, etc., which have to be elucidated. 

{d) When the working of man's organic and mental life is 
understood, when we know its conditions and laws, there still 
remain the problems of our own constitution. We speak of body 
and mind. What are they and what are their mutual relations? 
What is the origin and what will be the destiny of the human 



6 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

soul? What is the end of man? Even if our Christian faith has 
given us answers to these questions, what is the attitude of reason 
toward our behef? 

These are a few of the many problems which so far have 
received no solution. 

2. The Knowledge already Acquired must be Completed. — 
Even in sciences that have been mastered, there remain many 
incomplete conclusions. They are good as far as they go, but 
they do not go far enough. 

(a) At the very outset, wheii we learn to read and write, and 
when later we learn to express our thoughts correctly, accurately, 
and clearly, how many problems present themselves: the nature 
of thought, of correct and consistent thought; the possibility of 
expressing it by means of symbols and of understanding others; 
the general relations of body and mind, since, in speaking, writing, 
or making signs, bodily movements are supposed to be controlled 
by the mind and to represent mental processes or ideas. 

(b) Historical and social sciences lead to such problems as the con- 
ditions, motives, and value of human activity. We pass judgments 
on the actions of others, approve them as right or condemn them 
as wrong; what, then, is right and wrong? We rely on human testi- 
mony and historical records ; what is their value as signs of truth? 

(c) Sciences that deal with the material world leave also many 
notions unexplained. The very word "matter" is an enigma, 
and "force" is hardly clearer. We are told of a being acting 
on another in a certain way and under certain conditions, and pro- 
ducing such or such results. Because these are everyday occur- 
rences which have become familiar, they seem clear, and we do 
not even think that they may need an explanation. And yet 
if we are asked to define what is meant by acti\'ity, action, and 
cause in general, and how action and causality are possible, we 
find that the task is not an easy one, and that, at every step, 
many obscurities and difficulties are met with. If all this were 
understood, there would still remain questions which are altogether 
beyond the reach of natural science; namely, those concerning 
the first origin and cause of the world, the nature and necessity 
of the laws that govern it. 



NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 7 

(d) Religion requires a basis. It does not consist in blindly- 
believing certain things as true or following certain arbitrary 
practices. To reason belongs the task of proving the existence 
of God and of explaining his attributes as far as possible. 

To sum up: The task of philosophy is to complete and unify 
knowledge by showing how all the things which we know are related 
together, and by examining certain notions which have a wide 
range of application and cover numerous cases, such as those of 
substance, cause, activity, matter, mind, etc. 

III. Definition of Philosophy 

If we consider the name itself, we find that philosophy means the 
love of wisdom (</)tXos friend, o-o(^ta wisdom). The first Greek 
philosophers did not call themselves "friends of wisdom," but 
*'wise" {<ro(J30L), Cicero says that Pythagoras was the first to 
take the name of philosopher because, according to liim, the gods 
alone should be called wise. 

1. For the ancients philosophy included both science, i.e. the 
knowledge and explanation of things, and wisdom, i.e. prudence, 
the practice of virtue, and the right conduct of life. As a science 
it was not- limited to any special object, but included the sum total 
of all knowledge. Thus Cicero: "Nee quidquam aliud est philo- 
sophia, si interpretari velis, quam studium sapientiae. Sapientia 
autem est (ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est) rerum divi- 
narum et humanarum causarumque quibus hae res continentur 
scientia" (De Ofiic. II. ii). 

2. To-day, owing to the increase of human knowledge and the 
multiplication of sciences, philosophy can no longer be a universal 
science in the same sense as formerly, (i) Sometimes the word is 
still applied to any reasoned doctrine or science, the main sur- 
viving use being the name "natural philosophy," which is some- 
times given to the science of physics. (2) More frequently to 
say of a man that he is a philosopher, or that he takes things 
philosophically, indicates a habit or disposition, especially in 
practical matters, to refer things to higher principles and to govern 



8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

the senses and the feelings by reason. (3) Strictly speaking, 
however, the name philosophy applies to the science of the higher 
principles of things, to the elucidation of those concepts and laws 
which are common to several sciences and which are used by them 
without being subjected to any special investigation. 

It is not a mere classification of the sciences, it has special 
questions to answer and special problems to solve. Sciences reduce 
phenomena to general laws; philosophy tries to further unify the 
various sciences by taking a higher point of view and going to the 
principles common to many or to all sciences. 

3. Relation of Philosophy to the Other Sciences. — Hence it is 
easy to understand the relations of philosophy to the other sciences. 
It considers the same objects, but from a different and higher stand- 
point. It uses the same methods, at least essentially, although the 
processes of observation and experiment have a considerably smaller 
importance, whereas reasoning is given greater prominence. 

(a) Philosophy completes the other sciences, (i) It considers 
higher principles and causes which are neglected by them. (2) It 
examines critically the value of the principles which they pre- 
suppose, e.g. the principle of causaUty which is used by all natural 
sciences, but tested by none. (3) It links and connects the different 
sciences, because it considers the common principles that pervade 
them all and on which they rest. 

(&) On the other hand philosophy depends on the other sciences, 
for it must constantly keep in touch with the facts and laws which 
they manifest. Otherwise it would be a mere random play of the 
mind, in which any vagary could find a place. 

(c) The relation of philosophy to the sciences may be conceived 
diagrammatically as follows. If we have a large circle the cir- 
cumference of which represents the facts of experience, its surface 
will represent the sciences dealing with different groups of facts, 
and more or less closely related. These sciences may be repre- 
sented by sectors the number and dimensions of which vary with 
the progress of sciences and their differentiations. The circle 
itself is constantly being enlarged as new facts are discovered. 
Within this circle let us draw another concentric with it which will 
represent philosophy. It may also vary in size; originally it was 




NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 9 

co-extensive with the circle of sciences, but is now considerably 
smaller. Beginning at the outer circumference, sciences may go 
higher and higher, be more or less 
general, give a more immediate 
or a more remote explanation of 
the facts, stop at one or the other 
of the dotted circles; all converge 
toward philosophy. Can we 
reach a centre O which would 
give us one general principle, or 
one key applying to all sciences? 
This is a question which we can- 
not attempt to answer at present. 
The human mind craves unity; 
sciences are subordinate to one another and lead to a higher sci- 
ence. All finally lead to philosophy, which always, whatever be 
the extension of the questions assigned to it, occupies a central 
position and from this vantage-ground surveys in its own general 
way the whole field of human knowledge. 

IV. Division of Philosophy 

I. The Various Branches of Philosophy. — (a) Since the ex- 
tension of the field of philosophy has varied so much in history, 
and since even to-day not all philosophers are agreed on this point, 
it is impossible to give a division of philosophy into its various 
branches that will be acceptable to all and that may claim to be 
finally and forever settled. Not long ago logic, psychology i and 
ethics had still an undisputed place in philosdphy. To-day many 
look upon them as independent sciences, and only some of their 
higher problems are turned over to philosophy. 

For our purpose in the present course it matters little how much 
ground philosophy strictly so-called should cover. Our point of 
view is a practical one, and hence we shall treat of those ques- 
tions which have been neglected heretofore and yet are necessary 
to complete the knowledge acquired so far and prepare the student 
for further studies. 



lO 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION 



(b) Philosophy comes after the study of physical sciences; 
hence the name "metaphysics" (/Acra to. <j>v(TLKa.^ after-physics), 
which is frequently given to philosophy or to a branch of it. 

(i) The philosophical study of realities, i.e. of existing objects, 
includes cosmology, or the general study of the world; 
biology, or the more special study of living organisms; psychology, 
or the still more special study of the human mind; theodicy, or the 
study of God as the first cause of the world. (2) Besides the real 
we have to consider the ideal, i.e. the rules to which thought must 
conform in order to be consistent {logic); the expression of ideals 
to realize something beautiful ((Esthetics); the guidance of 
our actions in conformity with the rules of morality (ethics). 
(3) Epistemology holds an intermediate place between the science 
of the real and that of the ideal. It examines whether and how 
far our ideas correspond to external reaHty. Hence the following 
synopsis : 



Philosophical study of the 



real world = cosmology. 

man = psychology and philosophy 

of the mind. 
God = theodicy, 
relations of knowledge with reality 
= epistemology. 



ideal 



of thought = logic. 

of expression = aesthetics. 

of action = ethics. 



2. Division of this Course. — In itself the order just mentioned 
would seem to be the best. But it is not the most practical nor 
the most useful because it requires too many a priori postulates 
and obliges one to admit too many presuppositions which are to 
be justified only later. Moreover it is true that the mind is first 
objective, that it knows other things before knowing itself. But, 
in order precisely to develop habits of reflection, it seems preferable 
to begin with psychology. Hence the following order is better 
adapted to our present purpose, because it enables the mind to 
proceed step by step without supposing and taking too much 
for granted at the outset. We shall begin with the psychological 
processes of knowledge, feeling, and action; then proceed to examine 



NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY il 

the rules of these three groups of processes. After examining the 
vahie of knowledge we shall pass to the study of the world, of man, 
and of God. The synopsis of the present course is therefore as 
follows: 

I. The empirical study of the self = psychology. 

1. Cognitive consciousness = knowledge. 

2. Affective consciousness = feeling. 

3. Conative or active consciousness = activity and will. 
II. The normative sciences 

1. of the intellect = logic. 

2. of expression of ideals to arouse certain feelings 
= aesthetics. 

3. of will and action = ethics. 

III. Epistemology, or the study of the relations of cognitive processes 
to real world; a transition to the following. 

IV. Philosophical study = metaphysics. 

1. of the world = cosmology. 

2. of man = philosophy of mind. 

3. of God = theodicy. 



V. The Method of Philosophy 

The central rule to be observed for the profitable study of 
philosophy is : Use your own judgment and reason under the guid- 
ance of your professor and text-book. 

1. Eagerness to Know. — (a) The main cause that prompts 
men to philosophize, as Plato and Aristotle already pointed out, 
is wonder or admiration. The mind wonders as long as a given 
fact has not been given an explanation and assigned adequate 
causes. It endeavors to discover causes and principles so as to 
account for experience. Out of this desire philosophy was born; 
in this desire it finds its incentive. 

(b) Hence an essential quality of the mind is to be inquisitive, 
to question and investigate, and never to feel at rest so long as a 
satisfactory explanation has not been found. It must compare 
facts, gather solutions, discuss, criticise, and harmonize them. 

2. Personal Reflection. — (a) This work must be a personal 
work of understanding, not the mere memorizing of the words of 
the professor or of books. It is true that without books or pro- 



12 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

fessor the student could do very little; he would grope in the dark, 
uncertain of the direction to be taken and of the value of the 
progress already made. But nevertheless these are only aids for 
the student's thinking, and their teaching would be of Uttle value 
if the mind did not verify it and appropriate it. If exaggerated 
self-confidence is a serious defect, if man must Usten to the opinions 
of others, be somewhat difl&dent of his own intellect, and proceed 
cautiously, it is also a serious defect for the mind to remain 
inactive and to take for granted everything that is said without 
understanding the truth of it. 

A lesson in philosophy is not like a lesson in geography or history. 
When I am told that Peking is in China and London in England, 
I beheve it at once; my activity consists only in memorizing a 
fact which I cannot verify and on which all agree. But in philoso- 
phy it is always necessary first to understand and verify the 
truth of a statement; the work of memorizing comes last. Never 
try to memorize anything which is not understood thoroughly. A 
nurse is a help to the child who begins to walk; she guides his 
first steps, but cannot take the place of the child's own activity; 
the walking process must be that of the child. So also the beginner 
in philosophy needs guidance, but this can never dispense with his 
own activity. To be genuine and to deserve its name, philosophy 
must be the mind's own philosophy; not in the sense that the mind 
has discovered all the truths which it possesses, but in the sense 
that it has appropriated and digested them and thought them for 
itself. 

{b) Habits of reflection must be acquired. Man is not, or should 
not be, a machine to be moved at will by an engineer; he 
must act for himself. This is not a book of ready made formulas, 
but rather a book of suggestions for the student's thought. 

if) The study of philosophy should make man cautious in 
affirming and denying, in approving and condemning the opinions 
of others. If those men are not to be admired and imitated who 
are never able to take a resolution, to side for or against a proposi- 
tion, and to give a straight answer, still less are those to be com- 
mended who have ready made ideas on all questions, unchangeable 
and categorical solutions for all problems, and whom no amount 



THEWORLDANDMAN 13 

of proofs, however cogent, can ever induce to modify their views. 
The most affirmative are also frequently the most ignorant. 

In one word, at the time when the body is acquiring its full 
development, let the mind also grow, and, by its own efforts under 
the guidance of those who are more skilful and experienced, proceed 
in the acquisition, or rather in the building up for itself, of a sound 
philosophy. 

II. GENERAL VIEW OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN 

I. The Self and the Not-Self 

Sciences group and classify the various beings of the world accord- 
ing to their resemblances and differences. But there is one division 
which they overlook; a division which, though it is most important 
and should be most striking, is frequently neglected or receives 
little attention; a division the members of which are most unequal 
in number and extension, for it opposes one individual to the rest 
of the world. On one side I place myself; on the other, all the 
other beings of the world. The division of the universe into self 
and not-self is a primary one, as it brings into opposition beings 
that are endowed with irreducible characters. 

I. Their Opposition. — (a) What I call myself is that centre 
aroimd which the whole world seems to be grouped. I am con- 
stantly acting, perceiving, imagining, thinking, feeUng, etc.; yet 
this conscious activity, this inner life, is directly perceivable only 
for myself. It is my inalienable property which no amount of 
effort will enable me to transfer to another. I may, by certain 
gestures, speech, or writing, manifest my thoughts to others, 
but they remain mine, and are experienced by me alone. Nothing 
but a sign or a symbol of them can reach another mind. 

(6) Far different are the objects of the world; any number of ob- 
servers may study and examine them; they are not "private," 
but " public" property. If I know the existence of other minds 
like mine, of other selves, it is only because I see elsewhere the 
same manifestations by which I make mine known, but I am not 
aware of them directly. In themselves they have the same strict 
privacy which I enjoy. 



14 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

(c) My self is a sanctum into which I alone can penetrate, a 
within which I constantly oppose to a without, i.e. to the world 
which reflects itself in my mind. 

2. The Self is Primary. — (a) Although it is so small when 
compared to the universe, yet my self is for me the primary and 
most important reality in the whole world, and, in a certain sense, 
coextensive with it, since all the knowledge which I have of the 
world is in my mind. All other things and selves act on my self 
and are acted on by my self. I thus become a centre toward which, 
from my point of view, all converge. I know, it is true, of the 
interaction between them, but the chief point of interest is how 
they behave, not toward one another, but toward me. In this 
sense, we are all, and we cannot help being, egoists. I move and 
act amid other material beings and amid other persons, but my 
own motion and action is what concerns me most. The world 
is my world as I know it and as it affects me. 

(6) Nor does it take long for me to notice that my world, i.e. 
the world as known by me, is not perfectly identical with the world 
oj my neighbor. My views differ from his; the thoughts and feel- 
ings aroused by one and the same object are not the same for my 
mind and for his. In the same circumstances we are not affected 
in the same manner, and the ensuing actions are different. In 
all such cases I cannot but place myself first; for what I am pri- 
marily interested in is my own, and not anybody else's, knowledge 
and activity. 

3. The Objective World is Known First. — Self and not-self 
form an antithesis which is not known clearly to the individual 
at the beginning of his mental life. The child lives almost exclu- 
sively in an objective world. His power of reflection is not strong 
enough to be concentrated on the subject or self. The distinc- 
tion is for him vague and indistinct, but becomes clearer as the 
mind develops. 

A similar remark applies to the beginnings of philosophy. The 
first philosophers of Greece deal with the objective, not the sub- 
jective, world. Their theories are cosmologic, cosmogonic, theo- 
gonic; the self is neglected. They are concerned primarily with 
the origin of things, the constitution and the elements of the uni- 



THEWORLDANDMAN 15 

verse, not with the nature and functions of the self. We must 
wait till the time of Socrates to find the attention directed toward 
the subject, toward the internal world of ideas, feelings, and activ- 
ities, together with the rules these ought to obey: " Socrates autem 
primus philosophiam evocavit e coelo, et in urbibus collocavit, et 
in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque 
bonis et malis quaerere." (Cicero, Tusc, V. iv.) 

II. The Not-Self and its Obvious Characteristics 

1. Diversity. — If we consider the not-self, i.e. the material 
world around us, we are amazed at the number, variety, and com- 
plexity of the beings that compose it. Their multitude is beyond 
our power of understanding. Moreover, all have different natures, 
sizes, qualities, etc. Whether we can find in the whole world two 
beings exactly and in all details alike is a question which cannot 
be answered. Try to find in nature two things perfectly similar, 
even if they are the most common, like two leaves, or two 
blades of grass, or even two particles of dust, and you will at once 
find it very difiScult. Even when you think you have succeeded, 
a more minute examination, a dissection, the use of the microscopie, 
or certain modes of analysis will reveal numerous differences. 

2. Likeness. — At the same time we observe many common 
features, many points of similarity which enable us to classify 
things. 

(a) In the first place, there are other men to whom I attrib- 
ute a nature essentially similar to mine. I believe that they also 
are selves. Not that it is possible for me to be directly aware 
of the fact, for, although I see their organisms, their minds are, 
as stated already, their own private property; but, in their whole 
behavior, these organisms are so similar to mine that, by analogy, 
I cannot fail to infer that they are also related to minds like my 
own. I hold myself responsible for my actions, and worthy of 
praise or blame; I experience a number of feelings and impulses, 
and I attribute the same to my fellow-men. I cannot believe 
that they are governed by the same laws as physical things. I do 
not blame the stone that hurts me by its fall, but I condemn the 



l6 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

man who throws it at me; I judge his motives and intentions, and 
treat him differently from any other being. The physical laws 
that govern matter are fatal and inevitable, but man is capable of 
education; he subjugates nature and uses it for his own purposes. 

(b) Below man in nature I find animals with their infinite vari- 
eties. To them also I attribute a mind with sensations, memory, 
feelings of pain and pleasure, etc. But their mind is of an infe- 
rior order; they manifest no ideas by speech or writing, and are 
capable of but little progress. 

(c) Men, animals, and plants, however different, may never- 
theless be classed together as limig organisms. They possess 
certain common properties of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, 
and by these differ from inorganic substances. An organism 
originates from a similar organism ; it assimilates foreign substances 
and transforms them into its own substance. 

(d) In opposition to organisms we find the manifold beings 
which belong to the inorganic world. They exist in three differ- 
ent states, liquid, solid, and gaseous, and present many different 
properties and activities. 

(e) Obvious as are these main classifications theoretically, since 
they are based on marked differences between the classes, and on 
marked similarities among members of the same class, their con- 
crete applications sometimes offer great difficulties. If I compare 
a higher animal with a tree or a mineral, the points of difference 
are clear. But when we come to the confines of two kingdoms, 
it may be impossible to determine whether a given specimen is 
an animal or a plant, a plant or a mineral. The principle of the 
continuity of nature finds an application everywhere. In many 
respects nature is like the spectrum, the colors of which pass insen- 
sibly from one to the other. I see the different colors, and yet 
cannot point out the exact limit where one begins and the other 
ends. Between two extremes clearly differentiated are to be 
found numerous transitional forms. 

3. Change. — All beings, organic and inorganic, undergo mani- 
fold changes. 

(a) They pass from place to place, sometimes with slow and 
hardly perceptible motion, and sometimes with great rapidity. 



THE WORLD AND MAN 17 

There are motions of the smallest particles of matter and of the 
tiniest microscopical organisms, and there are motions of the earth, 
of the stars, and of the whole universe, carrying with them all 
things, even those that seem to be at rest. 

(b) Changes in size and quantity, in quality, color, tempera- 
ture, activity, etc., also take place constantly. And besides the 
changes which we may observe ourselves, many others are recorded 
in history or inferred from science. At all times and in all things 
change is a law of the world. 

(c) Nevertheless the order, harmony, atid unity of the world 
are preserved. It is important to keep in mind this unity of 
nature. We are obliged to study things separately, to analyze, 
divide, and dissect, but we must not lose sight of the miity which 
results from the various relations between all these elements of 
the universe. 

Changes are not produced at random, but form a continuous 
and uninterrupted chain of events, each link of which depends on 
the preceding and contributes to the production of the following; 
or rather it is a continuous network ramifying in all directions. 
This is another aspect of the unity of nature, a unity resulting 
from harmonious succession, and which must be added to that 
which was mentioned above resulting from the harmonious co- 
existence of manifold realities. Not only do the beings of the world 
form a series the members of which are close to one another, they 
also form one continuous network of activity and causality. Every 
event is determined by antecedent events. Sometimes the thread 
which links them is plainly visible; sometimes also we become 
lost in the investigation and are unable to trace the manifold ram- 
ifications of causes and effects. Yet we never doubt that such 
connections exist, even if they are unknown to us. The task of 
science is to discover them. 

III. Relations of the Self with the External World 

I. Knowledge and Action. — All the relations which the self 
has with the various objects of the world may be reduced to two 
groups : knowledge of, and action on, them. These two terms are 
3 



l8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

not mutually exclusive, for I am conscious that, in knowing, I am 
not merely passive and receptive, but that I also exercise some 
activity, and that I contribute my share to the final result. But 
such an activity is essentially immanent, that is, it remains within 
myself and in no way modifies the known object. 

(c) The object is perceived through its substitute, the idea, 
but my invincible inclination is to suppose that, known or 
unknown, it remains permanent and identical. I alone, not the 
object, imdergo a change when I acquire a new idea. In cog- 
nition the primary direction of activity is from the known object to 
the knowing mind, since the object is appropriated in the form of 
an idea within the mind imder the action or stimulation coming 
from the object. We naturally and spontaneously believe that 
we know things as they are; yet, a little reflection sufi&ces to con- 
vince us that exaggeration is very easy on this point, and that, 
since frequently men have different views of the world or of parts 
of it, all views cannot correspond exactly to the supposedly iden- 
tical reality. This problem will be examined in epistemology. 

{h) Besides immanent activity such as that of the mind in know- 
ing, there is another form, namely, transitive activity, when the 
modification is received in a being different from the agent. This 
is what is meant by action as opposed to knowledge. In action 
the primary direction is from the self to other things or persons. 
That we have many such relations is evident, for every use which 
we make of things impHes for them changes of place, shape, qual- 
ities, relations, etc. We adapt them to our purposes, and in 
many ways, voluntarily or involuntarily, modify them. 

2. Further Determination of Knowledge and Action. — The 
self's twofold relation with the world is ob\'ious. We know some 
reaUties of the world, and are known by some, namely, by other 
minds. We act on them and are acted upon by them. There 
are many forms of knowledge, from sense-perception to the high- 
est form of reasoning, from the weakest opinion or belief to the 
strongest certitude. There are also many forms of action, from 
those which we accomplish without, or even against, our •vsill to 
the highly deliberative and intentional actions. But the essen- 
tial characteristics of knowledge and action remain the same. 



THEWOBLDANDMAN 19 

One is an acquisition, an incoming, the other, a giving out or out- 
going. The two, however, are closely related. As stated already, 
some kind of action is implied in knowledge; one transitive, from 
the object to the mind; the other immanent in the mind. More- 
over, knowledge is frequently a principle or motive of human actions. 
Thus in knowledge, the object is to be looked upon as a centre 
acting in different directions, and its activity, when received in a 
responsive mind, produces knowledge. The sun sends its light 
all around; it is perceived by a number of minds which might be 
increased or decreased without changing the nature or amount of 
the light itself, and without modifying the perception of any indi- 
vidual mind. In action, on the contrary, the self is considered as 
a centre radiating its energy in various directions, sometimes at 
random, sometimes also for a purpose and in a chosen direction 
in order to obtain a certain response and produce a determined 
result. 

IV. Obvious Characteristics of the Self 

The obvious characteristics of the self may be reduced to the 
following: (i) Its states are manifold, complex, ever flowing, and 
ever changing. (2) Something one, permanent, and identical 
is the common centre of all mental states. 

I. Diversity. — (a) The variety which is observed in the mate- 
rial world is little when compared to that of the spiritual world 
of the mind. Since knowledge is but the mental representation 
of things, it is clear that every difference between objects perceived 
in the external world is accompanied by a correlative difference in 
the ideas that represent them. It is true that there is in the world 
more variety than can be known by the mind, since our knowl- 
edge is necessarily limited. But of unnoticed variety nothing 
can be said, and all the variety which is noticed has its correla- 
tive in the mind. In other words, if we assume — as common- 
sense obliges us to assume — that ideas are representations of 
things, it must be admitted that, on this ground, there is at least 
as much diversity in the representing mind as in the represented 
objects. 

But the mind offers another kind of diversity which is not 



20 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

shared by things and is the mind's exclusive feature. Conscious- 
ness is not Umited to representative states; it extends to imaginary 
ideas, to feelings of pleasure and pain, emotions of fear and anger, 
pride and sympathy, hope and despair, etc., to moral, aesthetic, 
and religious sentiments, to attention, effort, mental struggle, 
will, etc. A little reflection sufl&ces to show in all these an endless 
variety. At times, the field of consciousness is large and varied, 
but, at other times, it is more restricted and uniform. Conscious- 
ness itself may become more and more feeble till apparently it dis- 
appears altogether in a dreamless sleep, or in certain abnormal 
states such as epilepsy or swoons. 

(b) Moreover, mental processes are always very complex and 
depend on many factors, as will be made clearer when we study 
them in detail. Their elements cannot be taken apart in the same 
way that an organism is dissected, but reflection reveals their 
presence by showing that a mental state, even after it has disap- 
peared, nevertheless influences those that follow. This is clear 
for memory, imagination, and habit. It is hardly less evident 
that mental processes are conditioned by past experience, surround- 
ings, and education. Here the complexity of the mind baflBes 
all attempts at analysis. Common language seems to recognize 
this normal complexity and diversity of the mind, since the name 
"simple-minded " is applied to those whose minds are weak and 
defective. 

(c) To be constantly flowing and changing is also a law of the 
human mind, and this feature is even more striking in the mind 
than in the outer world. Things change, it is true, sometimes 
rapidly and sometimes imperceptibly. Yet many things seem to 
have great permanence; they may be observed year after year 
without noticing the slightest change in place, color, shape, size, 
or any other respect. As to mental processes, all are short-lived. 
Ideas are in constant flux; they succeed one another rapidly, and 
no sooner has one appeared than it is pushed out of conscious- 
ness by another. A persistent idea is not normal. Try to keep 
the same idea for some time in the field of consciousness, and you 
will see how short an interval elapses before a distracting thought 
enters the mind. 



THE WORLD AND MAN 21 

2. Unity. — Under the complexity, variety, and flux of mental 
states are found unity, identity, and permanence. There is unity, 
for all these states belong to the same self; however diverse they 
may be, all are referred to the same centre, and attributed to the 
same ego from whose activity they proceed. There is identity 
and endurance, for, under the constant flux of its conscious states, 
the self remains, and, under the undulating surface, a deeper real- 
ity is found. Such facts as memory and recognition of the past, 
responsibility for past deeds, remorse and self-approval, just 
reward and punishment, show that after the passing away of one 
state something remains, more stable and more enduring; some- 
thing related to, yet distinct from, the ever-changing surface of 
consciousness. 



PSYCHOLOGY OR THE EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF THE MIND 



INTRODUCTION 

I. THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 

I. Definition and Subject-Matter 

I. The Meaning of Psychology. — Psychology (ilrvx^ and Xo'yos) 
means etymologically the science of the psyche or soul. Formerly 
it embraced all the knowledge concerning the soul, its manifesta- 
tions or processes, its nature, origin, and destiny. Nor was it 
restricted to the soul as the principle of conscious life; it ex- 
tended to all vital activities, and dealt with life in all its forms. 

But the meaning of psychology, like that of a number of sciences, 
has been more and more restricted. Psychology is the study of 
mental processes. The higher questions concerning the nature 
of the mind or soul are referred to what is kno\^Ti as rational psy- 
chology or the philosophy of mind. Psychology is an empirical 
science, that is, its statements and laws may be tested and veri- 
fied by an appeal to some form of experience. Like physics and 
chemistry, which deal with material facts and laws without con- 
sidering the essence and origin of matter, it considers only mental 
processes, but not the first principle from which they originate. 

When the term "psychology" is used without qualification, 
(i) it applies only to the study of the human mind. When applied 
to the study of lower minds, such terms as " animal psychology " 
or "comparative psychology " are used. (2) It applies only to the 
study of mental life, and does not extend to the functions of organic 
life. Organic processes, however, may be considered as influencing 
and determining conscious processes, and this gives rise to the 
various problems of physiological psychology. (3) It deals chiefly 



NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 23 

with the normal manifestations of the human mind, the others 
being considered in abnormal psychology or mental pathology. 

2. The Subject-Matter of Psychology is what is called con- 
sciousness, mind, mental processes, or mental states. These terms 
cannot be defined; they denote facts which must be experienced. 
All that can be, done is to call attention to these facts, classify 
them and explain them. 

(a) Consciousness is internal or subjective experience. It 
includes all those states which a man calls his own, and which 
are experienced by him alone. It is the fact of being aware of 
something. It includes the complex and manifold experiences 
by which the state of wakefulness is different from that of a dream- 
less sleep. Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, wishing, desiring, 
willing, etc., are states of consciousness. However different they 
may be, all share the common characteristic of being internal 
experiences. Even in what is called external experience two ele- 
ments must be distinguished, one, objective or common, the other, 
subjective or private. A multitude of persons may see the same 
picture or listen to the same concert. All perceive the same object, 
but each has his own perception of it in his own consciousness, 
distinct from the perception in every other consciousness. This 
perception of the same thing arouses in one mind ideas, judgments, 
feelings, and appreciations different from those aroused in other 
minds. How different the world would appear to a man if it were 
possible to substitute for his own consciousness the consciousness 
of another man. 

{h) The terms conscious process and conscious state are often 
used synonymously; their meaning, however, is not quite iden- 
tical. Conscious or mental state applies to the contents of the 
mind at any given time and apart from their essential flux (static 
point of view). Conscious or mental process represents better 
the ever-moving and ever-changing character of consciousness 
(dynamic point of view). 

(c) Variations are observed in the extension of the field of con- 
sciousness, the intensity of mental processes, and the rapidity of 
their succession. 

(i) The field of consciousness, i.e. the number of ideas actually 



24 PSYCHOLOGY 

present, varies greatly. One idea only may be present, or perhaps 
a multitude of ideas try to crowd themselves together in the 
mind. Sometimes consciousness is concentrated on a very nar- 
row field, whereas at other times it is, as it were, diffused over a 
number of objects. 

(2) The intensity of consciousness, both as a whole and in its 
several processes, undergoes marked changes. We may pass 
almost insensibly from vivid consciousness to unconsciousness, 
and vice versa. It is like the bright Hght of the evening sun which 
decreases little by little till finally it leaves us in the complete 
darkness of night. As to individual conscious processes, they 
may at first occupy the very focus or centre of the field of 
consciousness, and gradually move toward the border till they 
finally disappear altogether out of consciousness; or, on the con- 
trary, they may move from the dim borders of the field toward 
its bright centre. Thus at any time the field of consciousness 
is composed of a central bright part or focus, and of a multitude 
of other more obscure elements which have been termed the fringe 
of consciousness. It is a fact of frequent experience that an idea, 
and especially a feeling, even when not actually thought of, con- 
tinues nevertheless to influence, tinge, or shade subsequent mental 
processes. 

(3) The rapidity with which mental processes succeed one an- 
other is also variable. Sometimes the stream seems to pass through 
a level region; the current is slow and weak, and constant efforts, 
frequently unsuccessful, are necessary to stimulate the mind and 
bring up ideas. In other cases, on the contrary, one has to deal 
with a mighty torrent which no effort can stay. Ideas succeed 
one another with amazing rapidity, and it is almost impossible to 
stop any of them. Not only may every one notice these varia- 
tions in his own consciousness, but certain minds are habit- 
ually and naturally slow and sluggish, whereas others are quick, 
impetuous, and precipitate. 

(d) The term mind (and the corresponding adjective mental) 
has several meanings. In general it is opposed to matter, which 
is external and located in space, while mind is internal, subjective, 
and without spatial relations. A body is always located some- 



NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 25 

where, and has definite relations with other material substances. 
An idea, on the contrary, has no size, and, for instance, cannot be 
said to be on the right or the left of another. "Mind " has a 
greater extension than "consciousness," for it includes not only 
actual conscious processes, but also whatever has been or may 
become conscious, and, in general, it is the capacity for experien- 
cing conscious processes. A narrower signification is given to 
the term " mind " when we say of a man that he is strong or weak 
minded, or that he has a great mind. 

3. Relations of Psychology to Other Sciences. — Psychology 
endeavors to determine the laws, conditions, relations, etc., of 
conscious processes. From this are derived its differences from 
other sciences. 

(a) It is needless to mention how psychology differs from sci- 
ences which consider the world external to man; what was said 
above concerning its subject-matter is sufficient. The distinc- 
tion from the sciences which consider the human organism, such 
as anatomy, physiology, morphology, histology, hygiene, is also 
obvious. The organism is an object external to the mind, al- 
though intimately connected with it. Hence psychology is not 
directly interested in it, but only indirectly: in general, because 
the organism influences the mind and is in some manner united 
with it, and, in particular, because some of its processes are accom- 
panied by, and are indispensable conditions of, consciousness. 

As to other sciences which also deal with internal and conscious 
facts, they diSer from psychology primarily in the points of view 
from which they regard these facts. Psychology alone considers 
conscious processes in themselves, as events, to find out their nature 
and the conditions of their appearance. The other mental sci- 
ences compare them with something else to which they have to 
conform. They do not examine what these processes are in them- 
selves and how they happen, but how they should happen in order to 
reach intended results. Thus logic teaches us how to use rational 
faculties, deals with intellectual processes only, and lays down the 
rules that must be observed in order to have consistent thinking. 
Epistemology examines the relations between knowledge and ex- 
ternal reality, and endeavors to indicate whether and how far the 



26 PSYCHOLOGY 

former is the representation of the latter. Ethics considers 
voluntary processes with the purpose of determining their con- 
formity with certain laws and rules, i.e. of ascertaining whether 
they are right or wrong. Thus the same mental process, as stud- 
ied by psychology, may be, for logic, good or fallacious reasoning; 
for epistemology, true knowledge or error; for ethics, worthy of 
praise or blame. For psychology, it is simply a mental event. 

(b) Psychology, however, needs the other sciences in so far as 
they may throw some light on mental processes. The sciences 
that study the human organism are especially very useful, as they 
explain some of the essential conditions of consciousness. Hence 
it will be necessary to study, or at least to recall to mind, the essen- 
tials of physiology, especially concerning the brain, the nervous 
system, and the sense-organs. 

4. The Utility and Importance of psychology need not be in- 
sisted upon. The maxim, "Know thyself," which was inscribed 
in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, is a fundamental one. Self- 
knowledge is indispensable both for one's private conduct and for 
one's dealings with other men. Many sciences and arts, such as 
logic, ethics, pedagogy, rhetoric, medicine, politics, history, etc., 
are based on, or largely indebted to, psychology. All need a thor- 
ough acquaintance with the working of the human mind. Success 
in social or business relations, even those of the most ordinary 
nature, wll always be found to depend greatly on the practical 
and applied knowledge of psychological laws. 

II. Method of Psychology 

Psychology uses a twofold method, one subjective or introspec- 
tive, based on the observation of one's own mental states, the 
other objective, based on the observation of the mental states of 
other men. 

(a) The introspective method is primary and fundamental , because 
the experience of a mental process is the only way we have of know- 
ing its nature. Thus no amount of explanation and description 
will ever give the faintest idea of a sensation of color to the man 
born blind, or of hearing to the man born deaf. If, from the ac- 
tions, words, and signs of other men we are enabled to know — 



NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 27 

always imperfectly — what mental states they experience, it is 
only in an indirect manner, from the analogy with those we have 
experienced ourselves. Hence an important remark for the stu- 
dent. Nowhere is reflection more essential than in the study of 
psychology. To try to understand psychology by merely reading 
a description of mental states, without verifying this descrip- 
tion by introspection, as far as possible, is preposterous. The 
text-book and the professor are useful guides in directing intro- 
spection, but they cannot take its place. The first and most 
indispensable text-book of psychology is one's own mind. 

{b) Introspection must be supplemented and controlled by the 
objective method, i.e. by the study of other minds. In psychology, 
as in every other science, the observation of one instance — and 
we can observe directly one mind only — is not always a sufiScient 
basis for a valid generalization. The mental processes of others 
are inferred from the oral or written account which is given of 
them, or from more or less decisive physiological manifestations. 
Physiology, pathology, and medicine may give valuable assist- 
ance in gathering data. 

{c) These two sources of information must be used together. 
Psychology starts from observed facts and endeavors to formu- 
late the laws that govern them. It uses, therefore, what will be 
called in logic the inductive method. 

III. Division of Mental Processes 

The classification of mental processes, and the division of psy- 
chology which depends on it, may be made from a philosophical 
or from a psychological point of view. 

I. Philosophical Point of View. — {a) If the distinction and 
opposition of mind and body were taken for granted, and if it 
were presupposed that some processes are at once and essentially 
both organic and mental, whereas others are essentially and exclu- 
sively mental and spiritual, we might be justified in distinguishing 
and opposing also these two groups of processes. But this dis- 
tinction, even if true and legitimate in itself, is not legitimate as 
a starting-point because it is far from self-evident. Later on we 
shall see whether it is a vahd conclusion based on observed facts. 



28 PSYCHOLOGY 

Here we are not justified in presupposing a dividing line be- 
tween sense (organic) and intellect (spiritual), or between lower 
tendencies (organic) and will (spiritual). 

(b) If the distinction oi faculties as specific energies of the mind 
were admitted, we might again be led to a bipartite division into 
what the scholastics called knowledge and tendency (appetitus), 
or what others term intellectual and active powers. According 
to this, feelings, emotions, and sentiments do not form a separate 
group, but share in the nature of both knowledge and appetitus 
without being adequately distinct from appetitus. The pleasant- 
ness or unpleasantness of a known object is nothing but its con- 
formity or disagreement with tendencies, i.e. a special aspect of 
appetitus. The whole affective life is a resultant of the two specific 
energies, knowledge and appetitus. But here again it must be 
noted that the doctrine of faculties, when assumed to mean any- 
thing beyond the mere classification and grouping of mental proc- 
esses, is not empirical, and hence cannot be used at the outset of 
psychology. 

2. Psychological Point of View. — Modern psychology does not 
attempt to explain philosophically, but simply to classify, mental 
processes. The classification which it ofifers may be more or less 
superficial and arbitrary, and nevertheless be more useful for, 
and better adapted to, a mere description of facts without any 
underlying philosophical assumption. 

Although exceptions are to be found, psychologists generally 
reduce mental processes to three groups: processes of cognition, of 
feeling, and of conation. The prominence given to feelings by mak- 
ing them a separate class is due to the recognition of their special 
characteristics and of their importance in the whole psychological 
life. FeeUng is the outcome of the exercise of all forms of activity, 
and, on the other hand, exercises a very great influence on action. 

(a) Knowledge is the presence in the mind of the idea of an ex- 
ternal object; it has both an active and a passive phase; the mind 
must be first acted upon, and then exercise its own activity. Feel- 
ing is subjective; it manifests no external reaUty, and is chiefly 
passive. Yet it is a powerful incentive to action. If it is too in- 
tense, it tends to exclude knowledge and intellectual appUcation. 



GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 29 

Moreover, feeling is of itself concerned chiefly with the present, 
and is largely spontaneous and necessary. Conation is essentially 
active and directed toward the future in order to produce, pre- 
serve, or remove a mental state according as it is found desirable 
or undesirable. 

(b) These feelings may undergo different variations. The same 
sound or song (knowledge), at first agreeable (feeling), may, if 
prolonged (same knowledge), become tedious and thoroughly 
annoying and painful (different feeling). As a consequence, and 
according to the complex motives and circumstances influencing 
human actions, the will may assume diverse attitudes, e.g. it may 
determine the listener to stay or to leave, to encourage or stop 
the singer, to make this or that remark, etc. 

(c) Knowledge of the same thing, because it is more objective, 
and especially sense-perception, will be more similar in the same 
and in different minds. Affections are more subjective and 
changing. Volition is also less permanent and more variable 
because it may struggle with different feelings. 

Such are the main reasons for distinguishing, in psychology, 
three groups of mental processes; but this is merely a working psy- 
chological classification, useful for purposes of study; and it must 
be remembered that there is a constant overlapping of one group 
upon the others. 

II. THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE MIND 

I. A Danger to be Avoided 

I. Necessity of Analysis. — (c) The human intellect cannot 
reach at once the complete knowledge of anything. Every real- 
ity is so complex, its aspects and relations are so numerous, that 
the mind is always obliged to decompose it, to proceed by analysis, 
and to take successively different points of view. The physicist, 
the chemist, the geologist, have to examine separately the vari- 
ous properties and energies of material substances. The histo- 
rian and the sociologist must consider one after another the differ- 
ent phases of human events. In proportion as an object is more 



30 PSYCHOLOGY 

complex, the necessity of analysis becomes greater. See, for 
instance, how the human organism has to be analyzed, and how its 
parts and organs must be studied successively, in order to reach 
even a superficial knowledge of its functions. We cannot acquire 
a thorough knowledge of the human organism as a whole without 
studying first separately the different organs that compose it. 

(6) Nowhere is this necessity of analysis greater than in psychol- 
ogy, (i) The mind is more varied and more complex than any 
material reahty. Yet recourse to dissection or actual separation is 
impossible. Nor can we take apart for single consideration one 
mental process and hold it in the mind for special examination. 
A mental process, as it occurs actually, is said to be complex and 
composed of elementary processes. But these cannot be really 
separated in the same manner that it is possible to dissect an organ- 
ism. (2) Material substances are permanent, whereas mental 
processes are essentially fleeting and disappear rapidly. Mental 
analysis can only be an abstraction and a process of inference. 
UnHke chemical elements, which are really set apart when the 
compound is analyzed, elementary mental processes, though influ- 
encing actual complex processes, are not experienced by themselves 
in consciousness. 

2. Danger of Analysis. — Such a necessity for the human intel- 
lect to proceed analytically is not without danger. The danger 
consists in resting satisfied with partial views, without reconstruct- 
ing again by synthesis the complete reality, and in studying the 
parts chosen more or less arbitrarily as units, without perceiving 
their relations to the whole. This danger again is greater in the 
study of the mind than in any other study because solidarity and 
continuity are most striking in the mental world. One might be 
led to consider a mental process such as sensation, memory, pleas- 
ure, love, anger, desire, choice, action, as isolated, as taking place 
apart from the others, and even sometimes independently of them, 
and thus to view, so to say, a dead and unreal mind, not the liv- 
ing, complex, and ever-changing mind. The mind is one. Even 
if it is endowed with distinct energies or faculties, it must be 
remembered that these are energies of one and the same mind, 
that they do not act independently of one another, but that the 



GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 31 

activity of one is always mixed with, and influenced by, that of 
the others. 

It is in order to obviate these difficulties, and guard the student 
against these dangers, that a short outline is given here of some 
general laws of the mind which must never be lost sight of while 
studying separately the different mental processes. On this 
condition only is the knowledge of the real living mind possible. 

II. General Processes and Attitudes of the Mind 

Several mental attitudes and processes, which will receive a 
more extensive treatment elsewhere, run through the three groups 
of mental processes and influence all. Hence a few words will 
be said of them here. They are attention and association, which 
are of a most general nature; memory and imagination, which refer 
especially to the cognitive aspect of consciousness; habit, which 
refers chiefly to activity in all its forms. 

I. Attention. — (c) By attention is meant the focussing of the 
mind on a special object or conscious process. It includes pri- 
marily a mental and sometimes also secondarily an organic atti- 
tude, like " stretching the ears," "fixing the gaze," "holding the 
breath " in expectation. In attention the energy of the mind is 
more concentrated, less diffused, and hence intensified with regard 
to the object to which it is applied. This attitude may be com- 
pared to the focussing of the sun-rays with a lens. Distraction, 
therefore, is not the contrary of attention, but rather a form of it, 
for it is attention to an object against the will, the inclination or 
intention. Distraction, however, may bear on many ideas and 
thus be equivalent to diffusion or dispersion of mental energy, 
which is the mental attitude opposed to attention. In attention 
the mind looks at one thing intensely; in dispersion it looks at 
many things, but less intensely at each one. 

Attention is not restricted to knowledge, but extends to feelings 
and actions. Thus a man may concentrate his mind on his sor- 
rows, sufferings, or joys; he may act with or without care, and care- 
fulness is but a form of attention. The power of attention is an 
indispensable condition of success in any pursuit. The man who 



32 PSYCHOLOGY 

cannot pay attention to his own thoughts, actions, or feelings, and 
to surrounding objects or persons, is doomed to failure. 

(b) The capacity for arousing attention is called interest. Inter- 
est depends both on certain conditions of the object and on the 
dispositions of the subject. Thus I may study a lesson because I 
like it and find it interesting; or because, although I dislike it, 
I am prompted by a sense of duty, or I feel that this study, 
uninteresting though it may be in itself, is useful or necessary. 

Hence, if we consider the cause that produces it, attention is of 
two kinds: (i) One is the result of objective interest alone. The 
will has no part in it, or may even oppose it. A concert may be 
found very interesting, and attention is naturally given to it; or 
an idea may be present in the focus of consciousness in spite of 
the efforts of the will to banish it. (2) The other is voluntary; 
the interest may be partly in the object, but it is chiefly subjec- 
tive. The will itself influences the mental activity, and applies 
it to the consideration of an idea or to a certain action. Thus 
even things which are foimd uninteresting in themselves are 
paid attention to for subjective reasons of utility, necessity, 
duty, etc. 

(c) The most important laws of attention are the following: 
(i) Attention is proportional to interest, objective and subjective. 
Sometimes one, and sometimes the other, is predominant. The 
presence of the subjective factor accounts for the fact that one and 
the same thing will be of interest to one man and not to another, 
nor even to the same man at different times. The object remains 
identical, but the mental dispositions are different. (2) In the 
object interest results from several qualities or properties, among 
which may be mentioned newness, imusualness in size, color, 
intensity, change, etc. In the subject it depends on education, 
habits, character, actual dispositions of the mind, ideals, as- 
pirations, etc. When a man wants to call the attention of others 
to anything, he has to take all these into account. A good illus- 
tration may be foimd in the art of advertising. (How? . . . 
Where? . . . When? ... By what means? ... is advertising 
done?) A more particular instance is that of the orator 
who varies the intensity and pitch of his voice and the 



GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 33 

nature of his gestures. Sometimes a thundering voice and 
sometimes a low whisper will be effective in making the 
listener attentive. (Why?) (3) Attention does not remain con- 
stant in the same direction for a long period of time. Little 
by little it decreases and disappears unless its object changes or 
some new aspect is discovered in it (e.g. ...?). (4) The intensity 
of attention varies in inverse ratio to the number of objects attended to: 
"Pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus." Jugglers know 
how to divert the spectator's attention so that the way in which 
they perform their tricks of legerdemain will not be detected. 
Pickpockets choose the psychological moment at which their pro- 
spective victim's attention is absorbed. . . . (Why? . . . Find 
other instances.) 

(d) From these principles it is clear that, besides physical and 
physiological obstacles to attention, such as surroundings, tempera- 
ment, health, etc., which it is not always possible to remove, 
there are psychological obstacles, such as mental restlessness or the 
incapacity for the mind of applying itself to one object, mental 
sluggishness or the incapacity of making an effort in order to bring 
the energy of the mind into play. It is important to correct these 
defects and to cultivate the power of attention. For children 
the only source of attention is objective interest, and the teacher 
must always remember it in his lessons and explanations. As 
the mind develops it becomes capable also of voluntary attention, 
which is the more important since by it we attend for a purpose 
and in order to reach an end. The power of attention must be 
increased by daily practice. How many fail in Ufe because they 
"notice" nothing, and are unable to concentrate their mental 
energy on the objects which should be of interest to them! 

2. Memory and Imagination. — After it has been experienced, 
a mental state can be recalled into the mind. Not that the same 
identical process which took place in the past can again take place 
at present; in this sense that which is passed never comes back. 
But I may be aware that the process which I now experience is 
similar to the one which I experienced yesterday; that I now see, 
hear, consider, or feel the same thing as formerly. This power of 
reproduction is exercised in memory (when the mind is aware of 
4 



34 PSYCHOLOGY 

the fact of reproduction), and in imagination (when in fact there 
is reproduction, but without the consciousness of the fact that it 
is a reproduction). Not only knowledge, but also feelings and 
conscious activities, may be reproduced in the mind. 

3. Association of Ideas. — Memory and imagination depend on 
association. We know from personal experience that an idea is 
not recalled at random, but is suggested by others which call it 
back to consciousness. Ideas seem to be linked together so that, 
if one is reproduced, it has a tendency to reproduce another. Like 
memory and imagination, association refers chiefly to knowledge, 
yet an idea will recall not only another idea with which it is 
connected, but also the feeling or action by which it was accom- 
panied. The sight of an enemy yesterday was accompanied by 
a feeling of anger. To-day the thought of the event tends to 
call forth not merely the idea that I was angry, but also this 
feeling itself. 

4. Habit. — What 'association does for ideas habit does for 
actions. In fact, habit and association present the same essen- 
tial features, and association is but one form of habit. The action 
which has become habitual is performed automatically, without 
effort, frequently even without distinct consciousness. Before 
acquiring the habit of piano-playing, for instance, every single 
action (vision, hearing, appropriate motions) of which the com- 
plete series is composed, required a distinct effort. When the 
action has become habitual, the result is more perfect and obtained 
more easily. Once the series is started, all the other com- 
plex elements follow in their order. Habit has also a close resem- 
blance with that form of memory which consists in learning by rote. 
The schoolboy who repeats his lesson several times in order to 
memorize it establishes a number of associations between words 
as written or spoken, and between the physiological processes 
necessary to utter them, so that words uttered by him follow one 
another in order and automatically. Both mental and organic 
activities are subject to the law of fixation or habit. We not only 
have habits of movement, but also habitual \dews, associations, 
and mental attitudes. 



GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 35 

III. General Laws or the Mind 

Besides the general processes and attitudes just mentioned, 
there are general laws that govern processes belonging to different 
groups. They are the laws of solidarity, continuity, and unity 
amid multiplicity. These laws should be constantly kept in mind, 
as applications of them will be found at every step. 

I. Solidarity. — By solidarity is meant the mutual dependence 
of all mental processes. 

(o) The use of the analytical process in psychology may be the 
source of great errors, if one fails to notice that it isolates arti- 
ficially that which is in reality always connected and associated. 
The mind is like an organism or a well-ruled society in which all 
organs or all classes depend on the others for their functions or 
their subsistence. Mental life, in its various manifestations, is 
one, and none of its manifestations is independent of the others. 

(b) All psychical phenomena are dependent on, and influenced 
by, the general processes and attitudes mentioned above: atten- 
tion, memory, association, and habit. The whole progress and 
development of the mind is conditioned by them. 

(c) All mental processes influence one another, (i) Cognition 
is the basis of most feelings. We are pleased or displeased, and 
experience various emotions according to the ideas that are pres- 
ent in the mind. Moreover, to know, or to study in order to 
know, is in itself an important source of feelings. The will is 
essentially guided by motives, i.e. by the results of reflection and 
reasoning. The actions which are not voluntary are frequently 
the consequences of impulses resulting from inferior forms of 
knowledge. (2) Feelings, being a source of interest, are also a 
source of attention and application, and hence very important 
in acquiring knowledge. They also often influence opinions and 
beliefs. What a man likes is readily accepted by him as true; he 
is willing to believe the calumnies which he hears about an enemy, 
but admits his good qualities more reluctantly. It is no less clear 
that feelings influence activity, since we act in order to obtain some 
good and for the satisfaction of some desire. How much greater 
and more effective is our activity for a task which we like than for 



36 PSYCHOLOGY 

one which we are compelled to do against our inclination. (3) 
The will is the power that rules — more or less perfectly — the 
other mental energies. It controls attention, commands a patient 
and impartial research, or, by its precipitation, causes the mind 
to assent without sufficient grounds, and is thus partly responsible 
for resulting errors. On the other hand, man endeavors to con- 
form his actions to his thoughts. Although the will has not 
perfect control over the feelings, it nevertheless exercises a great 
power in checking, suppressing, or fostering them. 

{d) Finally, there is a solidarity between the mind and the organism. 
(i) The conditions of the organism, age, sex, temperament, food 
and drink, health or disease, present physiological condition and 
disposition, have their counterpart in the activities of the mind. 
(2) The mind influences the organism in many ways, e.g. emotions 
are accompanied by various physiological phenomena; mental 
application may cause a headache; the will controls many move- 
ments of the body, etc. 

2. Continuity. — (a) In the perpetual flux of mental life we 
distinguish certain waves as more prominent, and consider them 
separately. This conception of mental states may be misleading, 
and it must be remembered that consciousness is not made up of 
parts J but is always flowing like a stream. In the state of wake- 
fulness at least, mental processes are always going on without inter- 
mission, even if, for purposes of study, only the most prominent 
and those that are better characterized are attended to. The 
break which seems to occur in a dreamless sleep, epilepsy, fainting, 
and similar states, is bridged over by memory which connects 
the part preceding with the part following the interruption. 

{h) At any one time the contents of consciousness are complex, 
including a focus and a fringe. Thus while I am writing, my 
mind is concentrated upon the ideas to be expressed — the school- 
boy's mind might be concentrated on the manner in which he has 
to hold the pen and form every letter; at the same time I have 
an indistinct consciousness of papers and books aroimd me, of 
the little noise of the pen as it runs over the paper, the ticking of 
the clock, the singing of the birds outside; of sensations of touch 
in the fingers holding the pen, the arm resting on the table, the 



GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 37 

parts of the body that are in contact with other objects; of tempera- 
ture; of my whole organic disposition; of images fleeting through 
my mind; of an emotion experienced a short time ago, etc. 

(c) Generally the contents of consciousness are not renewed all 
at once; its elements pass from the focus to the fringe, and vice 
versa; some disappear altogether, while others persist and enter 
the succeeding complex mental state. As an instance of such 
persistence may be mentioned a violent emotion, e.g. of anger, 
which may remain in the background of consciousness for a long 
time and continue to influence more or less apparently many suc- 
cessive processes. In this respect, the mind is somewhat Uke the 
organism, the whole of which is renewed after a certain length of 
time, but through changes that take place gradually, more rapidly 
in some parts, more slowly in others. 

{d) As a consequence of this fact, it follows that the nature of 
the contents of consciousness depends on previous contents. This 
is true even where the direction of the stream seems to be modi- 
fied suddenly. The new state is different according as it follows 
different thoughts, emotions, or mental efforts. For instance, 
the impression produced by a sudden clap of thunder varies accord- 
ing to the circumstances in which I find myself when I hear it. 
Differences in the contents of my mind will cause me to experi- 
ence different feelings when a friend calls on me unexpectedly. 

Not only is there continuity between immediately succeeding 
states, but habit, memory, and generally subconsciousness, are 
like so many permanent links of continuity, making mental life 
one uninterrupted whole, or like so many reservoirs into which 
all mental activities bring some modifying element, and owing to 
which, accordingly, every new mental activity is modified. Thus 
the mind may be compared to a water reservoir into which all 
ingoing streams would bring their own special and constantly 
changing qualities, and from which outgoing streams would in 
consequence derive these new qualities. We cannot experience 
two mental states perfectly identical, since, on the one hand, the 
actual mental background is always different in some respects, 
and, on the other, the new state is modified by past influences. 

(e) When in a series of objects arranged according to gradually 



38 PSYCHOLOGY 

increasing diversity two extremes are compared, the differences 
are striking; but if two objects placed in immediate succession are 
compared, the differences are hardly noticeable. Between any 
two colors, intermediate tinges may be inserted passing insensibly 
from one to the other; between a giant and a dwarf a series of men 
with slowly decreasing sizes make an easy transition, etc. The 
same is true of the mind: between extremes a number of transi- 
tional forms are found. The abstract definitions of mental atten- 
tion and mental dispersion are easily understood, and their 
concrete applications also are easily verified when two attitudes far 
apart in this respect are compared. But if the diffusion be re- 
stricted gradually, it is impossible to point out the beginning of 
the attentive attitude. Sensations of vision, sound, taste, smell, 
temperature, etc., may be arranged in series varying imperceptibly 
according to quality or intensity. Perfect memory and complete 
forgetfulness are extremes between which may be inserted an 
infinite number of partial, more or less vague and obscure, remem- 
brances. In a more complex sphere, the insane man in an asy- 
lum has mental defects by which he clearly differs from what he 
was when normal; yet if his condition has developed gradually, 
we cannot indicate the precise moment where insanity began. 
And in a series of minds passing from a normal to an abnormal 
condition, extremes alone are recognizable; the limit separating 
the normal from the abnormal cannot be indicated. Examples 
could be multiplied for all transitions from one process or series of 
processes to another. 

3. Unity amid Multiplicity, (a) From what is manifold in 
nature one conscious state may result, e.g. a large ntmiber of vibra- 
tions of ether, air, or molecules, produces in consciousness one 
sensation of light, sound, or temperature. Moreover, the mind 
strives to unify external experiences by constantly reducing them 
to more general laws and principles. 

{b) The mind tends to homogeneity and consistency. Self-contra- 
diction, i.e. the presence in the mind of irreconcilable judgments, 
is painful. Attempts are made to find the means of reconciling 
them or to see which should be eliminated. Moreover, the mind 
strives after harmony between itself and the external world of 



GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 39 

things and persons, either by trying to conform its ideas to the 
reality of things and to adapt itself to surroundings, or by trying 
to conform the environment to its own desires and purposes. 
Consistency, harmony, uniformity, are sources of pleasure; dis- 
sension is a source of unhappiness. 

(c) Attention has been called to the complexity, variety, changes, 
and succession of mental states. It is a fact of experience, how- 
ever, that these always form a part of a group which is personal. 
There is no mental process which is not somebody's, and which is 
not claimed by some person as his own. Isolated as they are from 
mental processes which belong to other minds, my own mental 
processes are all within the unity of my own self. 

{d) Hence the thinking subject is one. Consciousness is not 
simply the existence of thought, but also of my thinking, and / 
am the centre to which all thoughts are referred and attributed 
as their source and as the subject toward which all converge. 
This holds for past as well as for present states. The self appears 
not only as one, but also as identical under many changes. To 
say " / think " is true, but it is also true to say " / thought.^' Obvi- 
ously there is something underlying the stream of consciousness. 
A man remembers his past, feels responsible for his actions, pre- 
pares his future. Memory, responsibility, foresight, are signs 
that, even if the states of mind disappear, the mind itself is a more 
permanent and a deeper reality. 



CHAPTER I 

KNOWLEDGE 

Preliminary Remarks 

I, What is Knowledge? — (a) The mental state called know- 
ing cannot be defined strictly. It is obvious to all men, and a 
definition would be useful only inasmuch as it would be known, 
i.e. inasmuch as it would imply the experience of the very state 
to be defined. The following explanations are given only to make 
this experience clearer. To know is to be aware of something which 
is called the object of knowledge. In every cognitive process is 
implied essentially an antithesis of something (object) which faces 
or lies opposite to (ob-iacere) the mind and of the knowing mind 
or subject (sub-iacere) which is modified by the knowing process, 
that is, which acquires a new idea or the perception of a new 
relation. 

(b) The object of knowledge may be internal or external; it in- 
cludes not only external things, but also mental states. Thus a 
feeling or an emotion may not only be experienced as such, i.e. 
felt, but it may be analyzed, studied, recognized, and known; and 
the same is true of actions. It may be impossible in many cases 
to draw a well-defined line separating knowledge from other men- 
tal processes which are objects of knowledge, but nevertheless we 
understand the distinction between feeling and knowing that we 
feel, acting and knowing that we act. And even in cases of intense 
feeling or activity, the awareness or knowledge of them may almost 
disappear; a man feels and acts, and his whole consciousness 
seems to be absorbed in these processes so that he does not even 
reflect that he is experiencing them. 

(c) In knowledge, subject and object are opposed, yet closely 
related. In fact, the known object must, in some manner, be 

40 



KNOWLEDGE 41 

present within the knowing subject, not according to its natural 
reality, but in a special mental or ideal form. To know a thing 
is to have in the mind an idea or representation of it. The fact of 
its being known changes in no way the reality of the object; the 
mind alone is modified by the acquisition of an idea which it did 
not possess previously. 

2. There are Several Kinds of Knowledge. — (a) Knowledge is 
actual when the idea is present in consciousness; habitual when the 
idea which has disappeared from consciousness can be recalled. 
In the former case a man actually thinks of what he knows; in the 
latter, he does not actually think of it, but can do so. Immedi- 
ately upon completing the demonstration of a geometrical theorem 
I have the actual knowledge of its truth. The following day, 
when my mind is occupied with other matters, I still know it 
although actually thinking of something else. 

(b) (i) To know may mean simply to be acquainted with, to 
be able to recognize. Thus I know a man by sight after meeting 
him more or less frequently; I know his character after a more 
or less prolonged intercourse with him. This form of knowledge 
reaches the object directly; it implies perception and recognition. 
(2) To know means also to understand. In this sense knowledge 
reaches the object indirectly; it supposes the work of intellectual 
comparison, judgment, and reasoning. Thus I may know many 
things about a man whom I have never seen. A blind man who 
never perceived light may nevertheless know several things about 
it, like its laws of reflection or refraction. 

(c) The term " knowledge " is applied sometimes to the process 
of knowing (subjective sense), and sometimes to the known object 
(objective sense). I may speak of my knowledge of chemistry, 
and of the science of chemistry as a body of knowledge. 

(d) Knowledge is frequently opposed to opinion and belief. 
The former is more certain and has a stronger and firmer ob- 
jective basis; the latter is more subjective and depends also on 
personal mental dispositions. 

(e) The cognitive faculties are (i) presentation (sensation and 
perception), (2) representation (memory and imagination), (3) 
conception or abstract representation, (4) judgment, which is 



42 PSYCHOLOGY 

obtained either immediately (intuitive) or mediately by reason- 
ing. Hence the division of the present chapter into four articles, 
to which a fifth will be added on language, which is the expression 
of knowledge. 

A simple representation as such is neither true nor false, but 
only in so far as it is truly or falsely affirmed or denied to be 
the accurate representation of such or such an object. Hence 
knowledge proper is found only in judgment. 

3. Complexity of Knowledge. — It must be kept in mind that 
the cognitive processes just mentioned are not isolated, but work 
together. A simple and commonplace instance may be given to 
illustrate the complexity of knowledge and of the many processes 
which it implies. "I see my friend speaking to a policeman." 
This is about as simple an experience as can be imagined. It takes 
place all at once. Without reflection or hesitation, in what seems 
to be one single act of perception, I affirm that "I see my friend 
talking to a policeman." What is so simple now is in reality very 
complex in its analysis and genesis. If the many elementary 
processes are not now present in consciousness, it is owing to habit 
and to what will be called later the education of the senses. As 
we shall see more clearly in the following articles, it has not always 
been so. Let us now briefly analyze our statement; the analysis 
will be justified later. 

"7 see." Directly and primitively \-ision gives to the mind 
only sensations of light and color. In the present case, if by "I 
see " I mean a sensation, i.e. a primitive and elementary process, 
what I see is a certain surface colored in this or that way. But 
the educated eye reports much more than tliis. There are addi- 
tions to the primitive fact, that make the present mental state 
much more complex. 

'' My friend." A certain familiarity and habit make me recog- 
nize the form of a man, and, although I see only about one half, 
my imagination readily supplies the part which I do not see. 
Moreover, certain signs, e.g. the fact of his being in the street, of 
moving the limbs or lips, of facing another person, etc. (facts 
which are also perceived owing to a number of past associations 
and to the education of the senses), make me infer that I have before 



KNOWLEDGE 43 

my eyes a real man, and not a mere image or statue of a man. 
My imagination again supplies implicitly a whole group of sensa- 
tions of sound, touch, etc., of which this man, under certain cir- 
cumstances, would be the cause for me. All this supposes that 
I have seen, heard, etc., other men before. 

When I refer to this man as "my friend," I suppose an act of 
recognition. This is not simply a man, but it is this man with 
whom I had such or such relations, with whom I am in sympathy, 
who did this or that, etc. Many signs may help me to recognize 
him, but, strictly speaking, I do not see my friend; I see only cer- 
tain colors and shape, I perceive a man, and I recognize or infer 
that it is my friend. It is evident that the relation of friend- 
ship cannot be perceived by any sense : it is an implicit judgment 
supposing many mental elements past and present. 

^^ Speaking." I may hear a sound, I cannot see it. Here I 
perceive certain attitudes, gestures, and motions which, in my 
experience, are associated with sensations of hearing. We have 
here again an inference, an induction, an implicit reasoning, which, 
stated explicitly, would run thus: " Such or such visual sensa- 
tions in the past have always been accompanied by corresponding 
auditory sensations when I was within hearing distance. Now I 
experience the same visual sensations. Therefore the man is 
speaking, although, on account of the distance, I do not hear 
him." 

"To a policeman." Here again we have a very complex per- 
ception, as may be gathered from the preceding remarks. 

This is a very short and summary analysis of a simple state- 
ment, and every statement which we make is of the same com- 
plex nature. Let us now proceed to examine the various stages 
of cognition, and thereby see how the mind passes from simple to 
complex processes of knowledge. 



44 PSYCHOLOGY 



ARTICLE I. SENSE PRESENTATION 

I. SENSATION 

I. Sensation in General 

1. The Nature of Sensation. — Sensation is \.h.e first or element- 
ary mental process; first, because mental life begins with sensa- 
tion; elementary, because other mental states are based on and 
suppose sensation. Sensations are therefore real constituents of 
complex states, but they are only abstractions when considered 
in themselves as simple, and apart from the complex states. The 
normal adult does not experience simple sensations; his so-called 
sensations are always complex processes, and are influenced by 
other past or present sensations of the same or of different kind. 

Perception is the reference of sensations to an external object. It 
supposes several presentative and representative elements, and 
includes not only primitive data of the senses, but also results 
from the education of the senses. The knowledge which we have 
of sensations is not obtained directly from introspection, but rather 
from inferences based on introspection. Frequently, however, 
the distinction between sensation and perception is not observed 
in ordinary language, and both terms are used indifferently. 

2. Definition of Related Terms. — (i) Sense denotes the ability 
to experience a certain class of sensations. Thus we speak of the 
sense of vision or of the sense of touch. (2) The being which is 
capable of experiencing sensations is called sentieyit or sensitive, 
and this is opposed to inanimate or vegetal. There are evidently 
many degrees of perfection in sensitive life. In a more general 
way, sentient and sensitive are synonymous with conscious, and 
refer to any form of consciousness. (3) Sensitive frequently refers 
also to one who is excitable, impressionable, or who is easily affected 
by external influences. When applied to a special sense, it denotes 
a special keenness. (4) The adjective sensible is more ambigu- 
ous on accoimt of its several meanings. It may be synonymous 
with sentient; or it denotes a sound judgment and a prudent esti- 
mate of things, persons, and events. Again, a man is sensible 



SENSATION 45 

of a thing when he is aware or persuaded of it. Finally, the 
term "sensible " may be used objectively of a thing that can be 
perceived by the senses. (5) Sensuous means that which pertains 
to the senses. Thus we speak of sense-perception or of sensuous 
perception. (6) Sensual applies especially to one who indulges 
in the lower tendencies and pleasures of the senses. (7) Sensi- 
bility, sentiency, sensitivity and sensitiveness may be used to denote 
the capacity of experiencing sensations, but sensibility signifies 
more particularly a special susceptibihty to pleasure, pain, and 
emotion, while sensitiveness denotes a special mental or nervous 
excitability or keenness of the senses. 

3. Internal and External Sensations. — Sensations are com- 
monly classified into internal and external, but the meaning given 
to internal sensations to-day is not the same as formerly. Exter- 
nal sensations are those by which the mind enters into direct rela- 
tion with external things, e.g. seeing, hearing, etc. They are 
exercised through sense-organs located at the periphery of the 
organism. 

Formerly, internal sensations meant the mental processes by which 
the mind enters into relation directly with something mental, 
and indirectly with external concrete realities. Their organ is 
internal, namely, the brain. Thus memory and imagination 
were called internal senses because they deal immediately with 
mental images, and only mediately with the things of which they 
are images. To these two internal senses two others were added, 
the sensus communis or central sense which gathers together the 
various impressions received from the external senses, and the 
aestimativa which enables the mind to discern the good or bad, 
useful or harmful qualities of objects (akin to instinct in animals). 

To-day, by internal sensations are meant those sensations which 
do not refer to the external world, but to some internal states, 
especially of the organism, like hunger, thirst, fatigue, etc. They 
are vague, hard to localize, and generally indicative of physical 
conditions and needs. Hence they are also more subjective than 
external sensations. The division of sensations into internal and 
external almost coincides with the division into special and gen- 
eral or organic sensations. Internal sensations are closely related 



46 PSYCHOLOGY 

to the affective life, and in many cases they are feelings rather 
than cognitions. 

II. Internal or General Sensations 

1. Characteristics. — These sensations are called internal and 
organic because the information which they give refers to states 
and changes within the body; general or common because they have 
no special end-organs and are hard to localize. Ccenesthesis is a 
more technical term to express the same idea. Internal sensa- 
tions are numerous, complex, vague, difficult to analyze, localize, 
and discriminate. As cognitions they are in themselves of but 
little value; yet habit and experience enable us to assign to them 
external or internal causes, e.g. we may know what food has caused 
a painful digestion, where nervousness or fatigue comes from, 
etc. 

2. The Main Groups of internal sensations are: (i) The vital 
sense, or general sensations of life, of the whole living organism, 
of its position and changes of position, its general condition of 
strength or weakness, activity or sleepiness, etc. (2) Sensations 
connected with the nervous system, its excitability and tension, 
or, on the contrary, inactivity and laziness, nervousness and neuras- 
thenia. (3) Sensations connected with the muscular system. 
Some are more general, like the tension or relaxation of the muscles, 
and general fitness or fatigue.' Others are more special, like local 
fatigue, or the sensations experienced in executing various move- 
ments. (4) Sensations connected with the digestive system; 
hunger, thirst, repletion, nausea, easy or difficult digestion. (5) 
Sensations connected with the respiratory system, such as facility 
or difiiculty in breathing, abundance or scarcity of air, its qual- 
ities, like purity or foulness, choking, stifling, etc. (6) Sensations 
connected with the circulatory system, like those of blushing or 
growing pale, of active circulation in the whole organism or in 
some of its parts. 

III. External Sensations 

(a) External sensations are experienced through the sense- 
organs. A sense-organ includes three essential elements: (i) a 



SENSATION 47 

peripheral apparatus, like the eye, ear, nerve-endings in the skin, 
etc.; (2) a sensory or afferent nerve connecting the peripheral 
structure with (3) the centre, which is some determined portion of 
the brain. The study of the anatomy and functions of these 
belongs to physiology, and, while studying sensations, it will be 
useful to review the physiology of the senses as well as the physics 
of sound, light, etc. 

{b) The factors of sensation are: (i) Physical, i.e. something 
external (e.g. vibrations of ether or air) which acts on the organ- 
ism. It is called the stimulus of sensation, and its action on the 
appropriate organ is the stimulation. (2) Physiological. The 
organ at the periphery is especially adapted to receive the stimu- 
lation proper to each sense, and the impression thus received is 
transmitted to the brain by the afferent nerve. (3) Psychological. 
Consciousness is intimately connected with, and depends on, the 
physiological processes. Yet it cannot be identified with them, 
for consciousness is something altogether different from a move- 
ment, a vibration, or a chemical change, such as take place in the 
organism. 

External senses are reduced to five classes: smell, taste, touch, 
hearing, and vision. 

A. Smell and Taste 

I. Common Features. — (i) These two senses are closely 
connected and generally work together. Smell, however, is more 
independent of taste than taste of smell. It has been ascertained 
that when the sense of smell is impaired taste is also less perfect, 
and in some cases it is difficult to say whether a sensation is due 
primarily to smell or to taste, e.g. spices are "tasted " chiefly 
through the sense of smell. (2) In both cases the sensations 
are vague and lack definiteness. Feeling, i.e. their pleasantness 
or unpleasantness, is the predominant feature. (3) These sensa- 
tions are not easily classified, and the reason why a substance 
smells or tastes differently from another is not known. (4) As 
verbs, the terms "smell " and "taste " are transitive or intransi- 
tive; as substantives, they apply to both the sensation or mental 
State and to the physical stimulus. I speak not only of my sensa- 



48 PSYCHOLOGY 

tions of smell and taste, but also of the smell of a rose or the taste 
of an orange. (5) Smell and taste are not so useful for intellec- 
tual life as the other sensations, but are very useful for organic 
life, especially in animals. Their very position at the entrance 
of the respiratory and digestive systems is suggestive of these 
functions. Thus the sense of smell may give warning of the pres- 
ence of impure or poisonous air; that of taste, of the presence of 
some injurious element in food. 

2. Smell. — Its organ is the mucous membrane lining the 
upper part of the nasal cavity where the olfactory nerves are 
distributed. 

(a) Odors are the object of the sense of smell. It is impossible 
to classify them and to give definitions of the several odors. When 
we speak of them, we refer them to the substances to which they 
generally belong. Thus we say of a substance that it smells like 
the rose or the violet, or we use general terms like "fragrant," 
"nauseous," etc. 

(b) In order to have sensations of smell, emanations from odor- 
ous substances must be carried to the olfactory organs through the 
air. Liquids as such, if they come in contact with the organs of 
smell without air, produce no olfactory sensation. Breathing 
draws these emanations through the nasal fossae, and this is done 
more effectively by sniffing. A very small amount of an odorous 
substance is sufficient to produce a sensation of smell. Thus the 
smallest particle of musk will give its characteristic smell to 
clothes for years. The action of the odorous substance on the 
olfactory organs is probably of a chemical nature. 

(c) One of the important features of the sense of smell is that 
it easily becomes fatigued. The same continuous stimulation 
makes it dull with regard to this special odor. When entering a 
kitchen or a room filled with foul air, we are conscious at first of 
certain sensations which we cease to experience after some time 
spent there. 

3. Taste. — Organ : The papillae of the mucous membrane 
covering the superior surface of the tongue. The circum vallate 
papillae at the base of the tongue seem to be the most important. 

(a) Savors or flavors are the object of the sense of taste. For 



SENSATION 49 

want of a better division they are commonly reduced to four types: 
sweet, bitter, acid, and salt. Their action on the organ of taste 
is also probably of a chemical nature. 

(b) In order to have sensations of taste, the sapid substance 
must be soluble. Only fluids, i.e. dissolved substances, are per- 
ceived. The saliva, and the act of pressing the substance against 
the palate or the gums with the tongue, help the process of 
solution. 

(c) Like the sense of smell, the sense of taste is subject to fatigue. 
It is also greatly affected by contrast. Every one may notice, for 
instance, that the same cup of tea which has a very sweet taste 
while eating meat, bread, or pickles, seems almost bitter while 
eating candy or sweets. 

B. Touch 

The sense of touch includes three main groups of sensations: 
sensations of contact and pressure, sensations of temperature, 
and kinesthetic sensations. For contact and pressure, and for 
temperature, its organ consists of the papillae of the derma or true 
skin. For kinesthetic sensations, it consists of the numerous 
nervous fibrillae found in the muscular system. The distinction 
of the organs of contact and pressure from those of temperature 
is not clear physiologically, that is, organs special to each group 
cannot be pointed out. Yet they seem to be distinct, for, in 
certain diseases, the sense of touch proper may disappear while 
the sense of temperature persists, and vice versa. 

I. Contact and Pressure. — These two sensations go together. 
Evidently there can be no pressure without contact, and most 
sensations of contact are also accompanied by some pressure. 

(a) The qualities perceived by contact are hardness and soft- 
ness, roughness and smoothness. All these may be reduced to 
resistance; hardness and softness are degrees of resistance; rough- 
ness and smoothness are its qualities and its localization on the 
same surface. 

(b) The different parts of the body are not equally sensitive. 
The points of a pair of dividers kept at the same distance from 
each other will be felt as two or as one according to the place to 

5 



50 PSYCHOLOGY 

which they are applied. This has been called discriminative sen- 
sibility, or the skin's sense of locality. It varies from about i mm. 
(0.039 inch) for the tip of the tongue to about 68 mm. for the skin 
of the middle of the back, the upper arm and leg. Discriminative 
sensibility may be greatly improved by exercise. 

2. Temperature. — (a) "Hot " and " cold " are terms used in re- 
lation to our own temperature. Sensations of temperature depend 
on the physiological zero, i.e. the temperature of the skin on 
the part of the body where the sensation is experienced. An 
object having this temperature is felt as neither hot nor cold. 
The physiological zero is not identical with blood temperature, 
but may be higher or lower. 

(b) Contrast is an important factor in the appreciation of tem- 
perature. The temperature of a room which one enters seems 
colder or warmer according as one comes from a warmer or a colder 
place. The same water may be almost burning for a cold hand, 
and only warm for the hand which has just experienced a higher 
temperature. 

(c) Within certain limits, the sense of temperature is subject 
to adaptation. The water which at first seemed very hot to the 
hand becomes more tolerable if the contact be prolonged. Some 
heat being imparted to the organism, the contrast disappears, 
and thus it is seen that this phenomenon is connected with the one 
just mentioned. 

(d) Temperatures most readily appreciated are those between 
10 and 45 degrees Centigrade (50-1 11 Fahrenheit). Extreme heat 
and cold produce painful sensations in many respects similar. 
The finger dipped in boiling water or in liquid air experiences a 
sensation which might be called "burning " in both cases. 

(e) The organs for heat seem to be different from those for cold. 
There are "cold spots " and "heat spots," as may be ascertained 
easily by pressing gently on the skin with the point of a lead pencil. 
In some spots no distinct sensation of temperature is experienced; 
in other spots there is a sensation of cold. Or if the point be previ- 
ously warmed, sensations of heat are experienced only in some spots. 

3. Kinesthetic or Muscular Sensations may be reduced in part 
to internal sensations (e.g. muscular tension), and in part to 



SENSATION 51 

external sensations (when they give information concerning the 
external world, e.g. weight). They include two main groups: 
sensations of movement, including the sensations of skin, joints, 
muscles, and tendons; sensations of strain or resistance, e.g. 
muscular effort in lifting a weight. 

C. Hearing 

1. The Organs of Hearing consist of the ear; external ear 
{pinna or auricle, and auditory canal or meatus); middle ear or 
tympanum, separated from the external ear by the memhrana 
tympani and including the three auditory bones; internal ear or 
labyrinth (vestibule, semicircular canals, and cochlea) communi- 
cating with the middle ear by the two foramina. 

The external ear gathers air vibrations and transmits them to 
the middle ear by vibrating the memhrana tympani. The middle 
ear serves for the transmission of vibrations, the ossicles dimin- 
ishing their amplitude but increasing their intensity. The organ 
proper of hearing is the internal ear where the acoustic nerve is 
distributed, partly in the semicircular canals, and partly in the 
cochlea in which the complex and interesting organ of Corti is 
found. 

2. Sound is the stimulus of the sense of hearing. Physically 
it consists of air vibrations. According as these follow one an- 
other in regular or irregular succession, we have musical sounds 
or noises. 

(c) Sound possesses: (i) Intensity or loudness, which depends 
on the force or amplitude of the vibrations. (2) Pitch, which 
depends on the number of vibrations in a given unit of time. The 
number of perceivable vibrations, i.e. the range of hearing, is from 
about 16 to 38,000 a second for an ordinary ear. (3) Quality, 
timbre, or, as it is sometimes called, the color of the tone, which 
depends on the combination of secondary vibrations or overtones 
with the fundamental tone. 

{h) The discrimination of sounds of different pitch is susceptible 
of great improvement by exercise. For simultaneous sounds the 
sensitiveness is not so great as for successive sounds. With a 
little exercise the average ear may perceive the difference in pitch 



52 PSYCHOLOGY 

between two successive sounds whose number of vibrations are in 
the ratio 200: 201. A very keen ear may perceive the difference 
when the number of vibrations is in the ratio 1000: looi. 

D. Vision 

1. The Organ of Vision is the Eye. — (i) The enclosing mem- 
branes, protective and nutritive, are the sclerotic (in front, cornea) 
and the choroid (in front, iris). (2) The refracting media are the 
aqueous humor, the crystalline lens, and the vitreous humor. 
(3) Accessory structures are the various muscles both of the eye- 
ball and the interior eye (especially those which regulate the con- 
vexity of the lens and the aperture of the pupil), the eyelids, and 
the lachrymal glands. (4) The organ proper of vision is the retina, 
and among the eight or nine layers which are distinguished in the 
retina that of rods and cones is the most important. The retina 
is the expansion of the optic nerve spreading within the eyeball 
close to the choroid. The macula lutea or yellow spot, and chiefly 
the pit in its centre or fovea centralis, is the place where the rays 
of light fall in clear vision. The blind spot is the entrance itself 
of the optic nerve in the eyeball. Rays of light falling there are not 
perceived. 

2. The Stimulus of Vision is light, which physically consists 
of ether vibrations. 

By refraction the white light of the sun is decomposed into the 
seven colors of the spectrum. The differences in color depend on 
the rapidity and length of the waves, these two being in inverse 
ratio. Substances are white or black according as they reflect 
all or none of the rays of light. They are variously colored accord- 
ing as they absorb some rays of the spectrum and reflect others. 

The union of the seven spectral colors is not necessary to pro- 
duce white. Two colors, called complementary, give the same 
result: red and bluish-green, orange and greenish-blue, yellow 
and ultramarine blue, greenish-yellow and \aolet. 

3. Special Features. — (a) The sensation of vision does not 
disappear immediately after the stimulus is withdrawn, but con- 
tinues for a short time; e.g. the fiery trail of a shooting-star; a 
luminous point rotating rapidly, as the end of a kindled stick, 



SENSATION 53 

produces the impression of a luminous disk. If you look intensely 
at a bright lamp for a few seconds, and put out the light, you 
will continue to see the flame in the dark. 

(b) Color blindness, or the incapacity of the eye to discern one 
or several colors, is more frequent than is commonly supposed. 
Red is the color for which blindness is more generally found. Hence 
the necessity of careful tests for locomotive engineers and others 
who have to distinguish colored signals. 

(c) An after-image is a phenomenon of vision produced after 
the stimulus has disappeared. The after-image may be posi- 
tive, as in the cases mentioned above (under a), or negative, due 
to the fatigue of the retina. The negative after-images of dark 
objects are relatively bright, and vice versa; those of colored objects 
present the complementary color. After gazing fixedly at the 
bright window about a half minute, turn your eyes toward the 
white wall or ceiling, and you will see the window again, but 
the pane will be darker than the frame. After looking intensely 
at a bright and glossy red cardboard triangle, look again at the 
white ceiling; a green triangle will be seen, the dimensions of 
which will vary according to the distance of the wall which is used 
as a screen. If the wall or ceiling is not white, the color of 
the after-image will be different. 

(d) Contrast in brightness and colors is very important, and the 
harmonious arrangement of colors is to be observed in painting, 
decorating, dressing, etc. 

IV. Number and Comparison of the Senses 

I. Number. — The question of the number of the senses is 
limited to external senses. On account of their complexity and 
vagueness, no attempt is made to number internal senses, and 
psychologists follow different classifications. For the external 
senses, on the contrary, we have the traditional division into five 
senses as mentioned above. Some psychologists, however, pay 
little or no attention to this classification which they find inade- 
quate. The present question is secondary and of minor impor- 
tance, yet it may be of interest to see how solutions have been 
attempted. 



54 PSYCHOLOGY 

(a) If we take a psychological basis of division, namely, the dif- 
ferent qualities of sensations as mental states, we are at once con- 
fronted with the difficulty of determining the meaning of quaUty 
when applied to sensations. A sensation of red is qualitatively 
different from a sensation of blue; the sound of the flute from that 
of thunder, etc. It is asserted even that every change in intensity 
is also a change in quality. Hence on this basis alone a classifica- 
tion is impossible. Perhaps quality may be used in a generic 
sense, all colors forming one kind of quality; all sounds, another, 
and so on. But this is not purely psychological; sensations here 
are said to have the same generic quality because they are experi- 
enced through the same sense organ (physiology), or because their 
stimuli are of the same nature (physics). 

(b) If we take a physiological basis of division, namely, the 
number of the different sense organs, we have first to define what 
is meant by a special organ. Double organs like eyes and ears 
are counted as one. Why? Partly because they have the same 
structure and functions, partly also because they are affected by 
the same stimuli (this is not physiological, but physical). More- 
over, what is one special organ? Physiologists conmionly hold 
that there are within the eye special organs for the perception 
of each of the fundamental colors, that the organs of touch are 
distinct from those of temperature, that different qualities of taste 
are perceived through different papillae, etc. Hence the number 
of sense organs can hardly be determined. We may, however, 
admit five generic kinds of organs, counting as one those that are 
close together and have the same outer and accessory structures. 
For instance, even if every fundamental color is perceived through 
different retinal endings, the eye is one organ with only one set 
of enclosing membranes, refracting media, etc. 

(c) To argue from the number of distinct physical stimuli is to 
beg the question, since we are aware of the stimulus only through 
the sensation. To say that there are five groups of irreducible 
stimuli simply means that we experience five kinds of sensations, 
and this is the very question at issue. Physical sciences, however, 
lend us assistance by reducing. all colors to ether vibrations, heat 
to molecular vibrations, etc. 



SENSATION 55 

(d) Let us conclude that the commonly received division of 
the external senses may be retained on condition that it be under- 
stood as a generic division under which are found distinct sub- 
classes. As such it corresponds to the generic division of physical 
stimuli and of organs. All colors are referred to the sense of vision 
because, although blue differs from red, both are ether vibrations, 
and, although each may have special organs in the retina, these 
organs belong to the same structure and are parts of the whole 
complete organ, which is the eye. The same remarks apply to 
the other sensations. 

(e) As to the possibility of some other sense altogether different 
from those we have now, it has been asserted by some; but it 
can be neither proved nor disproved. The question is an idle one. 
(i) To have a new sense, there should be another stimulus differ- 
ent from those that are known at present. Its existence can only 
be asserted gratuitously. (2) In certain abnormal states, like 
somnambulism or hypnotism, a man may perceive things which 
he does not perceive normally, or in a manner different from that 
of the normal mind. But no new quality of things is manifested; 
there is only a special keenness of the senses, or a new mode of 
perceiving the same qualities. (3) Granting this supposition of 
another sense, it could not be inferred that things would seem dif- 
ferent from what they are now. The new information would not 
contradict, but complete, the information which we have at pres- 
ent. In the same way, if the power of vision is given to the man 
born blind, he becomes aware of qualities hitherto unknown to him, 
but this knowledge does not contradict or invalidate that which 
he has acquired through the other senses. 

2. The Comparison of the Senses may be made from different 
points of view. 

(a) In reference to usefulness, (i) Taste and smell are more 
closely related to organic sensations and less definite. They give 
less information concerning the external world. Hence, whereas 
they may be very useful for organic life, especially in some kinds of 
animals, they are of little use for intellectual Hfe. (2) Touch, 
hearing, and sight are the "intellectual" senses; from them are 
derived the data necessary for the higher mental fimctions. 



56 PSYCHOLOGY 

Through hearing we receive oral information, which is essential 
both in early education and in the whole course of life. Touch is 
the sense on which, in many cases, the other senses depend for 
the confirmation of the reaUty of their perceptions; it is of great 
value in educating them, as will be seen hereafter. In adult life, 
however, sight seems to be the chief sense, because it enables the 
mind to receive written information, and, as will be shown when we 
speak of perception, it embodies the results of touch and the other 
senses. 

(b) With regard to the mode of stimulation, it may be said that 
some kind of actual contact is required of the appropriate stimu- 
lus with the sense organ. Ether waves, air vibrations, emana- 
tions, etc., must act on the organ. Yet a distinction is to be made, 
if not for the simple sensation, at least for perception. An object 
cannot be tasted or touched without actual contact with it. 
On the contrary, it is possible to smell, hear, or see distant odorous, 
sounding, or luminous bodies, the reach of sight being far greater 
than that of any other sense. 

(c) As to the evolution of the senses, touch comes first, (i) It 
is the foundation of the other senses, since all require some contact. 
(2) It is the most xmiversal. Lower animals which do not have 
all the other senses have at least the sense of touch. There is no 
known instance of the presence of other senses where this one is 
absent. (3) In the same individual man, touch is the first sense 
to be exercised. 

V. PSYCHOPHYSICS AND PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 

I. Facts of Common Experience. — (a) Sensations are called 
weak, strong, moderate, etc., i.e. their intensity varies. A sound 
may be loud or hardly perceptible ; temperature may be increased 
or decreased; and thus for all the senses, (i) Generally to an 
increase in the stimulus corresponds an increase in the intensity 
of the sensation. Fifty candles give more light than one ; lifting a 
hundredweight gives a more intense sensation of muscular tension 
than lifting twenty pounds, etc. (2) Yet ordinary experience 
shows also that the sensation does not increase in the same abso- 
lute proportion as the stimulus. One singer's voice added to a 



SENSATION 57 

numerous chorus does not produce the same increment of sensa- 
tion as if it were added to one or two singers only. In a very bright 
room, the addition of one candle is not so striking as it would be 
in a dimly lighted room, etc. Therefore, in order to produce a 
noticeable difference in the sensation, the necessary increment of 
stimulus, must be proportioned to the already existing stimulus, 
i.e. it must be greater or smaller according as the original stimu- 
lus is itself greater or smaller. 

{b) A certain amount of physical stimulus is required to produce 
a sensation. A violin string may be vibrating without my hear- 
ing any sound, either because the vibrations are too feeble, or 
because, owing to the distance, they do not reach my ear. At a 
certain distance, the ticking of a clock may be heard whereas 
that of a watch is not. A small amount of a given substance 
diluted in a glass of water may not give it a noticeable taste; if it 
be increased a little the taste will be perceived. The initial point 
of sensation is called its threshold or its lower limit. There is also 
an upper limit or acme of sensation, but it cannot be determined, 
because some perceptible stimuli (e.g. some odors and savors) 
cannot be increased beyond certain limits, and chiefly because the 
sensations become too painful and dangerous; e.g. too high a tem- 
perature, too bright a light, too intense a sound, too great a con- 
tact and pressure are productive of pain rather than of external 
sensation, and injure the organism. 

2. Experimental Science tries to determine more accurately 
these facts of common experience. 

(c) Sensations cannot be measured directly and in themselves. 
Evidently no physical unit can be applied to mental states. Nor 
can any mental process be taken as a unit, because mental states 
are of widely different nature (a sensation of color or smell can- 
not be estimated in sound-units) ; and also because, even within the 
same class of processes, no unit can be applied. I may know 
that a sound is louder than another, but it is impossible for con- 
sciousness to determine whether it is exactly three or four times 
louder. The relative intensity of sensations cannot be measured 
by introspection. 

(6) Only an indirect measurement is possible. A sensation can 



58 PSYCHOLOGY 

be measured, not in itself, but in its relation to something else 
which is under control and which can be measured accurately, 
(i) I cannot, it is true, say whether a sensation of sound is three 
or four times more intense than another, but I can know that the 
number of vibrations producing it is three or four times larger 
than another. This relation of the sensation to the physical 
stimulus is the problem which psychophysics undertakes to solve. 
Its two main questions are those of the threshold of sensations, 
i.e. the minimum quantity of stimulus that can be perceived, and 
of the smallest differences of sensations, i.e. the minimum incre- 
ment of stimulus necessary to produce a difference in conscious- 
ness. (2) All mental states are accompanied by organic processes. 
Physiological psychology endeavors to measure these organic 
changes in blood-circulation, secretion, muscular activity, tem- 
perature, etc., in order to see how they are correlated to various 
mental states. (3) Mental processes require time. Between 
the application of a given stimulus and a corresponding reaction 
an interval of time elapses which psychometry tries to analyze and 
measure. 

N.B. Of these various problems, the first applies only to sen- 
sation and perception, for the stimulus must be external and 
under control, and such is not the case in other mental states like 
memory, emotion, volition. The second applies to all mental 
states, for all have correlates in the organism; but it is impossible 
to measure all organic processes. Some, like nervous processes, 
are central and cannot be reached. All are variable; what affects 
the circulation in one may affect the secretions in another; one 
grows pale where another would blush or tremble, etc. The third 
applies also to all mental states, but it is difficult to analyze 
and measure exactly every one of the elementary processes of a 
reaction. 

3. Methods. — (a) To determine the threshold of sensation 
two methods are followed, (i) Begin with too weak or too dis- 
tant a stimulus, and gradually increase it or bring it nearer until 
it is perceived. (2) Begin with a certainly perceivable stimulus, 
and gradually decrease it or move it farther until it ceases to be 
perceived. N.B. The latter method will generally give a lower 



SENSATION 59 

threshold than the former, i.e. weaker or more distant stimuli 
will be perceived; hence averages must be taken. 

(b) To determine the smallest perceptible difference, three meth- 
ods are used, (i) The method of least observable difference, which 
is applied in four ways. Begin with two equal stimuli, and grad- 
ually (a) increase or (b) decrease one till the precise moment when 
the difference is noticed. Begin with stimuli perceived as unequal, 
and gradually (c) increase the weaker or (d) decrease the stronger 
till no difference is felt. (2) The method of correct and mistaken 
cases. Slightly different stimuli are used, and after comparing 
them the subject pronounces on their relative differences, (3) 
The method of average error. One fixed stimulus is taken, and 
others more or less different are tried until one is found which 
appears to be equal to the first. 

N.B. In all these methods, which it is advisable to use together 
whenever possible in order to correct one by another, several 
experiments are made and averages taken. Without compli- 
cated apparatus they can be easily applied to certain sensations, 
e.g. weight, temperature, taste. 

(c) The methods of physiological psychology are very complex 
and require an elaborate apparatus to record and measure organic 
changes. 

{d) The same must be said of experiments in reaction-time. 
The general procedure, however, is as follows : In simple reaction- 
time or physiological time, the subject reacts by an easy and 
familiar movement — generally cutting off an electric current by 
pressing 6n a key — to a simple sensation which he expects. In 
complex reaction-time, which is longer, there is a choice in the mode 
of reaction according to the nature of the stimulus, or there is 
uncertainty as to the nature or quality of the sensation which will 
be experienced. The duration of the complex mental process is 
calculated by subtracting the physiological time from the total 
duration of the whole process. 

4. Results. — (a) Special results and numerical formulae which 
have been arrived at in these various experiments cannot be given 
here. Only some of the most general points will be mentioned. 

(6) Experiments on the threshold of sensation give different 



6o PSYCHOLOGY 

results according to the nature and distance of the stimuli used. 
Experiments on the minimum of perceptible increase have led to 
the formulation of the law known as " Weber's law," which is but a 
formula for both common and scientific experience: "The intensity 
of a sensation increases by absolute magnitudes when the stimulus 
increases by relatively constant magnitudes." Or: "Equal in- 
crements of sensation result from relatively equal increments of 
stimulus." Absolute increment means the addition of the same 
quantity; relative increment means the addition of a quantity 
compared to the already existing amount to which it is added. 
This law was given a more mathematical formulation by Fechner: 
"If the sensation must increase in arithmetical progression, the 
stimulus must increase in geometrical progression." Or: "The 
sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimulus." 

Thus, for instance, to say that the smallest perceptible incre- 
ment is, for sound \, for weight tV, and for light t^^, means that, 
in order to perceive the increment of stimulus, we must add i, 
tV> riiy, of the preceding stimulus. The difference between loo 
and loi candles will be the minimum perceptible. If the first 
stimulus be 200 or 300, then we must have, in order to perceive a 
difference, not 201 or 301 candles, but 200 -\- fo'^, or 202, and 
300 + f§§, or 303. 

(c) Experiments in physiological psychology show the influence 
of various mental states on organic processes, the effects of fatigue, 
emotions, dispositions, etc. 

{d) Reaction-time has led to determine the rate of transmission 
of the nervous current, and hence the duration of more complex 
cerebral processes. Even so-called simple reaction-time is in real- 
ity complex, for it includes the action of the stimulus on the end- 
organs, the transmission to the nervous centre, either to the brain 
directly or to the brain through the cord, the passage from a sen- 
sory to a motor process in the brain centre, the transmission of 
the motor excitation through the brain, cord, and motor nerves, 
and the production of muscular contraction. 

5. Value of the Results of Experiments. — We shall limit our- 
selves to a general appreciation. 

(o) Weher^s law has been discussed and criticised, and the 



SENSATION 61 

conclusion seems to be that it holds good provided it be accepted 
only as an approximation and applied only to sensations of mod- 
erate intensity. Hence Fechner's formula is too strict and too 
mathematical. 

(6) Experiments give different results according to the methods 
used, the aptitudes of the subject, his training, power of attention, 
habits and disposition. Hence the results obtained by different 
psychologists do not always agree, and they must always be 
understood as averages, not as invariable formulae. 

(c) Experimental psychology is a young science. The first 
psychological laboratory was founded by Wundt at Leipzig (1878), 
but Weber's and Fechner's investigations had taken place before 
that time. It has developed rapidly, and to-day psychological 
laboratories are found in all leading universities. By some, experi- 
mental psychology has been hailed as the only true psycholog- 
ical science in which alone progress is possible. By others, it has 
been condemned unreservedly as a vain and fruitless attempt from 
which no results useful to psychology have been obtained, and 
from which none are to be expected. It is not psychology at all, 
but physiology. It has even been identified with materialistic 
psychology. 

(d) The truth is to be found between these two extreme views. 
Experimental psychology in itself is not materialistic. It has 
nothing or Uttle to do with the metaphysical problem of the nature 
of the mind. It is only one branch or one method of psychology. 
It does not reach all mental processes, and considers only some as- 
pects of those which it does reach. Its hmitations are in its range 
of appKcation, in the restricted value of the results, and in the need 
which it has of other psychological methods to coordinate its 
results. 

Its value is both theoretical and practical. It makes of psy- 
chology a more exact science, helps us to understand better the 
nature and effects of certain mental attitudes and processes, like 
attention, emotions, expectation, and shows more clearly the rela- 
tions of mind and organism. The influence of sex, fatigue, heredity, 
drugs, etc., is ascertained more accurately and verified. The laws 
of habit, education, training, distraction, etc., are also determined 



62 PSYCHOLOGY 

more strictly. Hence experimental psychology is useful to medi- 
cine, physiology, and may become very valuable for pedagogy 
by finding better methods of teaching, in stricter accordance with 
the laws of the mind and the organism. The results so far obtained 
are imperfect, but they are sufficient to give hopes of greater, 
better, and more useful results in the future. 

n. PERCEPTION 

I. Analysis and Genesis of Sense Perception 

I. Analysis. — (a) Perception is the consciousness of things, 
whereas sensation is merely the consciousness of quaHties. Per- 
ception refers these qualities to objects. Thus in adult Ufe I do 
not merely hear a sound, but I hear the church bell or the whistle 
of the engine, I see a man, I smell a rose, I touch the table, etc. 

(b) Perceptions have not always the same degree of clearness. 
I may hear a sound without being able to ascertain its source; 
perceive an imknown tree, or a machine which I never saw before 
and the use of which I do not know, or an animal different from 
all those with which I am familiar. In such cases there is per- 
ception, although indistinct, for I am conscious not only of a 
quality, but also in some manner of a distance, direction, etc., 
and chiefly of an object to which I refer such quaUties. Percep- 
tions become more and more perfect with age, education, and 
mental development, because they embody a more accurate and 
more complete knowledge of the perceived objects. 

(c) Consequently it is in perception that sensations acquire a 
meaning. If I hear somebody speaking in a language imknown 
to me, his words have no meaning for me; they are simply soimds, 
since I cannot grasp the underlying thought w^hich they are in- 
tended to manifest. In the same manner sensations by themselves 
are meaningless, and perception unites them into a coherent 
whole. - 

(d) Perception is synthetic and coordinates several sensations. 
In the statement "I see the dog asleep over there," are implied 
many sensations past and present. I see simply a certain color, 
and I supply the rest from past associations. Many sensory, and 



PERCEPTION 63 

perhaps intellectual, elements enter into my complete perception 
of the dog, and only a few of these are actually given in my act 
of vision. All are now synthetized in the one perception of the 
sleeping dog. 

{e) Hence perception implies: (i) A synthesis of several simul- 
taneous sensations, although sometimes only one sense is used. 
Thus I refer to the same bell the sensations of vision, sound, hard- 
ness, etc. (2) A synthesis of present sensations with past sensa- 
tions of the same or of other senses, i.e. memory and recognition. 
Thus, although I have no actual experience of it, I know how the 
boiling water which I see would affect my sense of touch if I dipped 
my finger in it, and the knowledge that it is boiling is itself the 
result of past experiences. Imagination and habit may even pre- 
vent us from perceiving things as they are really, for instance, 
when a word in which a letter is missing is read without the mis- 
print being noticed. Or they complete the perception, as when I 
see a ball and perceive that it is spherical, although I really see 
only half of it. (3) The substitution of one sense for another, or of 
one sense for a more complex act of judgment and inference. 
For instance, I see that the table is hard and the pillow soft (touch), 
or I see that the dog is living (inference from its behavior). 

if) We may recall an old distinction which applies here. 

Sensile per se proprium. 

commune. 

per accidens. 

By sensile or ohiectum sensibile is meant the object about which 
the senses give information. The sensile per se is perceived 
directly. The sensile per accidens is not perceived in itself, but 
only because of some connection with the sense to whose percep- 
tion it is attributed. Color, sound, odor, taste, tactile qualities, 
are sensilia per se and propria, i.e. special to each sense. Size, 
number, shape, movement, rest, are sensilia per se but communia, 
as they may be perceived by more than one sense. Thus distance 
may be perceived by touch, vision, hearing, and even smell. 
To see the hardness of an object; to see a friend; to see that a dog 
is alive or dead, that a man is sad or joyful, healthy or sick; to 



64 PSYCHOLOGY 

hear that the bell is broken ; to know by taste that a fruit is of such 
or such a kind; to enter a room and learn by smell that the win- 
dows have not been opened for a long time, etc., are examples of 
sensilia per accidens. These qualities or objects are not perceived 
directly by the sense to which they are attributed, but inferred by 
habitual association. 

2. Genesis. — The first sensations are very vague, but, little 
by little, images left by them in the mind associate with sensations 
and images of the same or of different kind so as to enable the 
mind to identify and discern objects. The senses become educated. 
Applied to the senses, education means: (i) Their development and 
perfection for their immediate and original sensations. By exercise 
they acquire a greater keenness and accuracy. (2) The acquisi- 
tion by a given sense of perceptions which are not original {sensilia 
communia and sensilia per accidens). (3) The correction of errors 
and illusions. The main psychological factors in the education of 
the senses are attention, association, imagination and memory, 
intellect and will. Physiological factors are the habituation of 
the nervous system and the whole organism, the development, 
growth, and adaptation of sense organs, the development of the 
brain, hygiene, and the proper care and use of the sense organs. 

3. The Most Important Perceptions are those of sight, for, in the 
adult, sight is in many cases a substitute for the other senses, and 
reaches objects at a greater distance. It enables the mind to com- 
municate with others by gestures and writing. Touch, as we shall 
see, contributes greatly to the education of the other senses, 
especially of sight. Hearing has a great importance because it 
makes it possible to exchange ideas by means of speech. Smell 
and taste occupy the lowest place. 

II. Perceptions of Smell and Taste 

Both senses can be developed so as to reach a wonderful degree 
of keenness, e.g. in professional tasters. But even when educated, 
they give but little information concerning the external world. 
By experience, however, we leam to associate many odors and 
savors with the objects from which they proceed, and thus can 
recognize certain substances by these senses alone. Smell may also 



PERCEPTION 65 

indirectly, and more or less accurately, give information concerning 
the distance, direction, and even size of the odorous object. 

III. Auditory Perceptions 

1. Nature of Objects. — By association, sensations of hearing 
are ascribed to their causes and referred to such or such objects. 
A certain sound becomes the sound of a bell, and even of the 
church bell, the engine bell, the school bell . . . , because this sen- 
sation of hearing has been associated with other visual or tactual 
sensations, and because it has been noticed in what respects the 
sound of a bell in general differs from every other sound, and the 
sound of a particular bell from that of other bells. In the same 
way I come to know that a certain tune is played on the vioUn, 
the cornet, or the trombone, even when I do not see these instru- 
ments. (Let the student endeavor to indicate more in detail and 
more concretely the genesis of such perceptions.) Mention must 
also be made of the auditory perceptions of tempo, rhythm, and 
cadence in music, speech, poetry, etc., which are the sources of so 
much enjoyment. 

2. The Localization of Sounds in space includes the perceptions 
of direction and distance. 

(a) Perception of Direction, (i) The use of the senses of sight 
and touch is fundamental in acquiring and developing this percep- 
tion, and, even for the educated ear, these senses are frequently 
necessary to ascertain the direction accurately and to confirm the 
auditory perception. (2) Binaural perception is an index of direc- 
tion, because the intensity of sounds coming from the right or the 
left is different for the right and the left ear. Hence it is that in 
order to perceive the direction of a sound we generally turn the 
head around. Experience shows that the direction of sounds 
coming from the right or the left is more readily ascertained than 
that of sounds coming from objects in front or back of the hearer. 
(3) It is probable that the sensitiveness of the skin of the external 
ear and meatus, and the position of the semicircular canals, have 
something to do with the perception of direction. 

(b) Perception of Distance. The distance of a sonorous object 
is known by comparing the intensity of the present sound with the 



66 PSYCHOLOGY 

intensity of the same sound at greater or shorter known distances. 
To this end, the nature of the sonorous object and the intensity 
of its sound at a given distance must be already known. Atmos- 
pheric conditions, Hke the direction of the wind, the presence of 
fog, etc., must be taken into consideration. The distance of un- 
usual or unfamiliar sounds is much more difficult to determine. 

IV. Tactual Perceptions 

The information received from the sense of touch concerns the 
primary qualities of matter which are most fundamental, namely, 
quantity, extension, number, shape, etc. Moreover, touch is the 
sense to which appeal is generally made when other senses do not 
seem to agree, e.g. by grasping the object, walking toward or around 
it. Through cultivation it is capable of acquiring a wonderful 
and almost incredible degree of perfection, as, for instance, in per- 
sons born bUnd. In all cases active touch, e.g. " feeUng " with the 
hands, is much more useful than mere passive touch, because 
to the simple contact of the latter it adds sensations of muscular 
activity and movement, and it gives several simultaneous and 
successive sensations. The knowledge of the shape, dimensions, 
and qualities of a knife will be more accurate after handling it 
than after merely touching it. Tactual perceptions may be reduced 
to those of our own body and those of other material substances. 

I. Perception of One's Own Organism. — (a) There seems to 
be some native but very vague consciousness of the organism. 
In the beginning, tactual sensations — including contact and 
pressure, temperature, sensations of muscles and joints — are 
vaguely localized in the organism, and discriminative sensibility 
is very imperfect. The numerous and complex vital sensations, 
the various contacts of the organism with surrounding objects, the 
experience of pain, etc., contribute to make the perception more 
definite. So also the fact that objects produce different impres- 
sions according to their size and qualities, and according to the 
parts of the body with which they come in contact. 

(b) More effective are the sensations of double contact. When 
a part of the organism, e.g. the hand, touches another, a double 
sensation of touch is experienced, and thus by passive and chiefly 



PERCEPTION 67 

by active touch the Hmits and parts of the organism are soon 
ascertained. 

(c) The sense of sight is a help in localizing more accurately 
the sensations of touch. 

2. Perception of Other Material Substances. — (a) Sensations 
of single contact, as opposed to those of double contact, contribute 
to the consciousness of the distinction between one's organism and 
other bodies. The same is true of the pain felt in one part of the 
organism or in two according as the child strikes some external 
substance or his own body. 

(6) Size, figure, and distance are perceived chiefly by active touch, 
and by the muscular sensations experienced in passing the hands 
on or around the object, and in walking toward or around it. 
Measurements of size and distance are eSected by a comparison 
with a known imit, with parts of our own body, or with our bodily 
movements. It is noteworthy that the interpretation of visual 
sensations of size and distance is frequently done in terms of touch. 
A thing is so many " steps " away, so many " feet " or " cubits " 
long; it is at the distance of " a stone's throw," of " a two-hour 
walk," etc. In such expressions the standard unit is taken from 
the human body and its movements. 

(c) Weight depends largely on the strength, exercise, and educa- 
tion of the muscular sense. In consequence it is greatly relative, 
unless the habit has been acquired of referring it to a fixed unit, 
such as ounce, pound, etc. Active touch especially is important 
in the determination of the number and the movements of objects. 

{d) Combined sensations and perceptions of touch may in some 
cases give the knowledge of the very nature of an object. Thus a 
certain group of sensations will indicate a metal, and even this or 
that metal; another group will indicate marble or wood, oil or 
water, etc. 

V. Visual Perceptions 

I. Erect and Single Vision. — The phenomena of erect vision 
although the image formed on the retina is inverted, and of single 
vision although we have two eyes, belong chiefly to the domain of 
physiology. 



68 PSYCHOLOGY 

(a) With regard to erect vision, habit may be an important fac- 
tor, for, even if originally we had a tendency to see things inverted, 
habit acquired by touch would correct this tendency. It is possible 
also that, in the transmission from the retina to the brain, spatial 
relations are not preserved. But the more probable explanation 
is that the image on the retina is not perceived at all, and in fact 
we are not directly aware of it. The rays of light are perceived in 
the direction from which they come because in vision there seems 
to be a double movement, one of the object toward the eye through 
the refracting media, producing the inverted image on the retina, 
the other from the eye, projecting the image in its erected position. 
This activity from the eye is manifest in projected after-images. 
In photography, on the contrary, the object is simply received on 
the film, which is passive, and hence is found inverted. 

{b) As to single perception: (i) The greater part of the field of 
vision is common to both eyes, as can be easily verified by using 
each separately. The same is not true of fishes, birds, or other 
animals whose eyes are found on the sides of the head. (2) If 
we look simultaneously at two objects imequally distant from the 
eye, for instance, at two pencils held vertically before the eyes, one 
at a distance of seven or eight inches, the other seven or eight inches 
farther, the nearer pencil will appear double if the eyes are accom- 
modated for and fixed upon the more distant, and vice versa. Or 
hold a fiaiger before your eyes, and look at the ceiling or sky : two 
fingers will be seen, although vaguely. (3) Some animals cer- 
tainly have single perceptions from the beginning, e.g. the chick, 
which immediately pecks the grain of corn. But they are precisely 
those whose eyes are divergent, and for which therefore the majority 
of objects perceived simultaneously are perceived by one eye only. 
(4) Physiologists commonly hold that single perception is based 
on the corresponding points of the retina, i.e. points situated in 
the same relative position with regard to the fovea centralis, both 
being on the right of it, or on the left, or up, or down. Hence, for 
instance, the nasal half of one retina has no corresponding point in 
the nasal half of the other retina, but in its temporal half. Rays 
of light falling on corresponding points are perceived as single, 
otherwise as double. — From what precedes it would seem that 



PERCEPTION 69' 

both a native disposition and also education and exercise are factors 
in the phenomenon of single vision. 

2. Perception of Surface. — Against pure empiricists who claim 
that the perception of surface is not original and primitive, but 
acquired by experience, it seems certain that original perceptions 
of vision include in a vague manner that of surface and extension, 
(i) It seems impossible to perceive a color without perceiving at 
once some colored extension. (2) In fact, in the few instances of 
persons born blind and made to see in adult age, these persons 
perceive at once some colored surface, but no distance or solidity. 
(3) Some animals, e.g. the chick which does not miss its aim, as 
already mentioned, have originally not only the perception of 
extension, but also that of distance. 

The superficial shape, if small, is perceived at one glance; if 
large, by the movements of the eye around the object. 

3. Perception of Distance. — (a) The perception of distance is 
not original, but acquired. A nativistic view cannot be accepted 
here, as it was for the perception of surface, (i) A man born 
blind and operated upon for cataract reports objects as being in 
contact with the eye, or at most perhaps at a vague distance which 
cannot be estimated. (2) A child shows that it cannot appre- 
ciate distances, e.g. when it tries to grasp objects, like the 
moon, which are far beyond its reach. — These reasons show at 
least that distances cannot be estimated at first, even should 
the object be perceived as vaguely distant and distinct from the 
eye. 

(b) The main factors in the perception of distance are: (i) The 
sensations of accommodation, as various structures of the eye adapt 
themselves differently according as the object is far or near. (2) 
The visual angle, that is, the apparent size of an object when its 
real size is known. A man appears smaller at the distance of one 
mile than at the distance of ten feet, i.e. the visual angle — the 
angle formed from the eye as vertex between lines directed toward 
the extremities of the perceived object — is smaller. Hence 
illusions of distance will produce illusions of size, e.g. in panoramas. 
(3) The fact that an object covers another totally or in part, and 
the number of intervening objects, are signs of their relative distances. 



70 PSYCHOLOGY 

(4) The apparent brightness of the object, the distinctness of its 
parts and outlines. (5) The changes in the relative positions of 
different objects, and the rapidity with which these changes take 
place when one moves the head or the whole body. On a train, 
nearer objects seem to " move " much faster than the more distant 
ones. (6) The degree of convergence of the axes of both eyes, 
which is greater for near objects. This appHes only to distances 
under one fourth of, or perhaps half, a mile. For greater distances 
the convergence is the same. (7) The similarity and dissimilarity of 
the separate vision of each eye, which vary according to the distance 
of the object. (8) Touch and locomotion, which make it possible 
to estimate distances accurately and are necessary to train the eye. 

With the use of one eye only, vertically hold a pin or a pencil 
in each hand, one higher, the other lower, and without the help 
of the sense of touch try to bring the point of the higher pencil 
or pin exactly on top of the point of the lower, and see how you 
will succeed. Try again. Try with the use of both eyes. Do 
you succeed better? Why? 

4. The Perception of Solidity, Relief, and Depth is but an 
application of the perception of distance. It depends chiefly on 
binocular vision helped by touch. Monocular perception of 
solidity is always imperfect. Unless an object, e.g. a book, is at 
too great a distance (of over twenty or thirty feet), one eye does 
not perceive it in exactly the same way as the other. The right 
eye perceives more on the right side of the object, and the left 
eye more on the left side. Hold a pencil or rod about one foot 
long horizontally before the eyes, the nearer end being about six 
inches from the face, and at the height of the mouth; look at it 
with the right eye, it is seen as / ; look with the left eye, it is seen 
as \ ; look with both eyes fixed on the nearer end, it is seen as V ; 
fixed on the farther end, it is seen as \ ; fixed on the middle, it is 
seen as X . The factors in the perception of relief are the same as 
for distance. In paintings and drawings many illusions of distance, 
solidity, and relief are produced by the proper arrangement of light, 
colors, shades, perspective, sizes, etc. Two pictures may be 
taken of the same object, but sHghtly different, one as it appears 
to the right, the other as it appears to the left eye. In the stereo- 



THE MENTAL IMAGE 71 

scope, by means of lenses, both are made to be seen in the same place 
as one picture, and thus produce the illusion of solidity and relief. 
5. The Perception of the Size or Magnitude of surfaces and 
solids is acquired in different ways. 

(a) Near objects may be compared to the human body or to 
parts of it, and this comparison is facilitated by touch and locomo- 
tion. Or they may be compared to other bodies the size of which 
is already known. Hence in drawing the sketch of a building, 
an architect will place near it drawings of men, trees, carriages, or 
other familiar objects, so as to make it easier to estimate the 
height of the building. 

(b) By means of the visual angle, the distance, if known, makes 
it possible to form an idea of the real size of objects. Thus I may 
know that the man twenty feet away is taller than another at a 
distance of ten feet, although the latter, judged only by the visual 
angle, seems taller. 

(c) Important also are the muscular sensations experienced in 
moving the eyeball or head in order to follow the outlines of the 
object. 

ARTICLE II. SENSE REPRESENTATION 

I. THE MENTAL IMAGE 

I. Nature of the Image 

I. Psychological. — (a) Representation does not mean that 
the same object or quality which has been perceived is again pre- 
sented and perceived in the same way, but only as a likeness, a 
copy, or, better, an image {imago, from the root im in imitor). It 
is a fact of daily experience that we can " imagine " absent things, 
that is, recall to mind the images of things perceived in the past. 
Image, which in common usage refers to the sense of vision, applies 
here to all senses. Not only are there visual images, but auditory, 
tactual, etc., images as well. Mental imagery is the collection of 
images in the mind. 

{h) An image necessarily implies that something has been left 
over by the preceding perception which it represents. Where 



72 PSYCHOLOGY 

there has been no sensation, there is no image; a blind man may 
form images of sounds, but not of colors. This residue of the 
preceding perception is not the image itself, for image applies only 
to the representation actually present in consciousness, not to 
the unconscious retention of something intermediary between the 
perception and the image. This residue is therefore more com- 
monly called a disposition, i.e. a capacity or aptitude resulting 
from a permanent modification, which enables the mind to revive 
images of things perceived formerly. Three stages are included 
in representation: (i) perception; (2) retention of an unconscious 
disposition, sometimes called latent image; (3) actual revival and 
presence of the image in the mind. 

(c) The following characteristics differentiate the image from 
the percept, i.e. from the result of the act of perception. — We 
shall speak later of abnormal cases in which images are taken for 
percepts (hallucination) — (i) The percept is antecedent in time, 
and independent of the resulting image; the image is posterior to, 
and dependent on, perception. (2) The percept is vivid and at- 
tributed to the presence of a real object; the image is fainter, and 
is not referred to an object actually present. (3) Perception is 
dependent on the presence of external objects for its possibility, 
nature, appearance, or disappearance. The image is possible in the 
absence of the external object ; It appears or disappears of itself, or 
under the influence of the will; its nature even maybe modified so as 
to be either a true or a more or less fanciful representation. If my 
eyes are normal and open, I cannot help seeing objects within my 
field of vision, and I can see no other. But even in the dark or with 
my eyes closed, some visual images may come spontaneously or be 
called to the mind; others may be excluded or modified purposely. 

{d) A few remarks will be useful on the meaning of certain 
terms used in connection with the present question. " Idea " 
applies to both images and concepts, i.e. to all mental representa- 
tions, whether concrete or abstract. By the scholastics any 
image or mental picture was called phantasma, and the faculty of 
retaining images was the phantasia (^atVw, to appear). To-day 
the terms "phantasm" and "phantasy" are seldom, if ever, 
used in this sense. Phantasy or fancy indicates something illusory, 



THE MENTAL IMAGE 73 

odd or whimsical, " fanciful " or " fantastic." Phantasm is applied 
especially to forms or spectres of an hallucinatory nature which 
appear in various forms of mental excitation and exaltation, or 
under the influence of certain drugs. Sometimes, chiefly in spirit- 
istic literature, it is restricted to the true or supposed apparitions 
of disembodied spirits. 

2. Physiological. — {a) Certain facts make it clear that the 
mental image has a physiological basis, (i) Experimental re- 
searches and pathological observations have shown that injury 
to, and disease of, certain parts of the brain destroy or impair the 
power of reviving certain groups of mental images. (2) The 
restoration or cure of these parts has been followed by the restitu- 
tion of the missing images. (3) The easier acquisition of images 
in early age is generally explained, in part at least, by the fact 
that the nervous centres are more plastic than in old age. (4) On 
the other hand, physiological experiments show that a nerve, 
once it has been excited, acquires some facility for receiving again 
the same excitation, that is, every excitation leaves some trace 
or residue in the nervous system. Whether this is a persisting 
movement and vibration, or a permanent impression and modifica- 
tion, or a latent disposition, is secondary. These three hypotheses 
are not mutually exclusive. Persisting vibrations and persisting 
imprints may coexist, and both account for the resulting aptitude 
or disposition. Sensations produce some modification in the 
nervous substance, and hence leave special dispositions. 

(6) Physiological dispositions cannot dispense with mental 
dispositions. A movement, vibration, or chemical change in the 
organism can no more accoimt for the image than for the perception 
itself. Consciousness cannot be reduced to material properties. 
To speak of organic memory, or of the memory of a violin, because 
it improves by usage, is objectionable because memory is a 
psychological term implying consciousness. 

II. Properties of the Image 

The image is representative (psychological), and motor (physio- 
logical). 

I. The Image is Representative. — (a) According as it repre- 



74 PSYCHOLOGY 

sents an object as it was really perceived, or is combined with 
other images, the image is called simple or complex. In a certain 
sense, it is true that all images are complex, since perception itself 
is complex. But simplicity and complexity here refer to the 
image considered either as reproducing only one perception, or as 
reproducing together several, or parts of several, perceptions. 
The complexity of images results from the combination of several 
images into one, or from the dissociation of the elements of one 
image, and their grouping with parts of other images. I may 
imagine, for instance, a dog with feathers, or a bird with hair and 
four feet. In the simple image no new elements are introduced, 
but it may be a more or less complete representation of the object. 

{h) Images become fused, that is, images partly similar and 
partly dissimilar may be, as it were, superposed in the mind so as 
to strengthen common features, and blur individual features. 
By taking successively on the same plate photographs of, let us 
say, six members of a family, each one receiving only one sixth of 
the total necessary exposure, a composite photograph is obtained 
in which common features are reinforced, whereas individual 
characteristics are weak. The fusion of images has a similar result. 
For instance, the features common to all dogs, like the facts of 
having two ears and eyes, four legs, a certain general appearance, 
etc., remain prominent; but individual features, like size, definite 
color, etc., are in the background. These are included in the image 
of an individual dog, but are generally replaced by averages, or 
are hardly noticed, when we simply think of a dog without referring 
the image to this or that individual. 

(c) Complexity and fusion give one simultaneous result, namely, 
one composite or vague image. Association gives a successive 
result. It means a linking together of two or more images in a 
series as antecedents and consequents, so that the revival of an 
image is likely to produce the revival of another image with which 
it is associated. Of association we shall soon speak more in detail, 

{d) An image has intensity. Not in the same sense as sensation, 
for the images of thunder or of a dazzling light may be fainter than 
those of a whisper or a candle; but in the sense that it is more or 
less vivid, clear, distinct, and similar to the original. 



THE MENTAL IMAGE 75 

(e) Complexity, fusion, association, and vividness of images 
sometimes require no effort of the will, sometimes also are under 
the control of the will and are intended for special purposes. 

2. The Image is Motor. — This important aspect of ideas has 
a more direct reference to the chapter on conative faculties than 
to the present chapter on cognitive faculties. 

(c) All perceptions are accompanied by various organic pro- 
cesses which are more or less conscious. Hence by association 
mental images are accompanied by the images of these processes. 
In playing the piano, or the trombone, or any other instrument, 
the sensations of sound are accompanied by the movements of 
the arms, hands, and fingers, necessary to produce these sounds. 
In listening to music played by others, the performer's motions 
may also be perceived and associated with the auditory sensations. 
Or the listener may be aware of certain definite or indefinite motions 
in his own organism, e.g. of the tendency to dance, beat time, mark 
the rhythm by certain gestures, etc. In reproduction all these 
images tend to come back together. 

(b) A perception or image of a movement is accompanied by 
an inchoative execution of such a movement, which in many cases 
is conscious. When I follow the pianist's motions with the eyes, 
my hands themselves have a tendency to move with those of the 
player. I feel a beginning of the necessary innervation and 
muscular adaptation, the strength of which varies with the nature 
of the stimulus, and with subjective dispositions and habits. 
When I recall a tune which I have played, there is some inchoation 
of those movements which were required to play it. If it is a 
march or a dance, there is a tendency to take a certain bodily 
attitude and to execute appropriate movements. The image of a 
circle includes certain eye changes in order to follow its outline. 
The image of a word produces inchoative movements in the organs 
of speech to utter it, or in the hands and fingers to write it, etc. 
Hence, in general, an image always implies a motor tendency to 
realization. 

(c) This tendency may be so strong, for instance in the case of 
habits, that an idea is immediately and almost automatically 
accompanied by complete motor processes. Or it may be reduced 



76 PSYCHOLOGY 

to a feeble and imperceptible change in the nerve centres, without 
any external manifestation. If there is only one idea in the mind, 
as happens in a hypnotized subject, the tendency to realization is 
irresistible, because the mind is deprived of other ideas which 
normally would hold this one in check. If, for instance, while the 
subject is in reality eating something sweet and agreeable, the idea 
is suggested to him that he is eating something loathsome, his 
face will show an expression of disgust, and his stomach may be so 
upset as to cause vomiting. When, on the contrary, several ideas 
are present in the mind, either they will evoke a series of coordi- 
nated movements, if they are in harmony, or, if they are opposed, 
they will remain in equilibrium, or form antagonistic groups, one of 
which will finally prevail. Higher mental faculties also contribute 
to foster or check the motor tendencies of ideas. 

(d) Not only does the idea suggest the movement, but the move- 
ment or attitude suggests the idea. Thus the attitude of prayer 
suggests the idea of praying, clenching the fist is suggestive of 
revenge, etc. 

(e) This motor property of ideas accounts for many facts attri- 
buted to imitation. The perception of actions performed by 
another suggests the idea of this action, which is in turn followed 
by the appropriate movements. It also accounts for many facts 
attributed to mind-reading. Slight movements and muscular 
contractions are real, although unconscious, and they can be 
detected by a skilled and sensitive person. Thus, for instance, 
an object is concealed, and only one person knows where. This 
person is taken by the hand and led almost immediately to the 
hiding-place. Such mind-reading amounts simply to perceiving 
and interpreting some slight muscular contractions performed 
imconsciously and involuntarily by the subject, as he is led toward 
or away from the place where the object is to be found. The 
whole expression of the face, especially of the eyes, is also of great 
help in such experiments. 

III. Association and its Laws 

I. Meaning. — (a) As already remarked, association does not 
mean a process of combination by which several images would 



THE MENTAL IMAGE 77 

Unite so as to become one. It refers to the succession of ideas in 
the mind, and means that images are not revived independently 
and at random, but that their revival depends on actual perceptions 
or on the presence of other ideas in the mind. Images are grouped 
or linked together so that the revival of one tends to bring about 
the revival of another or of several others. 

(b) Sometimes we are clearly aware of this connection; we can 
follow the " train " of ideas and perceive their nexus. In other 
cases we are unable to see why one idea is revived; it seems to 
flash into the mind without being called for and of its own accord. 
But frequently in such cases further reflection reveals the hidden 
thread which bound ideas together. After a conversation, the 
beginning and the end of which deal with totally different subjects 
that seem to have nothing in common, it is very interesting to trace 
back the trend of the conversation in order to see the connection 
between the various topics, and examine how one led to another. 

(c) Association has no laws properly so-called. Every individual 
mind has its own associations, and the same idea or perception 
will revive different ideas in different minds; it " reminds " one of 
one thing, and another of another thing. Moreover, even in the 
same mind, manifold associations exist, and it is impossible before- 
hand to say which idea will be revived. Hence it occurs fre- 
quently that we fail when trying to " give the clue " to another, 
and that a " hint " is not always taken. The so-called laws of 
association simply indicate how groups of ideas are formed, and 
how one idea suggests another. 

2. The Laws of Association have been enumerated in various 
ways. Some psychologists mention three, others two, and others 
one, reducing all to the law of contiguity in consciousness. Here 
the various modes of association are indicated without any attempt 
to examine whether they are reducible to one or two laws. 

(a) An idea may be revived owing to the likeness which it has 
with another already present in consciousness. The similarity 
may be total or partial, and the common features are more or 
less numerous. Examples: likeness of two tunes, of two words in 
spelling or pronunciation, of a copy and its original, of two houses, 
of two smells or tastes, etc. 



78 PSYCHOLOGY 

(b) Contrast contributes to the revival of images, e.g. a hot 
summer day and a cold winter day, a giant and a dwarf, a good 
and a bad action. It is clear that contrast in some respects and 
similarity in other respects frequently exist together between the 
same objects. 

(c) Association also takes place on account of the contiguity in 
space or time. Thus my thought of a building in a city may recall 
that of another building in the same city; a state may suggest a 
neighboring state. The thought of a historical event may recall 
other contemporary or immediately preceding and following events 
or personages. 

Similarity, contrast, and contiguity are the three main laws of 
association. 

{d) Among other important factors of association must be 
mentioned: (i) The vividness oi the impression or impressions, and 
hence their interest, the attention voluntarily or involuntarily 
given to them, their emotional aspect, etc. (2) Recentness; 
generally images fade away with time unless they are recalled. 
(3) General and special dispositions, organic and mental, perma- 
nent and transitory, acquired and natural. 

(e) An idea may be linked with others in more than one way, 
and in this case the chances of its being recalled are greater. 

(/) Associations and groupings of ideas may be cooperative or 
conflicting. In the struggle for persistence and revival, the law 
which, for organisms, has been called the law of " the survival of the 
fittest," applies to ideas. An idea may have several advantages 
over its competitors, both in itself and on account of the group to 
which it belongs. In this case it stands a better chance of survival. 
Others, on the contrary, being weak, soon become weaker still; 
they fall into subconsciousness, never perhaps to be revived. 

n. IMAGINATION 

I. Nature of Imagination 

I. Meaning of the Term. — Imagination sometimes means the 
power, sometimes the process itself, of forming mental images, 
and sometimes the result of this activity, namely, the mental image. 



IMAGINATION 79 

The term " imagination " is also used in a more restricted sense 
for the constructive imagination, i.e. the forming of images that 
are not in conformity with reaHty, as when, after listening to a 
yarn, we say; " That's all imagination." This last meaning is 
more properly that of fancy, which is more superficial, playful, 
false, and artificial. 

2. Kinds of Imagination, — (a) Imagination is called passive 
or active according as images recur spontaneously, or as an effort 
is made to recall them. 

(b) Imagination is simply reproductive, or constructive, according 
as it merely represents (more or less completely) the object as 
perceived, or combines images into one composite image. The 
" construction " may be merely mechanical and spontaneous, or 
it may be purposive, for instance, in inventions and works of art. 
To the constructive imagination may be reduced the power of 
magnifying and minimizing things. 

(c) Constructive imagination includes two main processes, 
isolating and combining. By the former ideas are dissociated into 
several parts; by the latter the parts thus obtained are united in 
different ways to form composite images. 

(d) Imagination deals with reproduction, but not necessarily, 
nor even primarily, with faithful reproduction. Nevertheless all 
the elements of a composite image are found scattered in preceding 
sense-perceptions. 

II. Importance of Imagination 

The importance of imagination, both for good and for bad, can 
hardly be overestimated; it is a useful, yet dangerous power. 

I. For Organic Life. — Imagination exercises a great influence 
on the health of the organism because ideas are not only representa- 
tive but also motor. Many illustrations of this could be given. 
Do we not see frequently imaginary ills leading to real sickness? 
To imagine that you are sick is one of the best ways to become 
truly sick, and to avoid thinking of your real sickness frequently 
proves to be a powerful help in the cure. The use of an appropriate 
remedy is in itself very beneficial, but the conviction that it is 
beneficial and that it will produce a certain result makes it twice 



8o PSYCHOLOGY 

as effective. Imagination without the remedy may even produce 
the desired result. Cases might be cited of persons who felt sure 
they had taken a certain medicine, and indeed experienced the 
results of it, and who later found the pill which, in fact, they had 
forgotten to take. There is a better chance for the man who has 
made up his mind to get well than for the one who imagines that 
he will die and despairs. 

2. Intellectual Life. — (a) General. Perception supposes imag- 
ination; it is from images left by past experiences that we supply 
the elements of the object which are not actually perceived by the 
senses. The higher forms of mental life, conception, judgment, 
and reasoning, are dependent on imagination, as will be shown 
later. To a certain extent the imagination helps to concentrate 
the mind on an object; but it may also be the source of fickleness 
and of a constant wandering of the mind. 

(b) Special. Imagination helps the understanding of abstract 
truths because it furnishes concrete examples and illustrations. 
It may also become a danger, because thought cannot always take 
the form of images, and some are inclined to identify understanding 
with imagining. Under the guidance of reason, imagination is the 
principle of inventions, for it furnishes the mind with the complex 
images of certain effects to be expected and realized. It helps to 
frame and test hypotheses, and here it is very important to imagine 
all possible cases, e.g. for a general to think of all the possible move- 
ments of the enemy, since to omit one may cause defeat; or for a 
scientist to think of all the possible causes of a phenomenon, 
otherwise he is in danger of being mistaken. 

The danger of attaching too much importance to imaginary 
conceptions, and of mistaking them for reaHties, is to be avoided. 
One must beware especially of " complementary " imagination 
by which things are perceived, not as they really are, but as they 
should be in order to meet one's expectations and views. See, for 
instance, in how many different ways the same fact is interpreted 
and reported by different observers, every one coloring it according 
to his own fancy. 

(c) In arts, imagination creates ideals, types, fictions, etc., which 
the artist endeavors to realize and express. 



IMAGINATION 8l 

3. In Daily Practical Life, imagination has a very complex role. 
Success depends largely on imagination and forethought, since it 
requires the idea of the end to be reached and of the means to reach 
it, the prevision of the possible good and bad results of an enter- 
prise, etc. Failure is frequently due to an excess or a lack of 
imagination. Imagination exercises a great influence in making 
human life happy or miserable, for it causes us to magnify or 
minimize its goods and evils, and to compare our lot with the 
worse or the better lot of others. It thus gives an optimistic or a 
pessimistic view of the world and of life, and changes the aspect of 
things. In the relations with others, it may so blind one to reality 
that nothing but good will be seen in certain persons, and nothing 
but evil in others. Motives will be supplied rightly or wrongly, 
and " complementary " imagination will make it almost impossible 
to pass a soimd judgment on the actions of others. 

4. In Moral Life, imagination may usurp the place of reason 
as the guide of human actions, but it may also be used to construe 
the means of doing good, and to form ideals and examples. 

5. In Religious Life, imagination helps to grasp the highest 
spiritual truths and to express them by appropriate symbols. 
But it is also the source of errors, prejudices, and superstitions. 

III. Training of the Imagination 

I. General Principles. — (a) As imagination may be both very 
useful and very harmful according to the use which is made of it, 
it is important to pay attention to its development. Imagination 
must be cultivated on account of its utUity, and controlled on account 
of its dangers. Certain features must be strengthened, others 
must be checked. 

(b) The main principle is that imagination should he a useful 
servant. Hence it should never be allowed to reign over other 
faculties and activities, or to guide human actions and behavior; 
it must remain under the guidance and control of reason. To 
do this is a serious task which requires constant effort and vigilance, 
and, notwithstanding these, imagination from time to time will still 
work mischief in the mind; it will still deceive and mislead man. 
With persevering attention it is possible to train and control the 
7 



82 PSYCHOLOGY 

imagination, to increase its usefulness by developing it along certain 
lines and checking its excessive activity. Imagination must not 
be allowed free scope to wander at random. Images which should 
not occupy the mind — remember that they are motor — must be 
banished and held in check by calling forth other images and 
ideas. 

2. The General Factors in the development of the imagination 
are psychological and physiological, (i) Acquired or innate 
dispositions, temperament, sex, character, age, etc. (2) The 
relative development and keenness of the senses. (3) Surround- 
ings, mode of life, occupations, business, etc. (4) Habits. (5) 
The use of narcotics and stimulants. 

(a) From these result the various types of imagination: visual, 
auditory, tactual, and motor. A type of imagination consists in 
a special tendency to revive images of one sense in preference to 
those of other senses. Thus in reciting a lesson which they have 
memorized, some pupils will see it on their books, follow it line 
after line, remember the first words of each page and paragraph, 
etc. Others are led rather by the sequence of sounds; others, by 
the motions necessary to utter the words. In consequence, some 
will learn their lesson by simply reading it -with the eyes; others, 
by reading it aloud; others, by going through the motions of the 
organs of speech, especially of the lips and tongue, without uttering 
any sound. The revival of the image of a band concert may consist 
primarily of the visual images of the players, their respective 
positions, their uniforms, motions, etc.; or of the various sounds 
and tunes; or of certain motor phenomena, marching or dancing, 
which lead to remember the tunes. 

(b) More special features may be developed for certain purposes 
according to various conditions of life, for business, arts, and 
sciences. This is effected by attention and concentration of mind. 
Thus the chauffeur has to remember roads; the car conductor, 
persons; the business man, merchandise, etc. The musician im- 
agines sounds in preference to colors; the painter, colors and visual 
features in preference to sounds, etc. 

To conclude: Keep the faculty of imagination alive, but apply 



MEMORY 83 

it according to reason. Develop it, but control and direct it, and 
do not be led by it in your judgments and actions. 

ni. MEMORY 

I. Nature of Memory 

I. Distinction of Memory and Imagination. — It is difficult to 
draw a strict dividing line between memory and imagination. 
The main differences, however, are the following: 

(a) Imaginaiion is more fanciful and constructive, whereas 
memory reproduces the image of an experience as it really occurred. 
Whatever is added or changed, whether consciously or uncon- 
sciously, belongs to imagination. It must be noted, however, that, 
in order to belong to memory, it is not necessary for the image to 
represent all details. This is generally impossible, and the memory 
of some features co-exists with the oblivion of some others. The 
image may be true without being complete. Yet it cannot be 
called a faithful reproduction if essential features are left out; 
but, according to different points of view, different features may 
be looked upon as essential. 

(b) Memory implies a reference to the past, and includes recogni- 
tion; imagination refers chiefly to the present or future, and includes 
no recognition. An image may be present in the mind without 
the awareness that it is an image and therefore a reproduction. 
Or I may perceive a thing for the second or third time without 
remembering former perceptions; it is altogether "new" to me. 
This is true not only of images that are built up by the constructive 
imagination, and the elements of which are found scattered in 
past perceptions, but even of simple images. The mind may be 
incapable of referring them to the original, and is not conscious 
that they are copies. Or it may stop at the consideration of the 
present image, without thinking at all of the past perception. 
Or finally it may apply itself chiefly to the future realization of such 
an image or ideal. This is not enough for memory, which requires 
that the image be referred to its original, and that the mind 
recognize it as a representation of some past perception. 

(c) Hence memory supposes at least the implicit knowledge 



84 PSYCHOLOGY 

that the ego or subject who now recognizes the image is the same 
who experienced the original corresponding perception. It leads 
one to acknowledge the fact of the persistence of the self and of 
self -identity, since the same mind is at once forming the present 
image and referring it to its own past experience. 

2. Two Kinds of Memory. — According to the mode of this 
reference two kinds of memory must be distinguished, (i) One 
is the recall of an individual event which has occurred only once or a 
few times, at such or such a date, in these or those circumstances. 
Thus I may clearly remember an event which I witnessed, an 
action which I performed, a conversation which I held, a speech 
which I heard, etc. (2) The other is acquired by a series of 
repetitions made for the purpose of learning. The child who 
memorizes his lesson for the next day reads it and repeats it to 
himself one, two, . . . ten times, in succession, or at several intervals 
of time, and on the next day, when he recites it, the individual read- 
ings are of no importance for him; he is attentive only to the 
present conformity of his words with those of the book. This 
memory is very close to habit and consists of many habitual associa- 
tions. 

3. The Three Stages of Memory are retention, reproduction, 
and recognition. The former two are common to memory and 
imagination, the latter is special to memory. 

(a) Images are retained in the mind as unconscious dispositions. 
Images must not be conceived as " stored up " in the mind or the 
brain, as though the mind or brain were like a storehouse, box, or 
receptacle in which they can be gathered and preserved. Since 
image means a conscious representation, the retention of images 
is but a metaphorical expression. What is retained is the latent 
disposition or aptitude to call forth an image. 

(b) Reproduction, or the actual revival in consciousness, depends 
on (i) association with, or suggestion from, present perceptions 
or images; (2) recollection, that is, the voluntary effort to recall 
an idea that has been partially forgotten, and some elements of 
which are now present in consciousness. In recollection we 
endeavor to reach back in the past and to recall the whole idea 
or group of ideas by the use of the laws of association. 



MEMORY 85 

(c) Recognition, or the reference of the present to the past, is 
of two kinds, as already indicated. The child who recites a lesson 
learned by successive repetitions endeavors to reproduce the 
ideas or words of the book. This implies some recognition, namely, 
the recognition of the similarity of the present recitation with the 
original. Yet this recognition is rather secondary, for now the 
child is hardly aware of the past, he is all intent on the present 
recitation, and recognition is, in this case, little more than a general 
and vague sense of familiarity. Perfect and properly so-called 
recognition will occur only if there is a special reason directing the 
attention to the past. Thus, if a child be asked why he does not 
know the lesson, whether he has studied it, or how many times he 
has read it, his mind will begin to think of the past. Each attempt 
at learning, with its circumstances of time, space, succession, 
success or diflQculty, etc., will be brought back to the mind. This 
is recognition proper, i.e. the identification of a present image with 
its corresponding original, and it may be more or less perfect, more 
or less accurate and complete. Thus, for the time, I may recall 
the day, or the week, or the month, or the year in which an event 
took place; for the place and circumstances, details may be 
remembered with varying degrees of perfection. 

II. Qualities and Conditions of a Good Memory 

I. The Main Qualities of Memory are: (c) Ease and facility in 
acquiring knowledge, i.e. in receiving in the mind ideas capable 
of future recall. 

(b) Tenacity in retaining. The forgetful mind easily loses the 
traces of past experiences, of promises made, and of advice received. 
Once an experience has disappeared from consciousness, its recall 
is difficult. Some learn rapidly, but forget almost immediately. 
Others need a longer time to learn, but the knowledge once acquired 
is not so easily forgotten. 

(c) Readiness of revival. It is not enough to have many ideas 
in the mind. In order to be serviceable, these ideas must be at 
the mind's disposal, ready to come back when called for. 

(d) Faithfulness of revival, that is, the absence of purely im- 
aginary elements, and the completeness of the mental representa- 



86 PSYCHOLOGY 

tion. Many memories are defective in this respect. Sometimes, 
even in perfect good faith, events, chiefly when complex, are 
distorted and misrepresented owing to subjective additions and 
changes. 

2. Conditions of Memory. — Memory depends chiefly on: (i) 
The plasticity of the brain; hence in old age it is more difficult to 
learn, or to change ideas acquired formerly. (2) Natural endow- 
ments and mental education, including the various types of 
imagination and memory. (3) The laws of association, and conse- 
quently the interest of the event, the intensity, vividness, recentness, 
and repetition of mental processes. (4) The influence of intellect 
and will. 

III. Culture of Memory 

I. General Principles. — (c) Important as it may be to have 
a good memory, care must be taken not to develop it at the expense 
of judgment; the two must go together, and be developed and 
exercised together. This is true especially of rational sciences, 
in which the work of the understanding, not that of memory, 
is of primary importance. Nothing must be committed to 
memory before seeing whether it is worth retaining and before 
understanding it. 

(b) The development of memory coincides in a great measure 
with the development of the thinking powers, the growth of atten- 
tion, the faculty of properly correlating events, etc. Hence, to 
improve memory, special attention should be given to these 
faculties. 

(c) In general we must remember the law of " the survival of 
the fittest " ideas. The training of memory must have for its 
object to make ideas which we want to survive " fitter " than the 
others. Do what we may, it is certain that we shall forget a great 
many things; we must know what may be allowed to fall into 
oblivion and what should be preserved. The art of forgetting 
goes along with the art of remembering. The fitness of an idea 
consists in its strength, vividness, interest, and in its association 
with strong groups of ideas by strong ties, for then it has the strength 
of the whole group to which it belongs. 



MEMORY 87 

2. Special Rules. — (a) Attention and concentration of mind 
contribute to make a deeper impression, a more vivid and better 
defined perception and image. 

(b) Do not begin with something too complex, because the mind is 
puzzled by too great an abundance of details. This is why to a 
child who, for instance, has to learn the whole course in grammar, 
history, or geography, a primer is given first, containing only the 
essentials without the encumbering minor details, rules, and ex- 
ceptions which cannot yet be mastered. In the same way, for 
private study, try to analyze a complex lesson into simpler elements. 
The degree of simplification and analysis which is required depends 
on the stage of mental development and on personal aptitudes. 
What is simple enough for one mind may be far too complex for 
another. 

(c) Associate, i.e. organize ideas. An idea by itself is weak, but 
associated with others it acquires strength and vitality. The 
motto might apply here: "United we stand, divided we fall." In 
reading, study the objective sequence of ideas, and subjectively 
associate them in your mind. 

(d) Repetition strengthens ideas. A certain number of repetitions 
is required to learn a lesson, but it will be found preferable, after 
going over the lesson attentively several times, to allow some 
interval to elapse between following repetitions. To revive ideas 
at intervals of time, the duration of which varies with the nature of 
these ideas and the special dispositions of mind, is better than to 
revive them the same number of times in immediate succession. 

(e) Use as many faculties as possible so as to form several images 
of the same object. An idea which, at the same time, belongs to 
an auditory, a visual, and a logical group is more firmly seated in 
the mind and has more numerous associations. Real, not merely 
verbal, knowledge should be insisted on; learn ideas primarily, 
not words. Simple and obvious as this is, it is too often forgotten 
in practice. Of the several senses sight seems to be the most 
important, as it is a substitute for the other senses, especially for 
the sense of touch. 

(/) Use simultaneously reason and the senses. Know what to 
retain and what to forget. Group ideas logically around a central 



88 PSYCHOLOGY 

idea which is the most important, and which, when recalled, will 
tend to recall the whole group. In a speech, article, or lesson, see 
the logical connections, the main ideas, their organization and 
sequence. One attentive and intelligent reading will do much 
more than many mechanical repetitions. 

N.B. All so-called mnemonic systems and methods of never 
forgetting are but applications of the above rules. 

IV. Time-Perception 

Since memory refers the present to the past and implies suc- 
cession, a few words will be said here of time-perception. Evidently 
we are not concerned at present with the abstract idea of time and 
its definition; nor even with the concrete, but objective and artifi- 
cial, division of time into years, months, days, hours, minutes, and 
seconds. We deal only with the concrete subjective experience of 
time or duration; with time as recorded in the mind, not as recorded 
in nature by the course of the sun or the revolutions of the hands of 
a watch. 

(a) In the very beginning of mental life there is a succession of 
processes which, however, is hardly conscious. It takes some time 
to notice by reflection the facts of change, endurance, and recurrence, 
and thus to acquire the conscious distinction of a now, or present, 
and a then, or past. The memory of rhythmic changes like respira- 
tion, pulse, need of food or sleep, is probably of great importance 
in the development of time-perception. Little by little the vague 
notion of time or succession becomes clearer and develops into a 
time-appreciation. 

(b) The appreciation of time is to a great extent relative. It is a 
fact of daily experience that certain lapses of time objectively 
equal pass more or less rapidly. We are surprised that an hour 
has already passed in a conversation with a friend, the reading of 
an interesting book, or some amusement; and we are equally 
surprised that it is only ten minutes since we began studying an 
uninteresting lesson or listening to a tedious speech. 

These variations depend on: (i) The number of intervening 
experiences. When these are many and varied, time passes away 
more rapidly than when they are few. In retrospect, on the con- 



ILLUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS 89 

trary, intervals almost empty of experiences, as a week spent in 
bed, seem shorter because we have no memory of any events with 
which to fill up the interval. This is the source of a frequent 
historical fallacy which consists in jumping from century to century 
without distinction, because we have only a few events to record; 
hence the beginning and the end of a century seem nearer than 
they are in reality, and men who lived at great intervals of time 
are looked upon as contemporary. (2) The interest of intervals; 
if they are pleasant, time passes more rapidly. (3) Suspense, 
expectation, and anticipation; a future event which is desired anx- 
iously and has to be waited for does not come quickly enough; 
but once it has come, it passes off very rapidly. The youth sees 
a long, long life before him; behind him the old man sees only a 
short duration. Any one may compare the day or year that pre- 
cedes an expected and desired event with the day or year that 
follows it, and see how much shorter the latter seems. 

(c) Localization in time may be vague or accurate, definite or 
indefinite. It seems to depend chiefly on the importance of events 
and on associations between ideas. 

IV. ILLUSIONS OF THE SENSES 
I. Nature of Illusions and Hallucinations 

Illusions and hallucinations are generally dependent on repro- 
ductive activity. They may be partly presentative and partly 
representative phenomena. 

I. Definitions. — {a) Frequently common-sense draws a sharp 
distinction between illusion and normal perception, as if illusion 
were always something abnormal and indicative of a special defect 
in the mind. This meaning is inaccurate; there are illusions that 
are natural, ordinary, and common to all men. 

(6) Illusion may be defined in general as the acceptance as real 
by the mind of anything which is unreal. In this broad sense it 
includes delusion, error, and hallucination. More strictly, illusion 
is the acceptance as real by the mind of something unreal, but 
on the basis of some real data. Sense illusion is commonly re- 
stricted to errors of sense perception that are normal, regular, 



90 PSYCHOLOGY 

persistent, and common to all. Delusion applies rather to a false 
belief which implies reasoning processes, is persistent, and can 
be removed only with great difificulty. 

(c) Hallucination cannot always be distinguished from illusion. 
In general it differs from illusion because it lacks the basis of real 
data which is present in illusion, or' at least because real data 
contribute but little and remotely to the present mental state which 
is mistaken for a perception. To see a stick where there is no stick 
at all is a hallucination; to see a stick as broken in the water, when 
in reality it is straight, is an optical illusion. To see the moon when 
there is none would be a hallucination; to see the moon as gliding 
behind the clouds is an illusion. 

2. Classification. — Sense illusions can hardly be classified except 
by referring them to the different senses. The most frequent are 
optical illusions of color, shape, distance, size, and movement. 
Hallucination is (i) positive or negative, according as it makes one 
perceive the unreal, or prevents one from perceiving the real which 
under normal conditions should be perceived; (2) simple or complex, 
according as it affects only one sense or several senses. The senses 
most subject to hallucinations are sight and hearing and also 
ccenesthesis. 

II. Main Causes of Illusions and Hallucinations 

We speak of the causes of these two phenomena together because 
many are common to both. By indicating their causes, the means 
of correcting illusions and hallucinations will also be indicated. 
In general an illusion or hallucination is corrected by removing 
its causes when possible, and by testing the report of one sense by 
the use of other senses. 

I . The Constitution, Keenness, and Fatigue of the Sense Organs ; 
their defects, either special to some or common to all individuals, 
are sources of illusions. After-images, lack of discriminative 
sensibility of the skin, color bUndness, double vision, etc., come 
from such causes. Thus if a man with his eyes closed is touched 
gently on the hand with the point of a pencil, and is asked, always 
without looking, to indicate the exact spot with the point of another 
pencil, he will generally fail, and, if he succeeds, the success will 



ILLUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS QI 



(a) The newness of an object 

E 



A 



B 



H 



C 



D 



be purely accidental. The reason is that, on the back of the hand, 
the discriminative sensibility is about i^ inches; hence within that 
distance the two impressions are felt as one 

2. Nature of the Surroundings. — 
and the lack of familiarity with it 
tend to make imagination complete 
and interpret it. 

{b) Various circumstances, such as 
incompleteness, e.g. equivocal figures 
which are capable of being in- 
terpreted in different ways, thus 
the planes ABCD or EFGH may 
be seen in the front or in the back 
of the figure; amount of light, e.g. 
with a clear atmosphere a mountain 
seems nearer than with a misty 

atmosphere; in the fog, a lamp post may be mistaken for some- 
thing else; darkness is the source of many illusions; intervening 
objects; presence or absence 

of materials for comparison. ll l illll ll lllllllllllll l lll l llllj 

Compare a straight line 

crossed by perpendiculars with its continuation of the same 

Which part seems longer? 

and^^ ^ 

The moon seems larger at the horizon than at the zenith because 

the number of intervening objects makes it look more distant, 

and consequently the same 

visual angle is interpreted 

as corresponding to a 

larger object; the angles 

are equal, but their sides 

seem to extend farther. In a picture, the eyes always seem to 

follow the spectator because the pupil is always in view as if 

directed toward him (absence of relief). 

(c) Contrast in sizes, colors, shapes, etc., is likely to influence 
the judgment. (Instances. . . . ) 



length but without such cross lines. 
Or again compare ^^ 




92 PSYCHOLOGY 

(d) The use of instruments like colored glasses, lenses, mirrors, 
etc. 

3. Mental Influences. — (i) Memory, inference, association, 
suggestion, and habit. It is well known how sensations can be 
affected by these influences. (2) Lack of attention. (3) Ex- 
pectation, desire, and fear. 

4. Diseases, strong emotions, weakness, exhaustion, delirium, 
epilepsy, insanity, the use of certain drugs, hypnosis, etc., produce 
illusions and hallucinations. 

ARTICLE III. CONCEPTION 
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONCEPT 

I. Various Terms Explained 

Before describing the distinctive features of the concept, it will 
be useful to compare this term with some other closely related 
terms. 

1. Thought. — (i) Frequently the term " thought " is applied 
to all conscious activities and representations. To think of the 
events of yesterday is to bring them back to memory. When 
asked for information which I do not actually remember, I 
am likely to say: " Let me think a little." To think is also used 
to express mere opinion as distinct from certitude; for instance, 
when I say: " I think so." (2) Yet other current expressions point 
to another more restricted meaning. When we say of a man: 
"He never thinks," or of another: "He is or was a great 
thinker," we refer to something different from the mere power 
of memory and imagination. To think is to examine, com- 
pare, judge, classify, elaborate the data of the senses so as to 
see their logical relations. It is from present and past experiences 
to foresee and prepare the future; to find out the laws that govern 
events and the conditions of phenomena; to rise from the con- 
crete instance which is experienced to the abstract law or principle 
common to this and to similar instances. 

2. Intellect. — In this narrower sense, thinking is generally 
attributed to man alone, and referred to the faculty known as 



CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPT 93 

intellect. Animals are frequently called more or less intelligent, 
and by this we refer to their greater or smaller aptitude to adapt 
means to an end, or to be trained. But it will be seen in another 
place that this requires no thought in the stricter meaning; it is 
explainable by the senses and the retentive powers. In fact we 
do not speak of the intellect of animals, and thus we make a differ- 
ence between intelligence, or the taking of means appropriate to 
an end, and the intellect, or the superior mode of knowledge by 
abstraction, generalization, and logical sequence. Thought proper, 
or intellectual knowledge, includes three steps: the formation of 
abstract and general ideas, judgment, and reasoning. From these 
spring other manifestations, especially language, written or 
spoken. 

3. Concept. — Abstract and general ideas are properly called 
concepts. " Idea " is thus a more general term applying to all 
forms of mental representations, images, and judgments. I say, 
for instance: " I have no idea how that building looks; I never saw 
it; " or " I have no clear idea on this matter," that is, " I cannot 
form a satisfactory judgment, or reach certitude." As percept 
corresponds to perception, so the concept is the result of the process 
of conception. 

We have seen that sensations are gradually elaborated into per- 
ceptions. The perception, for instance, of a horse, resulting from 
many presentations and representations, is always concrete. I see 
this horse, with this color, size, etc., in this direction and at this 
distance. When I say: " It is a horse," I apply to this concrete 
object an abstract and general idea, or a concept. For not only of 
this, but of any other animal of the same kind, wherever it may be, 
and whatever its color and size, I may also say: " It is a horse." 
I therefore am led to distinguish something which is common to 
all horses and which I consider by itself apart from individual 
determinations. As a percept, horse is always an individual con- 
crete reality; as a concept it is an idea common and applicable to 
all horses, and it can be so only because it is abstract, namely, be- 
cause it does not include all the distinctive features of this or that 
individual. Hence abstraction is the fundamental process in the 
formation of the concept. 



94 PSYCHOLOGY 

II. The Essential Characteristics of the Concept 

I. Abstraction. — The first characteristic of the concept is to 
be abstract. The concept does not represent the object as it exists 
in nature, with all its individual qualities and determinations, but 
it considers certain features and leaves out the others (abs-trahere). 
Here evidently the question is not that of a physical, but only of a 
mental or ideal separation. 

Mental abstraction is of several kinds, (a) In the same object 
there are many qualities, each of which may be perceived by a 
special sense, the color by the eye, the sound by the ear, the resist- 
ance by touch, etc. Hence by its very nature every sense is ab- 
stractive; it perceives only one out of many qualities belonging to 
the same object. Or sense-abstraction may be due to voluntary 
attention, when, in an object, a quality or group of qualities is of 
special interest, e.g. the taste of an apple, the sound of a musical 
instrument. 

(b) There is also a process of abstraction in imagination and its 
various types, in the association and fusion of images, and in mem- 
ory. Some features of the images are considered while others are 
left out. 

(c) In language, spoken or written, one may consider the ideas 
represented, i.e. the meaning of words and sentences, or one's 
attention may be directed to the words themselves from the differ- 
ent points of view of etymology, declension, spelling, pronunciation, 
etc. 

(d) The concept is called abstract in a stricter sense. That 
which it represents is, or should be, only the features that are 
absolutely essential to the object and therefore common to all 
objects of the same kind, leaving out all unessential and particular 
features. The concept, for instance, will represent something 
essential and common to all movements (change of place), to all 
causes (production), to all squares (the fact of having four equal 
sides and four right angles). The individual determinations, con- 
ditions, circumstances, ... of this or that movement, cause, and 
square are left out of consideration. In the same concrete object, 
however, we may consider different aspects and find different 



CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPT 95 

concepts. Thus in my free action I may find the concepts of 
freedom, cause, motion, action, responsibihty, and change. 

2. Derived Characteristics. — Because the concept is abstract, 
it also possesses three other main characteristics. 

(a) It is not restricted to one individual, but may be applied 
to several; it is universal because it does not include individual- 
izing determinations. My perception of a man, because it is con- 
crete, applies only to the one man whom I perceive; my concept of 
man applies to all men; — the same is true of the concepts of color, 
weather, circle, etc., as compared to perceptions. 

(b) The concept is not restricted to individuals actually exist- 
ing. If it represents only that which is really essential — in many 
cases, as we shall see, it is not so — it is necessary, and indepen- 
dent of actual existence which is contingent. The acquisition of 
it depends on the perception of concrete existing things, but, in 
some cases, no concrete object may be found in which the concept 
thus formed is actually realized. Thus my concepts of a circle, 
of a triangle, of two parallels, represent in my mind that which is 
the essential and necessary constituents of these, although per- 
haps such elements are neither represented nor perfectly repre- 
sentable physically on the blackboard or on paper. I have the 
concept of a man perfect physically and mentally, although such 
a man may never be found. The formation of the concept of life 
supposes the perception of living beings, but this concept, once 
acquired, is indifferent to the various forms according to which 
life is actually realized, and even to any realization of life in the 
world. 

(c) Hence it follows that the concept is not dependent on the 
conditions of space and time, which are always determinations of 
concrete things. 

3. Various Degrees of these Characteristics. — These charac- 
teristics of the concept, and primarily its abstraction, are not 
always found in the same degree nor in the same manner. 

(a) By intension or connotation of a concept are meant its con- 
stituent notes. By its extension or denotation is meant the number 
of individuals to which it applies. Thus I may have the concept 
of a plane geometrical figure limited by four equal straight lines 



96 PSYCHOLOGY 

parallel two by two and intersecting at right angles. This is the 
intension of my concept of a square, and this concept denotes all 
squares. If in the definition I leave out the idea "equal," I de- 
crease the intension, but the concept will apply to a greater num- 
ber of figures, namely, to all rectangles. The connotation may be 
further decreased by leaving out the condition of intersection at 
right angles; the denotation will be increased, since the concept 
will apply to all parallelograms. Further still the condition of 
parallelism may be omitted, and the concept applies to all quad- 
rilaterals, and so on. Thus it is seen that intension and extension 
vary in opposite directions. To increase one is to decrease the other, 
and vice versa. 

(b) This also shows that the concept may be more or less com- 
plete, accurate, and comprehensive. It is true but incomplete 
to say that the essence of the square is to be a rectangle or a par- 
allelogram. In these latter concepts we reach a higher degree of 
abstraction, a lessening of the connotation, and an addition to 
the extension. Again, I may conceive the cow as a large herbiv- 
orous animal; this is true but insufl5cient. By the complete 
essence of a thing is meant that which includes all the constituent 
elements of the species to which it belongs, and that which 
distinguishes it from anything belonging to any other class. 

(c) In many, if not in most cases, we know the essences of things 
very imperfectly. For the child, a cat may be essentially black 
or white, and it is only later, after seeing cats of different colors, 
that this notion is corrected. The same frequently occurs in 
sciences; tentative and provisional definitions are used which must 
be revised by future progress along the same line of investigation. 

4. The Concept and the Image Compared. — From what pre- 
cedes, and from what has been said on imagination, the differ- 
ences between the concept and the image may be inferred. Since 
the concept is general, it is clear that it differs essentially from the 
simple image, which represents a single perception. Some claim 
that the concept is but a generic image in which the essential fea- 
tures, because they are common to many images, are prominent, 
whereas individual features are blurred. This account, however, 
is insuflScient. 



CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPT 97 

(a) Like the composite photograph, the generic image is concrete. 
It is true that it does not represent exclusively this or that indi- 
vidual which has been perceived before. To some extent it is 
vague and indetermined, but yet it is an individual picture, rep- 
resenting perfectly one individual only, which, it is true, has not 
been perceived and probably does not exist, but which is one and 
concrete. Because it is vague, it may be applied to several indi- 
viduals, but to all imperfectly and only in part; to none perfectly. 
The concept, on the contrary, is applicable perfectly to all the indi- 
viduals. As a concept, movement means simply a change of place; 
as an image, it is always this movement with this special direction 
and velocity. The concept of a circle includes no definite dimen- 
sions; the image of a circle cannot be without them. In other 
words, the composite image is an average picture, and an average 
here, as in mathematics, is always something concrete. In fact, 
every image, however complex, represents an object with certain 
dimensions, shape, size, color, etc. 

(b) Hence an image can always be outlined, or painted, or 
described in some manner; the concept cannot. The concepts of 
triangle, man, or color apply to all triangles, men, and colors. An 
image always represents one triangle, one man, 07ie color. It is 
true that the concept is generally accompanied by some shadowy, 
vague, and indistinct mental image. But as soon as we turn the 
attention to it, the image becomes clearer and assumes definite 
determinations. It was vague because attention was not concen- 
trated upon it. 

(c) A concept may be clear and distinct while the correspond- 
ing image is obscure or even impossible. I understand perfectly 
what is meant by a chiliagon or a geometrical figure of a thousand 
sides, and how it differs from another figure with a thousand and 
one sides. Yet my imagination is powerless to give me a mental 
picture of these. The same may be said in general of very large 
and of very small things, like the distance between the sun and 
the earth, and the size of a cell jtr^Tr of an inch in diameter. I 
understand what the mathematician tells me when he says that 
a quantity may be multiplied and divided ad infinitum, but I can 
imagine it in no concrete case. A familiar instance may be taken 



98 PSYCHOLOGY 

from those animals which are called myriapods (etymologically 
10,000 feet), among which are centipeds (etymologically 100 feet). 
To understand is not to imagine; intellect is not imagination. 

(d) We have concepts of things immaterial which can in no way 
be represented by imagination, like virtue, justice, duty, truth, 
etc. There are virtuous and just actions, but I do not perceive at 
all with the senses the goodness or justice of a concrete action. 
This concept, therefore, though derived from, and realized only 
in, individual actions, has a source distinct from the senses and the 
imagination. Or again, I see one thing succeeding another, but 
I do not see the causality or production, and yet I have not only 
the concept of succession, but also that of cause. 

II. GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT 

I. Various Proposed Systems 

The systems proposed to explain the origin of concepts may be 
reduced to three, two extreme and one intermediate, (i) At one 
extreme are found those who claim that the formation of the con- 
cept can be accounted for completely by the senses — presentation 
and representation — and their various complex functions; no 
special activity is required. (2) At the other extreme are found 
those who claim that the senses have nothing to do with the 
formation of the concept. It must be attributed to a special inde- 
pendent mental power. (3) Between these two are found those 
who claim that the senses are both necessary and insufficient to 
accoimt for the concept. Intellectual knowledge begins with the 
senses, but rises higher and cannot be completed by them. 

I. First Extrenje or Generally Sensism. — (c) It is clear that 
if no other existence than that of matter is admitted, every form 
of knowledge must be reduced to the properties of matter. This 
was the conclusion of the older and cruder materialists, Emped- 
ocles, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, who explained knowledge 
by the entering into the sense organs, of small material particles 
coming from the objects themselves. It is also the conclusion of 
the new and more elaborate materialism of the latter half of the 
eighteenth century in France and of the middle of the nineteenth 



GENESIS or CONCEPT 99 

century in Germany. Thought in all its forms is the manifesta- 
tion of some material energy. 

(b) The name of Sensationalism is given especially to the systems 
of Locke and Condillac. According to Locke, all ideas come from 
experience, and experience is twofold: sensation by which external 
objects are perceived, and reflection by which we are aware of 
concrete mental processes. Ideas thus acquired are complex or 
simple according as they are repeated and combined with others 
or not. Condillac rejects reflection as a distinct source of knowl- 
edge. For him there is only one source, sensation together with 
its various transformations, which are attention or application to 
sensations, reflection or attention to successive sensations, memory 
or the power of recall, comparison or attention to simultaneous 
sensations and memories, judgment or perception of their rela- 
tions of likeness and difference, imagination or the combination 
of ideas, reasoning or the inference of a judgment from other 
judgments. 

(c) More recently the theory reducing all ideas to images has 
been and is still advocated, but as a more complete and more 
elaborate system, (i) The main point which is insisted on is 
the fusion of images by which, as in composite photographs, com- 
mon features are made to stand prominent, while individual 
features are not apparent. There is thus a double process, disso- 
ciation and combination, the causes of which are either external 
and involuntary, especially the identity and dissimilarity of cer- 
tain features, or internal, like elective attention, mental types, 
and special purpose. This process of addition and subtraction, 
or, perhaps better, of multiplication and division, gives the ab- 
stract and general idea which represents only common features. 
This is Associationism (Stuart Mill, Bain). (2) Others say that 
the idea remains really concrete, but we look upon it as abstract 
and general when it is expressed by a universal term, or common 
name, applying to a group of similar images. The label only, 
not the real content of the mind, is abstract and universal. This is 
Nominalism (Taine). (3) Finally, the process may be completed 
by accumulating the experiences and associations not only of the 
individual, but of his ancestors. Thus the individual is born, if 



lOO PSYCHOLOGY 

not with ready-made ideas, at least with the capacity and apti- 
tude for forming them immediately, because he profits by the work 
of mental combination of images which has taken place before and 
the results of which he inherits. This is EvoluUonism added to 
Associaiionism (Spencer). And here, as in so many other instances, 
extremes meet, and this view comes close to innatism, which 
belongs to the aprioristic group of theories. 

2. Second Extreme or Generally Apriorism. — It has four chief 
forms: Innatism, Transcendentalism, Ontologism, Traditionalism. 

(a) According to innatism concepts are not acquired. All, 
or at least some, are inborn in the mind, (i) For Plato, this 
world is essentially changing and contingent; consequently our 
necessary ideas cannot be derived from sense-perception. There 
exists another world of which this visible world is only a partic- 
ipation, an appearance and a shadow, namely the world of ideas, 
in which are found, for instance, justice-in-itself, beauty-in-itself, 
virtue-in-itself, etc., whereas in our world are found only things 
that partake of these in various degrees, i.e. just things, beautiful 
things, virtuous actions, etc. Before being united with a body in 
this world, the soul preexisted as a pure spirit in the world of ideas, 
and had the intuition of them. Its union with the organism — 
which is a punishment — deprives the soul of this intuition. 
The perception of things by the senses revives in the mind 
ideas acquired previously, but forgotten. Pure ideas are really 
remembrances. 

(2) Descartes recognizes three kinds of ideas: adventitious, 
(from sense-perceptions), fictitious (built up by the imagination), 
and innate (universal and purely intellectual ideas). What Des- 
cartes means by innate ideas is not clear. Sometimes he speaks 
of them as actual and ready-made ideas or representations; some- 
times, when pressed by the objections of his adversaries, he 
speaks of them as faculties or virtualities or even unconscious 
ideas. 

(3) According to Leibniz, the soul having "neither doors nor 
windows," i.e. being incapable of communicating in any way with 
the external world, all ideas must be innate. But, of themselves, / 
innate ideas are not yet conscious, not yet "apperceptions." They 



GENESIS OF CONCEPT lOI 

are rather inclinations, dispositions, habits, or, better, germs 
which will evolve into conscious perceptions. 

(4) Rosmini claimed that one idea at least, namely, the idea 
of being which is implied in every concept, must be innate. 

(b) According to Kant, the mind must find in itself the "forms " 
according to which it knows things. The characters of universal- 
ity and necessity which are found in some ideas cannot be derived 
from individual contingent objects; hence they come from the 
mind alone. Things-in-themselves exist, but, as such, are unknow- 
able. They are necessarily known according to the mind's natural 
and inborn "a priori forms." We know things-as-they-appear 
to the mind (phenomena); to reach the thing-in-itself (noume- 
non) is impossible. This system is known as transcendentalism. 

(c) For ontologism — Malebranche and a few Catholic philos- 
ophers of the nineteenth century — we know all things in God, 
the source not only of all being, but also of all knowledge. God 
alone is intelligible, and things are intelligible only through the 
divine intelligence. 

(J) Traditionalism — another system of some Catholic phi- 
losophers: De Bonald, Lamennais, etc., in the nineteenth century 
— supposes that general ideas cannot be formed by the mind ; 
they must be taught and transmitted by tradition, and 
therefore traditionalists have recourse to a primitive divine 
revelation. 

3. Intermediate System. — The formation of concepts depends 
on, and begins with, the senses, but is completed by a special fac- 
ulty, the intellect, distinct from them, (i) We have no innate 
ideas, and, in forming concepts, the intellect depends on sense- 
perception and images. The senses are thus the necessary point 
of departure of intellectual knowledge. (2) All sense-perceptions 
and images are representations of concrete and individual objects. 
To be elaborated into concepts they require a special operation, 
namely, abstraction, by which the material, individual, and con- 
crete features of the image are, so to say, removed so as to leave 
only the essential and consequently common features. (3) Hence 
the formation of abstract and general ideas requires in the intel- 
lect a double function, one of activity, the other of receptivity. 



I02 PSYCHOLOGY 

By the former the sense-products are elaborated; by the latter 
the act itself of intellectual knowledge is performed. 

II. Discussion of the Systems 

It will be easier to begin with the last-mentioned system. Its 
very position between two extremes seems already to be in its 
favor. If it is true that "/» medio stat virtus," it is frequently 
true also that "/« medio stat Veritas" A system is not advo- 
cated by serious thinkers without good reasons, and when serious 
thinkers advocate systems that are diametrically opposed, it is 
generally safe to infer that there is some misunderstanding and 
some one-sidedness in their respective points of view. If another 
system can avail itself of the reasons in favor of both extremes, 
and avoid their shortcomings, it has a chance to stand nearer to 
the truth. 

I. Intellectual Knowledge Begins with, but is not Completed 
by, the Senses. — Let us briefly give reasons for this proposition. 

(a) Intellectual knowledge depends on the senses. In this we agree 
with the first extreme system and differ from most of the advocates 
of the second. By senses here we mean chiefly images with their 
various associations and fusions. The formation itself of the con- 
cept seems to depend ultimately on some corresponding image. 
For instance, to form the concept of a dog, I must have had the 
perception of a dog, or of animals closely akin to it, or I must 
have its appearance and nature explained to me. But once the 
concept has been acquired, any sign or image may recall it by asso- 
ciation. Thus the word itself, "dog," which is a purely arbitrary 
and conventional term, is sufficient to recall my concept. Again, 
although the concept of a circle may be acquired without having 
ever seen a perfect geometrical circle, yet the elements which com- 
pose this complex concept depend ultimately on sense-perception 
from which the ideas of point, line, curve, etc., are formed. 

The main reasons for asserting this dependence are based on 
the following facts: (i) The condition of the organism, especially 
of the brain, influences the highest mental functions, and, in many 
cases, mental disorders are traced back to organic, and especially 
cerebral, lesions and diseases. The influence of certain drugs 



GENESIS OF CONCEPT 103 

and intoxicants is also too well known. (2) When some sense is 
lacking, no concept of things referring to this sense is possible. 
The man born blind may have ideas of mechanical vibrations, but 
not of colors as such. (3) Experience shows that the highest con- 
ceptions are greatly facilitated by the use of images, symbols, 
diagrams, etc. 

(b) If the materials for forming concepts are found in percep- 
tions and images, these materials must be elaborated. This is but 
the conclusion of what was said above (p. 96) on the impossi- 
bility of reducing the concept to the image. The senses always 
give representations that have individual, contingent, and con- 
crete characters. A special power of abstraction must be used 
to elaborate these into a necessary and universal concept. The 
universal is radically in things, since they have an essence which 
may be looked upon as common when considered apart from the 
individual notes with which it is really found in nature; but, as 
a universal, it exists only in the mind. The image gives the 
necessary basis on which the concept can be formed. 

(c) Knowing the starting-point, i.e. the senses, and the result, 
i.e. the concept, the question remains: How can the bridging over 
be effected? Here we need a special activity, or "intellectus 
agens," whose function is abstraction and the elaboration of the 
data of the senses into some higher idea whose nature is purely 
intellectual. This process of abstraction is also called illumina- 
tion, as it throws light on certain features and leaves others in 
darkness. Thus is formed the abstract concept, which is a special 
mental representation deprived of the material and individual 
features found in the mental image, and which consequently 
may be applied to all individuals that belong to the same 
class. 

2. Sensism. — (a) In general sensism rightly recognizes the 
necessity of the senses for intellectual knowledge; but it does not 
go far enough in its account, for it denies the radical distinction 
which exists between the concept and the image. A defect in the 
method used may be pointed out: Sensists generally try to ex- 
plain the origin of concepts without examining first their specific 
characteristics. They seem to take it for granted a priori that the 



I04 PSYCHOLOGY 

concept must be reduced to some activity of the senses. It is 
true that the general law of continuity applies here, and that the 
passage from the image to the concept is gradual, but this does not 
prevent the two from being different and irreducible. Sometimes 
even metaphysical preoccupations — concerning the nature of the 
soul and its spirituality — seem to be found at the start of this 
investigation. It may also be noted that sensists often implicitly 
assume the existence of a special faculty of elaboration, even when 
they deny it. 

To all forms of sensism the following objections apply: (i) 
They fail to recognize the distinction between concept and image. 

(2) Either, if they are consistent, they cannot account for the 
special characteristics of the concept; or, if they do, it is by intro- 
ducing tacitly the special activity which they deny. In fact, 
when carefully considered, sensistic theories are seen to introduce 
special activities, reflection, the power of transforming the sensa- 
tions, the power of elective attention or elaboration, and the like. 

(3) Frequently sensism is only a consequence or application of a 
wider philosophical view, materialism, positivism, etc. 

(b) The features special to some systems do not obviate these 
diflSculties. (i) Reflection is only the consciousness of the mind's 
own individual and concrete activities. (2) The transformation 
of the sensation either does not account for the formation of the 
concept, or, if it accounts for it, requires a special elaborative 
faculty. (3) The association, or, better, fusion, of images may give 
a composite image; but this cannot be identified with the concept, 
even if we give it the accumulated associations of centuries. (4) 
The name, it is true, may be common and applicable to all individ- 
uals of the same class. Yet the name as written or uttered is 
always concrete; it is abstract and common only because it ex- 
presses an abstract and general idea. Suppress the abstract idea 
which it manifests, and the word is then a mere concrete utter- 
ance, at such a time, with such a sound, and in such circumstances. 
Far from giving to the image its abstract character, the name 
must itself receive it from the idea for which it stands. When I 
apply the name "triangle " to all triangles, it is because I have 
already recognized that which is essential to a triangle, and con- 



GENESIS or CONCEPT 105 

sidered this apart from the determinations with which it is always 
accompanied in the perceived or imagined triangle, of such an area, 
right-angled or otherwise, scalene or otherwise, with sides of a 
definite length, angles of definite dimensions, etc. 

3. Apriorism. — As aprioristic systems are widely different, 
they must be considered separately. In general, all rightly rec- 
ognize the impossibility of deriving the concept from mere sense- 
experience, but wrongly fail to recognize the dependence of the 
concept on the senses. 

(a) Ontologism and traditionalism were systems designed by 
Catholic philosophers to counteract extreme materialistic, sen- 
sistic, and rationalistic tendencies in the past century. Both were 
condemned by the Church and soon disappeared. Hence a few 
remarks will suflSce here. Ontologism is gratuitous and in oppo- 
sition to the testimony of consciousness. Ontologists took a great 
deal of trouble to explain the intuition of God, which, according 
to them, we must necessarily possess; but their explanation is 
satisfactory neither to the philosopher nor to the theologian. 

Traditionalism contains much that must be accepted. Un- 
doubtedly tradition transmitted by language is a great help in 
acquiring ideas. For the most part, our ideas are received from 
others, and, if our individual minds were left to their own activ- 
ity, all ideas would remain very imperfect. But it does not fol- 
low that no idea can be acquired otherwise. In fact, in order to 
convey ideas to the hearer or reader, language must be understood, 
and understanding supposes in the hearer or reader the ideas 
which the words represent. If words presuppose ideas, it is clear 
that they cannot be the exclusive source of ideas. 

(6) The theory of innate ideas is a purely gratuitous and lazy 
theory, since there is no consciousness of them, and their innateness 
is not the only way of accounting for their presence in the mind. 
On the contrary, we are conscious of the mental activity by which 
we elaborate concepts from the data of the senses, and of a con- 
tinuity, not of a break, between the senses and the intellect. To 
say that ideas are ready-made and conscious is obviously false. 
To say that they are ready-made, yet unconscious, is to say 
nothing intelligible. To say that they are mere faculties and 



I06 PSYCHOLOGY 

virtualities is to deny that they are innate and to fall back into 
another system admitting only the power of forming concepts. 

(c) Kant's special views on the present problem are but parts 
of his whole philosophy, and cannot be discussed fully here. His 
solution cannot be proved to have any real value, as it may be 
nothing but a result of a priori forms of the mind. It is difficult 
to understand the meaning of these a priori forms which are empty 
until they receive experiences from the external world, and, after 
receiving them, form with them the complete knowledge. Nor 
does it seem possible to demonstrate the necessity of their exist- 
ence. The principle: "Whatever is necessary and universal in 
knowledge must come from the mind, and not from the object," 
is gratuitous until it has been shown that these characteristics 
are not radically in objects themselves, and therefore can in no 
way be found in them. Thus we are told that, since all things 
are perceived in space, and all mental processes in time, space 
and time are presupposed to any perception; they must preexist 
in the mind as a priori forms of external and of internal sensibil- 
ity. It would be equally reasonable to say that they do not pre- 
exist, but simply coexist, and, in this case, the ideas of space and 
time may be derived from things and processes themselves. From 
the fact that all things are perceived in space, I may simply con- 
clude that all things are in space, and are perceived as they are. 
The same may be said of all a priori forms; their existence is not 
to be admitted if facts can be accounted for otherwise. 

4. Conclusion. — From what has been said we conclude that, 
of the two extreme systems proposed to explain the origin of con- 
cepts, one starts rightly but stops too low, the other ends rightly 
but starts too high. The intermediate system has the advantage 
of being in better conformity with experience, and of giving a 
sufficient explanation with a minimum of a priori elements. 



NATURE OF JUDGMENT 107 



ARTICLE IV. JUDGMENT 
I. NATURE OF THE JUDGMENT 

I. The Psychological Process 

1. What is Judgment? — (a) Human thinking essentially 
takes the form of judgments; judgment alone has a meaning and 
is true or false. I may have the idea of four miles, and the idea 
of the distance from a place A to another place B. There is no 
meaning, no truth or falsity, in these ideas taken separately, but 
only when I compare them and think or say that the distance from 
A to B is, or is not, four miles. This is a judgment, and the new 
essential element which has been introduced is the connecting 
link between two ideas, by which I pronounce on their agreement 
or disagreement. A mere list of words gives no meaning, unless 
these words are so connected as to form judgments. Con- 
versations, writings, scientific formulae, speeches, etc., all express 
judgments, and not merely ideas, although idea is sometimes 
used in the sense of judgment (cf. p. 93). Strictly, an idea is a 
mere representation of an object. When we speak of a true or of 
a false idea according as it does or does not correspond to reality, 
we really speak of an implicit judgment pronouncing on this con- 
formity. Judging is essentially affirming the relations between 
things or ideas, relations which may be of agreement or disagree- 
ment, of afl&rmation or negation. 

(b) Hence the distinction between positive and negative judg- 
ments, however true it may be from a certain point of view, and 
useful for certain purposes, is not strictly applicable to the psycho- 
logical act of judging, which is always essentially positive. The 
judgment: "Peter is not attentive," is negative from the point of 
view of grammar and logic; yet, if I consider only the nature of 
the mental process, it consists essentially of the positive act by 
which I pronounce or judge that there is a lack of attention in 
Peter's mind. The mental attitude opposed to this would be 
rather ignorance or doubt. 

2. Elements and Conditions of a Judgment. — A judgment 



Io8 PSYCHOLOGY 

always implies: (i) The presence of two ideas in the mind, 
namely, the subject, of which something is aflSrmed or denied, 
and the attribute or predicate, which is affirmed or denied of 
the subject. (2) A comparison of these two ideas. (3) The 
affirmation of their agreement or disagreement, which is the 
judgment itself. 

The judgment may be reached very rapidly as soon as the two 
ideas are brought in presence of each other. The comparison is 
only implicit and needs no special attention, as, for instance, when 
I say that the whole is greater than any of its parts. Or it may 
necessitate a more or less complex process of comparison of the 
ideas with other ideas and judgments, as, for instance, when I say 
that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two 
right angles. This cannot be affirmed immediately, but only after 
demonstrating it. 

3. Judgment and Concept Compared. — We may now under- 
stand the relations between judgment and conception. A concept 
is one notion standing apart from other notions. A judgment 
necessarily implies at least two notions or groups of notions, and 
the perception of their relation. But a notion which is the neces- 
sary element of a judgment depends itself on previous judgments. 
Our first concepts are vague and most general; they become clearer 
and clearer, more and more connotative, in proportion as they 
embody the results of more judgments. Thus my primitive 
idea of "water " as a flowing something, or a transparent liquid, 
may be perfected by the judgment that it is composed of oxygen 
and hydrogen, or that it has certain definite physical properties. 
These new elements in my idea of water are the results of a great 
many comparisons and judgments. The botanist's notion of a 
plant is more complex and more accurate than that of the 
ordinary man because it embodies many elements acquired by 
study, i.e. by a series of judgments. 

II. Various Kinds of Judgments 

N.B. We mention only the most important divisions of judg- 
ments from the psychological point of view. Other divisions 
belong to logic. 



NATURE OF JUDGMENT 109 

1. Singular and General. — According as the subject is an indi- 
vidual or a class, a concrete or an abstract idea, the judgment is 
singular or general, concrete or abstract. Thus, "This man is 
tall," or "This rose is red," are individual and concrete judgments. 
"Man is made to live in society," or "Roses are fragrant," are 
judgments referring to a class, and their predicates are attributed, 
not to any special individual, but to all. General judgments are 
also abstract, since the class as such does not exist, but is realized 
only in the concrete individuals. Universal judgments refer to 
all concrete individuals of a class, e.g. "All men are made to live in 
society," "All roses are fragrant." Partial judgments pronounce 
only on a part of the whole class. Thus, "Some men are white." 

2. Analytic and Synthetic. — When the predicate is already 
contained in the nature or essential relations and properties of 
the subject, the judgment is called analytical; the predicate may 
be inferred from the consideration of the subject. When the pred- 
icate adds something new to the subject, that is, something which 
no amount of analysis of the subject would reveal, the judgment 
is synthetical. The analytic judgment unfolds the subject, and 
states explicitly that which was already implied in it and in its 
essential relations. The synthetic judgment gives a knowledge 
which could not be derived from the essence of the subject. 

We must distinguish between the subject itself of the judgment 
and the knowledge which we have of it. A judgment may be 
analytic in itself, and yet synthetic for a given individual; and a 
judgment which is synthetic for one may be analytic for another 
who possesses a more complete knowledge of the subject. Thus 
the judgments "Two and two are four," or "The whole is greater 
than any of its parts," are obvious for all those who understand 
the meaning of the terms used. The same cannot be said of these 
judgments: "11 multiplied by 12 is 132," or "The sum of the 
angles of a triangle equals two right angles." In themselves 
these judgments are analytic, yet all men do not see why the pred- 
icate belongs essentially to the subject. On the contrary, such 
judgments as "This man is six feet tall," or "This iron is hot," 
are synthetic, because the predicate is not essentially contained 
in the analysis of the subject. 



no PSYCHOLOGY 

Hence analytical judgments are also called necessary, because 
they suffer no exception; absolute, because they do not depend on 
any condition; a priori, because they need not be known by ex- 
perience before their truth is accepted. Thus, after demonstration, 
the theorem "The sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to 
two right angles," is seen to express an essential property of all 
kinds of triangles, true of all triangles without exception and under 
all circumstances. It is not necessary to measure the angles of any 
given triangle to see that the theorem applies to it. Synthetical 
judgments are called contingent, hypothetical, and a posteriori, 
because they are based directly on experience, and are true only 
of the cases observed, or within the limits of a valid generaUza- 
tion. Experience alone can justify the statements: "This book 
has five hundred pages; " "This man is learned; " "This triangle 
is isosceles." 

3. Intuitive and Deliberative. — Considering the manner in 
which they are arrived at, judgments are intuitive or delibera- 
tive. An intuitive or immediate judgment is a judgment which 
is reached immediately as soon as both terms are compared. The 
intuition may be a sense intuition, as in the judgment "This iron 
is hot," or a direct perception of consciousness, as "I am suffering," 
or a rational intuition, as "The whole is greater than its part." 
A deliberative or mediate judgment is a judgment which cannot 
be passed at once, but requires a more or less prolonged considera- 
tion, study, and reasoning, e.g. the formulation of physical and 
chemical laws and properties. 

II. GENESIS OF THE JUDGMENT 

I. General 

N.B. We do not speak here of extra-intellectual factors in 
the formation of judgments, such as feelings, prejudices, personal 
dispositions, etc. They will be mentioned later. 

I. Analysis and Synthesis in the Judgment. — (c) Judgment 
supposes the power of abstraction. Frequently the subject is 
abstract and stands, not for something individual and concrete, 
but for an abstract quality or a class, as "Virtue is to be prac- 



GENESIS OF JUDGMENT III 

tised," "Iron is a metal." Generally the predicate is abstract, 
the only exception being for judgments in which there is a per- 
fect identity between the subject and the predicate, as when I 
say, "This man is Peter Smith." In other cases the predicate is 
the concept of a class to which the subject belongs or not, of a 
quality which is affirmed or denied of it. 

(b) The same judgment may often be considered both as an 
analysis and a synthesis of the subject. I say, for instance, "This 
paper is white." As explained above, this is a synthetic judg- 
ment; the mere analysis of the notion "paper " will not give me 
the predicate "white," but I have to verify it by experience. 
This judgment is therefore the synthesis of two terms, "paper" 
and "white." Yet, in another sense, this same judgment is really 
the result of my one perception of white paper, which I have first 
to disjoin or analyze into two elements in order to form the above 
judgment, i.e. in order to synthetize them again. However, a 
judgment based immediately on sense-perception differs from this 
perception, because the perception is concrete, " this-white-paper," 
whereas in the judgment "This paper is white " the predicate is 
abstract and general. 

2. Experience and Reason in the Judgment. — In all syn- 
thetic judgments some perception or experience is required to 
ascertain the relation between the subject and the predicate. 
Not that the experience need be repeated in every individual 
case; it is not necessary to decompose all drops of water to pro- 
nounce with certitude that they are composed of the same defi- 
nite proportions of hydrogen and oxygen. Natural laws like those 
of physics and chemistry are universal, although they have not 
been verified experimentally for all individual cases. But all 
rest on some experience interpreted with the help of reason. They 
never reach the same degree of certitude which we attribute to 
certain other principles, for we conceive that the laws that govern 
the world might be different, whereas we cannot conceive of a 
whole not being equal to the sum of its parts. This leads us to 
examine the genesis of a priori and necessary principles. 



112 PSYCHOLOGY 

II. Genesis of Necessary Judgments 

I. Meaning. — Necessary judgments as understood here are 
those that are simple, clear, primitive, and immediate, needing 
no demonstration, and self-evident as soon as their terms are 
understood. They are a priori and analytical — admitted inde- 
pendently of their verification by experience; necessary — the nega- 
tion of them is absurdity; universal both in regard to the knowing 
mind, which cannot fail to perceive their truth, and in regard to 
their range of application, for they admit of no possible exception 
at any time or in any place. Hence we do not speak here of all 
analytic judgments, but only of those that are obvious and require 
no demonstration. That is, we speak of principles, or judgments 
that stand hi the very beginning of intellectual Ufe, and that are 
admitted even before or without verification by experience. Thus 
the principles of identity: "yl is Aj" or "A thing is what it is "; 
of excluded middle: "^ is or is not"; of contradiction: "The 
same thing cannot be and not be at the same time "; of sufficient 
reason: "Whatever exists has a sufficient reason accounting for its 
existence or happening." Thus also in geometry such principles 
as: "The whole is greater than any of its parts, and equal to the 
sum of its parts "; "Two things which are equal to the same third 
are equal to each other;" "A straight Hne cannot enclose a space." 

These principles are not formulated explicitly by all minds, 
but they are implicitly recognized by all. The child may know 
nothing of the explicit statement called the principle of contradic- 
tion, yet he does not fail to recognize that one of two assertions 
which he knows to be contradictory is a falsehood. A man may 
not be aware that he is applying the principle of causality and of 
sufficient reason when he concludes that the house has not built 
itself, but requires an architect; yet he will consider it absurd to 
require proofs for his assertion. Ask a child to give you half his 
apple, and try to convince him that he will lose nothing by it and 
that what will be left is as big as the whole apple. 

Now the question is: Wherefrom do such principles derive their 
characters of necessity and universality so as to admit of no 
exception? 



GENESIS OF JUDGMENT II3 

2. Theories. — We need not discuss theories of apriorism and 
innatism. If there is no reason for asserting the existence of innate 
ideas, still less is there any for asserting the innateness of principles. 
Two main systems remain, intuitionalism and empiricism, (i) 
According to the former, the senses furnish the mind with the 
concrete materials out of which are elaborated abstract ideas, or 
concepts, representing the essences of things. The mind is thus 
enabled to perceive and affirm their essential and necessary rela^ 
tions. Thus the concepts of whole and of part are not given in 
pure experience; they are abstractions and elaborations from experi- 
ence. The relation between them is at once clear to the mind 
independently of the actual concrete perception of a whole and its 
parts. (2) According to the empirical theory, or associi iiocisms 
principles are simply the results of many associated experiences 
in which they have been constantly verified. The individuars 
experience is strengthened by the experiences of his ancestors, 
which were accumulated in the course of ages and transii'irtftd 
by heredity. Such judgments may perhaps seem intuitive to us 
now, but their formation has required many concrete experiences 
of instances in which they were applied. 

3. Criticism of Associationism. (a) A mere empirical theory is 
inadequate to give a satisfactory account of necessary judgments 
and axioms. Experience manifests only that which exists, but 
does not reveal whether things are necessarily or not. We are 
not concerned at present simply with what happens or is true, 
nor even with what always happens or is always true, but with 
what happens and is true necessarily so that it could never be 
otherwise. This character of necessity cannot be found in experi- 
ence. A man may not have seen many or even any straight lines, 
yet he knows a priori that two straight lines cannot enclose a 
space. He may never have seen parallels, yet he will not hesi- 
tate to pronounce that parallels can never meet, because the prin- 
ciple of contradiction is implied here: Lines always at the same 
distance cannot at the same time change their respective 
distances. 

(b) In order to have any reliable, orderly, and organized experi- 
ence, certain principles, like those of identity and contradiction, 
9 



114 PSYCHOLOGY 

are already required; they cannot therefore result exclusively 
from experience. How is any experience possible if the same thing 
can at the same time be and not be, be perceived and not 
perceived, true and not true, white and not white, etc.? 

(c) Finally, it may be noted that, for such principles, no trace 
whatever of any increase of evidence or firmness is found either 
in the individual or the race. At all times they are accepted as 
clear and self-evident, and repeated experience does not strengthen 
them. Ever since men have been, their thinking has implied cer- 
tain principles admitted as necessary and universal; their experi- 
ence has constantly testified to the regular succession of day and 
night resulting from the apparent revolution of the sun around 
the earth. Yet such constant experience does not show this regu- 
lar succession every twenty-four hours as necessary and universal. 
The empiricist may say that this is due to the known possibility 
of different experiences on the earth or on other planets, as re- 
vealed by science. But his explanation implies the very dis- 
tinction of the necessary and the contingent which is not 
given in experience, but derived from some other source. In 
experience we never find necessity, but at most universal con- 
tingency. 

4. Conclusion. — Hence we say that principles are neither 
a priori, if by this we mean innate and without any empirical 
factor, nor yet a posteriori, if by this we exclude the rational fac- 
tor. They are both. Experience is necessary to form the abstract 
ideas the relations of which are afiirmed by these principles; and 
it is useful for their reflex knowledge, formulation, and appUca- 
tion to concrete instances. But this experience is not necessarily 
so frequent and repeated as to produce invincible associations, 
as empiricists claim. The terms being known, the mind has at 
once the intuition of their necessary relation of agreement or dis- 
agreement. Knowing things, not* only in their individual and 
concrete existence, but in their abstract, general, and essential 
aspects, the mind is also capable of perceiving the essential 
relations which exist between them. 



GENESIS OF JUDGMENT I15 

III, Genesis of Mediate Judgments. Inference. 
Reasoning 

I. Nature of the Reasoning Process. — (a) Thinking consists 
essentially in judging, and is complete only when we can affirm 
or deny. We frequently say: "I think so," by which we implicitly 
formulate a judgment. We also say: "Let me think a minute," by 
which we mean that a little reflection and consideration is needed 
before we can express an opinion, make an assertion, and see the 
relation between ideas, i.e. pass a judgment. In this latter 
sense thought is equivalent to inference or reasoning. The imme- 
diate or intuitive judgments of sense or reason are few when com- 
pared to the number of judgments obtained by expUcit or impHcit 
reasoning. In an intuitive and immediate judgment, no re . - '-on 
be given except that the truth is seen at once, and that the judgmejar 
is self-evident. In the mediate judgment, obtained by reasoniBg 
— reasoning is only a means toward judging — a reason ca^ !■'■ 
given on which it rests and on which its truth depends, 
between two or several judgments is perceived. 

(b) Hence we see the difference between reasoning and associa- 
tion. In association also one idea or judgment is linked with an- 
other, but without dependence as far as the truth of the second 
judgment is concerned. One idea gives rise to another, but it is 
a mere succession. Thus, if I see John sick with a cold, a number 
of ideas may be recalled to my mind by association; of boys run- 
ning, drinking cold water, being careless . . . ; of remedies and drug 
stores . . . ; of coughing, staying in bed . . . ; of other diseases, 
other persons . . . etc. This is not reasoning. But, if I say: 
"John is sick because he remained in a draught of cold air," or: 
"This remedy will cure him because it has cured Peter and 
Henry in the same circumstances," then I perceive a relation 
<7/(/e^e«Jewce between two judgments; I conceive one as being the 
foundation of another. This is reasoning. 

(c) It is clear that the great majority of our judgments are 
based on some inference, sometimes explicit, sometimes also exist- 
ing implicitly in the mind, and ready to express itself in the form 
of a "because." When a judgment is not immediate, it is always 



Il6 PSYCHOLOGY 

accepted because of something else. Whether the psychological 
process be valid or not from the point of view of logic and epis- 
temology, the psychological process is the same. 

2. Elements of the Reasoning Process. — (a) From what has 
just been said, it is easy to understand that the elements of reason- 
ing are not only several ideas, but several judgments, which must 
be present explicitly or implicitly in the mind, and one of which 
is considered as a consequence of the others. This consequence 
may be expressed last: "He who wilfully injures his neighbor is 
worthy of blame; Peter has stolen, and to steal is wilfully to injure 
one's neighbor; consequently Peter is blameworthy." Or it may 
be expressed first: "Peter is blameworthy because he has stolen, 
thereby injuring his neighbor." Or it may find an intermediate 
place: "Peter has stolen; he is therefore blameworthy, since who- 
ever wilfully injures his neighbor is blameworthy." In Logic we 
shall see how these may be reduced to perfect syllogisms. For 
the present we are concerned with the process of syllogism as we 
generally use it. 

(b) The foregoing examples show that reasoning always includes 
a universal element or law, and a more special instance or applica- 
tion. Even in cases in which we seem to pass from one particular 
or individual instance to another a general statement is implied. 
Thus: "This remedy is likely to do good to John because it 
did good to Peter," implies that in both cases the diseases are of 
the same nature, and that in the same circumstances the same 
remedy will produce the same effect. Again, when I say : " We shall 
have rain because such clouds are forming and the wind comes 
from such a direction," I seem to derive my conclusion from 
concrete facts of past experience. Yet I suppose the general 
principle that such a direction of the wind and such clouds 
are generally followed by rain. 

3. Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. — (a) When the gen- 
eral principle or law is the goal reached or the conclusion, the rea- 
soning is inductive. When it is the starting-point or the reason, 
the reasoning process is called deductive. If I have been deceived 
by one, then by another, and by a third man wdth whom I dealt, 
I say — rightly or wrongly, it matters not for our present purpose 



GENESIS OF JUDGMENT II7 

— "All men, or at least all men of this class, are liars " (induction). 
Now when I say: ''Beware of ^, he will tell you all sorts of stories, 
for, you know, he is engaged in such or such a profession," I pro- 
ceed deductively. Again, it is by induction or generalization that 
the chemist pronounces that all water is composed of oxygen and 
hydrogen. It is by deduction that he applies this to a glass of 
water which he has never analyzed. These two processes com- 
plete each other. We proceed from the observed facts to the law, 
and from the law to the unobserved facts. 

(b) Induction is primarily analytic; deduction, primarily syn- 
thetic. By analysis is meant the resolution of the complex into 
that which is more simple; by synthesis, the combination of simple 
elements into something more complex. A general proposition 
is simpler than the individual fact, because it does: ' vinde 
the concrete determinations special to each instance. 'Ail bod- 
ies attract one another in direct ratio to their masses a \d in inverse 
ratio to the square of the distances " is a simpler sta ment than 
that which determines all the particulars in the case oi tiiis body 
whose mass is A, and this other body whose mass is B, the 
distance between the two being C. 

IV. The Processes of Judging and Reasoning in 
Ordinary Life 

I. There are Three Ways of Forming Judgments. — (i) As 

stated already, some judgments are intuitive, i.e. accepted in view 
of their self-evidence. I say that snow is white because I see that 
it is so; that two and two are four because I understand that it 
cannot be otherwise. (2) Other judgments are accepted on the 
authority of other men. I know that Napoleon was emperor of 
the French, that Columbus discovered America, and that Peking 
is a city in China. For these and a multitude of other judgments 
I depend on the testimony, and therefore on the knowledge and 
truthfulness of other men who either exist now or have existed 
in the past. The same is true of many scientific statements. 
Empirical science need not always be a science based on one's 
own experience. Little progress would be made if, before accept- 
ing the report of an experiment, one always had to perform the same 



Il8 PSYCHOLOGY 

experiment. There are facts that occur only once or a few times, 
and cannot be observed by all. (3) A third way of forming a 
judgment is to reason it out. For instance, I find two contradic- 
tory statements, say, on a political or religious question. I en- 
deavor to get the data on both sides, weigh the arguments, use my 
own inteUigence, and form my own judgment. In all sciences and 
in daily life many statements are based on personal inference. 
And even when a truth is based on authority, its acceptance sup- 
poses inferences concerning the value of the testimony of others. 

It is evident that judgments reached by these methods are 
not considered as having always the same value; and, within 
the same method, judgments are more or less certain, probable, 
or doubtful. The process by which they are reached may be 
short and simple, or require long and difficult demonstrations. 

2. Prejudices. — (c) Reflection shows that frequently assent 
IS given to judgments that do not deserve it. Things considered 
as certainly true, and never before suspected of being even doubt- 
ful, may be rejected later as certainly false. As a result of more 
careful study and greater mental development, it is found that a 
number of judgments must be revised. Statements that were 
not self-evident were accepted without reason, or for insuflacient 
reasons. Early education gives the child a number of ideas and 
beliefs which are accepted on authority or insufficient inference, 
and even are the results of misunderstanding and misinterpreta- 
tion. One may find many misrepresentations in former beliefs 
now outgrown, arising from various causes and circumstances. 
See how many popular maxims, proverbs, and sayings concerning 
health, happiness, social life, and even the weather, are accepted 
without reflection. Even when disproved by science and per- 
sonal experience, they still hold their ground; favorable occur- 
rences strengthen them; contrary occurrences are looked upon as 
exceptions. Surroundings, daily intercourse with other men, 
bodily and mental dispositions, contribute to form a nucleus of 
knowledge which, little by little, is developed and increased, and 
which is the centre toward which all knowledge converges. 

{b) We become accustomed to these judgments. Like all habits 
they become stronger, and take a deeper root by daily acceptance 



GENESIS OF JUDGMENT II9 

and by the uses or applications — at least implicit — which are 
made of them. They form a bulk of supposedly known and 
ascertained truths, and become the standard to which we refer 
and by which we judge new propositions offered for our accept- 
ance. If we reach a pleasant conclusion, little or no trouble is 
taken to verify it. Mere hearsay becomes the highest source of 
certitude. But sometimes the most cogent arguments do not 
succeed in leading to the acceptance of an unpleasant conclusion. 
See, for instance, how ready a man is to accept as true the 
slanders he hears about his enemy, and how reluctantly he 
admits the good qualities that are attributed to him. An obvious 
fact or argument against one's fixed ideas may convirre for the 
time being. If it does not frequently reenter the mind sc ai to 
strengthen its impression, it soon loses its hold on thr. '^nnd, A 
few days or months later it may have been forgo' ^n 
conviction may have vanished. The new and unexpt .tee: takdb 
root with difficulty; it rather tends to remain at the surface 
and wither, because the mental soil is already occupied by deep- 
rooted judgments which are not easily torn away. 

(c) In all cases the value of new judgments is tested by compar- 
ing them with other judgments accepted as certain and used as 
norms. And as man is loath to break with inveterate habits and 
to discard long-standing opinions, so is he likely to reject, or at 
least to suspect a priori, whatever conflicts with his previous views. 

(d) Because these judgments are habitual and familiar they 
attract no attention or reflection. It hardly occurs to the mind 
to question or test them until some strong evidence is offered 
against their validity. Even in this case they cling to the mind 
until obliged to retreat — a step which, hke the breaking of 
an old habit, is always more or less painful. Because they are 
unnoticed they are the more dangerous. 

(e) A large number of habitual views and opinions are true, 
but many also are narrow and belong to an individual man or a 
special group of men as a result of their education. They arouse 
the curiosity, sometimes the suspicion and hatred, of other indi- 
viduals or groups of men. They are sources of misunderstanding, 
frequently without any ill-will on either side, but too often with 



I20 PSYCHOLOGY 

the imputation of ill-will on the part of those whose opinions are 
dififerent. A man cannot be educated by, or associate with, other 
men without reflecting in some degree their views and opinions. 
This is true especially of children and young people, because their 
minds are more receptive and more easily influenced. Hence the 
importance of a good early intellectual education cannot be over- 
estimated; its influence extends to the whole life. All judgments 
acquired without sufficient justification, whether they be true or 
false, influence following judgments. For good or for had, they are 
prejudices. 

3. Knowledge and Belief. — {a) This leads us to recognize 
an important distinction between what may be called impersonal 
and personal truths. Impersonal truth is that which is so evident 
that it imposes itself on all. The reasons for accepting it are 
cogent, and appeal to all minds to whom they are presented. 
Personal truths have not the same evidence; they are accepted 
owing to both objective and subjective influences. Generally 
they are truths which carry with them practical consequences 
and are the sources of certain rules of conduct. To this class 
belong many judgments in the religious, moral, political, and 
social orders. 

{b) This distinction corresponds to a distinction which is fre- 
quently made between knowledge and belief. Knowledge is based 
on immediate or mediate evidence and is essentially rational. 
Belief refers to that which is not evident, or at least not clearly 
so; thus it is partly rational, partly emotional, and partly voli- 
tional in its causes. In the acceptance of a statement, the propor- 
tion of objective and subjective influences may vary; a truth is 
more or less impersonal and more or less personal. 

(c) With truths of the first class, e.g. a theorem of geometry, 
only the intellect is concerned. In truths of the second class the 
whole man is interested, and all the faculties contribute to influ- 
ence the judgment. "Thy wish was father, Harry, to that 
thought " (Henry IV, P. II, act iv, sc. iv) is appUcable to many 
thoughts, and, at times, all of us are so many Harries. As a mat- 
ter of fact — we are not concerned at present with what should 
be, but with what is — judgments are influenced by motives which 



GENESIS OF JUDGMENT 121 

do not come simply from reason, but from prejudices, feelings, 
desires, and will. These blind man, and either prevent him from 
accepting reasons at all, or act as convex or concave lenses through 
which reasons are seen in such a way that their real value is exag- 
gerated or minimized. Even in truths that are of themselves 
impersonal it may happen that, because a man has a theory which 
he cherishes, he will rather close his eyes than examine facts 
which, if admitted, would be irreconcilable with the theory accepted 
so far. 

To sum up: In the majority of our assents we are not simply drawn 
by objective light and evidence, but also impelled and prompted by 
subjective and internal motives which may or may not be explicitly 
recognized in consciousness. 

4. Three Uses of Reasoning. — Man, being reasonable, is not 
satisfied until he can give to himself and to others a reason for his 
judgments. Reasoning and proving may be used for three pur- 
poses, to form judgments, to test those that are already accepted, 
and to convince others. 

(a) When the truth is not known, we endeavor to find it by in- 
vestigating, comparing, and weighing the evidence for and against 
it. This is chiefly the work of reason; but, as mentioned already, 
reason is sometimes guided — or rather misguided and blinded — 
by preconceived ideas and prejudices. 

(b) When a judgment is already accepted, and we want to 
examine whether it is sufficiently justified, reasoning is again used 
as a test to revise the motives and arguments and estimate their 
value. Too frequently again, especially in matters of practical 
interest, reasoning is used to justify rather than to test. An opin- 
ion is already accepted, and only motives that can make it appear 
reasonable are considered, or their value is magnified, while the 
value of antagonistic motives is lessened. In such cases, judg- 
ments are not based on reasons, but rather reasons are adapted to 
suit our judgments. They are like the pretexts which are some- 
times found to justify in one's own eyes, and, if possible, in the 
eyes of others, a course of action which one has already determined 
to follow. 

(c) When reasoning is used to convince other men, two things 



122 PSYCHOLOGY 

must be kept in mind: the nature of the truth itself, and the men- 
tal dispositions of the man or of the audience addressed. 
According as the statement which is presented has an impersonal 
or a personal character in the sense explained above, the process 
of argumentation will assume a more rigid and more formal aspect, 
or a warmer and more highly colored tone. In one case, reason 
alone, in the other case, all human activities and feehngs, will be 
appealed to. A political principle is not demonstrated in the 
same way as a theorem of geometry. According as the audience 
is well disposed or hostile, fair or prejudiced, the speaker will 
again assume different attitudes. In every case, since the truth 
must enter the mind, it is necessary first to remove obstacles, 
then to prepare the mind for its reception and assimilation, and 
finally to present the truth in the best adapted manner. The 
same truth presented differently, by different persons, to different 
hearers, in different ways, and different circumstances, will 
produce an innumerable variety of results. Hear, for instance, 
the simple statement: "Miss So-and-So was in church yesterday," 
and Usten to the comment started by the mention of such a fact. 

ARTICLE V. LANGUAGE 

I. THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE 
I. Signs in General. Signs of Mental Processes 

Mental processes are essentially private and personal. They 
are not manifested directly by the action of one mind upon 
another, but indirectly by means of signs. I know the opinion of 
another man because he told me or because I read it. I know 
his grief or joy because I see him weeping or laughing. Words, 
spoken or written, tears, laughter, are so many signs of mental 
processes. 

I. Meaning of Sign. — A sign is whatever manifests something 
else because of some relation between the two, like similarity, 
causality, association, or convention among men. A certain 
position of the semaphore is a sign of danger for the engineer. 
A certain form of clouds, direction of the wind, peculiarity of the 



THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE 123 

atmosphere, are signs of an impending storm. The sign is per- 
ceived directly, and the thing signified, indirectly. The same thing 
may be a sign for one man and not for another, according as the 
relation between it and something else is known or not. The 
interpretation of signs is the work of mental association and 
judgment. 

2. Division of Signs. — (a) A sign is natural when its relation 
with the thing it signifies comes from nature itself. When this 
relation is one of similarity the sign is called formal. Thus cer- 
tain clouds are the natural signs of coming rain; smoke is the nat- 
ural sign of fire; a picture is the natural and formal sign of the 
individual whom it represents. On the contrary, the sign is con- 
ventional when its signification is based merely on an agreement 
between men. Such are the signals for trains or vessels, the tele- 
graphic codes, the flags of the different nations, the red, white, and 
blue striped pole to indicate a barber shop, etc. A sign may be 
neither strictly natural nor strictly conventional but share in the 
nature of both. Thus a sword is the emblem of war; a crown, 
the emblem of royalty, etc. 

(b) Signs are more or less certain, or equivocal, according as they 
are clear and refer to one thing only, or are vague and may refer 
to several things. Thus a symptom may be the certain sign of a 
special disease; smoke the certain sign of fire; a sentence the cer- 
tain sign of a meaning. But a tower is not certainly the sign of 
a church; perspiration not necessarily a sign of hot weather; 
constant reading not always a sign of science or of studiousness. 
Different signs may signify the same thing, or the same sign 
different things. 

(c) Signs may be perceived by any of the five senses. I see a 
certain badge and I know that the man wearing it is a poUceman ; 
I hear a bell and become aware that the church service is about 
to begin; I touch a patient and his temperature is a sign of fever; 
I smell tobacco smoke and am sure it is coming from a good cigar; 
I taste an apple and am sure that it may do me harm because it 
is not ripe, 

3. The Signs of Mental Processes may be: (a) Natural or 
conventional, or partly natural and partly conventional. Thus 



124 PSYCHOLOGY 

crying is the natural sign of pain; laughing the natural sign of 
mirth; clenching the fist the natural sign of anger. Some words 
— in onomatopoeia — may also be considered as natural signs, 
but they are exceptions, for words generally have a purely conven- 
tional meaning. The form of letters, the spelling and pronuncia- 
tion of words are also conventional. Some gestures are natural, 
e.g. pointing toward a certain direction to call attention to an 
object; others are artificial, e.g. the language-signs of the deaf and 
dumb; others seem to depend both on nature and convention, 
e.g. many of the gestures of an orator. 

(b) Certain or doubtful. Some words and sentences have a 
clear meaning; others are equivocal. The expression on the face 
is not always easy to interpret, and the corresponding feelings 
cannot always be inferred. The modes of salutation vary with 
different countries; the same gesture or action may be a sign of 
respect in one place, and an insult in another. Signs are frequently 
misunderstood owing either to the nature of the sign itself, and 
the circumstances in which it is used, or to the ignorance, 
distraction, and mental preoccupation of the man to whom it is 
given. . 

(c) Visual, auditory, and tactual. Touch is not a frequent 
sign of mental processes except for the blind. Hence normally 
there remain two classes of signs: auditory, Hke cries, speech, 
singing; visual, like certain physiognomical expressions, gestures, 
writing. 

II. Special Signs of Intellectual Ideas. Language 

I. Nature of Language. — The term "language" applies to a 
system of rational and conventional signs which express abstract 
and general ideas and the various relations between these ideas. It 
manifests thought in the strict sense, and thus does not refer to the 
manifestations of emotions and feelings, such as crying, laughing, 
or blushing. Animals may give signs of their mental states, but 
language proper belongs to man alone. The same words may be 
uttered by a man and a parrot, but in the former case only do they 
manifest ideas; in the latter they are the results of sensory asso- 
ciations and have no conscious meaning. Man alone has devised 



THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE 125 

rational means of communication with other men. Bugle calls, 
cannon and gun reports, ringing of bells, blowing of whistles, etc., 
are, or may be, so many auditory signs of orders and ideas. Sema- 
phores, flag signals, lights of certain colors, bodily gestures, etc., 
are so many visual signs which manifest thoughts or inferences; 
for instance, that a train has passed the station recently and 
consequently is still within a short distance, thus making it 
dangerous for the present train to proceed. 

However important these signs may be, there are two means of 
communication which are more common, more usual, and of greater 
value: one auditory, spoken language; the other visual, written 
language. In fact, all the others may be reduced to these. The 
signs of the deaf and dumb stand for alphabetical letters, the 
bugle call for a definite sentence or order, the red lantern for a 
warning of danger, etc. 

2. Speech and Writing Compared. — {a) Speech has several 
advantages over writing, (i) The visual field extends only in a 
certain direction and is intercepted by opaque bodies. Sounds 
can be heard from any direction, and are not so easily intercepted. 
Hence sound attracts the attention more easily. (2) Visual signs 
depend on light; sounds are heard even in obscurity. (3) Speech, 
especially when combined with facial expression and gestures, is 
more Hving than writing, and expresses better the feelings that 
accompany the ideas. 

(6) On the other hand, writing has several advantages over speech. 
(i) It is more permanent. (2) It can be transmitted more 
easily, and with less danger of alteration. (3) Hence it can reach 
a greater number of persons, especially by printing. 

(c) In certain modes of writing, such as hieroglyphics, the sign 
is directly the sign of the thing or rather of the idea of the thing. 
But in modern writing, the sign represents directly the sound. 
Thus a certain group of signs stands for the sound "cat," which 
in turn stands for the idea. 

3. Acquisition of Language. — In the acquisition of language 
the child is helped greatly by the fact that there are other speak- 
ing men to teach him. At first the exercise of the limbs and of the 
vocal organs is spontaneous; movements and cries manifest only 



126 PSYCHOLOGY 

sensations and feelings. These signs become rational little by 
little as reason itself develops. The main factors in this acquisi- 
tion of language are: 

(a) Natural signs. The attention of the child is called to cer- 
tain objects by appropriate gestures, and their names are pro- 
nounced until the association between the sound and the thing 
is esta;biished. Easy names are learned first, like "papa," "bow- 
wow," etc. 

{b) On the part of the child there are also certain natural mani- 
festations of painful or agreeable states, and to these correspond 
certain actions on the part of the mother or the nurse. Another 
association is formed, and the desire to have his mother come may 
induce the child to cry or utter certain sounds. 

(c) The child tends to imitate both rational beings and the 
phenomena of inanimate nature. 

{d) Little by little, from purely emotional, and, we might say, 
concrete expressions, the child passes to rational language. Signs 
are used to manifest concepts and their relations. Definitions, 
reading, intercourse with other men, constantly perfect the knowl- 
edge and use of language. 

(e) Even without the help of others, man, endowed with reason 
and reflection, would soon find the means to communicate his 
thoughts, however imperfect these might be at first. 

II. LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 

I. In the Speaker or Writer 

1. Language Presupposes Thought. — (a) Since the function 
of language is to express and communicate thought, it follows 
that language is not the source of ideas, but presupposes them. 
The child has ideas before being able to express them, and even 
the adult frequently has thoughts for which he can hardly find any 
expression. The child at first uses natural signs to express his 
desires and feelings, and later is gradually initiated to conventional 
language which he learns from others. This process of learning 
evidently supposes ideas in the child's mind, for otherwise language 
would be absolutely unintelligible, and words would have no mean- 



LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT I27 

ing. Nature gives only, so to speak, the instruments of speech; 
it is reason that gives to words their soul and their real intellectual 
value. 

(b) It is true, however, that thought and speech develop together 
and in close dependence, and that we hardly ever think without 
speaking to ourselves within our own mind. In Greek, the word 
Aoyos means both reason and speech, and in scholastic philosophy, 
the mental word or verbum mentale means the idea itself or concept. 
To think is really to speak to oneself; to speak is to think 
aloud and for others. 

(c) Hence the importance of clear and methodical thought. 
Without clear thought it is impossible to express oneself clearly, 
and what is clear in the mind is usually clear in the expression. 

2. Language Perfects Thought. — If language is the instrument 
of reason and reflection, it must be admitted also that it greatly 
contributes to improve thought and reason. 

(c) By transmitting thought, it is the basis of all social relations. 
It is also the means of preserving the knowledge accumulated by 
the individual and by generations, 

(6) It facilitates attention by giving stability and permanence 
to the thought, which is naturally transient and unstable. Hence 
it also facilitates memory by embodying the idea in a sensible sym- 
bol, which is the condition of thought, since, as we have seen, 
we never think without some image or some sense-perception. 
The best way to master ideas is to endeavor to express them, and 
this attempt frequently shows that ideas which seemed clear are 
really far from being so. A compendium of philosophy made by 
the student himself is not only a memorandum; it also contrib- 
utes to the understanding of the subject. Reading is much more 
profitable when it is done with a pencil or pen in hand to take notes. 

(c) Language is an instrument of analysis, for it serves to decom- 
pose the complex thought into its various elements, and to fixate 
every one of these elements. By the very fact that we can speak 
only successively we are obliged to express separately ideas which 
are together in the mind. When I say: "Peter is coming," I 
decompose the one act of perception, by which I see at once 
"Peter-and-his-coming," into two elements. 



128 PSYCHOLOGY 

(d) At the same time it is an instrument of synthesis, combina- 
tion, and classification. A word, because it is general, applies 
to a multitude of individuals. It includes in one single expres- 
sion all their common features which are found scattered in many 
individuals amid a multitude of other features. 

II. In the Hearer or Reader 

We shall simply call attention to a few general principles, easily 
understood, yet too frequently forgotten in practice. 

1. Speech Signifies the Ideas of the Speaker, not those of the 
hearer. The word or sentence, in the mind and intention of the 
man who uses it, may not always stand for exactly the same idea 
which it stands for in the mind of the man who hears or reads it. 
Hence arise frequent misrepresentations. Hence also frequent 
complaints on the part of writers and speakers that they have 
been misunderstood and misquoted. 

2. Changes in the Meaning of Words. — Language is sometimes 
equivocal, that is, the meaning may be uncertain. Meaning may 
also vary with the various countries, regions, and times. Like a 
living organism, a language is constantly changing. Many influ- 
ences are always at work to modify it with regard to the 
signification of words, their pronunciation and spelling, the rules 
of grammar, etc. The language that does not change and is 
crystallized is rightly called a dead language. 

3. Consequences, — It is important to keep these principles 
in mind. The word is only a symbol of the speaker's mind; it 
must not therefore be interpreted in the light of the hearer's or 
reader's ideas. How many discussions, oral or written, would 
be avoided if, on one side, the speaker were careful to make his 
meaning clear, and, on the other, the hearer were careful to get 
the right meaning. How many long and bitter controversies 
end or should end by: "If this is what you mean, I agree with 
you." Perhaps there is mental agreement all the time, and the 
disagreement is only a verbal one. Be sure then of the meaning 
of those to whom you listen or whose writings you read. 
Interpret expressions according to their obvious meaning, but 
always taking into account by whom and in what circumstances 



DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 129 

they were used. Ask for further explanation, when possible, 
especially in cases of different opinions, and you will frequently 
avoid many difficulties and discussions. 



CLOSING REMARKS ON THIS CHAPTER 

I. General Conspectus of Cognitive Faculties 

I. Summary. — (a) The present chapter has led us through 
the various successive steps of cognition. Beginning with the 
simplest elements we have risen to more and more complex acts. 
The elaboration of knowledge requires a multitude of processes of 
ever-increasing complexity, each process depending on those that 
have preceded. Analysis and synthesis, separation and combina- 
tion, resolution and construction, go together and give each other 
mutual help. The highest mental processes of the intellect 
pervade, complete, and perfect the data of the senses, and the 
senses are necessary to the highest mental processes. 

(b) Continuity and solidarity are found at every stage. Sensa- 
tion, perception, retention and reproduction, conception, judg- 
ment and reasoning, are all interwoven in cognitive processes. 
What is now a direct perception may have been in the beginning a 
judgment and an act of reasoning now embodied in one and the 
same act. When I say that I see my friend Peter, think how many 
acts of sensation, perception, comparison, and judgment, perhaps 
even scientific conclusions reached by a long process of reasoning, 
are summed up in that one word "friend." 

(c) Yet it must be kept in mind that continuity does not neces- 
sarily mean that all cognitive acts come from and must be attrib- 
uted to the same principle. If we admit, as common-sense leads 
us to admit, a radical distinction between inorganic and organic 
substances, and between plants and animals, we must also admit 
that there is in the plant a special mode of activity which is not 
found in inorganic matter, and in the animal some special property 
which is not found in the plant. Nevertheless it may be impos- 
sible to determine, in concrete cases, where one kingdom begins 
and where the other ends. From what has been said especially 



130 PSYCHOLOGY 

on the origin and the formation of concepts, one may already 
suspect that sense and intellect are two distinct and irreducible 
faculties. This point must now be made clearer. 

2. Senses and Intellect. — Man is endowed with two kinds of 
faculties or powers, irreducible to each other, the senses and the 
intellect. At present we shall simply indicate the main reasons 
for this assertion, as we intend to come back to the same subject 
and determine the nature of intellectual processes when we study 
the philosophy of the human mind. 

(a) We acquire concepts that are abstract and universal, not 
determined therefore by the concrete circumstances of space and 
time. The concept has been shown already to be irreducible 
to the image. Through an organic or material process we can 
know only the material, concrete, and actual reality. The senses, 
therefore, however complex or composite the image may be, can 
give only the knowledge of concrete objects determined in space 
and time. 

{b) The judgment supposes the concept. It does not simply 
consist in a juxtaposition, in a resemblance or a difference between 
two ideas, but it consists essentially in the perception and aflarma- 
tion of such relations. In the case of necessary judgments, that 
is, of judgments which not only are true as matters of fact, but 
must he true at all times, everywhere, and for all minds, no sense 
can ever give to any judgment, or perceive in any reality, this 
character of necessity. It comes from a higher source. 

(c) Probably the most marvellous power of the human mind 
is the power of reflection or self -consciousness. The mind not 
only thinks objects external to itself, but thinks its own thought, 
observes its own sensations, emotions, volitions, and desires, com- 
pares them with one another, and notices their differences or re- 
semblances. Under all these we are aware of the identity of the 
agent from whose activity they proceed and to whom all are attrib- 
uted. An organic or material action cannot thus perceive itself. 
Vision does not see itself, hearing does not hear itself, etc. An 
organ cannot be reflected, or folded back on itself. If this fea- 
ture belongs to higher mental manifestations, it points to a power 
superior to the senses. It is only a supra-sensuous power of thought 



DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 131 

that can bind together the passing states of mind, and recognize 
the identity and permanence of the self under its passing proc- 
■esses. 

II. Genesis of Some Ideas and Principles 

We give here a short outline of the way in which we acquire 
some fundamental concepts and judgments which others imply, 
or which are of most frequent use. The present point of view is 
exclusively psychological. Some of these ideas and principles 
will have to be examined elsewhere from other points of view, in 
Logic, Epistemology, Cosmology, etc. 

I. Ideas. — The most important ideas to be mentioned are 
those of being, self, substance and accident, cause and effect, 
finite and infinite, relative and absolute. 

(a) The notion of being is the first which the human mind ac- 
quires. It is the most general since it appHes to everything, 
hence also the most indetermined and the most imperfect. It is 
at the basis of all other notions, for, whatever is known is known 
as something, i.e. as some form of being. 

(b) The knowledge of self is acquired by reflection. The facts 
of memory and recognition lead to the idea of self-identity. Com- 
parison and the perception of difference and similarity between 
mental processes indicate a judging unity under the multiplicity 
of mental states. Moreover, the consciousness of power manifests 
the self as an active principle. It is not merely a centre or 
support for its passing states, but an agent from which they 
spring. 

(c) Consciousness gives me the testimony that I am a substance, 
namely, that I exist in myself as an individual. On the con- 
trary, it gives the testimony that the ideas, feelings, emotions, 
desires, etc., which I experience are mine. They do not stand by 
themselves, and I cannot think of a thought which is not some 
mind's thought. Another contrast is apparent, namely, the con- 
trast of the permanent ego with the transitory states of the ego, 
which again leads to the recognition of a distinction between 
the ego as a substance, and its states as accidents. This is 
also verified in external objects. The same thing changes in 



132 PSYCHOLOGY 

various respects. These two ideas of sameness and yet of 
successive variety are indications that, in external things, a dis- 
tinction must also be made between substance and accidents or 
properties. 

(d) Internal experience reveals the self as an agent. There 
are changes and successions of mental states, or even bodily move- 
ments, whose happening is the result of volition. We feel that, 
sometimes at least, we are not merely spectators, but agents and 
causes of the sequence of our mental processes; that we dispose 
of and use a certain energy which is in ourselves, and that we 
are capable of effort. Through external experience we observe 
similar facts of change and succession in the outside world. These 
changes take place according to laws which science endeavors 
to discover. In the same circumstances, the same antecedent is 
always followed by the same consequent. Reason is naturally led 
to inquire why these changes are produced, and to attribute them 
to the activity of causes from which they proceed. A cause is 
not merely an antecedent; it not only precedes in time, but it 
exercises an influence in the production of the consequent. 

(e) The senses of vision and touch give perceptions of surface 
and solidity, that is, of concrete extension and dimension. By 
abstraction, the concepts of extension, matter, and body in general 
are formed. Moreover, we perceive the various relations of dis- 
tance, the respective positions of bodies and their changes of place, 
and we look upon space as one immense receptacle in which all 
things are and move. 

(/) The perception of succession, i.e. of the fact that events, 
internal and external, do not all take place at once, but one after 
the other, leads to the idea of time, or of a present instant preceded 
by a past and to be followed by a future. 

(g) Everywhere in the world we find limitations in extension, 
power, activity, and perfection. From these we form the idea of 
limitation; and by removing all limitations we form the idea — 
always imperfect — of the unlimited, of the perfect and the infinite. 
1 can do only certain things, the Omnipotent or Infinite Power can 
do all things. My knowledge is imperfect and Umited, the Infi- 
nite Knower reaches perfectly every truth, etc. In the same man- 



DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 133 

ner, knowing that we are dependent on many other persons and 
things, both for our very existence and for our activity; knowing 
that all beings are thus dependent on one another and that they 
have manifold relations, we conceive the idea of the perfectly 
independent or Absolute. 

2. Principles. — From primitive concepts are formed primary 
judgments or principles which are necessary, universal, and funda- 
mental in experimental and rational sciences. The most important 
are: The principle of identity: "What is is," or *M is A" The 
principle of contradiction: "The same thing cannot be and not be 
at the same time; " or, appHed to cognition: "The same thing can- 
not be affirmed and denied at the same time and in the same 
sense." The principle of substantiality: "There is no mode or phe- 
nomenon without a substance." The principle of causality and 
sufficient reason: "Nothing begins to exist without an adequate 
cause." The principles of spcLce and time: "All bodies are in space," 
and "All events take place in time." The principle of the abso- 
lute: "The relative supposes an absolute; the imperfect supposes 
the perfect; the finite supposes the infinite." The principle of 
morality: "Right and wrong differ essentially," "Moral obHgation 
must be fulfilled, and moral evil must be avoided." 

III. Development of Intellectual Cognition 

I. Intellectual Development. — Let us first ask the question: 
In what does intellectual development consist? As has been 
indicated already, the first notions acquired by the intellect are 
very vague, indistinct, and general. The intellect is developed 
and perfected little by little, and its perfection consists mainly in 
the three following qualities : 

(o) The extension of knowledge, that is, the number of things 
that are known, of sciences that are mastered, and of facts, laws, 
and details with which the mind is acquainted. 

{b) Far more important than the quantity of knowledge is its 
quality, its distinctness, clearness, accuracy, and thoroughness. 
To know much is good; to know well is better. Persons are found 
who have acquired varied and extensive information on a number 



134 PSYCHOLOGY 

of subjects; they have a smattering of everything. But it is all 
vague and hazy, all a-peu-pres, without any clearness or definite- 
ness. They may astonish the ignorant, but to the really learned 
their display of knowledge appears as an addition of conceit to 
ignorance. 

(c) More important still and more fruitful is what may be called 
the synthesis of knowledge, that is, the perception, not merely of 
individual objects, but of their relations, both ontological and log- 
ical. Things and events are related by similarity, difference, 
analogy, causahty, etc., and, both in speculative and in practical 
thinking, success depends on the power of the mind to grasp these 
relations. What are scientific and popular classifications but 
groupings of things according to likeness and difference? On what 
does the success of an enterprise depend, if not on the power of 
grasping beforehand the possible sources of success and failure, 
and the relations of one event to another? In business, in sci- 
ence, in war, in poUtics, in commerce, everywhere, the powerful 
mind is the mind that does not see or foresee merely one side of 
reality, but that embraces at once all its complex aspects. Look 
not only at the individual; look at the whole to which it belongs 
and with which it has manifold relations. It is necessary for 
the mind to analyze, but it must later replace every object of 
knowledge in its true relations. 

2. Main Factors in Intellectual Development. — (a) Much 
assistance is received from others, but it is necessary to control 
human testimony and authority. I make no difficulty in believ- 
ing my friend, whom I know to be truthful, when he tells me of 
things he has seen and of events he has witnessed. If, however, 
he speaks to me on other matters, before I assent I must weigh 
his reasons and test their value. To act differently would be to 
renounce the highest and noblest human prerogative. 

(b) Besides this external assistance, several internal helps must 
be mentioned, (i) The intellect depends on the senses; therefore 
it is necessary to give to the senses the greatest possible perfection, 
and, within proper hmits, to cultivate memory and imagina- 
tion. Hence also the importance of explaining and illustrating 
abstract notions by concrete examples. (2) Attention must be 



DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 135 

given to the various aspects of sense-experience. Judgment and 
reasoning are to be used with caution and prudence. Care must 
be taken not to be misled by prejudices and habits of thought. 
The principle or law must be based on facts, and the facts must 
not be denied or distorted in order to fit in with a preconceived 
theory. (3) The habits of introspection and reflection are neces- 
sary, as self-knowledge is essential in all aspects of life. (4) The 
connections and relations between objects of knowledge are to be 
examined. The endeavor should not be so much to acquire mani- 
fold and varied information as to group it and arrange it in the 
mind. On this condition only will knowledge be available. A 
business man who has many things in his store but without any 
order, and who does not keep his accounts carefully, is not likely 
to succeed. The same is true of a mind in which many ideas are 
scattered at random without order and method. 

3. Main Dangers to be Guarded Against. — (a) The illusion 
of clearness is frequent. A word or sentence is heard or read fre- 
quently, and, because it becomes familiar, the mind never stops 
to consider its accurate meaning. A word altogether new will 
strike the mind and lead us to consult the dictionary. Yet many 
famiUar words are not thoroughly understood; we have only a 
vague and hazy idea of their signification. Try to read a page of 
a novel or of any easy book. Stop carefully to ponder every word 
and try to give a definition of it, and you will see how many do 
not convey a clear and distinct idea to your mind. 

{b) Imagination, prejudices, a priori theories, blind the intellect, 
prevent it from seeing things in their true light, and even make it 
incapable of observing facts without bias. They are hke colored 
glasses which change the visual appearance of everything, or like 
lenses which, according as they are convex or concave, magnify 
or reduce the apparent size of objects. 

(c) Some have an exaggerated credulity with regard to the state- 
ments of a favorite author, orator, friend, etc., without even 
examining their value; or, on the contrary, a disposition to 
disbelieve anything which another man may state. A priori the 
former are always right; the latter always wrong. 

{d) In general, mental passivity and laziness make the mind 



136 PSYCHOLOGY 

merely receptive instead of active. An easy-going intellectual 
life, satisfied with any kind of reason, frightened at the very idea 
of research, scrutiny, questioning, and reflection, incapable of 
advancing one step unless it is pushed, is the surest sign of 
mental weakness and atrophy. 



CHAPTER II 

FEELING 

Introductory Remarks 

1. Meanings of the Term "Feeling." — The term "feeling" 
has several meanings, (i) Sometimes it is used to denote general 
or internal sensations: a man feels hungry, tired, nervous, unwell, 
etc. (2) It is also applied to specific external sensations, especially 
those of touch: a man feels the contact and qualities of an exter- 
nal object, or he feels cold. (3) It expresses a form of cognition 
or belief which it is difficult to account for and justify by reason: 
a man feels that a certain action is right or wrong, that a certain 
man is not reliable or friendly, although the reasons therefor may 
not be clear and defined. (4) As opposed to knowing and willing, 
it denotes in general what is called the affective life, i.e. certain 
states of consciousness, or mental attitudes, known as pleasure 
and displeasure, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, etc., which 
result from the manner in which objects afifect us, (5) It has a 
more restricted meaning applying only to pleasure and pain, that 
is, to the elementary processes of affective life. 

Here we speak of feelings in meanings (4) and (5). In meaning 
(4) it includes, and in meaning (5) it is opposed to, the other mani- 
festations of affective life, namely, emotions and sentiments. 

2. Meaning of Other Terms. — An emotion is a mental state 
of an affective nature, more complex than the mere feeling of pleas- 
ure and pain. It is the way in which the mind is affected by a 
complex situation which it apprehends. By passion is generally 
meant a strong emotion or emotional tendency, uncontrolled 
and violent. A sentiment is of a higher and still more complex 
nature. It has its source in the higher mental processes of knowl- 
edge. Appetite impUes a tendency, craving, or desire, and applies 

137 



138 PSYCHOLOGY 

especially to organic and periodical needs, chiefly the need of 
food, which refer to the preservation of the individual and the 
species. Thus the modern use of this term is far more restricted 
than that of the term appelilus in mediaeval philosophy, where 
appetitus included the whole affective and active life. Love, 
anger, enjoyment, desire, satisfaction, will, etc., were all reduced 
to appetitus. 

These definitions, or rather descriptions, may be made clearer 
by an example. A wound on my body produces a feeHng of pain. 
If I am aware that it has been inflicted intentionally by an enemy, 
I may feel an emotion of anger which will prompt me to take 
revenge. But just then I may experience a moral or religious 
sentiment which will make me forgive. Pain is felt by the infant, 
but he does not experience any emotion when slandered or insulted, 
since this requires understanding. Some emotions, however, are 
experienced in very early childhood; the sentiments develop 
later. 

3. Classification. — No classification of the processes of the 
affective life is perfectly satisfactory. It is difl&cult to analyze 
these processes. They are very complex, and frequently it would 
be impossible to say whether a concrete affective process belongs 
to feelings, or emotions, or sentiments. Each group generally 
includes elements which belong to another group. However, 
for purposes of study a classification is needed, and the following 
will be used with the understanding that it is not adequate: 
I. Feelings proper, in the strict sense. 

II. Emotions: (i) self -regarding, personal, or individual; (2) 
altruistic, sympathetic, or social. 

III. Sentiments: (i) of truth, intellectual; (2) of beauty, 
aesthetic; (3) of right and wrong, moral; (4) of relations with 
God, religious. 



PLEASURE AND PAIN 139 

ARTICLE I. FEELINGS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 

I. NATURE AND LAWS OF THESE FEELINGS 

I. Nature of the Feelings 

1. Definitions, — The term "pain" and the term "pleasure" 
cannot be defined; their meaning can only be experienced. As 
no idea of color can be imparted to the man born blind, so no idea 
of pleasure and pain could ever be imparted to a man who had 
never felt them. But no definition is necessary since, in a gen- 
eral way at least, everybody knows the general character of each 
feeling and the difference between them. With regard to the use 
of these two terms it may be noted that "pain " applies chiefly 
to feelings resulting from certain organic conditions, for instance, 
a wound, a soreness, an ache. Yet some other mental states 
due to other causes are also called painful. "Unpleasantness" 
is a more general term and applies to all phases of mental hfe. It 
indicates less than pain, and many states of consciousness to which 
we could hardly apply the term "painful " may be called "unpleas- 
ant." The same distinction is also applied, but less generally, 
to the terms "pleasure " and "pleasantness." "Agreeable " and 
"disagreeable" have a meaning which is very close to that of 
pleasant and unpleasant. 

2. Psychological Nature. — (a) Whatever be said concerning 
their cause and their ontological nature, from the point of view 
of psychology both pleasure and pain are positive feelings. Even 
if pain be considered as negative in itself, i.e. as resulting from the 
lack of a due perfection, from a defect or a privation; if, for 
instance, a stomach ache results from the absence of certain normal 
conditions necessary for the proper functioning of this organ; 
or if the unpleasantness of a sensation is caused by the lack of 
adaptation of the sense organ to a certain stimulation, it is true, 
nevertheless, that, in consciousness, the feehng of pain or unpleas- 
antness is a feeling no less positive than pleasure and pleasantness. 

{h) Pleasure results from the healthy, vigorous, normal, and har- 
monious exercise of the various activities. Inactivity and rest, 



I40 PSYCHOLOGY 

as such, are not pleasurable. The most agreeable rest is a change 
in the nature and intensity of activity. Pain and unpleasantness 
result from excessive exercise or excessive restraint. The com- 
plete inactivity of a faculty — hke the eye, the ear, the muscles, 
imagination, etc. — especially if prolonged, becomes very painful. 
Think of being always in complete darkness or remaining with 
closed eyes, of making no motion, of not thinking of anything; it 
would be unbearable. On the other hand, excessive exercise is 
also painful. Too bright a Hght, too loud a soimd, too great a 
muscular effort are sources of pain. Moderate and appropriate 
efforts are rather pleasurable, and to assert, with pessimists like 
Schopenhauer, that activity and effort are essentially painful is 
to go directly against the clear testimony of consciousness. 

3. Variations. — Feelings vary in intensity, and their varia- 
tions depend both on subjective conditions and on objective factors. 
(i) According as the mind is disposed, the same perception or 
image may be pleasant or unpleasant. The present occupation, 
the mental contents, the preceding sensations, etc., exercise an 
influence on the way in which the mind is affected. We also know 
that the same stimulus may produce an agreeable feehng in one 
individual and a disagreeable feeling in another. (2) On the 
other hand, certain objects naturally produce an agreeable, others 
a painful feeling. Some sensations of taste, sound, etc., are 
pleasant, while others are unpleasant, for practically all individ- 
uals. The following laws will specify this general principle. 

II. Laws of Feelings 

1. Law of Stimulation. — The stimulus may be suitable for the 
sense, or unsuitable; proportioned, or too great, or too small. Too 
weak a stimulus — for instance, too feeble a light, a scarcely au- 
dible whisper — requires too much effort and tension. Too great 
a stimulus — for instance, a dazzling hght, a shrill sound, a 
suffocating odor, extremes of heat and cold — is also painful. A 
sensation is agreeable only when the stimulation remains within 
certain limits of intensity. 

2. Law of Duration, Change, and Contrast. — When pleasure 
is prolonged unduly it ceases to be felt, and even may be succeeded 



PLEASURE AND PAIN I41 

by unpleasantness. The same activity which was agreeable in 
the beginning becomes tedious. The same piece of music which 
was pleasing when heard for the first time becomes tiresome if it 
is repeated too frequently. See how rapidly the popularity of a 
song, even of a "hit," decreases and dies. The same dainty food 
becomes unbearable. We have "too much of a good thing." 
Hence the necessity of variety and of change: (1) In the kind of 
stimulus, even if we remain within the same group of sensations, 
e.g. change of visual surroundings. (2) In the degree of stimula- 
tion; in many cases the pleasure will continue up to a certain level 
if the stimulus be increased. The persistent admiration of real 
masterpieces is due to some kind of change. The more we see or 
hear them, the more also do we appreciate them, because we under- 
stand them better and find new beauties in them. (3) In the 
kind of activity. The monotony due to repeating certain actions 
is painful; hence the importance of varying exercises, and of passing 
from one mode of occupation to another. 

Contrast affects the nature and intensity of the feelings. Pleas- 
ure following pain is more keenly felt, and vice versa. 

3. Law of Acconunodation. — This law works in two ways, 
either toward pleasure or toward pain, as will be verified easily 
from personal experience, (i) Things which at first were very 
disagreeable may become indifferent and even pleasurable; smok- 
ing, eating certain foods or condiments, studying according to 
certain methods, may serve as illustrations. Taste for what is 
disagreeable may be acquired. We first "get used to " them, and 
later derive real pleasure from them. This is due largely to 
the influence of habit. (2) But accommodation may also lessen 
the pleasure. After a certain time of constant use, more condi- 
ment, more cigars, more amusements, etc., may be required to 
cause the same amount of pleasure. An activity which at first 
was accompanied by a pleasurable feeling, by repetition may 
become indifferent and tedious. (3) When an action or a stimu- 
lation has become habitual, even if it is the source of no special 
pleasure, the interruption of it, or interference with it, is painful. 
If I am used to the ticking of the clock in my room, I "miss " it 
when it stops. The interference with habitual activities, move- 



142 • PSYCHOLOGY 

ments, religious or moral opinions and accustomed modes of 
thought, is disagreeable. 

4. Laws of Mutual Furtherance or Hindrance of Activities, 
and of Harmony or Antagonism between Mental States. — As 
was said above, pleasure and pain depend largely on subjective 
dispositions. The same behavior toward me may be agreeable 
or disagreeable according as I am deaUng with a man whom I 
like or with one whom I disUke. In the same manner, when work- 
ing in behalf of a friend, I find pleasure in actions which would 
cause me annoyance if I had to perform them under other condi- 
tions. When a man is occupied with an important or interesting 
task, interruption, even in the form of an otherwise agreeable 
conversation or recreation, will be unwelcome. What furthers 
the present purpose and is in harmony with the present state of 
mind and disposition will, as the case may be, cause more pleas- 
ure or less displeasure than what is antagonistic to them and 
hinders them. 

II. IMPORTANCE OF FEELINGS 

All men naturally and without exception crave for happiness. 
They may dififer as to the means of obtaining it; they may look 
merely for present enjoyment, or work for future pleasure; they 
may seek the pleasures of the senses or those of the mind and the 
moral aspirations; they may work for happiness in this life or in 
the next; but the innate desire to be happy is imiversal. Hence 
the importance of feelings as springs of action. 

1. For Happiness. — Pleasure and pain are the main factors 
in human happiness and misery. The amount of happiness in 
life is measured by the amount of pleasure found in it. But such 
pleasure must not be estimated in reference to the present alone. 
An action which would be otherwise painful may become agree- 
able on account of the pleasure to which it is expected to lead. 
Frequently the same complex process will have pleasant and un- 
pleasant aspects, for instance, the satisfaction of the senses, and 
remorse of conscience; present pleasure, and anticipation of future 
pain. 

2. For Mental Life, — Pleasure and pain are very important 



IMPORTANCE OF FEELINGS 143 

in intellectual life and affect the whole mental attitude and be- 
havior. Pleasure or the anticipation of pleasure is a powerful 
incentive to study. What the mind likes is much more easily 
attended to and assimilated. From this fact important peda- 
gogical conclusions may be inferred. The child's reason is not 
yet sufficiently developed to control his feelings and direct his 
conduct. It is necessary, therefore, to give him lessons and exer- 
cises that will interest him, and from which he will derive some 
pleasure. He must be made to like his work and studies; and 
means, such as change, variety, concrete applications, etc., must 
be adapted to this end. Even for the adult, agreeable work is 
much easier. A great amount of will power is required to over- 
come repugnances and become proficient in a science for which one 
feels nothing but dislike. Pleasantness facihtates and quickens 
attention, and increases mental energy. 

3. For Ordinary Behavior. — Feelings play an important part 
in daily life, (i) Pleasure is often a guide, but not an infallible 
one, to the real good. Certain agreeable sensations of smell and 
taste may be signs of the healthfulness of aliments, and repug- 
nance is frequently a sign of danger. This is true especially of 
animals; man depends more on artificial conventions, and less on 
nature. Even for higher activities, pleasures to be obtained or 
pains to be avoided are ordinary motives of action. (2) Bodily 
pain is a warning and calls attention to a diseased organism. Were 
it not for pain, how many would die before knowing that they 
were sick at all. It also tells us when to stop the exercise of cer- 
tain activities; a soreness of the eyes or a headache may be a warn- 
ing that continuing to read will be injurious. (3) Pleasure and 
pain influence man's whole behavior and character. Suffering and 
enjoyment, whether transitory or permanent, affect the ordinary 
mental attitude. Reflection will show that the influence of 
feelings on the whole human conduct is much greater than is 
commonly supposed. 

4. For Development and Progress. — Pleasure and pain are 
prominent factors in the progress and development both of the 
individual and of the race, (i) What is the best educator for the 
child? His own experience. According as it is pleasurable or 



144 PSYCHOLOGY 

unpleasant there will be a tendency to repeat or to avoid it. Burn- 
ing his fingers will make him very careful when he sees fire again. 
Receiving a reward or a punishment will tend to make him per- 
form or refrain from certain actions. In adult age, reason becomes 
more important, yet reflection will show that the motives derived 
from reason are generally reducible to the obtaining of what is 
pleasurable and the avoiding of what is painful. (2) Civilization, 
that is, the progress reaUzed by mankind in useful sciences and 
arts, is due to a constant effort toward decreasing pain, fatigue, 
and whatever else is disagreeable, and toward increasing pleasure 
and comfort. Inventions tend to make life easier and more 
agreeable. 

5. For Morality. — In the higher sphere of moral life we shall 
mention only the following: (i) Pleasure and pain, whether 
immediate or future, supply motives of conduct, good or bad. 
Theft and almsgiving, murder and disinterested love, etc., have 
reference to present or future pleasure and pain of the agent or 
of his fellowmen. (2) They contribute to the practice of indi- 
vidual virtues, the development of the will, courage, self-respect, 
etc., and (3) of social virtues, charity, sympathy, self-sacrifice, 
almsgiving, etc. 

6. For Religion. — Religion and reUgious practices depend 
greatly on the feeUngs of pleasure and pain. Reward or punish- 
ment is always presented as the outcome of a good or a bad life. 
During life, suffering shows man his nothingness and the vanity 
of pleasures, and it makes him look forward to a future and bet- 
ter life. Evil and the fear of evil are incentives to prayer and 
divine worship so as to obtain the divine assistance. Christian 
religion is full of references to happiness, riches, and pleasures, 
to misery, poverty, and sufferings. It supplies higher motives 
and views both in the examples and in the teachings of its 
Founder. 

ARTICLE II. EMOTIONS 

As already indicated, the emotions are more complex than the 
feelings of pleasure and pain. They always include pleasurable 
or painful elements, and sometimes a mixture of both; these vary 



SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS 145 

with different individuals, and even with different manifestations 
of the same emotion in the same individual. Hence it is difficult 
to analyze an emotion, because its elements are closely interwoven 
and form a very complex and intricate state of mind. To this 
may be added that, at least when an emotion is strong and vio- 
lent, the power of reflection is lessened or suppressed. After the 
emotion has abated or ceased, what remains is the memory of it, 
not the emotion itself as it appeared in consciousness. And 
in the memory of an emotion it is almost impossible to dis- 
tinguish from the purely emotional elements the ideational and 
volitional processes which preceded, accompanied, or followed 
them. 

We shall consider successively the egoistic or self-regarding 
emotions — referring to and centring around the self; and the al- 
truistic emotions — referring to, caused by, or tending to others. 

I. SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS 

I. Their Nature. — These emotions refer to the personal good 
of the individual. When they are called egoistic, this term is 
not given the odious meaning which it frequently has, namely, 
that of an excessive self-love which makes one forget other 
men; it only indicates that these emotions refer primarily to the 
self. All are based on the innate tendency to self-preservation, 
self-assertion, and development. Man wants to preserve himself, 
that is, he wants to protect his life, not only the life of the body, 
but also his mental faculties, reputation, and character. Man 
wants to assert and develop his life and his faculties, to manifest 
his various energies, to increase and perfect them. Hence two 
general features of these emotions. Some refer to things that 
are conducive to the fundamental ends of man, and therefore 
objects of love; others refer to things that are antagonistic to them, 
and therefore objects of aversion. We shall mention the most 
important. 

Bodily appetites need not detain us; they are physiological 
needs which manifest themselves in consciousness by a painful 
craving, like hunger, thirst, need of air or of exercise, etc., and 



146 PSYCHOLOGY 

the satisfaction of which causes a special pleasure. They refer 
primarily to the conservation of individual organic life. 

2, Self-importance is a fundamental emotion which takes an 
explicit form with the power of reflection, clear germs of which, 
however, manifest themselves in very early childhood. It assumes 
several forms, (i) Self-esteem and self-love; man knows his own 
qualities, true or apparent, and is aware of the good there is, or 
he thinks there is, in himself. This leads to (2) self-complacency, 
that is, pleasure at the thought of his excellence, and (3) self- 
respect, which influences conduct in an honorable direction so as 
to preserve his dignity. (4) Self-reliance results from the con- 
sciousness of power, intellectual, moral, social, political, muscular, 
etc. It is based on self-esteem, that is, on the good opinion which 
a man has of himself. (5) Pride, in its ordinary meaning, is an 
excessive self-esteem, and a desire for superiority, which are not 
justified by real merits and excellence. 

These emotions are mostly pleasurable, but they may be closely 
associated with displeasure, if others do not concur in the opinion 
which we have of ourselves. Self-pity is a feeling of weakness and 
inferiority experienced when the lack of a desirable attainment 
is recognized. It may assume many forms and is chiefly painful. 

3. The Love of Approbation is the natural consequence of self- 
assertion and self-importance. It refers to the self, and includes 
also a social element. We want others to recognize our excel- 
lence or our superiority; we want their esteem and respect; we feel 
pleasure when we succeed and pain when we fail. Frequently 
pleasure and pain will be experienced together, because the ap- 
proval of all men, and even the approval of the same person for 
all actions, cannot be obtained. According as one is held in greater 
esteem, his approval gives greater satisfaction, and his disapproval 
greater pain. The esteem and love for a person may be so great 
that his approval alone seems sufficient, and what others may 
think is indifferent. 

This emotion easily leads to vanity or vainglory, which seeks 
undue praise or esteem, and deems very important that which 
is really worth little or nothing, like birth, dress, ornaments, 
wealth, etc. 



SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS 147 

4. Love of Activity. — (a) The love of activity and power fol- 
lows from the natural desire to exercise our faculties, that is, 
from the emotions of self-importance and self-esteem. The con- 
sciousness of power manifests itself especially in successful efforts 
to overcome obstacles which are met when endeavoring to reach 
an end (ambition). A social influence frequently manifests it- 
self, namely, the love of superiority over others. The feelings of 
restraint of activity, or of incapacity to overcome a difficulty, are 
painful. 

(b) The love of activity and superiority produces emulation 
and rivalry, which are so important in all concerns of life, in intel- 
lectual development, in business, in pohtics, etc. Individuals 
and nations in all their various pursuits, serious or sportive, seek 
to display their activity and power, and to outshine one another. 
There is pleasure in the hope and anticipation of victory and 
approval, and in the conflict itself that is expected to lead to them. 
Pain may result from failure and from the consciousness of 
inferiority. This emotion, in itself, is legitimate and noble. It 
stimulates the ardor and multiplies the activity. But it may 
also be the source of envy, hatred, anger, antipathy, and injustice 
in the use of the means. 

5. Fear is primarily egoistic, yet it may also refer to others. 
It is produced by the painful anticipation of some evil. This emo- 
tion depends on some previous painful experience which has been 
stored up in memory, or on a complexity of experiences which have 
been associated or constructed by imagination. I am afraid of 
fire because I have experienced sensations of burning. I am 
afraid of a strange animal, of darkness, of an imknown object, 
of a sudden and unexpected noise or sight, because they suggest 
danger. 

The physical effects of fear vary with individuals. In general, 
they are depressive and consist of a lowering of vitality and con- 
trol — paleness, trembhng, perspiration, chattering of the teeth, 
etc. Fear may have very serious, and even fatal, results. Men- 
tal functions are also impaired. Judgment, reasoning, reflection, 
and attention are suspended or disordered. In some cases the 
will, or rather the impulse to act, will be quickened, and strength 



148 PSYCHOLOGY 

increased in order to escape the object of fear. In other cases 
fear will paralyze every effort. It must not be forgotten that the 
fear of punishment simply deters from evil, and that, while it 
is a useful means of education, other means must be taken to 
promote good aspirations. 

Fear is legitimate and unavoidable, but must not be allowed 
to turn into cowardice, that is, groundless or exaggerated fear, 
out of proportion with the impending evil. The objective causes 
of it are generally beyond control, but its subjective causes — fre- 
quently ignorance, ill-health, nervousness, laziness, imagination 
— may be removed httle by little. 

6. Anger, like fear, is primarily egoistic, but may also refer to 
others. It results from a sense of injury, either bodily or mental. 
Hence it includes a painful element, namely, the consciousness 
of a wrong which is suffered, and of a failure on the part of others 
to respect our own persons or possessions. Anger is a stimulant 
for activity, and creates a desire to retaHate. It multiplies the 
energy, accelerates the circulation and respiration, quickens the 
heart, etc., but prevents the exercise of attention, judgment, and 
reason. It may include a pleasurable element in the exercise of 
activity, and the success in retaliating. Anger takes several forms. 
It may be a sudden involuntary outburst, or premeditated anger. 
It may lead to revenge, or take the form of a natural, persistent 
antipathy, and even hatred. Malevolence takes pleasure in inflict- 
ing pain on others. 

7. Remorse, Shame, and Self-Condemnation are painful feelings 
resulting from the consciousness of having done something wrong 
which lowers us in our own eyes or in the eyes of others. They 
are therefore opposed to the pleasurable feelings of self-importance 
and love of approbation. Remorse comes especially from self- 
disapproval, while shame is rather the result of feeling oneself 
disapproved by other men. 

II. ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS 

I. Their Existence. — (a) Man does not suffice to himself, 
he needs others and is made to live in society. He is also endowed 
by nature with certain feelings that refer to his fellowmen. The 



ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS 149 

distinct existence of these feelings has been denied or doubted by 
some psychologists. For them every feeling is essentially selfish. 
When we do good to others, it is because we expect a return and 
thus have in view our own good. When we feel sympathy for 
others, we imagine how we should suffer if their afiflictions were 
thrown upon ourselves. When we revere and respect others, it 
is self-regard and the desire of esteem and approval that prompt 
us. Whatever feeling is experienced toward other men is always 
reducible to a self -regarding emotion. 

(b) This view cannot be accepted. A man, it is true, may 
perform charitable actions, give alms or encouragement, for selfish 
motives and in the hope of deriving therefrom certain personal 
advantages, (i) But the inner feelings of compassion, respect, 
and sympathy are frequently experienced without being mani- 
fested at all, and therefore without being able to bring any return. 
(2) It is a fact of consciousness that sometimes disinterested feel- 
ings are experienced, and that actions springing from motives 
of compassion or of the love of others are performed without any 
expectation or prospect of reward or personal satisfaction. (3) 
Such feelings are universal, found in all men, beginning at an 
early age, extending not only to our fellowmen, but even to the 
imaginary characters described in novels or plays. 

(c) It must be admitted that in many cases personal satisfac- 
tion accompanies these feelings, but what is claimed here is that 
this satisfaction is not always what the agent has in view, and that 
there are sympathetic emotions which are completely orientated 
toward others, not toward self. Altruistic emotions may pre- 
suppose personal experience without being selfish in their nature. 
The love of others does not exclude self-love, but self-love does 
not account for all emotions and is not always primary. The as- 
sertion that there are altruistic emotions does not exclude their 
close contact with egoistic emotions. Emotions referring to others 
are more or less developed, but one of the worst insults that can 
be addressed to a man is to say that he has no feeling, no regard, 
and no sympathy for others. 

We shall not speak here of the blameworthy feelings toward 
others, such as hard-heartedness, hatred, cruelty, scorn, etc. These 



150 PSYCHOLOGY 

come rather from a lack of feeling for others, from exaggerated 
and overbearing self-love and self-conceit, and from egoism, in 
the bad sense in which this word is generally used. 

2. Sympathy. — The fundamental altruistic emotion is sym- 
pathy. Etymologically this word means a "feeling A\'ith "; it 
indicates, therefore, an understanding and a sharing of the feelings 
of others, of their pleasures and pains, of their joys and afflictions. 
Its chief factors axQi (i) A natural and instinctive tendency from 
the earliest age. (2) Association and imagination. We associate 
certain modes of expression with certain feelings, recall similar 
feelings experienced by ourselves, and imagine feelings which we 
have not experienced. Thus a man who never had his meal delayed 
more than a few hours will nevertheless imagine the feelings of a 
man whom he sees starving. Imagination is frequently misleading, 
because it interprets the feelings of others according to the dis- 
positions of the sympathizer himself, and hence may magnify or 
minimize them. (3) The intellect also is an important factor in the 
observation and interpretation of the manifestation of feelings. 

3. The Main Determinants of Sympathy are the following: 
(i) Its intensity varies with both the subjective dispositions — 
temperament, friendship, love, etc. — and the objective condi- 
tions, that is, the greatness, real or imagined, of the feeling ex-peri- 
enced by others. (2) It always supposes some similarity and 
community between the sympathizer and the object of his sym- 
pathy. This community may be merely one of nature, between 
all human beings; or of interests, between members of the same 
civil, industrial, commercial, society; or of purposes; or of family 
relations. In proportion as it is closer, the feelings of sympathy 
are more easily aroused and more intense. Differences and con- 
trasts in education, religion, social position, and character are 
frequently obstacles to sympathy. (3) Sympathy has a tendency 
to increase in proportion to the activity used in expressing it. 
Works generate love. Thus — all things being otherwdse the same 
— a mother will frequently love the more a sickly child who has 
required more care. (4) Sympathy is communicative and, as 
it were, contagious. The best means to win the sympathy of a 
person is to manifest sympathy toward him. 



ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS 151 

4. The Main Effects of Sympathy are the following: (i) It not 
only makes man share the joys and sorrows of his fellowmen, but 
tends to make him increase the former and lessen the latter. Hence 
arise benevolence, which is the desire of the good of others, and benef- 
icence, charity, commiseration, etc., which are practical endeavors 
to procure it. (2) There is a tendency, sometimes unconscious, 
to imitate those for whom sympathy is felt, to love what they love, 
and to share their interests. Members of the same family and the 
same community generally have many common features. (3) 
Respect and reverence are manifestations of sympathy toward 
persons who have some special merit and perfection. Respect is 
due to all in various degrees. Reverence is due to those who have 
some superiority in virtue, position, character, etc. Both imply 
some affection, otherwise they pass into mere formality, wonder, 
awe, and even fear. 

5. Forms of Sympathy. — Sympathetic feelings take several 
forms according to their range and nature. They are less intense 
in proportion as they refer to a greater number of individuals 
at the same time. 

(a) Love and friendship are selective; a special choice is made 
of the person who is their object. The former is generally more 
intense, less durable, more sensitive, more blind; the latter more 
reflective, more intellectual, more lasting. Friendship is always 
reciprocal and requires mutual esteem; love may be one-sided. 
Besides this meaning as an emotion, love has also a more general 
meaning applicable to feelings which we should have toward all 
men: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." 

{b) Family affections bind together by mutual sympathy 
husband and wife, parents and children, and children among 
themselves. There is a natural sympathy for members of the same 
family, which, unhappily, certain uncongenialities of temperament, 
or other causes, may sometimes prevent. 

(c) Local interests, business, and neighborhood bring men into 
special contact with some other men, and unite them for certain 
purposes, especially those referring to the good of the community. 
Thus in the cases of members of the same church, of the same 
political party, of the same commercial enterprise, etc. 



152 PSYCHOLOGY 

(d) Patriotism, or love of one's country, is still more extensive. 
It is based on a common consent to promote the interests of the 
nation. The community of tongue, religion, authority, laws, 
customs, history, etc., cements the wills of the citizens and unites 
their efforts. 

(e) Philanthropy is sympathy for mankind in general. On 
the mere ground of their community of nature, all men are entitled 
to the sympathy and respect of their fellowmen. 

ARTICLE III. SENTIMENTS 

Their Nature. — Sentiments are superior, more rational, more 
complex, and also more disinterested feelings. 

(a) They are based on higher needs, and hence can hardly ever 
be satiated. They manifest aspirations toward ideals which 
are never fully realized. The ideals of truth, beauty, goodness, 
and religion seem always to recede from us in our search for them. 
For instance, for the satisfaction and pleasure of discovering one 
truth, there is the pain and anxiety of finding several new unsolved 
problems and unanswered difficulties. As we proceed, new horizons 
are opened before us. Based on the higher mental processes, they 
are also the best incentives to the perfection of these processes. 

(6) Because they are of a more refined nature, they are also 
less common, at least in their nobler manifestations. They depend 
more on education and general culture than the feeHngs proper 
and the emotions. The same wound will produce about the same 
pain in several individuals. An insulting remark is Hkely to pro- 
duce emotions of anger in all men, although, for emotions, the 
variations are already of great importance, and the laws much 
less strict. In the sentiments still greater variations will be ob- 
served. Some men will experience no aesthetic sentiment when 
looking at a perfect painting, or reading a beautiful poem. Some 
may even prefer the ragtimes of the street-organ to a classical 
piece played by a first-class orchestra, and the funny pictures of 
the Sunday paper to a masterpiece of a great artist. Sentiments 
are so complex that the whole mental structure of every individual 
must be taken into account. 



INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENTS 1 53 

I. INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENTS 

1. Love of Truth. — The basis of the intellectual sentiments 
is the love of truth. Man is naturally eager to know, and although 
this tendency is not explicit at first, it manifests itself in many 
ways, such as questions, investigations, attempts at generaliza- 
tion and explanation. Men do not always require the same 
accurate and scientific explanation, but all want to link facts and 
events together under the same general laws. In its highest 
form, the love of truth is disinterested, pursuing knowledge for 
its own sake, and apart from practical and utilitarian motives 
like the love of fame, the hope of remimeration, the satisfaction 
of ambition, and the like. In its earlier stages, especially, this 
sentiment is associated with, and results from, other feelings. 
The child learns his lesson in order to please his teacher and parents, 
or in order to avoid punishment and obtain reward. Later he may 
come to see the necessity of learning in order to attain success in 
life, and, later still, he will learn because of the pleasure w^ich he 
finds in knowing. 

2. Ignorance. — (a) Since man Ukes to know, it follows that 
the awareness of ignorance and perplexity is painful. To see some- 
thing which cannot be understood creates a certain feeling of want 
and a sense of uneasiness, especially if that thing is of interest. 
This general feeling of ignorance and confusion, however, may 
sometimes be accompanied by pleasurable elements, like novelty, 
surprise, and wonder. 

(b) Novelty implies either an objective change, or the discovery 
by the mind of a new aspect in the object. It is likely to produce 
a certain amount of pleasure. Surprise indicates not only a change, 
but a sudden and unexpected change. Wonder refers to something 
which is unexpected because it is out of the ordinary, or which 
seems strange on account of its unusually large or small size, its 
peculiar unwonted characteristics, its excellence or depravity, etc. 
Hence it is a very complex state, in which pleasurable and unpleas- 
urable elements may be combined. 

(c) Ignorance, perplexity, wonder, naturally arouse the curios- 
ity and the desire to know. Curiosity is one of the mainsprings of 



154 PSYCHOLOGY 

mental activity. It prompts to inquire, investigate, and question. 
At a more developed stage it can be sustained longer, because 
the love of truth is deeper. In the child the feeling of curiosity 
would soon be forgotten, were not the interest kept up and revived. 
Curiosity is very useful; it must be encouraged, and, as much as 
possible, satisfied. It is the sign of an inquisitive mind and of 
eagerness to know. Hence, in repressing the excessive and objec- 
tionable forms of this feeling, care must be taken not to discour- 
age or rebuke the child, or in any way to repress the natural and 
useful tendency of the mind to know what it has the duty or right 
to know. 

3. Curiosity Leads to Investigation. — At this stage are expe- 
rienced various feelings of pursuit, discovery, assimilation, and 
possession; or of incapacity, disappointment, and failure. 

(a) Pursuit, as an exercise of activity, is a source of pleasure. 
This character, however, may be modified at every step by the 
hope of success or the fear of failure, the sense of power or of 
incapacity. 

{b) Discovery is a source of great pleasure, and, when confusion 
and perplexity have preceded, when the pursuit has been arduous 
and strenuous, the pleasure of final success is enhanced by con-, 
trast. How much greater is the joy of finding a solution for one- 
self than that of being told without having made any effort. A 
success which has cost more labor is more pleasurable. The 
failure to find a solution is always unpleasant. 

(c) The knowledge thus acquired is assimilated with the knowl- 
edge already at hand. It is compared to and incorporated with 
the other mental possessions. The feeling of logical consistency, 
that is, of agreement with previous experience and knowledge, 
is very pleasant. On the contrary, the awareness of contradiction 
and inconsistency is distressing and produces a new state of per- 
plexity; either the new knowledge is invalid and the mind has 
gone astray, or previously acquired knowledge has to be rejected. 

Besides the feelings of which we have spoken may be mentioned 
some others that have both an intellectual and an ethical aspect, 
like fairness, impartiaUty, disinterestedness, or, on the contrary, 
intellectual bias, prejudice, and prepossession. When these are 



ESTHETIC SENTIMENTS 155 

experienced in ourselves or perceived in others, they naturally 
produce complex agreeable or disagreeable sentiments. 



II. ESTHETIC SENTIMENTS 

Certain persons, things, and actions which we call beautiful, 
pretty, graceful, sublime, harmonious, melodious, witty, ludi- 
crous, etc., produce in the mind a pleasurable impression, whereas 
others recognized as ugly, inharmonious, improportionate, etc., 
produce a disagreeable feeling. This is called the aesthetic sen- 
timent, and the special faculty for experiencing it, or the suscepti- 
bility to it, is called the aesthetic taste. The beautiful is always 
agreeable, but the agreeable is not always beautiful. 

I. Elements of the iEsthetic Sentiment. — The objective ele- 
ments of beauty will be examined in Esthetics. On the subjec- 
tive side, the one of interest to psychology, the elements of the 
aesthetic sentiments are: 

(a) Sensory. Objects that produce aesthetic sentiments are 
perceived by two senses: (i) sight — natural objects, such as land- 
scapes, sceneries, rivers, seas, mountains, etc.; artificial objects, 
such as paintings, monuments, sculptures, etc.; (2) hearing — 
singing of birds, music, rhythm, poetry, etc. Some sensations of 
color, light, sound, etc., in themselves are agreeable and pleasant 
for all men. This purely sensuous feeling which results from a 
suitable stimulation of the sense-organ disposes and contributes 
to the agsthetic pleasure, but stops at its lowest degree. 

(b) Perceptive and intellectual. Details must be perceived in 
their mutual relations, so as to give rise to the perception of the 
object as a whole. The aesthetic sentiment is due chiefly to 
this perception of details or units forming one harmonious 
whole. 

(c) Associative and ideal. Things which of themselves might 
not arouse any special aesthetic sentiment do so on account of 
the memories which they recall or the ideas which they suggest. 
Historical places where important events have occurred, or places 
associated with legends, will, on account of these associations, 
arouse sentiments more readily. Or again, a certain scenery will 



156 PSYCHOLOGY 

suggest ideas of danger, power, or strength, which contribute 
to the production and special aspects of sentiments. It is not so 
much on account of their melodies as on account of the associa- 
tions which they suggest that the national hjTnn or patriotic songs 
are able to arouse enthusiastic feelings. 

2. Special Features. — Among the special features of the aes- 
thetic sentiments two must be mentioned. 

(a) ^Esthetic taste is capricious, and the old proverb "De gus- 
tibus non disputandum " does not only apply to the sense of 
taste, but indicates also that diverse feelings may be aroused in 
several individuals by the perception of the same object. These 
differences come partly from native dispositions, emotional 
tendencies and character, and partly from the cultivation of 
taste in a certain direction. 

(b) However, there is a standard of taste which varies within 
broader or narrower limits according as it is appUed to a more or 
less numerous class of men. Thus there are things which cannot 
be considered as aesthetic in any place or at any time, but they 
are few. The standard is more uniform for the same epoch, still 
more so when applied only to a nation, a class having the same 
education, a school within the class, a closely related group within 
the school. 

These questions will be developed more at length in .Esthetics. 
Some points concerning the subjective or psychological aspect 
of the aesthetic feeUngs will find there a more suitable place, as 
they will help to determine the nature of objective beauty. 

3. Forms of the .Esthetic Sentiment. — The sentiments thus 
far analyzed in their generaUty take several forms according to 
the nature of the object by which they are aroused, (i) Sublim- 
ity implies greatness, superiority, and power. Hence the corre- 
sponding feeling is mingled with awe, fear, admiration, and a sense 
of inferiority and weakness. Thus something immense and impos- 
ing in space or time, the power of the sea in a tempest, an heroic 
deed, etc. (2) Prettiness, on the contrary, refers to something 
small, tiny, or weak. (3) The feeUng of the ludicrous, wit, humor, 
is produced by something unexpected, surprising, incongruous, or 
undignified. It is expressed by laughter and mirth. 



MORAL SENTIMENTS 157 

III. MORAL SENTIMENTS 

1. Their Nature. — The moral sentiments refer to voluntary 
human actions in so far as they are good or bad, right or wrong, 
(i) Voluntary actions are the only ones which we call moral. 
Merely physical happenings have no moral aspect, and the same 
must be said of accidental results produced unintentionally, and 
of spontaneous actions in man, like the organic vital functions. 
The will has no control over these. We condemn as wrong the 
mere intention and desire to do wrong, even if it be not carried out. 
(2) In so far as they are right or wrong. Other feelings may refer 
to the same actions in other respects; other sciences may try to 
give them another special direction. The point of view here is 
that of the moral value, i.e. of the rightness or wrongness of the 
actions, their comparison with a rule, a standard, and an ideal to 
which they ought to conform. 

2. The Fundamental Form of the Moral Sentiment is the feeling 
of right and wrong in conscience, that is, a feeling of obligation to 
do or avoid certain actions. It imposes a reference to some law, 
authority, and command which tell us absolutely: "Thou shalt," 
or "Thou shalt not." Whatever source be assigned to this cate- 
gorical imperative, and however great be the differences in the 
standards of morality among different nations and at different 
times, all men recognize that some actions must, and others must 
not, be performed. Hence this sentiment is a powerful spring of 
action. 

The sentiment of right and wrong must be distinguished from 
that of mere utility or from the conditional imperative. If I fail 
to profit by a good business opportunity, I may blame myself, 
but not as having done wrong morally. According to the moral 
character of the action a man feels satisfaction, pleasure, and 
self-approval, or remorse, shame, guilt, and self-condemnation. 
All this supposes the sentiment of responsibility and free-will. 
We experience satisfaction and remorse only for those actions 
which we feel we could perform or avoid. If I kill a man 
accidentally and unavoidably, I may, of course, be very sorry, 
but I do not feel responsible for it. 



158 PSYCHOLOGY 

3. Factors in the Concrete Sentiment of Morality. — This is 
not the place to speak of the value of the moral law, which will 
be explained in Ethics. But one cannot fail to notice a great 
diversity of standards according to individuals, places, and times. 
What one would be thoroughly ashamed of will be indifferent for 
another. What is considered wrong in one locality, or at one 
time, may be considered right elsewhere and at another time. 
Few, if any, are the actions which have been regarded as wrong 
at all times and by all men. Without speaking of the objective 
value of actions, and of the true rule to which they ought to con- 
form, we merely enumerate the main psychological factors that 
influence concrete moral feelings, (i) The importance of intel- 
lectual faculties in supplying motives and intentions, and in deter- 
mining the moral value of actions, is self-evident. (2) Custom, 
association, imagination, and habit exercise a very great influence. 
What a man has been accustomed to do, even if known intellec- 
tually to be wrong, will hardly excite any feehng of shame or 
remorse. The inveterate drunkard or criminal are good illustra- 
tions of this. Again, what is customary in a locaUty arouses 
no surprise and no moral feehng for those who live there, though 
it may shock outsiders. (3) Human passions may blind man's 
understanding and pervert his will. Thus avarice and greed will 
easily lead to theft, hatred to murder, and so on. The feehng ex- 
perienced may vary in nature and intensity according to the 
prompting passions and the derived advantages. 

IV. RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS 

I. Their Nature. — Religious sentiments, manifestations, and 
practices are found in all places and at all times, but take many 
diflferent forms. The conceptions regarding the attributes of the 
object or objects of religious worship, and the nature of religious 
practices, have been and are stiU varied almost beyond imagina- 
tion. One has but to recall the practices of polytheism and 
fetichism to understand the truth of this statement. In some reli- 
gions, the dominant feeling is that of fear, and, in order to placate 
the terrible divinities, practices of an inconceivable cruelty are 



RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS 159 

frequently adopted. In others the dominant feeling is love, and 
all good gifts are lavished by the Creator on His creatures. These 
feelings may assume numberless forms and give rise to many others. 
It would be an endless task to go through their analysis, and to 
enter into the enumeration of the actions performed for religious 
motives. Some elements, however, are common to all forms of 
the religious sentiment. 

Independently of particular creeds, there is in all religions a 
sentiment of dependence, a recognition of God's greatness and power, 
and of man's littleness and weakness when compared to God. 
According to the nature which is ascribed to God, this feeling will 
take the forms of love, confidence, fear, resignation, prayer, etc., 
and express itself in the offering of various sacrifices. In its high- 
est stage of development, the feeling of the greatness of God 
becomes that of the divine Infinity which brings man face to face 
with an unfathomable mystery. 

2. Main Forms of Religious Sentiments. — The religious sen- 
timent will tend to make man view things in their relations to 
God, as coming from Him, directed by Him, returning to Him, 
and, in the case of man, accountable to Him. It ennobles our 
views of things and events by referring them to their source and 
ultimate goal. It even creates the desire of a union with God by 
knowledge and possession. Hence come many of the ideas of re- 
ward and punishment in the next life. Hence also the ideas of 
being in peace with God when we have not offended Him, and 
of enmity when we have not compUed with His law. It is easy to 
see how complex these feelings are, how numerous their elements, 
and how diflBcult their analysis. They vary in nature, eleva- 
tion, and refinement according to the nature and elevation of the 
ideas concerning God, the divine attributes, and the divine laws 
and sanctions. 

3. Psychological Factors. — These feelings manifest themselves 
by religious worship, that is, by a multitude of religious practices 
which in turn are the sources of many other feelings. The main 
factors in the determination of these practices are: (i) Reason, 
^hich examines the foundation of beliefs and the value of religious 
practices. (2) Habit; what we are used to seems right, whereas 



l6o PSYCHOLOGY 

novelty arouses suspicion. A new belief that contradicts accus- 
tomed ways of thinking, or which is merely added to them, is 
sometimes difficult to accept. Unwonted practices are generally 
unwelcome until the sense of novelty has passed. On the contrary, 
an unfounded or superstitious belief and practice, if habitual, 
stands firm. It is easy to notice how great a difficulty is found in 
changing the habitual religious ideas and customs of thoroughly 
religious people. (3) The senses, association, and imagination; 
certain surroundings, times, and places are more favorable to 
religious practices and to religious manifestations. Looking at reli- 
gious pictures, statues, symbols, etc., hearing or singing religious 
hymns, are incentives to the religious feelings. (4) Other emotions 
and sentiments; thus suffering and need are motives for having 
recourse to God by prayer. How much more fervent is prayer in 
time of danger! The beauty of religious temples, and the solem- 
nity of rites and ceremonies, also contribute to the experience 
of religious sentiments. 



CONCLUSION 

IMPORTANCE AND CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE 

I. Importance of Affective Life 

Affective life is very important both for the individual himself 
and in his relations with other men. In general it may be said 
that feelings give to human life its distinctive character, its tone, 
its happiness or unhappiness, its enjoyment or irksomeness. Hence 
judgments passed on other men refer in a large measure to their 
character and their various modes of feeling. The esteem in 
which some men are held, and the reprobation which is given 
others, are due to their conduct in so far as this conduct manifests 
their sentiments. 

I. In the Development of Intellectual Life, as already pointed 
out, feelings are important factors, (i) They incite to the search 
of truth, the enjoyment of the pursuit and of the success. They 
may also be the sources of error and bias, when interest is found 



CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE l6l 

in one solution rather than in its opposite. They magnify or min- 
imize reasons that tend to prove a conclusion which a priori is found 
to be favorable or unfavorable, and which accordingly one desires 
to have demonstrated or disproved. (2) Feelings are frequently 
made use of in convincing others. In many cases an appeal to pure 
reason, though it be cogent, will fail, whereas an appeal to the 
feelings will be successful. If a speaker wants to bring his audi- 
ence to practical conclusions, he has not only to convince but to 
move and touch them; hence he must appeal to their ambitions, 
desires, interests, egoistic or altruistic emotions, and higher 
sentiments. (Cf. p. 117 ff.) 

2. In Regard to Moral Life. — (i) Feelings themselves may have 
a moral value according as they are or are not regulated and con- 
trolled. One may be blameworthy for failing to repress certain 
emotions or passions. (2) Feelings are powerful springs of action. 
As a motive of action, a mere intellectual idea is weak; its strength 
is greatly increased by feelings. The notion that an action is good 
or bad will not go far toward making one perform or avoid it, 
unless there is at the same time in consciousness the love of the 
good and the hatred of the bad, the sense of duty, and the pleas- 
ure in complying with the rules of morality. (3) Feelings exer- 
cise a great influence on responsibility. A murder committed coolly 
and deliberately is judged more severely than a murder com- 
mitted in a passion. Certain feelings blind the understanding 
and prevent it from throwing its searching light on the value of 
an action. 

3. Religious Life is largely dependent on the affective life. A 
revealed creed, especially one that includes mysteries to be beheved, 
will be accepted with difficulty by a proud intellect. Under the 
influence of feeUngs, how frequently is the accidental in religion 
preferred to the essential, the optional to the obligatory! The 
choice of religious practices which are not regarded as obligatory 
will be largely a matter of feelings prompting to one mode of prayer, 
devotion, offering, sacrifice, rather than to another. Some saints 
are austere and unsympathetic; others are mild, and excite not 
only our admiration, but also our sympathy and love. The former 
are directed chiefly by fear of the judgments of God, the latter by 



l62 PSYCHOLOGY 

confidence in His mercy. According to our own feelings, we are 
inclined to imitate the former or the latter. 

4. For Success and Happiness. — The importance of affective 
life in daily affairs and for general happiness is very great. 

(a) Feelings are not all of the same importance, nor are they 
necessary to all men in the same degree — this depends on the 
special conditions of life and culture, — yet some are fundamental, 
especially those of joy, hope, cheerfulness, fear, grief, gloominess, 
etc., since they are the main factors of happiness or misery in life, 
and contribute so much to man's character, and to his view of 
things. Emotions, and especially passions, are the source of the 
greatest good, and of the greatest evil. A good conscience 
makes a man happy, remorse leaves him no rest. 

(b) Personal moods and dispositions, inclinations, or aversions 
are due to feelings, and experience teaches how much influence 
they exercise for success and failure. 

(c) Other men are to be dealt with according to their temper 
and character, that is, chiefly according to their affective peculiar- 
ities. Success in dealing with others depends principally on a cer- 
tain insight into the propensities of those with whom we come in 
contact. The successful man knows that each individual must 
be treated differently from all others, that each has a special 
"touchy " or "sensitive " spot, etc. 

(d) General happiness is partly objective, and due to the enjoy- 
ment of external goods; but it is chiefly subjective. Frequently 
we see the poor happier than the rich, the man who has only the 
necessaries of life more cheerful than the one who has all possible 
luxuries. Happiness is the satisfaction of desires. Desire little, 
and little will suffice to make you happy. Be resigned to the in- 
evitable, and accept cheerfully that which, however painful, can- 
not be averted. Let your mind be hopeful, and always strive for 
better things, but let it not lose courage and equanimity if failure 
follows your efforts. All things, even the worst, have some brighter 
aspect; look at them from this point of view, and this bright- 
ness will be a source of light for your reason and of agree- 
able warmth for your heart. In all circumstances, cultivate 
"happy " feelings and dispositions, throw away melancholy 



CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE 163 

and gloomy views; life will bring you greater comfort, pleasure, 
and success. 

II. Cultivation of Affective Life 

1. Its Necessity. — The importance of feelings in general su£&- 
ciently shows the necessity of cultivating them. 

(a) This culture is general — of the affective life in its most general 
manifestations, — or special — of particular feelings and emotions, 
for instance, of the religious sentiment, aesthetic taste, sympathy, 
etc. All feelings are not equally necessary in all conditions of Hfe. 

(b) Nor are all feelings capable of the same degree of culture 
and control. This varies with subjective dispositions, natural 
endowments, character, and temperament, which cannot be 
changed altogether. The more refined feelings are not accessible 
to all classes in their perfection. Yet for all, within variable lim- 
its, progress is possible. Even physical suffering which seems 
inevitable can be alleviated by physical and mental means. 

(c) The culture of affective life is negative when it has for its 
object the repression or suppression of feelings; positive when it 
tends to increase or acquire them. 

(d) It may also be personal, for the individual himself who 
applies himself to it ; or it may be the culture of feelings in others, 
especially in children, by education. The child's affective life 
must be cultivated very early. Even when objectionable, feelings 
may be utilized, transformed, and elevated by making them serve 
nobler purposes and giving them worthy objects. 

2. General Principles. — (a) Difficult though it is, cultivation 
is possible and necessary. Feelings can and must be regulated, 
acquired or suppressed, increased or decreased, according to the 
dictates of reason, and within just limits. Some are praiseworthy, 
others shameful. Even feelings that are good may be excessive, 
e.g. self-love, sympathy, etc. Hence all must be controlled. 

(b) No fixed standard can be assigned, for it varies within exten- 
sive limits according to conditions in life. In the case of more 
fundamental and more necessary feelings, like sympathy, love, 
fairness, etc., the limits, though wide, are narrower than for the 
others. Moreover, it is impossible for all men to be moulded 



l64 PSYCHOLOGY 

according to the same pattern. Every individual's personality 
must be preserved. This world would be a dull world if it were 
otherwise. 

(c) Generally speaking, the egoistic feelings tend to excess and 
should rather be repressed; altruistic feelings tend to defect and should 
rather be developed. Higher sentiments are to be cultivated ac- 
cording to education and special dispositions. 

{d) Feelings are connected. Hence cultivating one group will 
also aflfect the others; cultivating the more general will affect the 
more special. Thus developing sympathy will develop compas- 
sion, esteem, and respect. 

(e) Feelings arise from ideas, hence controlling the ideas mil 
naturally modify the resulting feelings. Feelings are also closely 
associated with their physical expression; control of the physical 
expression will be a help in controUing the feeling itself. The 
law of adaptation and habit and the law of change have been 
mentioned already. 

(/) Feelings are contagious. For instance, to be with a congre- 
gation praying fervently helps the attitude of prayer; panic is a 
fear which spreads rapidly; the indignation and cruelty of a mob 
are communicated sometimes without any reason. 

(g) A special illusion must be guarded against, that of mistak- 
ing the strong expression of a feeling for strenuous action. The 
man who vents his displeasure and inveighs vehemently against 
this or that evil, may come to the belief that he is doing much to 
relieve the situation, whereas he merely expresses his dissatisfac- 
tion without trying to find the causes of the evil or the suitable 
remedies. 

3. A Few Special Applications of these general principles will 
be mentioned here. 

(c) To repress a feeling: (i) Avoid occasions in which you know 
from experience that it would be aroused. (2) If it is aroused, 
combat it by positive efforts of reason and will. (3) Give rise 
to contrary feehngs by calling to mind contrary ideas. In most 
cases this is the most effective means. (4) Procure yourself diver- 
sion and distraction by thinking of other things which have enough 
interest to keep the mind's attention. (5) Control the emotional 



CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE 165 

expression, or create an antagonistic one. To check all manifes- 
tations of anger helps to decrease the feeling itself. To whistle 
at night will help to remove fear. A noble and proud behavior 
will tend to do away with excessive timidity. Expressions of 
sympathy will reduce excessive selfishness, and so on. 

(b) To create or stimulate a. feeling: (i) Call forth suitable ideas, 
objects, circumstances, or situations. (2) Cultivate certain modes 
of attention, reflection, and imagination. (3) Produce the suit- 
able expression. Clenching the fist is likely to stimulate anger; 
trembling, fear; kneeling, prayer; an humble deportment, humil- 
ity. Actors have been seen to feel really and with great inten- 
sity the sentiments and emotions which they merely sought to 
express. 

In all this the purpose is to make the affective life an auxil- 
iary in striving for the noblest aims. 



CHAPTER III 
ACTING AND WILLING 
ARTICLE I. ACTION AND MODES OF ACTION 
' I. INTRODUCTION 

I. Meaning of Action 

1. Definition of Terms. — It would be as impossible to explain 
action to one who had never exercised any activity — were such 
a case possible — as it is to explain color to the man bom blind, 
or sound to the man born deaf. No definition of action can be 
given. Nor is a definition necessary, for all men understand 
what it is to "do" and to "be active" and to "exercise one's 
energy." The term conation denotes all the active aspects of con- 
sciousness, or rather that which is common to them all, namely, 
a tendency to induce, preserve, or change a state of mind or body. 
Thus conation applies to those processes which we call desiring, 
craving, longing, endeavoring, trying, making effort, striving, 
wishing, willing, and the like. 

2. Meaning of Action. — {a) In a broad sense — first extreme 
— activity is a general condition of all our faculties, and all men- 
tal states have an active aspect. To think, to judge, to perceive, 
to reason, to feel . . . are actions, or, perhaps better, reactions. 
The mind is not exclusively passive; it is first acted on, but must 
also, in response, exercise its own activity. Thus knowledge has a 
twofold aspect, one representative, and the other active. So far 
we have considered only its representative aspect. Even feelings 
and passions, though primarily passive, are also in this sense active. 

{h) In a very strict sense — second extreme — action refers 
only to external actions, i.e. to movements of the organism. Thus 
we oppose action to thought and feeling, both of which are inter- 

i66 



ACTION 167 

nal and subjective. Thus also we oppose the man of science, 
thought, contemplation, meditation, ... to the man of action, who 
uses his energy in some external and visible manner, and for tan- 
gible results. The man who spends his days in study and reflec- 
tion, although he is at work, and hence really active all the time, 
is not called a man of action. 

(c) Between these two extremes, terms denoting exercise and 
activity are applied to a multitude of processes. My stomach 
acts on the food to digest it. My brain and my mind are active 
during study, reflection, reasoning, deliberation, and choice. I 
am active in interpreting or paying attention to my sensations 
and perceptions, but I should rather be incHned to call myself 
inactive when simply receiving sensations and perceptions with- 
out making any effort to interpret and understand them. Thus 
we say of a boy in class that he is merely passive and does nothing, 
when he is present without making any personal effort. 

II. General Modes of Action 

N.B. What we say here of positive action must be applied also 
to inhibition, i.e. the checking of an activity which would natu- 
rally manifest itself. Inhibition is but another form of effort and 
activity. 

1. Personal and Impersonal. — There are actions which I am 
conscious of as coming from, and attributable to, myself. They 
may be called personal. Others, on the contrary, take place 
within myself, but do not spring from my own ego. They may be 
called impersonal. Thus my digestion, my winking of the eye 
when some object suddenly approaches too near, my wounding 
or killing a man accidentally and unavoidably, the thoughts that 
come to my mind of themselves and inadvertently, etc., are not 
my own doings. Applying my mind purposely to a certain object 
or study, my killing a man premeditately and intentionally, my 
voluntarily going to a certain place, etc., spring from my own 
personal activity. 

2. Actions are Conscious or Unconscious. — (a) While I am 
now conscious of reading and writing, I am not conscious of a mul- 
titude of processes that take place within the organism, and that 



l68 PSYCHOLOGY 

might be conscious, like breathing; nor of the pain which I felt a 
moment ago, and which I know I should feel if I were not absorbed 
in something else; nor of the ticking of my clock, although I must 
hear it in some way, since, if it stops, I become immediately aware 
of the fact. 

(b) Conscious actions are not always personal. For instance, 
I may be conscious of the beating of my heart, of my respiration, 
of the winking of my eyes, the stretching forward of my arms 
when I feel I am going to fall, or of thoughts suddenly occurring 
to my mind. Yet I know that I am not the cause, but only the 
witness, of such actions. They take place within me, but I am 
not accoimtable for them. Conscious actions therefore may be 
impersonal. 

On the other hand, in order to be personal, must an action be 
conscious? Or can there be personal, yet unconscious, actions? 
An action cannot actually spring from myself and be personal with- 
out my being aware of it. The man who is so thoroughly intoxi- 
cated, or in such a passion that he no longer knows what he is 
doing, does not perform any personal actions. Not himself, but his 
state and condition, are the true agents if, for instance, he kills 
another man. Such an action is not actually and immediately 
personal. Yet it may be called indirectly, remotely, and causally 
personal, if the man consciously and voluntarily induced the 
state of intoxication or the passion, and at the same time had 
some consciousness or prevision of what was likely to happen when 
he would no longer be himself and no longer capable of acting as 
a person. Hence all personal actions suppose consciousness, if 
not actual, at least antecedent. 

3. Voluntary, Non- Voluntary, and Involuntary. — From what 
precedes we see that there are three degrees in our mode of acting. 
Some actions are unconscious; others are simply conscious but 
without personal will; others finally are voUtional. 

With regard to the attitude of the person toward the action, 
we may have (i) voluntary, (2) non-voluntary, (3) involuntary 
action, according as it (i) is intended, and proceeds from a posi- 
tive act of the will; or (2) is independent of the will, the will neither 
producing nor opposing it; thus I may let my mind wander at lei- 



NON-VOLITIONAL ACTION 169 

sure without doing anything to induce or check the train of thought; 
or (3) finally takes place against the will. My arm may be moved 
by force notwithstanding my efforts to the contrary; I may be 
obliged to stay in some place because of paralysis; or I may 
be unable to banish a certain thought or feeHng from my mind. 



II. NON-VOLITIONAL ACTION 

We shall speak here only of organic activity and movement. 
There are also many non-voluntary mental actions such as 
perception, reproduction of images, association, feeling, etc., but 
these have been examined elsewhere. They are the spontaneous 
or automatic working of the mind. Non-volitional movements 
may be divided into two general classes according as (i) they are 
performed not only without a command and direction of the will, 
but, even, as sometimes happens, without preceding or accompany- 
ing consciousness of purpose (random, automatic, and reflex move- 
ments) ; or, on the contrary, (2) are performed for an end and with 
some consciousness of a purpose (impulsive and instinctive move- 
ments). There is no strict line of demarcation between the two 
classes; actions pass gradually from the former to the latter. It 
may be noted also that authors do not always agree in defining 
the terms mentioned here. 

I. Random, Automatic, and Reflex Movements 

1. Spontaneous or Random Movements include a great number 
of movements of the limbs in the child, and few in the adult. As 
far as can be known, they are not provoked by external impres- 
sions or internal states of mind, but are purposeless, and seem to 
be merely spontaneous overflows of energy. 

2. Automatic Movements are purposive and necessary for life, 
although the purpose may be unconscious. They require no stimu- 
lation from without, but are spontaneous discharges of energy 
from the nerve-centres. The most common examples are those of the 
regular beating of the heart, respiratory movements, the processes 
of digestion and assimilation. These are automatic from the be- 
girming. Some are or may be conscious; others are unconscious. 



lyo PSYCHOLOGY 

To these may be added others that become automatic by habit. 
In the beginning they require consciousness, attention, and effort; 
but, later on, these factors are no longer necessary, and, as soon 
as the series is initiated, all the movements follow of themselves, 
being perfectly automatic in some cases, and in others, nearly so. 
As examples may be mentioned walking, dancing, speaking, etc. 
These have also been called acquired reflexes. More will be said 
about them when we speak of habit. 

3. Reflex Action differs from automatic action chiefly in this, 
that, whereas the latter has its origin within the organism itself, 
the reflex action is due to a stimulation from without. It is a motor 
process due directly to a sensory process, but without will, desire, 
conscious effort, or conscious purpose. The action itself, however, 
may be performed consciously or unconsciously. Thus if the sole 
of the foot be tickled, the foot is immediately withdrawn from its 
place, whether the person be asleep or awake. In both cases the 
action is reflex; in the former it is unconscious, in the latter con- 
scious. Reflexes are due to motor centres which are excited by 
an external sensory stimulation, the afferent nerve and the effer- 
ent nerve being connected in the nerve-centres of the brain or of 
the spinal cord. 

Some reflexes are original and natural; they tend chiefly to the 
preservation of life, hke sneezing, swallowing, winking. Others 
are acquired and depend on association and education. These 
suppose generally some conscious state to start the whole series. 
Thus the sight of the notes by the pianist determines immedi- 
ately the appropriate movements for striking the keys. 

Animals, the spinal cord of which has been severed, or the brain 
removed, perform reflex actions. A decapitated frog will jerk 
away its leg or scratch it if some acid be put on it. These actions 
depend on the nerve-centres in the cord, and, although they are 
not conscious, they are nevertheless seemingly purposive. They 
correspond directly and immediately to the stimulation, just as 
if there had been a conscious sensation. 

In normal life, such actions as sneezing, winking, vomiting, 
secreting saliva, withdrawing the hand from a burning object, 
extending the arms forward when in danger of falling, etc., are 



NON- VOLITION AL ACTION 171 

reflex actions. Although they are generally accompanied and 
even preceded by consciousness, they are not determined by any 
effort, nor produced under the guidance of the will. 

II. Impulsive and Instinctive Movements 

1. Impulsive Actions are those which proceed immediately from 
the presence of an idea in the mind, and from the consciousness of 
an end to be reached. There is no deliberation, no reflection, no 
multiplicity of tendencies, and no choice. The primary impulses 
are toward pleasure and freedom from pain. But, as the work of 
education proceeds and habits are contracted, impulses are diver- 
sified, and become as numerous as the things themselves from which 
pleasure and pain are derived in the physical, the intellectual, 
the moral, and the religious spheres. Hence the impulses of sev- 
eral men in the same circumstances will be widely different. For 
instance, a murder may be committed impulsively when the mind 
is so obsessed by one idea that the action follows immediately 
without any deliberation. Again, upon hearing a noise in my room 
at night, my impulse may be to run away, or to speak and ask 
questions, or to grasp my revolver and fire, etc. 

To impulsive movements may be reduced imitative movements 
which originate from an impulse excited by the perception of these 
movements as performed by others. Children especially have a 
tendency to imitate the actions of others, like smiling, pouting, 
talking, etc. 

2. Instinctive Actions are found chiefly in animals; their num- 
ber is small in man. They are more complex than impulsive 
actions, do not always suppose the clear idea of the end to be 
reached, have a more remote purpose, and do not vary so much 
with the individuals, but are common to the species, and are trans- 
mitted by heredity. Thus the migratory habits of birds, their 
building of nests, the constructing of wax cells by bees, the swim- 
ming of the young duck, etc. These actions are prompted by 
sensations or images of some kind, and tend to a purpose, 
but sometimes — for instance, when the bird builds a nest for the 
first time — the representation of this purpose can only be a 
vague one. 



172 PSYCHOLOGY 

Summary 

We may sum up briefly the main characteristics of the various 
forms of action mentioned so far. All agree in being fatal and 
necessary, that is, there is no conflict of motives and no delibera- 
tion. The tendency to act is all in one direction. The will may 
sometimes interfere with them, foster or inhibit them, but, in this 
case, the action becomes more or less voluntary. 

{a) Random movements are purposeless, and centrally initiated. 
Automatic movements are purposive, and adapted to an end which, 
however, is not a determinant of the movement; they also are 
centrally initiated. Reflex movements are purposive, but periph- 
erally initiated. Their purpose is an immediate one, and hence 
reflex differ from instinctive actions. 

(Jb) Impulsive movement supposes only one idea in the mind, 
and generally follows this idea immediately; it varies with the indi- 
viduals. Instinctive action is not always accompanied by the dis- 
tinct consciousness of the end; it impHes a greater complexity of 
ideas and elements, and is the same for all individuals of the same 
species. Both impulsive and instinctive actions are ordinarily 
more complex than random, automatic, and reflex actions, and in- 
volve a series of movements coordinated in order to reach an end. 
They always suppose some consciousness, whereas the others 
may be conscious or unconscious. They are not so mechanical, 
but require some intelligent adaptation and coordination. 

(c) In the young child we find only the forms of movement men- 
tioned so far. Voluntary or controlled movements, that is, move- 
ments consciously directed and adapted to a known end, are evolved 
little by little as the mental and the organic faculties become more 
developed. The main factor in this development seems to be the 
mental association of certain uncontrolled actions with the sensa- 
tions of pleasure or pain resulting from them. Some random, 
impulsive, automatic, and instinctive actions yield a pleasant 
result; others are unpleasant. Hence the tendency to repeat the 
former, and to abstain from the latter. Hence also arise tentative 
efforts to do so; and Httle by Uttle the control of more and more 
complex movements is secured. 



VOLITIONAL ACTION 173 

III. VOLITIONAL ACTION 

I, Elements of Volitional Actions. — Volitional action is directed 
to an end known and intended. Hence it implies the following steps 
which, however, have not the same importance in all actions, and 
may require more or less time according to the dififerent cases. Some 
even may not be explicit at all, but merely implied in others or pre- 
supposed, because they have already taken place at other times. 

{a) The mind must have the idea of an end to be reached, i.e. 
of a good to be obtained or of an evil to be avoided. To become 
rich, successful, learned, or influential; to enjoy oneself, to be up- 
right and virtuous, etc., may be so many ends. They appear as 
good, and create in the mind the desire of reaching them. There 
may be in the mind several alternatives of ends to be reached or 
of means to reach them, of actions to be performed or omitted, 
of means to be taken or rejected, of conduct to be followed or 
avoided. 

(&) The reasons for choosing one end rather than another, for 
instance, duty rather than pleasure; and, when the end has been 
chosen, the reasons for taking some means in preference to others, 
are examined, compared with one another, and weighed. In some 
cases, this takes a long time; in other cases, it is a short process, 
because either the merits of the various alternatives are clear 
enough, or it is urgent to act at once, or the decision is imprudent 
and hasty. This process is called deliberation. 

(c) Choice follows the examination of motives. A course of 
action is selected, and an alternative accepted. This is decision or 
volition. 

(d) Finally comes the execution. At the command of the will, 
the mental or organic faculties are appHed to perform the action 
that has been chosen. 

From this analysis it is easy to see how voluntary actions 
differ from those mentioned above. Example: A young man has 
to choose a profession . . . must learn . . . goes to college . . . 
applies himself to study, etc. See how many alternatives pre- 
sent themselves at every step, and how every step is taken in 
accordance with the analysis just made. 



174 PSYCHOLOGY 

2. Desire. — (a) We have mentioned the term " desire." Desire 
must be distinguished from volition; it is the transitional step 
from knowledge to volition. Desire is a tetidency to, or craving 
for, something which appears good. It includes cognitive ele- 
ments, presentative and chiefly representative, by which the idea 
of the object arouses the idea of some pleasurable feehng con- 
nected with it. Hence it contains also elements of feeUngs, and 
the intensity of the desire is in proportion to the greatness of the 
pleasure which is anticipated. 

(b) (i) Desire is blind and fatal. We cannot help finding cer- 
tain things good and agreeable. (2) Desire may refer to things 
that are independent of the will — e.g. good weather — and even 
to unattainable things which one would Uke to possess — e.g. 
good health. (3) With regard to the same thing, we may have 
contradictory desires, desire in one respect, and aversion in an- 
other. I may at the same time desire to enjoy a certain pleasure 
because it is agreeable, and to turn away from it because it is for- 
bidden. Two things may be desired at the same time — e.g. a 
walk outside and an entertainment indoors — although one only 
is possible. 

(c) In opposition to these characteristics of desire, (i) the will 
is reasonable and controllable. (2) It appUes only to things 
that seem attainable and that are in our power. (3) Of several 
incompatible alternatives one only can be willed. (4) It may be 
added that the will is not always proportioned to the desire. 
Some men seem to be almost incapable of carrying out their plans. 
Their desires may be strong, but their will is weak. They " would 
like " to do certain things, but have not enough determination to 
say: "I will do it." 

3. Decision concerning a certain action may be positive or neg- 
ative, a volition or a nohtion; it may produce or inhibit a move- 
ment. As psychological processes, however, both are positive, 
and nolition is called negative only with regard to the result. 
Inhibition is as frequent and as necessary as the initiation of action. 
It may check the desire and impulse to action, as when we desire 
to perform certain actions which, for better reasons, we decide 
not to perform. It is implied in any decision where a choice is 



HABIT 175 

made between conflicting desires. It may also interrupt an action 
already begun, and prevent it from being completed. Like action, 
arrest of action is more or less volitional, sometimes being entirely 
or almost automatic, and sometimes resulting from deliberation. 

IV. HABIT 

Recall to mind your first lessons in writing, and compare them 
with the facility which you have at present. Writing has now 
become habitual. In examining the nature, genesis, and impor- 
tance of habits, constantly keep before your mind the instance 
just given, or any other habit which you have acquired. 

1. Nature of Habit. — (a) Experience shows that, after being 
performed several times, organic and mental actions become eas- 
ier, and require less attention and effort. Hence habit is a disposi- 
tion to reproduce certain actions and to act in the same way under 
the same circumstances. The perfectly habitual action is not 
actually voluntary in the strict sense, because it is performed 
.without reflection and dehberation, and even with Httle or no 
consciousness. This, however, is true only of actions that proceed 
exclusively from habit. In many cases habit and will together 
play a more or less important part. Habitual actions differ 
also from instinctive actions because they are not results of innate 
dispositions, but acquired by repetition. They are more diverse, 
and are not perfect from the beginning, but become more and 
more so by repetition. 

(6) A habit may be contracted voluntarily or involuntarily. 
In the former case, the resulting action, although presently non- 
voluntary, is nevertheless voluntary in its cause. In the latter 
case, the action cannot be voluntary since the habit itself is not. 

2. Genesis of Habits. — (a) Habit begins with the first act, 
and grows with every repetition. If no disposition were left by 
the first act, there would be no reason why habit should begin 
with the second or any subsequent act. Every action leaves a 
trace or disposition, which, however, may disappear if it is not 
again excited within a certain time. The trace left is more im- 
portant in proportion to the interest, attention, application, etc, 

(Z>) The strength of the habit increases in proportion to the 



176 PSYCHOLOGY 

frequency of the actions, their duration, their intensity, the inter- 
val between them, and chiefly the accompanying attention and 
feelings. How frequent, how long, and how intense the actions 
and repetitions should be cannot be determined except by ex- 
perience. This varies with the nature of the actions, and the 
subjective dispositions. 

(c) Habits decrease in strength, or even disappear, through lack 
of exercise, and chiefly, when possible, through opposite actions. 
Will and effort to resist the habit are more or less effective accord- 
ing to the strength of the habit and the amount of effort. 

3. Importance. — (a) Habit is important because of the range 
of its application and influence which include every aspect of 
human life. The organism becomes habituated to certain modes of 
activity, to foods, stimulants, narcotics, climate, diet, etc. Its 
various movements are perfected, or vitiated, by habit. On the 
mental side, we find habits of perception, memory, imagination, 
association, judgment, conduct, feelings, will, etc., all this framing 
man's character and personaHty. 

(b) The effects of habit are chiefly the following: (i) Habitual 
actions, good and bad, are more perfect and easier than others. 
(2) They require less attention, and are performed, so to say, 
automatically. (3) Habit is a great economy of energy and time; 
instead of having to make an effort for every detail of the action, 
the series of details follows of itself, and meanwhile attention 
may be directed to something else. (4) Habits enable one to do 
things wliich would be otherwise impossible. 

(c) If you examine your daily actions, you will see how many 
are performed by force of habit and routine, without conscious- 
ness or attention, whereas in the beginning they required many 
distinct efforts. Dressing, eating, walking, speaking, writing, in 
fact, every ordinary action has been made as easy as it is by habit. 
Hence habit has rightly been called a second nature, and man has 
been termed a bundle of habits. Hence also the importance of 
learning to do all things well from the beginning, for a bad habit 
is hard to overcome, and every false step means a great waste of 
energy. 



DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 177 



ARTICLE II. DETERMINANTS AND FREEDOM OF 
THE WILL 

I. Determinants and Motors of the Will 

I. Motives. — (a) A motive is that for which we act. It is 
always the idea of something good, i.e. of something useful, pleasur- 
able, noble, honest, etc., which we want to obtain. Motives may- 
be subordinated to one another. Thus I take my umbrella to 
avoid getting wet. I want to avoid getting wet in order not to 
fall sick, or not to spoil my new straw hat, or not to feel uncom- 
fortable, etc. I want to preserve my health in order to do my work, 
and so on. Whatever is done voluntarily is done on account of 
some good to be derived from the action. It is impossible for 
man to act otherwise; he cannot choose to do something which 
appears altogether, and from all points of view, evil and unpleas- 
urable. He may be mistaken in his estimate, and pursue an appar- 
ent for a real good, but there is at least the appearance, that is, 
the idea, of something good. 

(b) The first motor of the will, therefore, is the tendency to happi- 
ness, which is implied in every action. Happiness is the ultimate 
goal which all men want to reach. They do not agree in their con- 
ception of the concrete realization of happiness. Some may place 
it in riches, others in glory, others in pleasure, others in the ful- 
filment of duty, etc. Some may expect it in this life, others in a 
future Hfe. But the desire of happiness in general is always the 
mainspring of every form of activity. Hence the most gen- 
eral and the most uniform tendencies of man are toward those 
things that are conceived as necessary to happiness: life, health, 
reputation, the normal exercise of faculties, etc. 

(c) If all men had the same conception of concrete happiness, 
and if there were only one possible means of reaching it, all would 
be determined to act in the same way. Thus, whenever a man has 
chosen to reach a certain end, and he has only one possible way of 
doing so, he necessarily takes this one means. If I have deter- 
mined to go to Europe, there is as yet no other means but to take 
a vessel. Hence to do this is necessary, although there are several 

13 



lyS PSYCHOLOGY 

vessels to be chosen from. If I really want to learn, and see that 
the only means is to study, I certainly will study. To neglect 
study is a sure sign that one has at most a desire, not the will, of 
acquiring science. As concrete ends vary, and as even the same end 
may be reached by different means — e.g. I may earn a Hving in 
dififerent ways; I may, as a Christian, sanctify myself by the prac- 
tice of different virtues — a great variety of actions will result, 
but all with the same underlying motive of reaching some form of 
happiness. 

(d) Ends may be conflicting, like acquiring wealth by what- 
ever means, and observing the rules of justice. In such a case the 
will abandons one in so far as it is incompatible with the other. 
Some will abandon honesty and become rich by whatever means; 
others will remain poor rather than go against the dictates of 
their conscience. 

2. Relative Force of Motives. — Thus we see that we follow a 
certain hne of action because the motives for it appear prepon- 
derant, and because it seems to be a greater good than another. 
What makes a motive preponderant? To a great extent it is its 
objective worth. But it is also, and perhaps to a greater extent, 
the subjective dispositions of the agent. Both internal experience 
and the observation of other men make it clear that we act as we 
are, and that we are what we are on account of heredity, tempera- 
ment, habit, surroundings, education, etc. When we know a man, 
we generally can guess pretty accurately how he will behave under 
certain circumstances. The views entertained of things during 
deliberation, and the attention given to one motive — for instance, 
the religious or moral aspect of an action — rather than to another 
— for instance, personal interest or gratification of the senses — 
are due largely to circumstances, to personal character, and to 
the manner in which a man has been educated. We may not be 
aware of it at all times, but to a great extent we are what all these 
circumstances have made us, and our actions follow our nature. 

II. Freedom of the Will 

I. Meaning of the Question. — When we ask whether the will 
is free, we ask whether the motors mentioned above so completely 



DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 179 

determine the will that the choice which it makes is always made 
necessarily; or whether the will, notwithstanding these, can deter- 
mine itself, choose freely, and subtract itself from the necessity of 
acting in one way only, (i) Hence we do not speak here of 
physical liberty, or liberty of execution, for it is certain that I may 
choose to do a thing and be prevented by force. I may want to 
go out and may be locked in, or refuse to go out and be carried out 
by force. Here we speak of the volition itself. (2) Nor do we 
speak of various Uberties, political or economic, as when we speak 
of a free citizen, a free nation, a free country, free thought, free 
trade, free port, free goods, free of cost, etc. These liberties 
imply the absence of some external obligation, restraint or duty. 
(3) By freedom of the will we mean the power of the will to be its 
own determinant and to originate action. The question, there- 
fore, is this: Are objective motives and subjective influences the 
only adequate causes of all actions, or is the will itself a power, 
capable of self-determination? 

2. Limits of Freedom. — (a) (i) From what has been said above 
it is clear that freedom does not mean caprice, or the power of act- 
ing without motives. On the contrary, only those actions can 
be free that are voluntary, and imply some implicit or explicit 
deliberation and weighing of the motives. Hence habitual ac- 
tions, and actions proceeding from a violent passion or from igno- 
rance, are not free unless there is nevertheless enough attention 
and reflection given to them. (2) Many organic actions are not 
and can never be free because they are not under the influence 
of the will. (3) We can be free only with respect to what seems 
possible and attainable. Thus the strong or the learned may at- 
tempt what is not possible for the weak or the ignorant. Hence 
freedom is limited both in regard to the nature itself of freedom 
which is present or absent, greater or less in different individuals, 
and in the same individual with regard to different actions. 

{b) From habits, education, temperament, etc., life has a gen- 
eral direction which, however, may have been taken freely to some 
extent, and perhaps even now may be changed. Because a man 
is engaged in a certain business in which he wants to succeed, he 
will not act in the same manner as the man who is in another line 



l8o PSYCHOLOGY 

of business. Certain actions are determined by the end one wants 
to reach. But the end itself may have been chosen freely in the 
past. The will is Hke a vessel sailing on a river and kept between 
the two banks so that she can move only within them ; or like a 
man walking on the deck of a steamer, having his own limited 
movement, and, at the same time, carried on by the general move- 
ment of the vessel. Every individual has to steer his own vessel, 
but the general direction toward happiness cannot be changed, 
although all do not expect to find happiness in the same port. 

3. The Consciousness of Freedom. — (a) When we deliberate, 
we are conscious that we can choose one of two or more alterna- 
tives that are offered to the mind. The power of choice supposes 
the absence of determinism. The stone thrown up in the air has 
no choice between staying up or falling down; it falls necessarily. 
Moreover, we are conscious that we are not mere spectators, 
but actors, in the deliberation; that, by voluntary attention, 
we may strengthen one motive or underrate its value, and that 
we may even suspend the deliberation, shorten it, or exclude certain 
reasons and considerations. Thus all the time we are conscious 
that the final decision is in our power. The motives are weighed 
in the balance, but their weight depends partly on the mind. 

(b) The decision itself comes from the individual, and the result- 
ing action seems to be free. Not only are we conscious of no de- 
termination, but we are conscious of indetermination. We make 
a clear distinction between a necessary and a free voHtion, between 
the cases where we can choose freely and those where we cannot, 
between an action performed in a passion and one performed 
calmly and deliberately. We do not dehberate and decide whether 
we shall try to be happy, but we do deliberate and decide by 
what means we shalP endeavor to reach happiness. 

(c) Sometimes deliberation manifests an action as obligatory; 
there is a sense of duty and obligation. Duty is an imperative inde- 
pendent of pleasure and usefulness, and duty supposes freedom. 
I cannot feel obliged to respect my fellowmen, or to abstain from 
theft and murder, unless it is in my power to do so. To act neces- 
sarily against what I feel to be now my duty is an impossibility. 
If I must, I can; if I can, I have the power and am free. 



DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM l8l 

(d) After acting we feel that we have been prudent or impru- 
dent, and that we might have done otherwise. If the action has a 
moral character, we feel worthy of praise or blame. This again 
is inexplicable if the action was not free. I deserve neither esteem 
nor blame for what I could not have done otherwise. I clearly 
distinguish between a just and an imjust punishment according as 
I failed voluntarily and freely, or, on the contrary, "could not 
help it." We deplore and regret actions that are evil and neces- 
sary as we deplore and regret accidents or bodily deformities. 
These do not cause any feeUng of shame nor any desert of blatne. 

(e) That all men have the same consciousness of freedom is evi- 
denced by their behavior, especially in their deliberations, and in 
the blame or praise which they give to others. A man cannot be 
blamed unless it is supposed that he acted freely. I do not blame 
the stone that hits me, but I blame the man who threw it, inasmuch 
as such an action was free and could have been avoided. All 
men have the idea of a just punishment, and a just punishment 
supposes freedom. Indeed, even if committed necessarily, a 
crime might be punished to deter others from committing it, or 
to train the wrongdoer as we train an animal. Such a pun- 
ishment is only useful, not just. It is intended to have good re- 
sults in the future, but cannot be merited by the past deed. In 
fact, the law makes a difference between free and necessary actions; 
it punishes the criminal, but not the insane. 

In a word, the testimony of consciousness is summed up in the 
awareness that certain actions are personal, that they come from 
me, that I am their cause, that the ego is, in part at least, respon- 
sible for the occurrence, that the action is really mine, not only 
because it takes place in me, but because it originates from me. 

(/) The reason why the will is free is found in the relations of 
concrete goods to perfect happiness. All concrete goods are lim- 
ited and imperfect; they even have some evil aspects, such as the 
difiSculty of obtaining them, the uncertainty of the success, the 
necessity of parting with them perhaps in Ufe, and certainly at 
death, and the fact that we cannot have all at once. Hence none 
satisfies the will fully, for the will craves for perfect happiness. "' 

4. Value of this Testimony of Consciousness. — This testimony 



l82 PSYCHOLOGY 

seems clear, and, if we are really free, it is difficult to see how the 
fact could be perceived with greater evidence. We must say imme- 
diately that a clear testimony of direct consciousness cannot eas- 
ily be invalidated, and should not be rejected except for cogent 
reasons. Yet, in the present instance, it has been rejected by some 
psychologists. 

(a) Stuart Mill asserts that the consciousness of freedom is 
impossible. We have the consciousness only of what occurs, not 
of what perhaps could, but in fact does not, take place. The con- 
sciousness of actual processes alone is possible, and the conscious- 
ness of freedom would be the consciousness of processes which 
could be, but are not actually, performed. 

Answer: Consciousness does not perceive what is not, but it 
perceives the actual power which the individual possesses of deter- 
mining himself, namely, it perceives the act as it is, as indeter- 
mined and as coming from an agent who acts as he chooses. 

(b) The consciousness of freedom is illusory; it is simply the 
ignorance of determinant motives. Not being conscious of the 
motives that determine us necessarily, we beUeve falsely that we 
determine ourselves. 

Answer: We are not only unconscious of determining motives, 
but positively conscious of our own active power in the decision. 
Moreover, if the objection were true, the sense of freedom would 
be in inverse ratio to the knowledge we have of the motives. But, 
on the contrary, it is when there has been no deHberation and 
when we do not know why we have acted that the action seems 
necessary and that we feel no responsibility for it. 

(c) In fact, we know that a hypnotized subject acts necessa- 
rily and cannot refuse to execute the command of the hypnotizer. 
Yet he feels and asserts that he is free. Consciousness of freedom 
is again illusory. 

Answer. The following remarks will answer this difficulty, 
(i) The subject may assert his freedom, but he shows no sign of 
the consciousness of freedom; there is no deliberation before the 
action, and no joy or shame after it. Moreover, he will not always 
assert his freedom; in some cases he will say that he acted neces- 
sarily, although he may be unable to account for this necessity. 



DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 183 

When he falsely asserts it, he may do so by force of habit, because 
he generally has the real sense of freedom, or because the answer 
has been suggested to him, or finally because he Imows what 
answer is wanted. Many excuses of irresistible hypnotic influ- 
ences have been brought before the courts. (2) From abnormal 
and exceptional cases one cannot validly base an inference apply- 
ing to all, even normal, cases. Because a man is sick or insane, 
it cannot be inferred that all men are in the same condition. The 
objection, therefore, consists in depriving a man of his freedom 
and concluding that no men are free. The illusion of the subject 
who is made to believe that he is an emperor does not prove that 
there are no real emperors, although he is not one. And the fact 
that some men have not the use of their legs does not prove that 
no men can walk. The reason why the hypnotized subject is 
deprived of his freedom is easy to find. For him there can be no 
choice of motives, since only such ideas enter his mind as are al- 
lowed by the hypnotizer. (3) The question of the existence of 
freedom in a hypnotized person, and his power to resist the orders 
that are given to him, is one on which there is no complete 
agreement. 

{d) Character, habits, temperament, education, and in general 
subconscious factors determine the will. The actions of other 
men can be foreseen with enough accuracy, and, were our knowl- 
edge of other minds more perfect all actions could be fore- 
seen with certainty. In a word, as was admitted above, we act 
as we are. 

Answer. To the first statement we say that: (i) All these may 
sometimes be necessitating, but not always. We feel that we can 
resist them and we do resist. A man struggles against ■ himself 
and changes his natural dispositions. (2) They give a general 
impulse which does not determine all concrete actions, but leaves 
some room for freedom. (3) Subconscious factors exercise an 
influence only when they appear at the surface in consciousness, 
and their action results in a conscious impulse. 

To the second statement we say that: (i) We may foresee a 
free action of other men, because men act for reasonable motives, 
have the same essential nature, and are influenced by their char- 



l84 PSYCHOLOGY 

acter. (2) This foresight is in most cases only a conjecture, and 
we are frequently mistaken. (3) Our foreknowledge generally 
bears on external, spontaneous, indeliberate, and hence necessary 
actions. (4) Our behavior toward other men in bestowing praise 
or blame shows that we recognize some of their actions as free. 
(5) " We act as we are." Even if this were true, we must say that 
we are not only what circumstances make us^ but also what we make 
ourselves. Emotional tendencies, dispositions, character, strength 
or wealuiess of will, etc., depend greatly on ourselves, on the will, 
and on the good or bad use which is made of it. 

(e) It is affirmed that the strongest motive determines the will. 
It would be unreasonable to act without a motive, or to choose a 
less good when a gi^ater good is offered. 

Answer. As was said above, it must be admitted that a free 
action is always performed for a motive, but it does not necessa- 
rily follow that the greatest objective good is always and neces- 
sarily chosen, (i) We may also admit that the strongest motive 
determines the will, for we have no other means of determining 
which motive is the strongest except that it finally prevails. There 
is no common measure to estimate objectively the weight of dif- 
ferent motives such as duty and pleasure. Evidently the prepon- 
derant motive is the one according to which we act. But do we 
act necessarily or freely? This is the question. (2) The will 
contributes to make a motive preponderant, and gives it its final 
victory over the others. As already stated, the will is not Uke the 
indicator of a balance, inert and passive, but hving and active. 
It makes a given motive stronger and prevalent. But, it may be 
asked, why does it do so? Sometimes, because we have already 
"made up our minds," either deliberately and freely, or indelib- 
erately and necessarily. Sometimes, owing to the influence of 
subjective dispositions and habits which may, more or less, be 
dependent on the past or present exercise of the free will. Some- 
times, with the full consciousness that it is doing right or wrong, 
yielding to the call of duty or to that of pleasure, and doing it 
freely. 

(/) The objection taken from the constancy of human statistics 
— births, marriages, crimes, etc. — need not detain us. Statistics 



CULTIVATION OP THE WILL 185 

apply to communities, not to individuals; nor are they abso- 
lutely constant. They simply point to a uniformity of motives 
by which men in general are prompted to act; whether freely or 
necessarily, statistics cannot indicate. 

Hence, although it is true that the large majority of human 
actions are not actually free, in a number of cases the conscious- 
ness of freedom remains a vahd testimony. 



CONCLUSION 

CULTIVATION OF THE WILL 
I. The Qualities and Defects of the Will 

I. Importance of the Will, — (i) A man is himself in propor- 
tion as he is his own master, has control of his actions, and with- 
draws himself from external determining influences to cormnand 
his own actions. (2) A man who has self-control, who possesses 
a strong, persevering, and well-directed will, is not only his 
own master, he will also subdue inanimate nature, succeed in his 
imdertakings, and be the leader of his fellowmen. To be the mas- 
ter of others, a man must first be master of himself. Nothing 
resists a strong will. The man who has taken a firm resolution, 
and takes the proper means to carry it out, will seldom fail, or, 
after a first failure, he will try again until his efforts are rewarded 
with success. (3) Even intellectual value depends to a great 
extent on the will. Application, attention, perseverance, are so 
many conditions of success, and the will is the power that com- 
mands them. (4) Moral character, habits, even feelings, and hence 
personaUty, are largely dependent on the will. The will is the 
supreme power, the mainspring of hmnan activities, and the gov- 
erning authority. To it must be attributed to a great extent man's 
success or failure in his various undertakings, and in general, 
man's worth. 

No man, it is true, can ever be independent of external sur- 
roundings and of internal dispositions, innate or acquired, per- 
manent or temporary, which influence his thought and action. 



l86 PSYCHOLOGY 

Nor is such an independence what we mean by freedom and 
mastery over oneself. But, whereas the weak will is the tool 
of these influences and is unable to resist them, the strong will 
utilizes some, resists others, directs and controls all. Influences 
known to be good are accepted knowingly and willingly; those 
that are misleading are excluded. Thus the man who is his own 
master does not blindly follow the example of others or his own 
impulses, but he examines first whether they are worth following. 
He is able to check the natural impulse to act until he has 
reached a prudent decision based on calm judgment, and, when 
the occasion requires it, he is also able to muster all his energies 
and make them subservient to the reaUzation of his ideals. 

2. The Main Qualities of the Will are the following: (i) There 
should he no hastiness in the deliberation or decision, but the whole 
process should be calm and without passion. Be slow, take as 
much time as is required and as circumstances will allow accord- 
ing to the importance of the step which you want to take and 
the diflaculty which you experience. Precipitation in speaking or 
acting is often the source of subsequent regrets. (2) Yet the neces- 
sity of reflection must not cause one to postpone the decision and 
action indefinitely. Do not remain all the time hesitating, fluc- 
tuating, and deferring. When all the evidence is at hand, take 
your decision accordingly, and carry it out. (3) Execute your 
decision promptly. Be not satisfied with desires that are never 
realized. When you have seen what you ought to do, do it with- 
out useless delay. Remember that "desires kill the slothful, 
for his hands have refused to work at all. He longeth and desir- 
eth all the day." (Prov. xxi, 25.) He will keep his resolution 
"to-morrow," or the "next time," and the more he procrastinates, 
the weaker he becomes. (4) Do not "change your mind " on the 
slightest pretext, but he constant and persevering. To abandon 
one's prudent plans without sufficient reason is a sign of fickleness 
and a presage of failure. 

3. The Defects of the Will come from two causes, and are in 
two opposite directions, excess and defect, (i) The will may he 
too strong, when it shows, not prudent, but imprudent firmness, 
constancy, and perseverance. This is obstinacy and stubborn- 



CULTIVATION OF THE WILL 187 

ness. A man who is stubborn will abide by his former decision 
in spite of new contrary and convincing evidence. (2) The will 
may he too hasty, impulsive, rash, and impatient. Instead of re- 
flecting attentively, a man will at once rush into action on the 
impulse of the moment. The power of inhibition seems insuffici- 
ent to apply the brakes in time and to prevent impulses from 
passing at once into action. (3) Some, on the contrary, have 
not enough will power. Without speaking of extreme cases of 
aboulia which are pathological, some persons are unable to take 
a decision. They are always hesitating and cannot resolve to 
adopt a plan. Others ''want to do," but always find an excuse. 
"I know," they will say, "that I ought to do it, but I can't." In 
every pursuit man needs light and intelligence, but he needs also 
a good, strong, and persevering will. Truly and sincerely to 
say "I will" implies generally "I can," whereas to say "I 
cannot " is to make an action almost impossible. 

II. Some Principles to be Used in Will Culture 

In general, try to acquire the qualities and to avoid the defects 
mentioned above. Here we must Hmit ourselves to a few of the 
most general principles regarding the intellect, the feehngs, and 
the will itself. 

1. Intellect. — The common principles "Nil volitum nisi prae- 
cognitum," and "Ignoti nulla cupido," express the evident truth 
that the will does not tend to any unknown good, but must neces- 
sarily have something apprehended as good presented to it. But 
the intellect by itself is a weak motor, and mere ideas have but 
little influence on the determination. How many know what is 
good, noble, and right, and yet seem to have no inclination for it, 
or, if they have an inclination, seem incapable of making it pass 
into action. They know their duty, but do not love it. They may 
even desire to fulfil it, but do not will it. 

2. Feelings. — Therefore ideas must be associated with feelings. 
What we ardently love and want sets the energy into action. The 
meditation on the motives must not be cold and purely rational; 
it must be warm, and tend to excite not only the knowledge, but 
also the love of the good. Consider not only the truth, but also 



l88 PSYCHOLOGY 

the utility, pleasure, peace, etc., that will result. See the examples 
of heroes and saints, and let them instil in you courage, confidence, 
and enthusiasm. At every step, keep in mind the necessity and 
advantages of your action. Attention to the end, attention to 
the means, attention to the results, will lead to strength and per- 
severance. It has been said that ideas lead the world. This is 
not exact; what leads the world is not so much the ideas as the 
love for certain ideas. Hence the necessity of feelings and of 
enthusiasm. 

If you find it impossible to perform an action or conquer a habit 
immediately, proceed gradually and step by step, but always 
take clear-cut resolutions bearing on a well-determined point. 
The resolution to do good in general is too abstract, and does not 
excite a concrete love. But take the resolution to do this speci- 
fied kind of good, in this special circumstance, under these special 
conditions. 

3. Will. — (a) As to the will itself, see what should be devel- 
oped and what should be repressed, where there is excess and 
where there is defect. It is very important to acquire good habits, 
for a habit is a ready mechanism which needs only a first impulse 
to unfold immediately a whole series of actions. Habit prevents 
the diffusion of energy in various useless directions, and the dis- 
persion of strength. The whole energy goes straight to performing 
the action. How much conscious and organic energy is dispersed, 
for instance, in the first piano lesson. Later on, it is concentrated 
unconsciously and tends to the perfect result. Hence the impor- 
tance of acquiring immediately the habit of performing a series of 
movements in the manner which is the shortest and the best 
adapted to the intended result. Watch constantly lest you should 
acquire bad habits, for it is very difl&cult to uproot them. Apply 
yourself chiefly to the acquisition of those habits which you need 
most, and especially of the four moral habits that have such 
an importance in the whole course of life: prudence, justice, 
temperance, and courage. 

{b) Always keep your will on edge; exercise it constantly; find 
something to do that requires effort. If you simply let yourself 
go down the stream, carried along by the current of your habits 



CULTIVATION OF THE WILL 189 

and character, even if they do not lead you astray, you will 
find that you will not have strength enough to overcome 
obstacles and change your course if it becomes necessary to 
do so. Like our muscles, our will weakens if it is not exercised. 
Hence every day impose on yourself some task and effort. A 
great fault to be avoided is to fail to carry out a good resolution 
once it has been taken, for every voluntary failure is a weakening 
defeat. It is better to take no resolutions than to take them reluc- 
tantly and without trying to keep them by all possible means. 
Yet let not your failures discourage you, but rise again, strengthen 
your resolution, and try to do better. Let not a single day pass 
without making some useful effort, without using your will, and 
using it well. 



CHAPTER IV 

SUPPLEMENTARY. — SOME SPECIAL RELATIONS 
AND MODES OF MENTAL PROCESSES 

I. MIND AND ORGANISM 
I. Mutual Relations of Dependence and Influence 

Although the mind is distinct from the organism, and conscious- 
ness cannot be reduced to any form of movement, it is certain 
that the two are very closely united and influence each other. 

I. Influence of the Organism on the Mind. — (a) In general, 
mental processes depend on the conditions of the organism, (i) 
Sensations depend on the transmission through an afferent nerve 
to the brain, of an impression received by the peripheral appa- 
ratus. Cut the transmitting nerve, or let the nerve or the brain 
centre be diseased, and no sensation is experienced. (2) Imagina- 
tion, memory, intelligence, depend on brain centres; if these are 
destroyed or impaired, there follows a loss or a disturbance of these 
faculties. Moreover, intellectual faculties cannot be exercised 
until the brain reaches a certain minimum of development. (3) 
Feelings depend' largely on organic dispositions, especially of the 
nervous system. (4) The exercise of activity commanded by the 
will can be carried out only if the organism is in the normal 
condition. Thus the paralytic is unable to execute a volition of 
movement. 

(b) In a more special manner, we mention the concomitant 
variations of mental processes with the dispositions of the organ- 
ism: (i) health and illness; (2) food and drink; (3) special or- 
ganic modifications caused by mental processes like memory, 
imagination, emotions, etc. 

(c) Finally we note the following influences: (i) Age; the child, 
the adult, and the old man have not the same views, the same 

190 



MIND AND ORGANISM 191 

sensibility, and the same constancy. The youth is more impetu- 
ous and more changing, the mature man more circumspect and 
prudent, the old man generally weaker. These dififerences are 
due largely to differences in the irritability of the nerves, the 
strength of the muscles, the plasticity of the whole system, the 
quality of the blood, and the vital functions. (2) Sex; women have 
generally more sensitiveness, more delicacy, more changeableness; 
men, more strength, constancy, and intelligence. (3) Tempera- 
ment; strong or weak according as the mental energy is greater 
or smaller, and in consequence the mental states are more or less 
intense; quick or slow according as the mental states succeed one 
another rapidly or slowly. The strong temperaments are the 
choleric and melancholic; the weak temperaments, the sanguine 
and phlegmatic; the quick temperaments, the choleric and san- 
guine; the slow temperaments, the melancholic and phlegmatic. 
Strong temperaments are inclined to great emotions, and yield 
more easily to painful impressions. Weak temperaments have 
little emotion, and are rather disposed to enjoyment. Quick tem- 
peraments have rapid changes, are intent on the present, and re- 
quire additional strength to do more work. Slow temperaments 
change slowly, are rather inclined to look toward the future, and 
require additional time to do more work. We may also note 
that the choleric and phlegmatic temperaments chiefly refer to 
action; the sanguine and melancholic, chiefly to feelings. Tem- 
peraments are seldom found with these exclusive features; they 
include elements belonging to several groups, and are determined 
by their predominant features. (4) Climate; mental dispositions 
vary with different atmospheric conditions, and there is a notice- 
able difference between the inhabitants of cold and those of hot 
countries. (5) Heredity of certain organic traits. 

2. Influence of Mental Processes on the Organism — {a) 
Ideas and images of movements tend to produce those movements. 
In general, as explained above, the image is both representative 
and motor. The thought of something terrible may cause trem- 
bling; the thought of something disgusting may cause vomit- 
ing, etc. Imagination may contribute to induce and increase 
sickness, and many an apparent remedy has acted with as 



192 PSYCHOLOGY 

much efficacy as a real one. In such cases, there is generally a 
combination of images and feelings. 

(b) Feelings, and chiefly strong emotions, are naturally expressed 
in the organism by certain modifications; circulatory — blushing, 
turning pale, acceleration or decrease of pulsations, etc.; res- 
piratory — cries, moanings, acceleration of respiration, etc. ; 
movements of eyes; secretions, e.g. tears; facial nerves, physiog- 
nomy; and other nerves — trembling, spasms, etc. Moreover, 
emotions may affect all vital functions, secretion, digestion, etc. 
If too violent, they may cause serious troubles, swoonings, and 
even death. 

(c) The will causes motions in the organism; some are directly 
under its control, but it can reach indirectly all organs and func- 
tions, for instance, digestion by allowing only a certain quantity 
or quality of food. 

Hence, in a general way, organic habits, health, features, etc., 
are to a certain extent signs of habits of mind. Physiognomy is 
frequently an unsafe and misleading guide, yet its value, especially 
in certain cases, cannot be denied. Although unsafe when used 
alone, and when relied on too securely, judging a person "by 
his looks " may sometimes be of great utiUty. 

II. Cerebral Localization 

Besides the general relations of mind and body, there are others 
of a more special nature. Certain mental functions have their 
seat, or are localized, in certain parts of the organism. 

I. Phrenology generally applies to the systems of Gall and 
Spurzheim, in the beginning of the nineteenth century. They sup- 
pose the innateness of all mental faculties or qualities, and their 
adequate manifestation through the brain, which, according to 
them, has as many special organs as there are distinct faculties. 
Hence, according as a certain area of the brain is more developed 
— this is manifested externally by the shape of the skull — a men- 
tal aptitude will be predominant. The mmiber of distinct facul- 
ties varies from twenty-six, according to Gall, to thirty-five, 
according to Spurzheim, and even more according to others. 

Phrenology is completely discredited to-day. The methods 



MIND AND ORGANISM 193 

used are unscientific, and some of the fundamental principles are 
false, for instance, that the development of a mental power always 
depends on the size of the corresponding organ — it depends rather 
on qualitative properties; that mental tendencies are innate 
and unmodifiable; that the shape of the skull always manifests 
the relative development of the corresponding parts of the brain, 
— the convolutions of the brain, which are very important, can- 
not be manifested by the shape of the skull. The division of fac- 
ulties is arbitrary and fanciful; and to assign a special part of the 
brain to every faculty is impossible. The main objection against 
phrenology, however, is the progress of modern psychological and 
physiological sciences which have disproved the tenets of phre- 
nologists concerning the functions of the brain, and, in some cases, 
have established cerebral localizations different from those which 
phrenology mapped out. 

2. Scientific Localization. — (a) The methods used to deter- 
mine the localization of functions in the brain are: (i) Experi- 
mentation. Either stimulate — chiefly by an electric current — 
certain areas of the brain cortex, and see what movements take 
place or what results are obtained. Or extirpate certain por- 
tions of the brain, and see what loss or disturbance in motion or 
in sensory processes follows. Such experiments are performed 
on animals, and, by analogy, the results are applied to man. (2) 
Pathology. Man does not experiment on the human brain. But 
it happens that lesions or pathological affections occur which are 
observed in post-mortem examinations, and thus the cause of the 
motor or sensory troubles which had been manifested is ascer- 
tained. In some cases the skull has been trepanned, and a tumor, 
piece of bone, or lesion has been foimd where it was supposed to 
be. (3) Comparative anatomy and histology. The higher the 
organization of animals, the greater the number of localized fimc- 
tions. Hence localizations verified in the highest vertebrates 
are applied to man with great probability. Histology is making 
progress toward following the nerve-tracts through the brain to 
the cortex. (4) These methods are generally used cumulatively, 
and the evidence is compared. 

(J)) The student is referred to text-books of physiology for the 
14 



194 PSYCHOLOGY 

details of cerebral localization. The most general and best estab- 
lished are the following: (i) The motor centres are found on both 
sides of the fissure of Rolando. It is noteworthy that motor 
centres of one hemisphere are related to the other side of the body 
— the right hemisphere controls the left hmbs, and the left hemi- 
sphere, the right limbs. (2) The sensory centres are not all ascer- 
tained. The visual centre is in the occipital lobes; the auditory, 
in the temporal lobes, as also probably the olfactory and the 
gustatory. The tactile centres are probably in the parietal 
lobes. 

(c) These localizations are not restricted to a well-defined spot, 
mathematically circumscribed. Neighboring centres, so to speak, 
interpenetrate. Moreover, if one part becomes incapable of per- 
forming its functions, other parts — either corresponding parts 
of the other hemisphere, or neighboring parts in the same hemi- 
sphere — sometimes may take its place. 

II. SOME SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 

The following mental conditions are related to special organic 
conditions, many of which are but very imperfectly known. 

I. Insanity. — The mind as well as the body has its diseases. 
They form the object of the sciences known as abnormal psychol- 
ogy; mental pathology, i.e. the science of the diseases of the mind; 
psychiatry (etymologicajly, the healing of the soul). Some of 
these diseases, like hallucination and aboulia, are partial and 
affect a special faculty. Others are of a more general nature and 
seem to affect the whole or almost the whole mental life. Again, 
some are of small importance and little apparent. Others are more 
manifest and deeper. The term "insanity" — although etymolog- 
ically meaning any disease {in-sanitas) — is restricted to the most 
general and best characterized forms of mental disease. Hardly 
any definition or classification of its various forms can be given. 
In general, insanity is not applied to temporary mental derange- 
ment, like that due to a strong emotion; yet this usage seems to 
become current in criminal courts where temporary insanity is 
made the plea for the defence. Nor is it appHed to a slight dis- 



SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 195 

turbance or irregularity of functions, but to a serious defect of 
thought, emotion, or rational activity.. 

Dementia is a weakened condition of the mental powers. It 
denotes feebleness, inactivity, and incapacity, rather than ab- 
normal functioning. It supposes that the faculties have been 
stronger before, whereas idiocy and imbecility or feeble-minded- 
ness are congenital. 

The causes of insanity may be general dispositions or accidental 
events. The most important are heredity, worry, a melancholic 
temperament, various hereditary and acquired dispositions and 
defects of the organism, and especially of the nervous system. 
Many accidents, bodily injury, strong emotions, intemperance, 
drug-habits, etc., may bring about insanity. 

2. Sleep and Dream. — Sleep is a temporary dementia, and in- 
sanity has been termed the dream of the waking man. In fact, 
there is more than one point of resemblance between these two 
states. In dream and in insanity we observe the same incoher- 
ence, irrational sequence of ideas and images, and the same 
absence of control of the inferior mental powers by the higher 
faculties. 

(a) Psychologically, sleep is the suspension or, at least, the lowering 
of consciousness. If we rely on the testimony of memory, we may 
think that consciousness is totally suspended at least during some 
periods of sleep, for we are not aware of dreaming all the time. 
However, this testimony is not necessarily reliable, for we have 
dreams which we do not remember, or which are recalled later 
owing to some accidental association. It seems also that when- 
ever we wake up, if we can take immediate cognizance of our 
state we are conscious of waking from a dream which may be 
weak, and the memory of which, after a few instants, disappears 
beyond recall. 

{b) The physiological causes of sleep are not certain. To a great 
extent they seem to be changes in the blood circulation in the 
brain. The work of the day fatigues the brain and accumulates 
waste-matter. Hence the need of rest, during which this is elim- 
inated. The main conditions contributing to induce sleep are 
fatigue, monotonous impressions, the influence of cold and heat. 



196 PSYCHOLOGY 

certain organic functions like digestion, or organic morbid dis- 
positions, and chiefly the absence of ordinary sensory stimuli, that 
is, darkness, silence, and tranquillity. Waking may resvdt from 
the sufficiency of rest, from a stimulus, either internal, hke pain, 
or external, like soimd, light, or touch, especially if the stimulus 
is strong, or if, though weak, it corresponds to a special attention 
of the subject. Thus a mother perceives the slightest cry of a 
sick child, the fireman hears the sound of the alarm bell, etc. 
The stopping of accustomed regular movements or noises may 
also cause one to arouse from sleep. 

(c) Conscious processes during sleep are called dreams. Be- 
tween the state of wakefulness and the dreaming state we may men- 
tion "reverie," in which little or no attention is paid to external 
things, and free play is allowed to the imagination. As all mental 
faculties maybe, or at least may seem to be, suspended during sleep, 
so also all may be exercised. There is imagination and memory; 
feeHng — e.g. fear in a nightmare; judgment and reasoning, 
no matter how imcouth and imreasonable these may be; will, or 
at any rate something akin to it, for instance, when one wants to 
run away, speak, etc. There is even some kind of sensation, as 
we shall see when we speak of the causes of dreams. However, 
a dream is a continuous hallucination. Images, no matter how 
ridiculous from the point of view of the waking state, are taken 
for realities. This is due to the fact that such images are not cor- 
rected by perceptions or by reason. They are not under the con- 
trol of attention and will, and follow their own capricious course. 
No account is taken of time. Observations have shown that, in 
a few seconds, one may dream of a succession of events that would 
occupy a very long time. 

(d) The main causes of dreams are: (i) Sensations. Thus a little 
touch or smart may be magnified and represented in consciousness 
by huge weights or wounds. (2) Organic conditions like indiges- 
tion, difficult breathing, etc. (3) Mental states going on before 
sleep and continued during it. (4) General tendencies and pre- 
occupations which contribute to modify the dreaming tendencies. 

3. Somnambulism — etymologically, walking asleep — is a state 
of mental activity during sleep, or perhaps quasi-sleep, accompa- 



SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 197 

nied by perceptions, movements, and purposive actions. It has 
been called the acting of one's dream. In somnambulism there is 
activity and coordinated movement, e.g. walking, speaking, writ- 
ing. Frequently there is also sequence and coherence in the ideas. 
The somnambulist may speak or write very sensibly, and even do 
intellectual work, solve problems, write essays, and find solutions 
which had been sought in vain during the state of wakefulness. 
The senses are awake, and the somnambulist walks and avoids 
obstacles on his way, or carries on a conversation. The senses 
are even generally keener than in the waking state, especially 
the muscular sense. The somnambulist performs dangerous 
actions which he would never be able to perform when awake. 
At the same time, the senses are selective, and their field is narrower. 
Frequently certain objects only are perceived, namely, those that 
are connected with the train of ideas, while the others are over- 
looked. There is thus an exaggerated form of what, in the wak- 
ing state, would be called distraction. Whereas we may have a 
very vivid recollection of dreams, actions performed in the somnam- 
bulistic state are not remembered in the state of wakefulness, but 
may be recalled in a new somnambulism. 

4. Duality or Multiplicity of "Selves " or "Personalities " is a 
term frequently used, although what it expresses is in reality a 
dissociation of the centres, chiefly of the memory centres. 

(a) In some cases, a person has had, so to speak, two or three 
different successive or alternating personalities which, though suc- 
ceeding one another, form in consciousness two continuous series 
and are generally more or less independent: 

A — Ax — Ai Az — Ai — Ai, A& 



B Bi — B2 — ^3 — Bi B^ — Bq — B^ — B^ 



In the series A, the events of the series B are not remembered, 
nor are those of the series A in the series B. Sometimes, however, 
one series is privileged, and includes the other, but not vice versa. 
Something, e.g. language, knowledge of persons, etc., may be, 
but is not always, common to both series. If one "personality " 
has any knowledge of the other, it will generally refer to it 
in the third person. It also may happen that in one series the 



198 PSYCHOLOGY 

character and aptitudes are greatly different from those in the 
other series. 

(b) Two simultaneous "personalities " may also be found. 
For instance, while the subject is engaged in conversation with 
another person, a third person may ask questions which will be 
answered rationally by automatic writing. In more general 
terms, two simultaneous series of rational actions will go on inde- 
pendently. It is remarkable that, when the subject writes auto- 
matically while carrying on a conversation, the "writer" will 
refer to the "speaker " in the third person, and even may refer 
to him as a stranger or an enemy. 

Such facts — which of course are rare — occur chiefly in cases 
of hysteria. Hysteria is a very complex organic and mental dis- 
ease, having several points in common with somnambulism, chiefly 
the hyperaesthesia of certain senses. 

5. Suggestion is very closely allied to imagination. 

(a) In a broad sense, to suggest is to impart an idea, especially 
with a view to determine some action. It is of daily occurrence 
and use. A striking instance will be found in advertising. The 
purpose of advertising is to arouse in the mind the idea of certain 
wants, and hence the desire to satisfy them by buying the recom- 
mended article. The symptoms of a disease will be described 
so as to suggest that you have that disease. Conclusion: buy the 
patent medicine. The more completely an idea takes possession 
of the mind and is- prominent, the greater is its motor power, 
and the greater the chances of its being effective. Hence if 
it is the only idea present in the mind, or if other ideas are 
made to strengthen it, or if, finally, other antagonistic ideas 
have no time to counteract it, the suggested action is certain to 
follow. 

{b) This necessary determination of an action by an idea is 
suggestion in the strict sense. The determined process may be 
sensory — hallucination, illusion, etc., — motor, inhibitory, emo- 
tional, or ideal. Suggestibility in the broad sense is common to 
all men. In the strict sense it is found chiefly in certain abnormal 
states, especially in hypnotism. Hetero-suggestion, or simply 
suggestion, is given by the words, gestures, or signs of some one 



SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 199 

else. Auto-suggestion comes consciously or unconsciously from 
the agent himself. 

6. Hypnotism (vttvos, sleep) is the art, theory, or practice of 
hypnosis. Hypnosis is a mental state in many respects similar 
to somnambulism. 

(a) Hypnosis is produced in many different ways: gazing at a 
bright object, listening to a monotonous sound, passes before the 
eyes and on the body, suggestion or command to go to sleep. 

(b) The main psychological features of the deep and complete 
hypnosis are: (i) Suggestibility. All kinds of illusions and hallu- 
cinations occur at the will of the hypnotizer. Present things or 
persons are not perceived, or absent things and persons are imag- 
ined to be present. The subject changes his attitude and behav- 
ior accordingly. Actions are performed when and as commanded 
— whether always irresistibly seems uncertain. Post-hypnotic 
suggestions are suggestions made during the hypnotic state, but 
to be carried out only at an appointed time, after the subject has 
been aroused. (2) Alterations of memory. Actions performed 
during hypnosis generally are not recalled in the normal state, 
but may be recalled in a subsequent hypnosis. (3) The " rapport " 
of the subject with the hypnotizer is a special relation of the two, 
to the exclusion of every other person unless the hypnotizer allows 
the subject to communicate also with others. 

(c) The causes and mechanism of hypnotism are very uncer- 
tain. Some analogies and hints are found in other mental condi- 
tions already mentioned; but an adequate explanation is not 
possible with our actual knowledge. 

(d) All serious psychologists and hypnotists agree that the prac- 
tice of hypnotism is dangerous. It weakens the intellect and will, 
and generally has a harmful influence on the nervous system, not 
to mention the immoral or criminal influences that may be exer- 
cised by unscrupulous hypnotizers. In some cases, however, 
hypnotism may be useful to correct mental or organic defects. 
Only competent and upright physicians should be allowed to 
practice hypnotism, and under restrictions and conditions which 
obviate its dangers. 

7. Clairvoyance, Mental Suggestion, Telepathy. — (a) Clair- 



200 PSYCHOLOGY 

voyance is the alleged power to see things through opaque bodies, 
or at great distances. If the facts alleged are true, perhaps other 
facts, such as radio-activity, wireless telegraphy, and wireless 
telephony, may throw some light on these abnormal phenomena. 
Certain rays penetrate opaque bodies, and can affect special 
photographic plates. Is it impossible that the eye should be 
adapted to receive and perceive them? All that is required 
is that the eye should allow such rays to pass through its 
various refracting media — which it does not ordinarily — and 
that the retina be sensitive to them. As to the vision of past 
and future events, if true, it can be explained to some extent by 
memory — even though the event was not consciously known, — 
or by guesses and inferences from known causes. 

(b) Mental suggestion is a suggestion made immediately from 
mind to mind without any sensible sign, word, or gesture. Sev- 
eral hypotheses have been proposed to explain such facts, suppos- 
ing them to be authentic. None seems satisfactory, or, at least, 
sufficiently based on known mental or physical properties. Is it 
possible for an idea to correspond to certain brain processes which 
would be transmitted to and interpreted by another brain? Here 
again recent discoveries in physical sciences must make us hesi- 
tate in denying this possibility. As we do not know all the prop- 
erties of matter, so we do not know all the properties of organized 
matter, nor of mind. Investigations seem to point out that men- 
tal work produces something like emanations or radiations. At 
certain times two brains may be in special relations of sympathy, 
so that one of them is apt to receive and interpret the other's 
messages. 

(c) Telepathy is the communication between two minds without 
the help of the senses, and generally at a great distance. The 
alleged facts consist chiefly of apparitions of persons dying far 
away, of a sense of uneasiness when some absent relative or friend 
meets with an accident, and of certain premonitions of danger. 
Whether and how such facts can be explained, it is not possible 
at present to say. The indications given for mental suggestion 
or thought-transference apply also to some of the facts of 
telepathy. 



SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 20I 

8. Spiritism, sometimes called spiritualism, which is to-day 
so much in evidence, includes many marvellous facts: table-turning 
in order to receive answers to questions asked, motions of furni- 
ture, light or sounds coming from unknown and unseen causes, 
apparitions, etc. It is noteworthy that the presence of a 
medium is required, that is, of a specially sensitive person 
through whom the "spirits" manifest themselves. Frequently 
the medium gives answers by speech or automatic writing. 

(a) Many of the so-called spiritistic phenomena are frauds 
which have been exposed more than once. However, there seems 
to remain a certain number of well-ascertained facts, and, even 
if there is much more fraud than truth, this is not a sufficient rea- 
son for denying everything, especially when we have honest, 
serious, and competent witnesses. These facts are not at present 
explicable. We simply note that the facts of objectivated dreams, 
hallucinations, hypnotism, double personality, and somnambu- 
lism can probably account for some of the medium's powers, and 
perhaps for all those which he really possesses. Thought-trans- 
ference, if possible, would also be a clue toward an explanation. 
It is significant that the same "spirit" does not speak in the same 
manner, nor are his opinions the same, when given through dififer- 
ent mediums, and that the medium impersonates the "spirits" 
and transmits messages purporting to come from them according 
to the knowledge he has of such "spirits." Significant also 
is the fact of the "trance" of the medium during his supposed 
communication with the spirit, as we know that hypnotism 
predisposes one to play a role or a second personality. 

{b) What has been said of the dangers of hypnotism applies to 
spiritism, and here even the dangers are much greater, as experi- 
ence teaches. Moreover, there may be moral and religious rea- 
sons for avoiding all spiritistic practices. As a religious system 
based on supposed revelations of the "spirits," spiritism is in open 
contradiction with the Christian religion. 

N.B. It is impossible to enter here into a more detailed account 
of these extraordinary facts. We caution the student against 
too great a credulity with regard to the multitude of stories cir- 
culated on these topics, and against hasty inferences and theories. 



202 PSYCHOLOGY 

It may also be noticed that these facts form a continuous series. 
The passage from one to the other is gradual; there is no sudden 
jump and no gap. But psychology is unable at present to explain 
them all. Finally, it must be recalled that continuity does not 
necessarily mean identity in nature or in the causes of the ex- 
tremes that are linked by many intermediaries. 



CONCLUSION 

CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY 

I. Character. — (a)'Etymologically, character signifies a dis- 
tinctive mark, and accordingly means the most salient features 
in every individual's mental structure and functions, that which 
makes him to be so or so. In this broad sense it denotes something 
very complex, namely, the general relations between mental ten- 
dencies, their relative importance, the inferiority or predominance 
of some. The most obvious distinctive feature in man is his con- 
duct, his mode of acting, especially in such actions as are volun- 
tarily purposive. Hence character refers chiefly to the active 
aspect of life, that is, to the tendencies and feelings, inasmuch as 
they prompt to certain lines of action. 

(b) In a narrower signification, as when we speak of a man of 
character, or say that a man has no character, we refer especially 
to the unity and consistency of his mental processes, together 
with some independence and strength of will. A character is 
thus dependent on the quaUties of intelligence, especially reflec- 
tion, and on the emotional nature, especially the control of the 
emotions by the will. Although character depends largely on 
heredity, environment, early education, and surroundings, it 
refers chiefly to the acquired habits of will. We act according to 
our habits. The early formation of character is very important. 
Parents and teachers can never give too much attention and care 
to it. They must use innate tendencies to help the formation of 
right habits and the uprooting of wrong ones, and to suggest noble 
motives and ideals. 

(c) Temperament and disposition are closely related to char- 
acter. Temperament is chiefly dependent on inherited organic 
conditions, and can be reformed less easily than character. Dis- 
position is also mostly innate and hereditary. It refers to emo- 

203 



204 PSYCHOLOGY 

tional and active tendencies. Thus a man is said to have a happy 
disposition, an excitable disposition, a sluggish disposition, etc. 
We have spoken above (p. 191) of the four temperaments; char- 
acters cannot be classified satisfactorily; according to their domi- 
nant features they are referred to as weak, obstinate, inconstant, 
selfish, etc. 

2. Personality. — In its psychological — not philosophical — 
sense, personality is almost the same as character; it denotes a 
strong and marked individuality. Man alone is a person, and 
he is personal when he performs certain actions that spring from 
himself. To be a person is to emerge above the universal deter- 
minism of matter, to conquer and not be conquered, to possess 
oneself. The self is the centre of attribution of voluntary activ- 
ities, the responsible agent, that which in us is worthy of respect 
and which, therefore, is the foundation of social ethics. The 
psychological self changes and is modified by circumstances and 
chiefly by effort. We say of a man: "He is not what he used to 
be; " and of the man who acts according to his character, and accord- 
ing to our expectation, we say: "That is just like him." Of a man 
whom we suppose to have acted under such a strong or sudden 
impulse that his will was prevented from inhibiting the action, we 
say: "He was not himself." To be oneself is to be one's own mas- 
ter. Hence let your primary and chief endeavor be to develop 
in you good habits, good dispositions, and a good character. 
Always strive after what is worth your best effort. Ascertain 
the direction to be taken, and, when you know that your efforts 
are directed toward right and noble ideals, be strong, constant, 
and invincible. In all things and actions, he a personality; he 
yourself. 



LOGIC OR THE NORMATIVE 
SCIENCE OF THE INTELLECT 



INTRODUCTION 

I. Main Conclusions from Psychology, which it is necessary to 
recall here, (i) Truth is found in the judgment, that is, in the 
afifirmation or negation of the agreement of two notions. A simple 
idea in itself has no truth, but only when its relation to another is 
asserted (p. 107). (2) Judgments are immediate and self-evident, 
or mediate and reached through a process of reasoning (p. 112, 
115 fi.). (3) Judgments are true or false according as they 
affirm that which is or is not in conformity with reality. Men 
reform some of their judgments, considering as false what they 
previously considered as true, and vice versa. Again, they look 
upon the judgments of other men as true or false, and as more or 
less certain or uncertain (p. 117 ff.). (4) The mind may be in a 
state of ignorance, when it has no knowledge whatever of an object, 
and hence can form no judgment; of error, when a false judgment 
is accepted; of doubt, when the mind, although knowing something 
about an object, finds no sufficient reason for afiirming or denying; 
of opinion, when the mind assents to a judgment, but does not 
give a firm assent because there are reasons to fear lest such a 
judgment be false; of certitude, when the truth appears with evi- 
dence, and a judgment is assented to unreservedly. It may be 
noticed that in common usage ignorance is often used for doubt 
and error, and doubt for opinion, or rather for the fear of error, 
(s) We have also called attention to the distinction between assent 
and consent, convincing and persuading, knowing intellectually 
and practically accepting the truth with all its consequences. 
The former regards the intellect alone, the latter concerns the 
whole man (p. 120 ff.). 

205 



2o6 LOGIC 

2. Meaning of Logic. — (a) The names of many sciences 
end in -logy — psychology, cosmology, geology, etc. The term 
Xdyos signifies primarily word, and secondarily thought, and also 
science. "Logic" comes from the same Greek term. In ordinary 
language it refers to the power of reasoning, and to the consistency 
either between the thoughts of an individual, or between his 
thoughts and his mode of action. To he logical is to be reasonable. 

(b) As used here, the term "logic" means the normative science 
of the intellectual faculties. Certain modes of thought are invalid. 
There are judgments that are incompatible and exclude one an- 
other. Others are compatible, but independent of one another, 
and have no logical relation. Others are compatible and log- 
ically related as principles and conclusions, one being inferred from 
others. The purpose of logic is to indicate the rules of valid infer- 
ence so as to facilitate the progress of the mind in the pursuit of 
truth and the freedom from error. In other words, logic tries to 
dispose the materials found in the mind into harmonious struc- 
tures, and to indicate the way toward the acquisition of new 
knowledge. 

3. Definition of Logic. — The truth which is considered here 
is logical truth. The intrinsic value of the materials used is not 
examined, but only their valid sequence in the mind. For instance, 
"All men are white; Peter is a man; therefore Peter is white," 
is a true and valid syllogism from the point of view of logic, 
although the first proposition is not in conformity with reaHty. 
The logical value of a syllogism is independent of the truth of its 
propositions, as will be explained more in detail later on. Hence 
logic has frequently been defined as the science of the formal laws 
of thought. 

By "thought" is meant chiefly discursive thought or reasoning. 
The "laws of thought" are the norms of valid reasoning, and of 
inference in general. By "formal" laws is meant that logic deals 
with the process of reasoning apart from its contents or materials, 
considering only the vaHdity of the process, no matter what the 
contents may be. 

Hence logic differs from psychology, which studies also the proc- 
esses of thought, but in their nature and genesis apart from their 



NATURE OF LOGIC 207 

validity; from epistemology, which examines the value of the con- 
tents of judgments; from oratory, which tries not only to convince 
but chiefly to persuade; from grammar, which deals with the 
correct expression of thought. 

4. Utility of Logic, — Logic is a very useful science, since it 
teaches the proper use of intellectual faculties in finding and teach- 
ing the truth and in guarding against error. It has been called 
rightly the science of sciences, or the instrument of sciences. All 
men have a natural logic; all know what it is to contradict one- 
self; all use arguments and detect fallacies. Scientific logic 
develops this natural aptitude. It strengthens the intellectual 
faculties by exercising them methodically and contributing to the 
acquisition of good habits of thought. It assists the mind in find- 
ing the truth and testing the value of judgments. It makes it 
easier to detect the numerous fallacies which, consciously or uncon- 
sciously, creep into books, conversations, speeches, and articles. 
The logical mind is not drawn so irresistibly by an appeal to 
prejudices, passions, and emotions. It looks for the reasons and 
the inner value of the arguments used. 

5. Division of Logic. — This treatise will be divided into two 
chapters. The first will consider the instruments which the mind 
uses to reach truth, the most important of which is reasoning. 
The second will deal with the proper use of these instruments, 
their value, and orderly arrangement. 



CHAPTER I 

REASONING 

Knowledge is generally discursive. Except in the case of self- 
evidence, truth is acquired by proceeding from some known judg- 
ment to another. This is called reasoning, by means of which a 
judgment, unknown or less known before, is reached. Hence rea- 
soning is the main instrument by which knowledge is acquired, 
and consequently the primary object of this chapter. However, 
as reasoning supposes judgments, and judgments suppose ideas, 
it is also necessary to consider these elements of reasoning. Begin- 
ning with the simplest, we have the three following articles: (i) 
Idea. (2) Judgment. (3) Reasoning. 



ARTICLE L THE IDEA 
I. NATURE OF IDEAS 

I. The Idea in Logic 

I. How Logic Considers Ideas. — From what has been said in 
psychology we know that an idea is a simple mental representa- 
tion, i.e. something in the mind, holding the place of or represent- 
ing some object. This representation is called simple because it 
includes no affirmation or negation, and in this differs from the 
judgment. Logic does not consider the idea in all its aspects; it 
leaves its genesis to psychology, and its conformity with the object 
to epistemology. It considers the idea only as the element — sub- 
ject or predicate — of the judgment. An idea may be attributed 
to another according to various modes, and their connection may 
be more or less necessary. On the other hand, all possible ideas 
are reducible to certain higher classes in which they are contained. 

208 



IDEAS AND TERMS 



209 



Hence the necessity of speaking of predicables and of predicaments 
or categories. To predicate (praedicare) means to affirm the 
relation of an attribute to a subject. 

2. Predicables. — (a) An idea may be conceived: (i) As con- 
stituting the complete essence, and only the essence of a class of 
individuals, e.g. the idea of man as applied to Peter, Paul, John, 
etc., or the idea of a plane figure bounded by four straight lines as 
applied to all quadrilaterals. (Species.) (2) As common to sev- 
eral classes of individuals and constituting their essence incompletely. 
Thus I say that a man, a horse, a robin, a fly, etc., are animals. 
(Genus.) (3) As something differentiating this common idea or 
genus. Thus every class of animals just mentioned has essential 
characteristics by which it differs from the others. (Specific 
difference.) (4) ^5 necessarily connected with, and flowing from, 
the essence, although not constituting it. Thus in man the power 
of expressing ideas by speech or writing. (Property.) (5) As 
present in fact, but with no necessary connection, so that it might be 
absent. Thus for man to be white, learned, tall, strong, etc. 
(Accident.) 

(b) Hence we have five predicables, that is, five modes according 
to which ideas may be predicated of others: species, genus, spe- 
cific difference, property, and accident. The predicates of all 
judgments are attributed to the subject in one of these five ways. 
Hence the following synopsis. 



Predication 



(i) necessary 



(a) constituting the essence 
(i) completely = Species 
(2) incompletely, 



(a) as the more com- 
mon element = Genus 

(b) as the restricting 
element = Difference 

(6) resulting from the essence = Property 
(2) imnecessary = Accident 



(c) Hence several individuals may agree or differ specifically. 
Individuals within the same species necessarily agree in species, 
genus, specific difference, and properties. Individuals within 
the same genus always have some common essential note. 
IS 



2IO LOGIC 

N.B. We speak here of property in the strict sense, as that 
which belongs to all individuals of the same class, and to these 
individuals alone. In common language other meanings are fre- 
quently used. 

{d) The same idea may often be considered both as genus and 
as species from different points of view. Thus animal is a species 
of living substances — specifically different from plants which are 
also living, — and at the same time it is the genus of man and of 
irrational animals. The genus supremum is the first division of 
the most general notion, that of being. The species infima is the 
last species under which individuals only are found. The follow- 
ing list is known as the tree of Porphyry (a philosopher, a.d. 
233-304)- 

Substance = Highest genus 



Corporeal Incorporeal = Specific difference 



Body = Subaltern genus, also species 



I I 

Organic Inorganic = Specific difference 



Living = Subaltern genus, also species 



Sentient Non-sentient = Specific difference 



Animal = Subaltern genus, also species 



I I 

Rational Irrational = Specific difference 



Man = Lowest species. (Irrational animals or 

I brutes have other species) 



Peter Paul John Etc. = Individuals 

N.B. We suppose that there is no genus above substance. The 
idea of being alone is above it, and this is not a genus, since, what- 
ever difference that might be added to it is something or some 
being, and therefore already contained in the notion of being. 



IDEAS AND TERMS 211 

Ideas may be within the same proximate, or only within the same 
remote genus. Thus man and stone are within the same genus 
of material substances or bodies, but not within the same prox- 
imate genus. 

3. Predicaments or Categories are the genera suprema, or high- 
est genera to which all possible ideas are reducible. Aristotle 
numbered ten categories: substance, quantity, quahty, relation, 
action, passion, place, time, situation or posture, habit or bear- 
ing. All ideas certainly can be reduced to one of these groups. 
The nine last together form the group known as accident. Acci- 
dents are conceived, not as existing in themselves, but as being 
received in and modifying the substance. Probably a further re- 
duction of the categories is possible into: substance, quantity, 
quality, and relation, all other accidents being reduced to rela- 
tions; or into: substance — existing in itself, — as man, gold, etc.; 
accident — existing in the substance — as science, color, size, 
etc. ; and relation — referring a thing to another — as cause and 
effect, similarity, right or left, etc. N.B. Notice the difference 
in the meaning of accident as a predicament and as a predicable. 

4. Terms. — A term is a word, spoken or written, used to express 
an idea. The function of language has been explained in psychol- 
ogy (p. 122 ff.). Since it is a sign, the term stands for something 
else. This is called its supposition. The term may stand for 
itself as written or spoken, for instance, "man is spelt m-a-n," or 
"man is a monosyllable." This is called material supposition. 
Or the term may stand for an idea that exists only in the mind, 
e.g. a genus or species, for instance, "Man is a species of animal." 
This is called logical supposition. Or, finally, it may stand for a 
reality existing outside of the mind, e.g. "This man is wise." 
This is called real supposition. 

II. Intension and Extension of Ideas and Terms 

I. Meaning. — In the Porphyry tree above, higher notions 
are not so complex as lower ones. Thus animal includes the 
ideas of substance, material, organic, and sentient; living in- 
cludes only the ideas of substance, material, and organic; body 
includes only the ideas of substance and material. On the 



212 LOGIC 

contrary, as we go higher, the number of individuals contained 
under the notion grows larger. There are more living substances 
than animals, and more bodies than living substances. Tlie total- 
ity of the necessary elements of an idea, that is, of the simpler ideas 
that are implied in it, is called its connotation, comprehension, inten- 
sion, or contents. The totality of the individuals to which such an 
idea applies is called its denotation, extension, or sphere of applica- 
tion. 

2. Law. — From what precedes it is apparent that extension 
and intension vary in opposite directions, that is, the greater the 
extension, the smaller the intension, and vice versa. Since increas- 
ing the intension means adding a new difference, it means forming 
two or several sub-classes, each of which cannot include the same 
number of individuals as all taken together. And since widening 
the extension means enlarging the number of individuals, it means 
removing some barrier, i.e. some difference by which the former 
class was separated from neighboring classes. Thus, there are 
more men than white men, more books than bound books, etc. 
"White" and "bound" are new differences or new ideas intro- 
duced in the connotation, and restricting men and books to fewer 
applications. The addition of "tallness" to white men or of 
"leather binding" to bound books would still further reduce 
their extension,- and so on. We suppose, however, that such 
connotative additions are not already contained essentially in 
the former idea so as to apply to all individuals; e.g. "trilateral 
triangle" has the same extension as triangle. (Cf. p. 95.) 

III. Division of Ideas and Terms 

I. Division of Ideas. — An idea is: (i) Clear, if the object which 
it represents can be discerned from every other; obscure, if this is 
not possible. For instance, I know clearly a bird in general, but 
I may not be able to distinguish certain kinds of birds from cer- 
tain others. My generic knowledge is clear, but my specific knowl- 
edge is obscure. (2) Distinct, if the distinctive essential notes 
are known; vague, if they are not known. Thus I may know the 
scientific characteristics of a bird, or simply know it as an animal 
that flies in the air. N.B. A distinct notion is always clear, 



IDEAS AND TERMS 213 

but a clear notion may be vague, because accidental features 
may be sufficient to distinguish clearly one thing from another. 
Closely connected with this division is the division of ideas into 
generic, specific, and individual, the nature of which results from 
what has been said on the genus, species, and individual. (3) Ade- 
quate, if it represents all the object's features; inadequate, if it does 
not. In the strict sense no human idea is adequate, i.e. none rep- 
resents all that can be known about an object. In a relative 
sense an adequate idea is one that represents as much about an 
object as the present state of science allows. 

2. Division of Terms. — The main division special to terms is 
into univocal, equivocal, and analogous. 

(a) A term is univocal when it applies to several things in ex- 
actly the same sense, i.e. without any change in its connotation. 
Thus "man" is applied univocally to all individual men. 

(b) It is equivocal when it stands for two or several different 
ideas, i.e. when the connotation is not at all the same. Terms may 
be equivocal (i) in sound only — equivocation in speech — e.g. 
"right," "rite," "wright"; (2) in spelling only — equivocation 
in writing — e.g. "lead" and "lead," "tear" and "tear"; (3) in 
both sound and spelling, e.g. "pen" (writing instrument, and 
cattle enclosure), "mean " (average, and vulgar). 

(c) It is analogous when the sense is neither totally different nor 
totally identical, i.e. when there is some connection between the 
several meanings of a term, and hence its connotation is partly 
the same and partly different. Such a relation may be one of 
causality; thus we speak of a healthy man (enjoying health), of 
a healthy food or climate (producing health), and of a healthy 
appearance (caused by health). Or it may be a relation of sim- 
ilarity, as when the term " fox " is applied to an animal, or to a 
man because of his cunning. Such terms as "sweet, brilliant, 
terrible, awful, smart," etc., have many analogous uses. 

3. Division of Both Terms and Ideas. — (a) Considering their 
object, we have the following: (i) Positive and negative, according 
as they mean the presence or the absence of a reality. "Good," 
"man," "organic," . , . are positive. "Immature," "abnor- 
mal," "inorganic," . . . are negative. If the reality which is 



214 LOGIC 

absent ought to be present, the term is called privative, e.g. "deaf," 
"dumb," or "blind," when applied to man. It must be noted 
that certain terms are positive in appearance, yet really negative, 
like "bad," "blind," etc. Others are negative in appearance, — 
i.e. preceded by a negation or by negative prefixes like im, in, a, 
dis, etc., or followed by negative suffixes like less — and yet in real- 
ity positive, because they are the negation of a negation, e.g. 
"immortal." "Death" (mors) is the cessation of a reaHty (life), 
hence negative; and "immortal " is thus really positive. Some 
terms may be regarded as positive or negative according to the 
point of view. Thus "unpleasant" may mean simply "that 
which is not pleasant," or "that which produces a painful feeling." 
(2) Categorematic or syncategorematic, according as they can or 
cannot stand alone as subjects or predicates in a judgment. 
"Man," "good," white," . . . are categorematic; "very," "with," 
" through," . . . and in general, conjunctions, adverbs, prepositions, 
and interjections are syncategorematic. (3) Concrete or abstract, 
according as they mean a subject, or a determination without 
its subject. "Man," "white," . . . are concrete; "humanity," 
"whiteness," . . . are abstract. N.B. Adjectives are always 
concrete, for they apply to a subject. (4) Substantive or adjec- 
tive, according as they represent a thing as existing in itself, e.g. 
"man," "blueness," "humanity," or in a subject, e.g. "blue," 
"human." (5) Real or logical, according as the object repre- 
sented can or cannot exist independently of the mind. Names of 
individuals are real; genera and species are logical. 

(J) Considering their relations to other terms, some terms may 
be associated together, like "man" and "wise," "man" and 
"white," "paper" and "blue." Others are opposed to and excltide 
one another, like "white" and "black," "cold" and "hot," 
"square" and "circle." Opposition may be (i) cojitradictory, 
when a term simply denies the other, i.e. when one is positive and 
the other negative, e.g. "white" and "not-white"; (2) privative, 
in the sense already explained ; (3) contrary, when one implies more 
than is necessary to deny the other, e.g. "white" and "black," 
"good," and "bad." Between contradictory terms there is no 
middle; a thing is white or not-white. Between contrary terms 



DEFINITION AND DIVISION 215 

there are intermediates. Between white and black there are vari- 
ous shades of gray ; between good and bad there is indifference. 

(c) Considering their extension, (i) Singular terms apply only 
to one individual, and are indicated by a proper name, or by a 
demonstrative with a common name; particular terms apply to a 
part of a whole class, and are indicated by such particles as "some," 
"those," "a part of," . . . ; universal terms apply to all individ- 
uals of the same class. (2) A distinction must also be made 
between the distributive term, applying to all taken individually, 
e.g. "soldier," "book," . . . and the collective term, applying to 
all taken together, e.g. "army," "library." ... A collective 
term may also be used universally: "All armies are composed of 
soldiers"; particularly: "Some armies are composed of volun- 
teers"; or singularly: "This army is commanded by General 
X." But with regard to the soldiers that compose it, army is 
always a collective term. Not the individual soldiers, but only 
the aggregate can be called an army. 

II. DEFINITION AND DIVISION 

In psychology attention has been called to the confusion that 
may arise from language. It is very important both to under- 
stand the meaning intended by other men, and to use expressions 
that will manifest clearly one's own ideas. The use of definition 
and division is intended to make the meaning of terms clearer, and 
also to make the ideas themselves more distinct. 

I. Definition 

1. Meaning of Definition. — In general, to define (de-finire, 
finis) is to assign Umits. Hence to define a thing is to say what 
it is, so as to distinguish it from everything else. To define a 
word is to explain its meaning by indicating its comprehension. 
Complex ideas become clearer when their total comprehension is 
analyzed and reduced to simpler ideas. 

2. Kinds of Definition. — A definition is nominal when it ex- 
presses the meaning of a term; real, when it expresses the nature 
of an object. 



2l6 LOGIC 

(a) Nominal definition is (i) Private and conventional when a 
man uses a new term, or when he assigns a special meaning to an 
already existing term; (2) common when it gives the accepted 
meaning or meanings as found in dictionaries. A nominal defini- 
tion consists in describing the idea which a term expresses in such 
a way that it will be distinguished from all others. To the nominal 
definition are reduced etymology — which is sometimes misleading, 
e.g. in "physiology," "geology," "geometry," — the use of syn- 
onyms the meaning of which is better known, and the translation 
into another language in which the meaning of the equivalent term 
is known. 

(b) Real definition is perfect or essential when it indicates com- 
pletely the essential elements of an idea and of the things which 
the idea represents, i.e. the genus proximum and differentia speci- 
fica. These elementary ideas in turn, if not clear, may have to 
be defined again until some simple and therefore indefinable idea 
is reached. Hence some ideas cannot be defined because of their 
simplicity; others, on the contrary, because of their complexity 
and of the great number of elements entering into their com- 
prehension. Thus individuals cannot be defined perfectly. In 
such cases we have to be satisfied with some of the following 
imperfect modes of definition, which are frequently used, because 
a perfect definition supposes that the thing to be defined is 
known completely and definitely, which" is seldom the case. 

A descriptive definition gives a certain number of accidental 
features suflicient to make the object distinctly recognizable, e.g. 
shape, color, density, properties, etc. 

A genetic definition indicates the process by which a thing is 
produced, e.g. the materials and manufacturing process of alcohol, 
paper, cigars, etc., or the factors of a psychological process. 

An analytic definition indicates the materials out of which a 
thing is made. Chemistry commonly uses such definitions. 

A definition by the effects indicates what a thing is capable of 
doing, e.g. the explosion of a chemical substance, or the purpose 
of a mechanism. 

All kinds of definitions agree in pointing out some feature com- 
mon to several things, and some specific characteristics, that is, some 



DEFINITION AND DIVISION 217 

agreement and some difference which in the perfect definition are 
expressed by the genus proximum and the differentia specifica. 
Thus I define water as a compound (common notion) of oxygen 
and hydrogen in certain definite proportions (difference) ; or a pen 
as an instrument (common notion) to write with (difference which 
is also common to pencils) by letting the ink flow regularly on the 
paper (more special difference), etc. 

3. Rules of Definitions. — (a) Definitions must be reciprocal, 
i.e. there must be a complete identity of the thing defined with its 
definition. In other words, the definition must apply "omni et 
soli definito," and be coextensive with the object. Examples. . . . 

(b) Definitions must be clear, i.e. convey a definite idea of the 
term to be defined. Hence, as far as possible, (i) Do not use 
merely negative terms which indicate, not what a thing is, but 
what it is not. (2) Use neither metaphors, nor obscure, ambig- 
uous, and vague expressions. (3) Avoid the "circulus in defi- 
niendo," i.e. in the definition do not use the term itself to be 
defined. Examples. . . . 

4. Place of Definition. — What is the place of the definition in 
the process of knowledge? Nominal definitions are presupposed in 
the beginning of any investigation. As to the essential defi- 
nition, it is the very purpose of the investigation. Hence, except 
in cases in which the definition is clear, and used as a principle 
(e.g. in geometry), its place is at the end, since it supposes a com- 
plete and perfect knowledge of the object. If it is placed at the 
beginning, it is only as a hypothesis to be verified. 

II. Division 

I. Meaning of Division. — (a) To define is to analyze or unfold 
the comprehension of a term, and to go up to less complex, but more 
extensive, notions. To divide is to analyze or unfold the extension 
of a term, and to go down to more complex — because new differ- 
entia are added — but less extensive notions. If "man" is 
defined by the genus " animal," and the differentia " rational," divi- 
sions will be obtained by adding new differences like white and 
colored, young and old, etc. 



2l8 LOGIC 

(b) We speak here of the logical division, by which a logical 
whole, an abstract representation, a genus or class, is divided into 
the species or sub-classes which are contained under it, and which 
are formed by adding new specific or accidental differences. Thus 
I divide the class "book" into bound or unbound; scientific and 
non-scientific; quartos, octavos, etc. "Scientific books" again 
may be subdivided into books deaUng with theoretical and books 
dealing with practical sciences, and so on. Hence we do not speak 
here of (i) physical division by which the actual physical whole, 
made up of parts really united in the physical world, is divided 
into its component parts, e.g. the dissection of an organism; (2) 
metaphysical division by which the actual metaphysical whole, 
made up of ideas that are not separate except in our conception, 
is divided into these ideas; e.g. the division of "animal" into life 
and sensation. If these ideas are the essence of the object, meta- 
physical division is the same as perfect definition, otherwise it is 
the same as imperfect descriptive definition. 

2. Main Rules of Logical Divisions, (i) Each process of divi- 
sion must have only one basis or principle, i.e. the differentia which is 
added must be the same. Thus "man" should not be divided 
into "white, learned, and tall." The basis of division varies with 
the purposes for which the division is made. (2) As a conse- 
quence, the sub'classes of the same degree must be mutually exclu- 
sive according as the new difference is present or absent. (3) 
The division must be adequate, i.e. all the parts must be mentioned, 
and no individual of the general class must be found which will 
not have a place in one of the sub-classes. In other words, the 
parts taken together must be coextensive with the whole, and 
none separately must be coextensive with it. (4) The processes 
of division and subdivision must be gradual, proceed without jumps, 
always going to the immediately following sub-classes. (Find 
instances.) 



JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 219 



ARTICLE 11. THE JUDGMENT 

I. Nature of the Judgment and Proposition 

In Psychology (p. 107 ff) we have spoken of the process of judg- 
ing. It consists in pronouncing on the agreement or disagreement 
of two ideas. Hence its elements are (i) two ideas, the subject 
— that of which something is affirmed or denied — and the 
predicate — which is affirmed or denied; these two ideas are 
called the matter of the judgment; (2) the copula, that is, the 
affirmation or denial; it is called the formal element of the 
judgment. 

A proposition is the expression of a judgment, and hence has, at 
least implicitly, the same three elements as the judgment. The 
one Latin word "amo" expresses a judgment: "ego" (subject) 
"sum" (copula) "amans" (predicate). All grammatical sen- 
tences are not logical propositions; for instance, interrogative, 
imperative, optative sentences, as such, express no judgment. 

From the point of view of logic the subject and predicate are 
not always the same as from the point of view of grammar. Log- 
ically, a proposition contains nothing but the subject, the predi- 
cate, and the copula, and always contains these. Thus in " Dogs 
bark," "bark" is not the predicate, but contains both the copula 
"are" and the predicate "beings that bark." When I say: "The 
boy who learns his lesson is worthy of praise," the logical sub- 
ject is " the boy who learns his lesson," and the predicate is " worthy 
of praise." Whatever is found in a proposition besides the cop- 
ula, which is invariably the verb "to be," is always logically 
reducible to the subject or the predicate. 

II. Division of Judgments and Propositions 

I. If we Consider the Quantity, i.e. the extension of the subject, 
judgments are singular, particular, collective, or universal. Ex- 
amples: "Paul is tall." "Some men are virtuous." "The fam- 
ily is numerous." "All men are mortal." N.B. In logic, the 
singular proposition is considered as universal, since the subject is 



220 LOGIC 

in fact taken in its total extension. Hence it has the same prop- 
erties as the universal proposition. 

2. If we Consider the Connection between the Subject and the 
Predicate : — (a) Judgments are contingent or necessary according 
as the relation which is affirmed between the subject and the predi- 
cate can or cannot be otherwise. Thus, "The part is not so large 
as the whole" is necessary. "The part is one-third of the whole" 
is contingent. 

(b) In a closely related sense, but with special reference to the 
mode of acquisition, a judgment is a priori, when it is not based 
directly on sense-perception, e.g. "The whole is greater than its 
part," or a posteriori, when experience is required, e.g. "This line 
is four inches long." 

(c) If the relation between the subject and the predicate is per- 
ceived immediately, either by reason or by experience, the judg- 
ment is intuitive; if mediately, the judgment is discursive. "I am 
suffering," "This paper is white," "Two and two are four," are 
intuitive. "The soul is immortal " is discursive. For further 
development, and for the distinction between analytic and syn- 
thetic judgments, see Psychology (p. 109). 

(d) The absolute judgment simply affirms or denies. In the 
conditional judgment, the affirmation or denial depends on a sup- 
position. "I am pleased" is absolute; "If he comes back I shall 
be pleased " is conditional. To the conditional proposition may 
be reduced the disjunctive proposition, when it is affirmed or de- 
nied that the subject is this, or that, or ... ; and the conjunctive 
proposition, when it is affirmed that this, and that, and . . . can- 
not belong to the subject at the same time. For instance, "To-day 
is either Sunday, or Monday, or Tuesday, or . . . " is disjunctive. 
"A man cannot be sitting and standing at the same time" is con- 
junctive. More will be said on these propositions when we speak 
of the syllogism. 

3. From the Point of View of Unity and Simplicity. — (a) 
Simple propositions are those in which there is only one subject 
and one predicate, e.g. "The rose is fragrant." 

(b) If various explicative or restrictive terms or propositions 
are used to quaUfy the one subject or predicate, the proposition 



JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 221 

becomes complex. It may include several propositions, one prin- 
cipal, and the others subordinate. For instance: "The rose which 
you gave me" (subject) is "the most beautiful I have ever seen" 
(predicate). 

(c) If the proposition has two or several principal subjects or 
predicates, it is called compound, and is equivalent to a number of 
propositions equal to the number of the subjects multiplied by the 
number of the predicates. Thus: " Exercise and pure air are neces- 
sary to health " is equivalent to two propositions, each with one 
of the two subjects. "Peter and Paul are tall and strong" is 
equivalent to four propositions: "Peter is tall," "Paul is tall," 
"Peter is strong," "Paul is strong." A proposition may be both 
complex and compound. 

4. If we Consider their Quality, i.e. their formal element or cop- 
ula, propositions are affirmative or negative. 

Looking at both the quantity and quality of propositions, we have 
four kinds of propositions symbolized by four vowels: 

Universal affirmative, A (affirmo) 
Universal negative, E (nego) 
Particular affirmative, I (affirmo) 
Particular negative, O {nego) 

As already noted, individual propositions are reduced to uni- 
versal. 

5. Intension and Extension of the Terms in Propositions. — It 

is very important to know what are the extension and intension 
of the terms in a proposition. 

(a) In a proposition A like "All birds are vertebrates," it is clear 
that the subject is taken according to its complete extension. 
But it is not taken according to its whole intension, for there are 
elements in it — e.g. living, animal, egg-laying, etc. — to which 
the predicate "vertebrate" cannot be attributed. 

As to the predicate "vertebrates," it is taken according to its 
whole intension, since, in order to be truly called vertebrates, 
birds must have all the essential characteristics of vertebrates. 
But it is not taken according to its whole extension, for, besides 
birds, there are other vertebrates. In other words, birds do not 



222 LOGIC 

exhaust the extension of vertebrates; they are only some of the 
vertebrates. 

It would be easy to show similarly that in a proposition / as 
"Some men are prudent," the subject is taken according to its 
partial extension and comprehension, and the predicate according 
to its partial extension, but according to its whole comprehension. 

Hence the first general rule of the predicate: In affirmative prop- 
ositions the predicate is undistributed, i.e. not universal in exten- 
sion, but must be taken according to its complete intension. This 
is always true in formal logic. However, if we consider the con- 
tents or matter of the proposition, it may happen that the predi- 
cate has the same extension as the subject, namely, in cases of 
definitions. E.g. " Logic is the science of the formal laws of 
thought," "A triangle is a plane figure bounded by three straight 
lines." 

{b) If we take a proposition E, as "No moUusks are verte- 
brates," the subject is universal in extension, but its comprehen- 
sion is limited — e.g. the idea of "animal," which is an essential 
element of it, does not exclude the predicate "vertebrates." 

The predicate is taken according to its whole extension — 
"mollusks are none of the vertebrates," i.e. the whole class of ver- 
tebrates is excluded, — but not according to its whole comprehen- 
sion, for certain ideas included essentially in that of "vertebrates " 
— e.g. the idea of " animal " — may also belong to mollusks. 

In the same manner, in a proposition 0, as "Some elements are 
not metals," the subject is taken according to a part of its exten- 
sion and comprehension; the predicate, according to its whole 
extension, but not according to its whole comprehension. 

Hence the second general rule of the predicate: In negative 
propositions, the predicate is distributed, i.e. universal in extension, 
hut taken only according to a part of its comprehension. 

III. Related Propositions 

Propositions are related in several manners, namely, as opposed, 
obverted, converted, contraposed, and immediately inferrible. 

I. Opposition. — In the strict sense, propositions are opposed 
when the same predicate is affirmed in one and denied in the 



JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 223 

other, of the same subject, in the same sense, and from the same 
point of view. In a broader sense, propositions are opposed when 
they differ in quantity, or in quahty, or in both. If they differ 
in both, they are contradictory, A and 0, E and /. If they differ 
in quahty only, when universal, they are contrary, A and E; when 
particular, they are subcontrary, / and O. If they differ in quan- 
tity only, they are subalterns, A and /, E and 0, the universal 
A or E being the "subalternans," and the particular I or being 
the "subalternate." 

There is a strict opposition only between contradictories and 
between contraries. Subalterns have the same quality. In 
subcontraries, there is not necessarily identity of subject, for the 
part of which the predicate is affirmed may not be the same as 
that of which it is denied. The following diagram shows the vari- 
ous kinds of opposition. 



All men are wise 

e 



Some men are wise 



Contrary 



V 



,<5 



Subcontrary 



No men are wise 

e 



o 

Some men are not wise 



2. Ob version consists in negativing both the copula and the 
predicate of a proposition, i.e. in changing the quality of the 
proposition, and giving it as predicate the term contradictory of 
the former predicate. Thus, Obvertend: "All men are mortal "; 
Obverse: "No men are not-mortal." Aga.in, Obvertend: "No birds 
are quadruped "; Obverse: "All birds are not-quadruped." Obver- 
tend: "Some men are unhappy." Obverse: "Some men are not 
not-unhappy," or "Some men are not happy." 

3. Conversion consists in transposing the subject to the place 
of the predicate, and the predicate to the place of the subject, 
without changing the quality of the proposition, and without 
distributing an undistributed term. A distributed term in the 
convertend may be undistributed in the converse, for what was 
affirmed or denied of the whole may evidently be also affirmed 



224 LOGIC 

or denied of its various parts. N.B. In the following, S stands 
for Subject, P for Predicate. 

(a) A proposition E is susceptible of simple conversion, i.e. of a 
conversion in which the same quantity is retained. SP{e) becomes 
PS(e), for both terms are universal in both propositions, one as 
the subject of a universal proposition, the other as the predicate 
of a negative proposition. 

A proposition / also is susceptible of simple conversion. SP(i) 
becomes PS{i), for both terms are particular in both propositions, 
one as the subject of a particular proposition, the other as the 
predicate of an affirmative proposition. 

{h) A proposition A cannot be converted except by limitation, 
i.e. from a universal SP{a) (convertend) it becomes a particular 
PS{i) (converse). For, in the convertend, P is particular as the 
predicate of an affirmative proposition, and it must remain par- 
ticular in the converse. 

(c) A proposition cannot be converted at all, because S is par- 
ticular, and if it became the predicate of a negative proposition 
it would become universal. SP{6) can only be contraposed. 

N.B. Let the student find appUcations and concrete instances 
of these and of other rules of formal logic. 

4. Contraposition consists in negativing the copula and the 
predicate, and tlien converting the proposition. In other words: 
First obvert, then convert. E.g. "All men are mortal "; ,"No men 
are not-mortal"; "No immortal beings are men" (contraposed). 
"Some men are not just "; "Some men are not-just "; "Some im- 
just beings are men " (contraposed). From what precedes it 
follows that a proposition / has no contrapositive, since by obver- 
sion it becomes O, which is not convertible. 

5. Immediate Inference is the immediate passage from one 
proposition to another. Knowing or supposing the truth or fal- 
sity of a proposition we may be able to infer at once the truth or 
falsity of certain others. 

{a) Inferences owing to the opposition of propositions, (i) Of 
two contradictories one must be true and the other false. Hence if 
one is known or supposed to be true, the other is false. If one is 
known to be false, the other is true. If, for instance, it is true to 



JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 225 

say that "some men are just" (/), it is false to say that "no men 
are just" (£). If it is false to say that "all men are just" (A), 
it is true to say that "some are not just" (O). 

(2) 0/ two contraries one must be false, and both may be false. 
If one is known to be true, the other is false; but if one is known 
to be false, the truth of the other cannot be inferred. If I know 
the truth of "All men are mortal" (^4), I know the falsity of "No 
men are mortal " (E). But if I know the falsity of "All men are 
just" (^), I cannot infer the truth of "No men are just" (£), 
The reason is that, between these two extreme propositions, there 
is room for a third assertion in which alone perhaps truth is to be 
found, namely, "Some men are just" (/). 

(3) In the case of two subalterns, the truth of the subalternans 
implies the truth of the subalternate, and the falsity of the subalter- 
nate implies the falsity of the subalternans, because what is true of the 
whole is a fortiori true of the part, and what is false of the part is 
a fortiori false of the whole. But we cannot say that what is true 
of the part is also true of the whole, nor that what is false of the 
whole, is also false of the part. From the truth of "Some men 
are just" (/), I cannot infer the truth of "All men are just" {A). 
From the falsity of "All men are unjust" {A), I cannot infer 
the falsity of "Some men are unjust" (/). It must be remarked 
that logically, in such sentences as "Some men are just," we con- 
sider only that which is afl5rmed, not that which is frequently 
implied and meant, namely, that some others are not just. 

(4) Of two subcontraries one must be true, and both may be true. 
If one is known to be false, the other is true; but if one is known to 
be true, it cannot be inferred that the other is false. If it is false 
to say "Some men are immortal" (/), it is true to say "Some 
men are not immortal " (0). The first proposition I is false, as 
we suppose; then E is true as being its contradictory, and also a 
fortiori O as the subalternate of E. But both / and may be 
true, for the predicate which is affirmed or denied does not neces- 
sarily apply to the same subject in each proposition. The part 
of which it is affirmed in / may be different from the part of which 
it is denied in O. E.g. "Some men are virtuous"; "Some men 

are not virtuous." 
16 



226 LOGIC 

(b) From the obvertend, the obverse may be inferred, and vice 
versa. 

(c) From the convertend, the converse may be inferred, and vice versa; 
except in the conversion by limitation, for SF(a) gives FS{i), 
which can be converted only into SF(i). 

(d) From a proposition its equivalent is inferred, for instance, 
when synonyms are used, e.g. "Peter is not just," and "Peter is 
unjust." 

(e) Inferences are also obtained by the use of determinants, "All 
metals are chemical elements," "All heavy metals are heavy 
chemical elements"; and by complex conception, "All metals are ele- 
ments," "A mixture of metals is a mixture of elements." Great 
care must be taken in this process of inference, as frequently the 
determinant has not the same relative meaning when added to 
the predicate and when added to the subject. For instance, 
"Voters are men," "The majority of voters is the majority of 
men"; "Flies are animals," "Big flies are big animals." 

ARTICLE III. REASONING 
I. THE PERFECT SYLLOGISM 

I. Nature of the Syllogism 

I. Reasoning and Syllogism. — As explained in Psychology 
(p. 115 ff), reasoning is a mediate inference. It consists in proceed- 
ing from two or several known judgments to another unknown 
or less known judgment. It may be defined: The logical infer- 
ence of a judgment from two or several others. An argument 
means either the mental process of reasoning or its expression. 
We have seen also in psychology that, if the mind proceeds from 
a general law or principle to particular or individual instances, the 
process is deductive, i.e. the individual or sub-class is derived 
(de-duco) from the more general class in which it is contained. 
If the mind proceeds from individual or particular instances to a 
general law or principle, the process is inductive, i.e. individuals 
or sub-classes are classified under, or put in (in-duco), a more 
general class. 



remote: three terms 



THE PERFECT SYLLOGISM 227 

A syllogism is a perfect form of deductive reasoning. The pres- 
ent article will deal only with the syllogism, and with other forms 
of reasoning reducible to it. The laws of the syllogism are gener- 
ally applicable to inductive reasoning. But the latter is a more 
complex process in which the series of steps to be taken is more 
numerous. We shall speak of it in the second chapter. 

2. Elements of the Syllogism. — The formal element of the syl- 
logism and of any reasoning is the consequence, that is, the right 
to assert the conclusion, owing to the nexus between the inferred 
proposition and those from which it is inferred. 

The material elements of the syllogism are: 

proximate: three propositions | major proposition 1 , 

. •^- f antecedent or premises 

j mmor proposition J 

[ conclusion, consequent 

major term, the predicate of the conclusion 

minor term, the subject of the conclusion 

middle term, not foimd in the conclusion, but in both 

premises 

The conclusion expresses the relation of a predicate with a sub- 
ject after they have been compared with the same third (middle) 
term in the premises. The predicate of the conclusion, having 
generally a greater extension than the subject, is called the major 
term, and the subject is called the minor term. The premise in 
which the third or middle term is compared with the major term 
is called the major premise, and that in which it is compared with 
the minor term, the minor premise. 

All virtues are praiseworthy; Major premise 1 . . , , 
T^ , , . T. --. . I Antecedent 

Prudence ts a nrtue; Minor premise J 

Therefore prudence is praiseworthy. Conclusion 

II. Figures and Moods of the Syllogism 

I. Figures. — Syllogisms are divided into four figures according 
to the four places which the middle term may occupy in the premises, 
namely, as (i) Subject in the major and predicate in the minor. 
(2) Predicate in both. (3) Subject in both. (4) Predicate in 
the major and subject in the minor. Or as a Latin mnemonic 



228 LOGIC 

verse expresses it: "Sub prae, turn prae prae, turn sub sub, denique 
prae sub." (Sub stands for subiedum, prae for praedicatum.) 
Representing the major term by P, the minor by 5, the middle 
by M, we have: 





ist fig. 


2d fig. 


3d fig- 


4th fig. 


Major premise 


MP 


PM 


MP 


PM 


Minor premise 


SM 


SM 


MS 


MS 


Conclusion 


SP 


SP 


SP 


SP 



2. Moods. — The moods of the syllogism are the various man- 
ners according to which the three propositions in a syllogism may be 
arranged considering their quantity and quality. If for the present 
no attention is paid to the validity of the syllogism, the four kinds 
of propositions {A, £, /, 0) may occupy one of three positions 
(major, minor, conclusion). With a proposition A as major, we 
may have a minor A and four conclusions, A,E,I, or 0; or a minor 
E and the same four conclusions; or a minor / and four conclu- 
sions; or a minor and four conclusions, giving us sixteen moods 
for this one major. The same will be true for majors E, I, and 0, 
giving a total of sixty-four moods. Combining these now with 
the four figures we find a total of two hundred and fifty-six moods. 
But the majority of these are against the rules of the syllogism. 
Only nineteen are valid, some of which are seldom used: 

ist fig. AAA, All, EAE, EIO 

2d fig. AEE, AOO, EAE, EIO 

3d fig. AAI, All, EAO, EIO, lAI, OAO 

4th fig. AAI, AEE, EAO, EIO, lAI 

N.B. Let the student construct syllogisms according to the 
various moods and figures, and, after studying the rules of the 
syllogism, indicate why the other moods are not valid. 

III. Rules of the Syllogism 

There are eight rules of the syllogism, four of which refer to the 
terms, and four to the propositions. 
I. Rules for the Terms: 
(a) ist. Terminus esto triplex, maior, mediusque, minorque. 



THE PERFECT SYLLOGISM 229 

There must be three terms, only three, and they must be used with 
the same meaning. From the very nature of the syllogism two 
terms only are not sufficient, and if there are more than three, there 
can be no comparison of two with the same third. Hence it is 
necessary to pay attention to the meaning of the terms to see 
whether it is the same, since a term used with two different mean- 
ings is equivalent to two terms; e.g. "All men are mankind; Peter 
is a man; therefore Peter is mankind." "All men," i.e. taken 
together. Peter is only "one" man. 

(b) 2d. Latins hos quam praemissae conclusio non vuU. No 
term must have a greater extension in the conclusion than in the 
premises, otherwise the conclusion contains a surplus which is 
not justified by the premises, since this surplus was not compared 
with the middle term. E.g. "Liars are not to be believed; liars 
are men; men are not to be believed." 

(c) 3d. Nequaquam medium capiat conclusio fas est. The middle 
term must be found only in the premises, not in the conclusion, 
where it has nothing to do. It can only vitiate the conclusion. 
"This boy is poor; this boy is a ball player; this boy is a poor ball 
player." 

{d) 4th. Aut semel aut iterum medius generaliter esto. Once 
at least the middle term must be taken according to its whole 
extension. Otherwise the two parts to which it refers might be 
different in each premise, and thus there would be in reality no 
common middle term. The syllogism would have four terms. 
"Thieves are men; saints are men; therefore saints are thieves." 

2. Rules for the Propositions: 

(a) 5th. Ambae affirmantes negueunt generare negantem. If 
both premises assert the agreement of the subject and of the pred- 
icate with the same middle term, the conclusion must evidently 
assert the agreement of the subject with the predicate. 

(6) 6th. Utraque si praemissa neget nil inde sequetur. No 
conclusion can be inferred from two negative premises, because 
two ideas disagreeing with the same third may or may not agree 
with each other. 

(c) 7th. P eior em sequitur semper conclusio partem. The"peior" 
or weaker part is the negative as compared to the affirmative, 



230 LOGIC 

and the particular as compared to the universal, (i) If one prem- 
ise is negative and the other affirmative, the conclusion must be 
negative. One extreme is in agreement with the middle term, 
and the other is not; hence they cannot agree together. (2) If 
one premise is particular and the other universal, the conclusion 
must be particular because a partial agreement in the premise 
cannot be the valid ground of a total agreement in the conclusion. 
If the premises are A and I, there is only one universal term, and 
this must be the middle term (4th rule). Both extremes are there- 
fore particular, and the conclusion must also be particular (2d 
rule). If the premises are A and 0, or E and /, there are two imi- 
versal terms, one of which must be the middle term (4th rule), 
and the other the major term as predicate of a negative conclu- 
sion. Hence the minor term or subject must be particular in the 
conclusion, since it is in the antecedent (2d rule). 

(d) 8th. Nil sequitur geminis ex particularibus unguam. Two 
particular premises give no conclusion, for (i) both cannot be 
negative (6th rule); (2) if both are affirmative, all terms are 
particular (4th rule); (3) if one is affirmative (/), and the other 
negative (0), the conclusion will be negative (7th rule), and conse- 
quently the major term, universal. But the premises have only 
one universal term, namely, the predicate of the negative premise. 
If this is the middle term, the syllogism is against the second 
rule; if it is the major term, the syllogism is against the fourth 
rule. 

II. VARIOUS KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 

Perfect syllogisms are not used so frequently as imperfect forms 
of reasoning. Reasonings are expressed in abbreviated or length- 
ened forms. Hence we shall speak here of hypothetical syllogisms, 
and of certain incomplete or irregular arguments. 

I. Hypothetical, Conjunctive, and Disjunctive Arguments. — 
(a) A hypothetical syllogism is one in which one proposition — 
generally the major — is conditional, i.e. consists of two proposi- 
tions, the antecedent or condition, — preceded by such particles 
as "if," "in case," "suppose that," etc., — and the consequent 
or conditioned. 



VARIOUS KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 231 

Rules: Either affirm the condition in the minor, and the condi- 
tioned in the conclusion; or deny the conditioned in the minor and the 
condition in the conclusion. In other words, in the first figure — 
in which the minor contains the antecedent — the affirmative mood 
is valid, but not the negative mood. In the second figure — in 
which the minor contains the consequent — the negative mood is 
valid, but not the affirmative mood. E.g. "If John studies, he will 
know his lesson." First fig., "He studies; therefore he will know 
his lesson." Second fig., "He will not know his lesson; therefore 
he does not study." 

A conditional proposition may be reduced to a categorical 
proposition, not always, as some logicians have claimed, to a uni- 
versal proposition, but to a universal, particular, or singular prop- 
osition, according to the nature of the condition itself. "If a 
man runs he is moving " is equivalent to "All running men are 
moving." "If John studies he will know his lesson" is equiva- 
lent to "John's studying means the future knowledge of his les- 
son"; other individuals might study their lesson without being 
able to understand and to know it. To change a conditional argu- 
ment into a perfect syllogism may sometimes be useful to test 
its validity. 

{b) A conjunctive syllogism has a conjunctive proposition as 
major. The rule is to affirm one member in the minor and deny the 
other in the conclusion. The "modus ponendo tollens" is vaUd, 
not the "modus tollendo ponens." For instance, "You cannot 
play and study at the same time; you are playing; therefore you 
are not studying," or "you are studying; therefore you are not 
playing." The major states only the incompatibility of its mem- 
bers, but these may not exhaust all the possible cases. Hence 
we cannot say: "You are not playing; therefore you are studying." 
This syllogism may be reduced to a hypothetical and a categorical 
syllogism, the major propositions of which are: "If you are playing, 
you are not studying at the same time," and " Your playing implies 
your not-studying at the same time." 

(c) In the disjunctive syllogism, the major is a disjunctive prop- 
osition. Both the "modus ponendo tollens'^ and the ''modus tol- 
lendo ponens" are valid, since the disjvinction must be exhaustive 



232 LOGIC 

in order to be true. But, if there are more than two members, 
and one member is affirmed or denied in the minor, all the others 
must be denied or affirmed disjunctively in the conclusion. E.g. 
"To-day is either Sunday, or Monday, or . . . Saturday; it is 
Sunday; therefore it is neither Monday, nor Tuesday, nor . . . "; 
or, "it is not Sunday; therefore it is either Monday, or Tuesday, 
or . . . ." The disjunctive syllogism may also be reduced to 
the conditional and the categorical syllogism. 

(d) A dilemma is a disjunctive argument in which, whichever 
member of the disjunction be selected, something is inferred against 
an adversary. E.g. "Speaking irreverently of Holy Scripture is 
done either in jest or in earnest; if in jest, it is not respectful; if in 
earnest, it is not good." Rules: (i) The disjunction must be com- 
plete. (2) The consequences inferred from each member must 
be valid. 

2. Imperfect and Incomplete Syllogisms, (a) The enthymeme 
is an abbreviated argument, either one of the premises or the 
conclusion being understood. E.g. "He must be sick, for he has 
not come." 

(6) The epicheirema is an argument in which to one or both of 
the premises its reason or proof is added immediately. E.g. 
"Order requires an intelligence, for chance does not produce 
order; there is ofder in the world, otherwise it could not continue 
to exist as it is; therefore the world requires an intelHgence." 

(c) The polysyllogism is a series of complete syllogisms in which 
the conclusion of one is assumed immediately as the major of the 
following. "A is B; B is C; therefore ^ is C; C is D; therefore A 

is Dr 

(d) The sorites is a series of incomplete syllogisms or enthy- 
memes in which only one conclusion, the last, is expressed. It 
includes as many complete syllogisms as there are propositions 
minus two. To test its vaUdity, it is useful to reduce it to com- 
plete syllogisms. "A is B; B is, C; C is D; D is E; therefore A is 
E." There are two special rules for the sorites: (i) Only one par- 
ticular premise is allowable, namely, the first; otherwise the argu- 
ment is against the 4th rule of the syllogism. (2) Only one 
negative premise is allowable, namely, the last major; otherwise 



PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM 233 

the argument is against the 2d rule. The student may ver- 
ify for himself that, if any premise except the first is particular, 
the middle term will be undistributed in one of the syllogisms, 
and, if any premise except the last is negative, the major term will 
have a greater extension in one of the conclusions than in the major 
premise of the same syllogism. 

N.B. Sometimes in order to reduce an argument to a perfect 
syllogism it is necessary to use equivalent propositions. E.g. 
"Those who are not good will not be rewarded; Peter is not good; 
therefore Peter will not be rewarded." Both premises are appar- 
ently negative, and yet the syllogism is certainly valid, because in 
reality the minor, as compared to the major, is affirmative. Again 
this syllogism contains apparently four terms: (i) "those who 
are not good," (2) "rewarded," (3) "Peter," (4) "good." By 
using equivalents, we have "Men in the class not-good will not 
be rewarded; Peter is in the class not-good; therefore he will not 
be rewarded." Again ''Iron (i) is a useful metal (2); this bridge 
(3) is made of iron (4) ; therefore this bridge (3) is made of a useful 
metal (5)." Here we have apparently five terms. But it must 
be noticed that besides the mediate inference by reasoning, we 
have an immediate inference by complex conception (p. 226) and 
the argument is perfectly valid. This type of reasoning is used 
very frequently. 

m. PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM 

1. Points of View of Extension and of Comprehension. — In 
a syllogism, the propositions may be considered from the point 
of view of comprehension or from that of extension. The predi- 
cate may be looked upon as an idea contained in the comprehension 
of the subject, or as a class containing the subject. "All men are 
mortal," interpreted from the point of view of comprehension 
means "Mortal is an attribute of all men," or "Man owing to his 
nature is mortal." Interpreted from the point of view of exten- 
sion it means "Man is a sub-class of the class mortal," or "Man 
is one of the mortal beings." In the former case it is meant that 
man has a greater comprehension than mortal; in the latter, that 



234 LOGIC 

mortal has a greater extension than man. This is in agreement 
with what has been mentioned concerning the relations of inten- 
sion and extension. 

2. Principles of the Syllogism. — (a) From the point of view of 
comprehension the eight rules of the syllogism are based on the 
following principle: "Quod dicitur de continente dicitur etiam de 
con ten to." That which is predicated — affirmatively or nega- 
tively — of that which contains must be predicated also of that 
which is contained. If "mortal" is contained expUcitly or 
impUcitly in the comprehension of "man," and "man" in the 
comprehension of "Peter," "mortal" is also contained in the 
comprehension of "Peter." 

{b) From the point of view of extension, the principle of the syl- 
logism is stated briefly as "Dictum de omni " and "Dictum de 
nullo." Whatever is predicated — affirmatively or negatively — 
of the genus or class must also be predicated of the spfecies, sub- 
classes, and individuals under this genus or class. If "man " is 
a sub-class of "mortal," and "Peter " is an individual man, Peter 
is also mortal. 

(c) More generally the principles of the syllogism are three, 
(i) Two terms agreeing with one and the same third agree with 
each other, (a) Two terms one of which agrees and the other 
disagrees with the same third disagree with each other. (3) Two 
terms neither of which agrees with the same third cannot be 
said to agree or to disagree with each other. It would be 
easy to show that all the rules of the syllogism are but applica- 
tions of these principles. 

N.B. It may be found useful to represent syllogistic processes 
by means of circles which diagrammatically show their value (see 
on opposite page two illustrations showing how this can be done). 
By applying the rules given for the quantity of the predicate, 
one may verify which inferences are vaHd, and which are invalid. 

3. Quantitative Syllogisms. — So far we have spoken only of 
the logical or qualitative syllogism. There is also a mathemat- 
ical or quantitative syllogism based on quantity, succession, 
equality of relations, etc. For instance: "A is equal to B; B is 
equal to C; therefore A is equal to C." "/4 is greater than B; 



PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM 235 

B is greater than C; therefore A is greater than C." "A (a 
musical instrument) is in tune with B; B with C . . ." "vl is 
a brother of 5. . . ." " A lived before B. . . ." In each of these 
arguments we have four terms. Yet they are vaHd, because they 
are based on quantitative self-evident relations: "Two things equal 
to the same third are equal to each other "; "The greater than the 





Point of view of extension Point of view of comprehension 

MP(a); SM(a); Conclusion: SP(a) 




MP(e); SM{i); Conclusion: SP(o) 

greater is greater than the great," etc. In the syllogism: "A is 
greater than B; B greater than C; therefore A is greater than C," 
if ^'s greatness is a, 5's greatness b, and C's greatness c, we have: 
a = b-{-x;b = c-\-y; therefore a = c -{- y -{- x. 

4. Primary Laws of Thought. — All the principles and rules 
of the syllogism are ultimately reducible to three primary laws 
of thought implied in all affirmations, negations, and processes of 



236 LOGIC 

reasoning, (i) Law of identity: "A thing is what it is." Or 
logically: "Every subject is its own predicate"; "A is A" (2) 
Law of contradiction: "The same thing cannot at the same time and 
from the same point of view be and not be." Or logically: "The 
same predicate cannot at the same time and in the same sense be 
afl&rmed and denied of the same subject." (3) Law of excluded 
middle: "A thing is or is not." Or logically: "Of two contradic- 
tory attributes one must be affirmed and the other denied of the 
same subject." These laws are the basis on which the syllogism 
rests, and are implied in every process of thinking and judging. 



CHAPTER II 

METHOD 

Object of this Chapter 

1. Meaning. — Method (6805 /icra, road or way toward) in gen- 
eral signifies the adaptation of means in order to do something and 
to reach safely a determined end. In logic, it signifies the adap- 
tation of means in order to reach scientific truth, i.e. the knowl- 
edge of things from their causes and in their relations to other 
things. To know, in the strict sense, is not simply to apprehend 
a fact or an event, but also to perceive the reasons, laws, causes, 
and relations of facts and events. Methodology teaches how to 
proceed in order to acquire science. In every syllogism there is 
a progress from the premises to the conclusion. Knowledge is 
generally acquired by a series of reasonings. Hence, although a 
method is required for one single reasoning, method as understood 
here applies to a more complex progress in which arguments of 
different value and from different sources are used. 

2. Importance. — It is important to proceed methodically. 
(i) Unless the road is known, one is likely to go astray, or at least 
to lose much time in finding the way. This will be made clear if 
you compare, with regard to both quantity and quality, the work 
of two men, one of whom proceeds methodically, and the other 
does not. (2) It is necessary to proceed gradually, not by jumps; 
precipitation is likely to mislead the mind. (3) What is acquired 
with method, and orderly arranged, is more easily memorized, and 
only such a methodical arrangement of ideas deserves the name of 
knowledge. 

Thus, whereas the first chapter of logic indicated how to make 
a valid formal syllogism, and as such is indispensable, there re- 
mains to show (i) the value of the premises used; if the form be 
correct, but the materials weak, the whole edifice lacks solidity; 

237 



238 LOGIC 

(2) the use to be made of the syllogism, and the mode of proceed- 
ing step by step from one conclusion to another; (3) the danger of 
fallacies which may come either from the form or the matter of 
the syllogism, 

3. Division of this Chapter. — Method being a progress supposes 
two extremes: one, the starting-point; the other, the end to be 
reached. As the direction of any movement or progress is derived 
from the term to which it tends, — *'motus specificatur a ter- 
mino " — we must begin with the end to be reached, for it is from 
this end that the process derives its orientation. As to the proc- 
ess itself from the starting-point to the terminus, it supposes that 
we know the value of the instruments to be used, the various kinds 
of methods, and the wrong ways, fallacies or errors. Hence our 
division: (i) The extremes; (a) the terminus ad quern, or end to 
be reached, (b) the terminus a quo, or starting-point. (2) The 
progress itself; (a) the value of the arguments, {b) the two main 
general methods, (c) the obstacles. 



ARTICLE I. THE TERMINI 

I. THE END TO BE REACHED 

Man's intelligence strives after science, that is, a certain mode 
of knowledge to which his innate curiosity instinctively impels 
him. Man not only wants to see things and events, but he is 
anxious to know their "how" and "why" — two words which 
are frequently used by both the child and the adult. 

I. The Nature of Science 

The term "science" is used with both a subjective and an 
objective meaning. It signifies the knowledge and the object of 
knowledge, and we speak of the science which a man possesses, 
and of the various sciences which he studies. 

I. Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge. — Science is always 
knowledge, but knowledge in its broad sense is not always sci- 
ence, (i) Sense-perception, of itself, is not scientific knowledge. 
(2) Things known directly and immediately by the intellect, i.e. 



SCIENCE 239 

self-evident principles, are not said to be known scientifically, 
but are the bases of science. Scientific knowledge is essentially 
the knowledge of things through their causes and their common prin- 
ciples. It possesses the three following characteristics: 

(a) It is certain. It starts from something certain, and uses valid 
inferences that lead to certitude. This certitude is based on rea- 
sons and justified by proofs. Unscientific knowledge is frequently 
doubtful and accepted without proof. 

(b) It is general. The fact or individual as such is not the object 
of science. Science has for its object the causes common to several 
happenings, the types common to several beings, the laws com- 
mon to several phenomena. To know that a man died is not sci- 
ence; to know that he died on account of his swallowing a certain 
poison which, under the same circumstances, is capable of killing 
not only this man, but any other man, because it has such or 
such effects on the organism, is scientific. To see a dog is not 
science; to know its nature and essential features belongs to sci- 
ence. To perceive that the stone thrown up in the air falls down 
is not science; the law of gravitation gives a scientific explanation 
of the fact. 

(c) It is systematic. Facts are only the materials of science. 
They are not science itself any more than the materials of a house 
are a house. The materials become a house by their adjustment 
according to certain relations. So also facts become science only 
when their connections and relations are perceived, and when they 
are reduced to common principles and laws. 

2. Two Meanings of Science. — (a) If stress is laid on the knowl- 
edge of causes and on certitude, it may be insisted that such causes 
give necessary conclusions, i.e. conclusions which, under existing 
circmnstances, the mind conceives as incapable of being otherwise. 
Mathematical sciences are the best types of this meaning of 
science. 

{b) If stress is laid on the element of systematization, the limits 
of science are widened and may be made to include not only con- 
clusions that are certain, but also others that are more or less 
conjectural and hypothetical. These, it is true, do not consti- 
tute science in the strict sense; they are called scientific because 



240 LOGIC 

they are obtained methodically, connected with strictly ascer- 
tained conclusions, and, for the present, offer a plausible explana- 
tion of facts. Many such conclusions are found in empirical 
sciences. 

3. Advantages of Scientific Knowledge. — From the charac- 
teristics of scientific knowledge its advantages are easily 
derived, 

(c) It enables the mind to understand and explain things; to 
know not only what happens, but also why it happens. 

(b) It makes it possible to foresee the future, so that measures 
may be taken accordingly. Certain events, like an ecHpse of the 
sun or an explosion of dynamite, may be foreseen and predicted 
with certitude. Others, like a storm, human actions, pohtical 
events, etc., can be foreseen only with varying degrees of prob- 
ability. Besides freedom which is found in human actions, the 
reason of this difference is the complexity of the causes that con- 
tribute to produce a given phenomenon, and the difficulty of 
knowing them all in their various relations, 

(c) It increases our power over nature, for, when the causes that 
produce a thing are known, they may be brought about, or avoided, 
or combined in a thousand ways, so as to give rise to intended 
results. Machinery is an obvious instance. It is the adaptation 
of many causes, laws, and principles for certain purposes. To 
know the cause of a disease is the first step toward curing it. To 
know the character of a man is of great importance in dealing 
with him. 

II. Classification of Sciences 

I. Distinction and Subordination. — (a) Sciences are distin- 
guished attd classified according to their formal objects, that is, not 
according to the object itself of which they treat considered in its 
totality (material object), but according to the special point of 
view which they take of it (formal object). Thus many sciences 
have the human body for their material object : anatomy, physiol- 
ogy, pathology, histology, hygiene, etc. They are distinct 
sciences because they do not study the human body imder the 
same aspect. 



SCIENCE 241 

(b) Sciences may be subordinated in several ways, (i) // we 
consider their objects, some are more general, and the knowledge 
of them is supposed by the more special. Thus ethics supposes 
psychology; trigonometry supposes geometry, etc. This does not 
mean that the higher sciences must always be studied first; some- 
times the inferior and more special sciences may be a necessary 
means toward the superior. (2) // we consider their utility, some 
sciences are speculative, and others more immediately practical. 
As a rule practical sciences are based on theoretical sciences. 
(3) // we consider their origin, empirical sciences come or should 
come first, since psychologically experience comes before general- 
ization. (4) If we consider their excellence, the higher the object, 
the nobler the science. Thus the knowledge of God and of the 
human soul is higher than that of nature. 

2. Classification. — It is diflicult, not to say impossible, to 
give a satisfactory classification of sciences, (i) In fact, scien- 
tists do not agree in all details. (2) The number of distinct 
sciences increases with experience, and mere chapters of former 
sciences little by little become special sciences. (3) The limits 
separating distinct sciences are largely artificial. Since all the 
objects of nature, and all aspects of these objects, are in close con- 
nection, it is not possible for any science to be independent; it 
must necessarily go beyond its own limits into the domain of other 
sciences. 

Without stopping to consider the merits of other classifications, 
the following seems sufficiently complete and satisfactory. Gen- 
eric sciences alone will be mentioned, and these again may be 
subdivided. 

I. Physical and natural sciences, i.e. sciences of the material 
world. 



I. Inorganic 



(a) General properties of matter, Physics 

(b) Nature, composition, and special properties 

of elements and compounds, Chemistry 

(c) Minerals, Mineralogy 
{d) Description of the earth, Physical Geography 
(e) Constitution of the earth, Geology 
if) Other mundane bodies, Astronomy, Cosmogony, etc 



17 



242 



LOGIC 



2. Organic 



(a) Life in general, 

(b) Plant Ufe, 

(c) Animal life, 



Biology 
Botany 
Zoology 



N.B. — Both botany and zoology are subdivided into 
the study of 



(a) General structure of organisms, 

(b) Minute structure, 

(c) Functions, 

(d) Diseases, 

(e) Early development, 
(/) Fossil remains, 



Anatomy 

Histology, Cystology 

Physiology 

Pathology 

Embryology 

Paleontology 



II. Sciences of man considered as intelligent, free, and social, 
either as an individual or in his social relations. 



I. Individual 



2. Social 





Psychology 


truth, 


Logic a-nd Episte- 




mology 


duty, 


Ethics 


beauty. 


Esthetics 



(a) Conscious processes, 

(b) Normative sciences of 



(a) Language, Philology 

{b) Wealth, Political Economy 

(c) Social ethics and politics, Law and Jurisprudence 

(d) Description of States, Political Geography 

(e) Past events, History and Historical Sciences, e.g. 

Epigraphy, Archeology, etc. 

(/) Early human development. Anthropology 

(g) Human races, Ethnology 



III. Mathematical sciences, i.e. sciences of abstract quantity. 



1. Of numbers, 

2. Of extension, 

3. Of movement and force, 



Arithmetic, Algebra 

Geometry, Trigonometry 

Mechanics 



IV. Metaphysical sciences, i.e. higher constitution and nature, 



1. Of material substances, 

2. Of the human soul, 

3. Of God, 



Cosmology 

Philosophy of mind 

Theodicy 



THE STARTING-POINT 243 



II. THE STARTING POINT 

1. Doubt. — Any question and any desire for learning suppose 
in the mind both knowledge and doubt; namely, the knowledge, 
however vague and imperfect, of something concerning the object 
we want to study, for, if man were altogether ignorant of it, he 
would not even suspect that any question may be asked about it ; 
and a doubt with regard to the special points to be examined and 
the answer to the questions proposed. This doubt, however, 
bears on a special point. It is not universal, for, if everything, 
including sense-experience, the value of the faculties of knowledge, 
and the first principles be doubted, it becomes absolutely impos- 
sible ever to reach anything certain. Since they are primary, 
self-evident facts and principles cannot be reconstructed out of 
anything else. 

Descartes began by a universal doubt, but did not reach certi- 
tude except through inconsistencies, implicitly admitting later 
on what he had formerly rejected as doubtful. He warns us him- 
self that his example is not to be followed indiscriminately. Log- 
ically, certitude can come only from certitude, universal doubt can 
beget only doubt, since the conclusion must be contained in the 
premises. Moreover, it is impossible to demonstrate everything, 
for, if a proposition M be demonstrated by L, L by K, K by /, 
and so on, without ever reaching a proposition standing by itself 
and on its own merits, no certitude can ever be obtained. 

2. Positive Data. — The process may be analytical or synthet- 
ical. In the former case, the positive starting-point will be a fact 
or a series of facts; in the latter, it will be self-evident and indemon- 
strable principles. Facts will be gathered from internal or external 
experience. Principles will be either general, or special to each 
science. Thus the principle of sufficient reason is general; the 
axioms and definitions of geometry are more special. In all these 
are contained implicitly or explicitly the fact of the subject's 
existence, which is implied in every conscious process; the 
subject's power to know which is implied in the act itself of 
knowledge; the primary laws of thought — identity, contra- 



244 LOGIC 

diction, and excluded middle — without which consistent thinking 
is an impossibiUty. 



ARTICLE II. THE PROGRESS 

I. THE VALUE OF THE ARGUMENTS 

Method is the way to make progress from the known to the 
unknown, or from the better known to the less known. Hence 
the importance of knowing the value of inferences and reasonings. 
These may be (i) certain, i.e. start from premises that are certain, 
and lead to conclusions that are also certain; (2) more or less prob- 
able and worthy of assent; (3) false, either because the premises 
are false, or because the rules of the syllogism are not observed. 
Only the first two classes belong here as instruments of science, 
and as yielding scientific results, permanent or provisional. The 
last class, on the contrary, is an obstacle to science, and will be 
considered later. 

I. Demonstration 

1. Nature of Demonstration. — Demonstration is a process of 
reasoning in which from premises known to be certain a conclu- 
sion which is also certain is inferred. Hence two conditions are 
required: (i) The formal validity of the process of reasoning; 
(2) the certainty of the premises, either because they are self-evi- 
dent, or because they are ultimately reducible to self-evident 
facts and principles, since, as was said above, the process of demon- 
stration requires indemonstrable principles. Thus the last the- 
orems of Euchdean geometry are based on the preceding ones, and 
ultimately on principles, axioms, and definitions. 

2. Various Kinds of Demonstration. — A demonstration is: 
(a) (i) Direct, when it proceeds by positive arguments, and shows 
positively that the predicate does or does not belong to the sub- 
ject. (2) Indirect, when it shows the falsity of the contradic- 
tory or of opposite propositions. To prove the freedom of the will 
from consciousness is to proceed directly; to prove it from the 
consequences of determinism is to proceed indirectly. 

(b) (i) A priori, synthetic, or deductive, when it proceeds from 



VALUE OF ARGUMENTS 245 

that which is in reaUty prior, namely, from the cause to the effect, 
from the essence to the property, from the law to the phenomenon. 
(2) A posteriori, analytic, or inductive, when it proceeds from that 
which is in reality posterior, namely, from the effect to the cause, 
from the property to the essence, from the phenomenon to the law. 
To prove the immortaUty of the soul from the soul's spirituality 
is to proceed a priori; to prove the existence of God from the world 
is to proceed a posteriori. In natural sciences, these two methods 
are generally combined. We proceed first from the effects to the 
cause, and the knowledge of the cause leads again to the knowledge 
of other effects. 

N.B. Prioriness and posterioriness here are taken in the natural, 
not in the fogical, order, since logically the premises, whatever 
be their natural relation to the conclusion, are always prior to the 
conclusion. In the a posteriori demonstration, the fact is better 
known than, or logically prior to, the law, although in the natural 
order it is but an application of the existing law. 

(c) (i) Perfect — propter quid, Siori, "why" — when it gives 
the necessary, proximate, special, and adequate reasons or prin- 
ciples of the conclusion. Hence it is always a priori. (2) Imper- 
fect — quia, oTi, "that " — when it shows simply the existence of 
a thing, or does not give its intrinsic, special, or proximate reasons. 

N.B. Causes and reasons are necessary when they make it 
impossible for the conclusion to be otherwise; proximate and spe- 
cial when there is no Unk omitted between the conclusion and its 
premises; adequate when they give the complete reason of the 
conclusion. The perfect demonstration is possible chiefly in math- 
ematics, logic, and metaphysics, where it can start from the 
axioms of quantity, and from self-evident principles considered 
either as laws of thought or as principles of being and existence. 

(d) (i) Absolute when the premises are true in themselves and 
for all men. (2) Relative, or ad hominem, when the premises are 
admitted by an adversary, although they may not be certain. 
The former is valid for all, not the latter. To base a demonstra- 
tion on principles or facts which are admitted by an opponent, 
but known to be false by the one who uses them, is a lack of intel- 
lectual honesty. ProbabiUties are frequently used in this way. 



246 LOGIC 

II. Probable Arguments 

I. Nature of Probable Arguments. — (a) Probable arguments 
are those in which one of the premises is, or both premises are, 
probable, and lead to a probable conclusion. Probability means 
likelihood, approach to truth, or greater force of argument. It 
refers to the object, and produces in the mind the state of opin- 
ion, that is, an assent without the firmness of certitude. Degrees 
of probability are numberless, and the corresponding states of 
opinion are more or less firm, nearer to, or farther from, doubt and 
certitude. In fact, doubt and certitude exist only in one point, 
at each extreme of the line of mental assent; doubt is the absence 
of assent; certitude is full, complete, and unrestricted assent. 
Opinion with its various degrees occupies the whole range between 
these two extremes. ProbabiUty is much more frequent than 
certitude, especially in practical matters, in historical, moral, 
social, political, and even natural sciences. But in many cases, 
as explained in psychology, subjective motives are added to objec- 
tive evidence, and make one consider as certain that which pru- 
dently and logically should be considered only as probable (p. 
117 ff.). 

{b) The general rule of probable arguments is that the conclu- 
sion cannot have a greater probability than the weaker premise. We 
must understand in this sense also the general rules: "Latins hos 
quam . . . ." and: "Peiorem sequitur semper. ..." If in a 
series of arguments, or in the same argument, two or several prop- 
ositions are only probable, the conclusion represents their combined 
weakness. A mathematical example will illustrate this: In toss- 
ing a coin, the chances of turning tails are \; the chances of turning 
tails twice in succession are i X i, i.e. i, for there are four chances 
in all, two for tails and two for heads. In the same way probabil- 
ity means a chance for truth. If to this be added another chance, 
the probability of both chances coinciding with truth is smaller 
than it would be if only one proposition were probable. 

However, probabilities, when independent, form a cumulative 
evidence, and may produce certitude. Thus a coincidence of inde- 
pendent facts, each one only probable in itself, may show the guilt 



VALUE OF ARGUMENTS 247 

of an accused person, because his guilt is the only sufficient reason 
of this coincidence. Cumulative evidence is frequently used in 
all sciences. 

The main probable arguments are analogy and example, statis- 
tics, hypothesis, and authority. 

2. Analogy and Example. — (a) Analogy applies to an object 
what is known to apply to another object having with the former 
one or several points of resemblance. From certain features 
known to be common certain other features are inferred to be also 
common. Example and analogy are closely related, and these 
terms are frequently used for each other. Strictly speaking, 
however, analogy argues from one instance to another by passing 
through a general law; it is inductive and deductive. Example 
goes directly and conjecturally from one instance to another. 
Thus, knowing that a certain disease is produced by micro-organ- 
isms, I infer by analogy that another disease having some similar 
symptoms is also due to a similar cause. Here is implied the gen- 
eral principle that the same symptoms are due to the same cause. 
To deter a man from excess in drinking, I may point out to him the 
example of this or that man who is an habitual drunkard. 

(b) Analogy and example are of frequent use in all sciences and 
in daily Ufe. They are the starting-point of many discoveries, 
by suggesting solutions which later on may be proved true. Their 
value depends on the number and character of the observed re- 
semblances, and thus ranges anywhere from certitude to zero. 
Hence extreme caution is necessary in using and admitting these 
arguments. They are sources of metaphors and allegories which 
must not be taken as true beyond the legitimate value of the 
inference. Points of resemblance must not cause one to over- 
look the differences. 

3. Statistics consist in noting the absolute and relative fre- 
quency of certain happenings. All happenings of a certain nature 
and within a certain period are numbered, and averages are taken 
and compared with various circumstances which are conjectured 
to be the causes of these happenings. Thus I may note the number 
of divorces for a whole nation or for a certain class of people dur- 
ing a certain period of time, compare their increasing or decreas- 



248 LOGIC 

ing rate with changes in social, political, and religious conditions, 
and thus find out the causes which influence their frequency. 
Statistics are of frequent use in social sciences, for mortaUty, 
births, diseases, crimes, accidents, suicides, etc., and also in many 
other sciences, e.g. for harvests, money circulation, mineral and 
agricultural products, etc. Statistics are very useful because ob- 
served coincidences help to find the causes of phenomena, or at 
least the various influences under which they happen. But they 
are difl&cult both to make and to interpret correctly because the 
causes and influences of events may be very complex and 
varied. There is danger of mistaking a mere fortuitous coinci- 
dence for the true cause, and of overlooking some important 
factors. 

4. Hypothesis (Greek, "placing under") in general consists in 
supposing (Latin, sub-positio) or presuming the solution looked 
for, and deaUng with it as if it were known. It is, therefore, a 
tentative explanation to be verified. 

(a) When a fact or a series of facts has been observed, we may 
not know its law immediately. Or even if the law is known in 
its generality, we may not know all its determinations. A 
hypothesis consists in supposing the law to be true, and in working 
on this assumption so as to ascertain whether it is true and justi- 
fied. The principle which impels to frame hypotheses is the prin- 
ciple of suflicient reason which applies to all phenomena. The 
faculty that frames them is the imagination imder the guidance 
of reason. 

{b) The main utilities of hypotheses are, (i) to offer a more or 
less probable solution of a problem which perhaps cannot be solved 
definitively, or which has not yet received a satisfactory solution ; 

(2) to coordinate and group results already obtained, and to sys- 
tematize them into a class that will be more or less permanent; 

(3) to incite to work in a certain direction in order to ascertain if 
the hypothesis is verifiable; (4) to throw many side-lights on the 
problem, even if the hypothesis is disproved, and to point the way 
to a true solution. 

(c) The conditions of a scientific hypothesis are the following: 
(i) It must not be taken as an end, but as a means; not as a prop- 



VALUE OF ARGUMENTS 249 

osition to be proved, but as a proposition to be tested. (2) It must 
not contradict any well-ascertained facts, conclusions, or principles, 
but sometimes may overthrow conclusions hitherto accepted as 
certain. (3) It must not be gratuitous, but based on facts. (4) It 
must be adequate, i.e. applicable to all the observed phenomena, 
and assign to them what is, or seems to be, a sufficient explana- 
tion. A hypothesis which certainly contradicts one fact which is 
certain, ceases to be vaUd. (5) It must be capable of some veri- 
fication or disproof, for its value consists chiefly in the hope of 
testing it. 

5. Authority. — Historical sciences are based on human author- 
ity. In all other sciences, as well as in daily life, men frequently 
rely on the authority of others. Few are the beUefs and actions 
prompted exclusively, and even principally, by personal reflec- 
tion, when compared with the number of those prompted by the 
authority of others, common opinion, education, individual ad- 
vice and suggestion. 

(a) In general it may be said that the -value of human author- 
ity as such ordinarily does not go beyond probability, for any man 
may be deceived or be a deceiver. Yet there may be found such 
guarantees in one single witness or in several independent wit- 
nesses — cumulative probability — as to give a moral certitude. 
On questions of facts, especially of facts that are easily observable, 
it is possible in many cases to reach certitude, but in other cases 
probability alone can be obtained. On questions of doctrine and 
systems, a competent man has greater authority; yet none is 
infalHble, and for a man who can appreciate and weigh the 
reasons that are given, an authority is worth these reasons. 

{h) Hence two extremes must be avoided: (i) Making of sci- 
ence a mere study and repetition of the opinions of others. This 
does not give a scientific knowledge; it is a lazy process dis- 
pensing with private research and progress. (2) Neglecting 
completely what others have said. We may profit by their 
discoveries and discussions, avoid doing the same work twice, 
proceed more safely where they have groped and, perhaps, 
lost their way, appropriate the conclusions of science already 
acquired. 



250 LOGIC 

n. THE TWO GENERAL METHODS 

1. Induction and Deduction. — The two general methods are 
induction and deduction. Induction goes from the particular to 
the universal, from the effect to the cause, from the phenomenon 
to the law. It tries to generalize, to find uniformities and general 
truths. Deduction follows the reverse process. Hence, consid- 
ering the real order of things, induction is regressive; deduc- 
tion, progressive. The cause is prior to the effect, but the effect 
may be known better than the cause (cf. p. 116.). The chief 
instrument of induction is analysis; of deduction, synthesis. 

2. Analysis and Synthesis. — By analysis (re-solutio) is meant a 
decomposing, a passing from the more complex to the simpler. 
By synthesis (com-positio) is meant a putting together, a passing 
from the simpler to the more complex. The whole which is decom- 
posed by analysis, and the parts that are put together by synthesis, 
are to be understood, not according to extension, but according to 
comprehension. Thus the human organism is more complex than 
a single organ, since it includes this organ, and others besides. The 
fact is more complex than the law, since it is a concrete appli- 
cation of the law, i.e. it is the law plus some individual determina- 
tions. In general, analysis proceeds from the conditioned to the 
condition; synthesis, from the condition to the conditioned. 

(a) In the case of facts or of concrete realities, analysis reduces 
the whole to its parts or components; either really, as, for instance, 
water to oxygen and hydrogen; white light to the colors of the 
spectrum; the organism, plant or animal, to its organs, tissues, 
etc.; or mentally, as, for instance, in psychology we have tried to 
analyze the complex mental states into their elements which do 
not exist separately as simple. Synthesis proceeds in the opposite 
direction. 

(b) In the case of ideas or mental truths, e.g. in mathematics, 
analysis proceeds from a more complex to a more simple statement 
until known principles are reached. Synthesis starts from the 
principles, and deduces consequences from them. Thus when I 
consider the theorem "The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal 
to two right angles," I may ascend from it to simpler principles 



INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 251 

(analysis), or, as is commonly done in learning geometry, descend 
toward it from the simpler principles (synthesis). 

I. Induction 

We do not speak here of complete induction, or induction -per 
enumeraiionem simplicem, which consists in affirming of the 
whole in the conclusion that which has been affirmed of all the 
parts enumerated separately in the premises. E.g. "It rained 
Sunday, Monday, Tuesday . . . and Saturday; but these are all 
the days of the week; therefore it rained every day of the 
week." "Peter, Paul, John . . . are under thirty; but Peter, 
Paul, John . . . are all the men here present; therefore . . , ," 
Such an induction is not scientific, and leads to no new result. It 
is a mere process of addition based on the principle that the total- 
ity equals the sum of its parts. We speak only of incomplete in- 
duction, e.g. "This water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen; 
therefore all water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen." 

I. Description of the Inductive Process. — The inductive proc- 
ess includes three steps: knowledge of individual facts, generaliza- 
tion, verification. 

(a) The knowledge of facts, internal or external, is acquired by 
observation and experiment. Experiment is a special mode of, 
and includes, observation. To observe is to watch attentively 
phenomena as they occur in nature when it is left to itself. To 
experiment is to question nature. It consists in varying and con- 
trolling circumstances so as to see what results will follow. When- 
ever possible, experiment is superior to simple observation, because 
it creates circumstances, and consequently results which other- 
wise might never occur. I may simply observe the behavior of 
an animal, or experiment with drugs to see how the animal's be- 
havior will be affected by them. Observation and experiment 
are very important. If the facts are not observed correctly, the 
theory based on them cannot fail to be weak for lack of sufficient 
foundation. 

The qualities required are: (i) On the object's side (a) precision 
as to the circumstances; (b) the variation of these circumstances 
in a precise manner; (c) the isolation, as far as possible, of the 



252 LOGIC 

phenomenon under observation from other phenomena. (2) On the 
observer's side, (a) physiological and physical conditions : health and 
normal state of organs; use of good instruments; (b) intellectual: 
attention to all circumstances and to analogies; desire to know; 
(c) moral: patience, impartiality, carefulness to discriminate accu- 
rately betv/een what is observed and what is inferred, between 
what is really perceived and what is imagined. 

(b) When a fact or a sufficient number of facts have been ob- 
served, their uniformities are noted, and their laws assigned, first 
generally in a tentative way. 

(c) The theory must be verified by new observations and exper- 
iments. 

2. Methods of Induction. — Observation and experiment are 
made according to four methods known as the four inductive 
methods. All inductions, both in science and in daily Hfe, depend 
on the use of one or several of these methods by which experience 
is interpreted. 

(a) Method of agreement. When a phenomenon occurs in two 
or several cases which agree only in one circumstance, this circum- 
stance is probably the cause of, or at least causally related to, the 
phenomenon. In other words, if, in several instances where a 
phenomenon occurs, there is only one common antecedent, this 
antecedent is the cause. The value of the conclusion depends on 
the constancy and multiplicity of coincidences under varying 
circumstances. Thus, if after eating a certain food — whatever 
other food I may also take with it — I invariably feel sick, this 
article of food is very likely the cause of my sickness. 

(b) Method of difference. Two or several instances are observed, 
one in which the phenomenon occurs, and the others in which it 
does not. If all the circumstances except one are the same in 
all cases, this one circumstance is probably the cause. In other 
words, the one difference in the antecedent is the cause of the dif- 
ference in the result. Thus sickness or death is ascribed to a cer- 
tain poison because, everything else being identical, the taking of 
the poison is followed by sickness or death. 

N.B. The joint method of agreement and difference combines 
these two methods. 



INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 253 

(c) Method of residues. It is a modification of the method of 
difference. When in a group of consequents, a, b, c, d, some, for 
instance, a, b, c, are known to be due to certain antecedents A, B, 
C, the residual consequent d is probably caused by a residual 
antecedent D. If I have bought three articles, a, b, c, and know 
how much I have spent in all and how much a and b cost, I can find 
the cost of c. Knowing what effects are due to the presence of 
certain elements in a compoimd, a new effect is ascribed to the 
presence of a new element. 

(d) Method of concomitant variations. If variations of a phe- 
nomenon occur simultaneously with variations in the antecedent, 
it is probable that these two variations are causally related. Thus 
the concomitant variations of the number of vibrations with the 
pitch of a sound, or of the thermometer with the temperature, 
show that these phenomena are causally related. 

N.B. As much as possible these methods must be used to- 
gether to test, correct, verify, and strengthen one another. The 
experiments in each must be varied and multiplied according to 
the nature of the case. 

3. The Principle of Induction. — (a) In induction, the conclu- 
sion has a greater extension than the premises, since from observed 
particular instances a general conclusion is drawn applying to un- 
observed instances. If the process is valid, there must be some 
principle that makes this passage legitimate. Observation and 
experiment are always limited to few cases, and, by themselves, 
justify only the affirmation of the facts observed. Nor is the 
association of ideas sufficient to justify this passage. 

According to associationists, as mentioned in Psychology (p. 
113), because several times a man has observed that the same ante- 
cedents were followed by the same consequents, he is led to expect 
this succession in every case. Little by little these associations 
and partial uniformities lead to the formation by the mind of the 
general principle of the uniformity of the laws of nature: "Nature 
always acts in the same manner under the same circumstances," 
In addition to its psychological difficulties, this view is open to 
the following objections: (i) This principle would have only a 
subjective and relative value; it could be changed by subsequent 



254 LOGIC 

experiences and habits. (2) A law is frequently discovered after 
one observation, or very few observations, and hence not through 
constant associations. On the contrary, sometimes induction 
corrects long-standing prejudices due to associations and habits 
of thought. (3) The number of cases in which constant uniform- 
ities are perceived by the senses is very small when compared to 
the number of cases in which they are not observed. 

(b) Some other criterion is needed since experience can never 
accoimt for the universality and necessity of knowledge. In fact, 
the principle of induction is the principle of the uniformity of nature: 
"The same causes produce the same effects," or "Causal relations 
are constant," or "Nature is governed by constant laws." This 
principle is not derived from mere sense association, but rests imme- 
diately on the principle of sufficient reason, which in turn is but an 
application of the principle of contradiction. Not only does every 
single fact require a sufficient reason without which it could not 
occur, but a series of coincidences, or harmonious and constant 
occurrences, must be assigned an adequate reason. A single fact 
requires a proportionate cause. The recurrence of the same fact 
requires the sameness of natural inclination and of energy, which 
alone can explain the observed uniformities, and from which we 
are led to know future and unobserved uniformities. Wherever 
there is the same nature, i.e. the same source of activity, there 
also the same effects will necessarily occur. 

II. Deduction 

I. Description of the Deductive Process. — (a) Deduction 
starts from principles, and goes to their special appUcations. These 
principles may either be self-evident, hke the axioms and defini- 
tions of geometry, or result from a previous inductive process, hke 
the various laws of natural sciences. Deduction is used especially 
in abstract sciences, the best types of which are mathematics and 
geometry. In physical sciences it is used to demonstrate that 
which has been found to be the truth. The professor may some- 
times proceed deductively in proving what he has discovered by 
induction. Generally speaking, however, the method of demon- 
stration should be essentially the same as the method of invention. 



INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 255 

(b) Deduction includes three steps: (i) Definition, i.e. the unfold- 
ing of the intension of the terms, and the indication of the exact 
meaning in which they are used. (2) Division, i.e. the unfolding 
of the extension of the terms, and classification. (3) Proof, i.e. 
the assigning of the reasons, or demonstration proper. 

2. Utility of Deduction. — Two main objections are raised by 
Stuart Mill against the usefulness of the deductive syllogism. 

(a) It is sterile, and teaches nothing new, since the major already 
contains the conclusion. In the following syllogism, "All men are 
mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal," in order to 
be able to afi&rm the major, I must already be certain of the conclu- 
sion, for, the major would not be true if Socrates were not mortal. 

Answer: (i) The conclusion may be contained only virtually 
and implicitly in the premises. The syllogistic process makes 
it explicit. Who can say that deduction is sterile in geometry, 
and that he who knows the principles knows also all the theorems 
which these principles serve to prove? (2) Deduction teaches the 
reason why the conclusion is true. I might know that Socrates 
was mortal because in fact he died, that the number 275 is 
divisible by 5 because I have tried the division, and that the 
square built on the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is 
equal to the sum of the squares built on both its sides because 
I have measured them. But demonstration will give me the 
reason of these truths, show not only that they are so, but why 
they are so, and why they are universal. 

(b) The syllogism is a petitio principii; in afl&rming the major 
we already suppose the truth of the conclusion. 

Answer, (i) In the example given by Mill, the major is not 
taken extensively, but comprehensively. "All men are mortal" 
does not mean primarily "All men numerically are mortal," but 
"mortal" belongs to the comprehension of "man," or "Human 
nature implies mortality," an assertion which is based on the 
knowledge of human nature acquired by an inductive process. 
(2) Hence induction does not require the complete enumeration 
of all cases. 

(c) Mill also says that, in fact, we do not argue from the general 
to the individual, but from the individual to the individual. For 



256 LOGIC 

instance, a matron unhesitatingly prescribes a remedy for her 
neighbor's child simply because it has cured her own child. 

Answer. Universal principles are implied here; that the same 
symptoms are signs of the same disease; and that what has cured 
the disease in one case is likely to cure it in all cases. The matron 
would give the same advice to anybody else, thus showing that, 
in the case of her neighbor's child, she only applies a general 
principle. 

3. Induction and Deduction Compared. — In conclusion we 
may briefly compare the uses of induction and of deduction. 

(a) Induction gives to deduction many of its principles. It is 
the main method of the sciences of nature. But with the progress 
of sciences, more laws are discovered, and deduction of particular 
instances from these known laws is more frequent. 

(b) Deduction is necessary even in the inductive process. It is 
by deduction that hypotheses are verified, and laws applied to 
particular cases. 

(c) Some sciences are chiefly deductive; others, chiefly induc- 
tive; others, like politics, political economy, ethics, make frequent 
use of both processes. Thus I may demonstrate the advantages 
of a certain form of goverimient either from facts or from principles. 

N.B. Find concrete applications of these methods in the 
sciences which you have studied. 

m. OBSTACLES 

Besides the difficulties inherent in the problems themselves, the 
main obstacles met with in an investigation are fallacies, which, 
together with other causes to be mentioned later, are sources of 
error. As to controversy, contradiction, and discussion, they may 
also be obstacles, or may become great helps, according to the use 
which is made of them. 

I. Fallacies 

I. Nature of Fallacies. — (c) A fallacy (fallacia, Jailer e, to 
deceive) is an erroneous argument, or a reasoning which, for some 
reason, fails to lead to a valid conclusion. The term "fallacy" is 
more general than the terms "paralogism" and "sophism." A 



OBSTACLES 257 

paralogism supposes in the logical form of the reasoning a defect 
which is apt to deceive the reasoner himself. As generally used, 
the term sophism, and its derivatives, have an ethical implication, 
namely, that the reasoner is aware of the weakness of the argu- 
ment, but nevertheless uses it with an intention to deceive. 

(b) It is difl5cult to give a satisfactory classification of fallacies. 
The following, though imperfect, is sufficient for the present prac- 
tical purpose. 



Fallacy 



(i) of simple inspection, or a priori 



(2) of inference (a) logical or formal purely logical and format 

semilogical, verbal, or in dic- 
iione 

(b) real or material, or extra dictionem 

(c) special fallacies of induction 

2. Fallacies of Simple Inspection, or a priori fallacies, in 
general consist in the acceptance of certain principles, maxims, 
and generalizations without sufficient evidence. By some these 
fallacies are said to be wholly a priori, i.e. accepted without any 
reasoning. It seems truer, at least in most cases, to say that 
such principles are accepted on the strength of an implicit reason- 
ing, hasty and insufficient induction, or common acceptance and 
authority. They are looked upon as self-evident and as requiring 
no proof, and many inferences are based on them. 

Many are popular, like omens, the interpretation of dreams, 
prognostics, superstitions, lucky or unlucky days or numbers, 
prejudices, etc. They are found in the most ordinary assents of 
daily life, and in the highest pursuits Hke religion and morality. 
Others have a higher character in science, philosophy, and religion, 
like such ambiguous principles as: "All men are born equal;'* 
"Progress and evolution are the law of nature"; "Man is essen- 
tially truthful"; "Nature and the supernatural cannot meet"; 
"All religions are equally good"; "It is enough for man to live 
honestly"; and a multitude of other maxims either admitted 
almost imiversally or special to a certain region or class of men. 
To avoid them it is necessary to exercise constant watchfulness. 
Because they are common to all or to many, and because they 
18 



258 LOGIC 

are habitual, they attract no attention. Yet they need to be 
explained, tested, and verified. Observe the conversation of 
certain persons, and see how many principles of this kind are 
appealed to. (Cf. p. 118 fif.) 

3. The Formal or Purely Logical Fallacies are those which 
result from violating any of the logical rules of propositions and 
reasonings. The most frequent are: (i) In immediate inferences: 
the confusion of contrary and contradictory terms and proposi- 
tions; the violation of the rules of opposition, conversion, and 
contraposition. (2) In mediate inferences: the fallacy of four 
terms, of undistributed middle, of the illicit process or undue 
extension of either the major or the minor term, of negative 
premises, and of the consequent, i.e. the violation of the rules of 
hypothetical syllogisms. 

4. Verbal Fallacies — fallacies in dictione, or fallacies of language 
— arise from the use of terms. They include a defect in the 
form of the syllogism, and consequently a violation of its rules, 
but this defect comes from the matter, that is, from the terms 
which are used. Hence they are also called semilogical fallacies. 
The most important are: 

(a) Amphibology, or the use of ambiguous grammatical struct- 
ures and sentences, e.g. "The noble hound the wolf hath slain," 
or this sign at the entrance of a store: "Why go elsewhere to be 
cheated? Come in here." 

{b) Equivocation, or the use of a term — more frequently of 
the middle term — in two senses, so that the syllogism has really 
four terms: "What produces intoxication is evil, and should be 
prohibited; the use of alcohoUc liquors produces intoxication; 
therefore it should be prohibited." Distinctions should be made 
between the various alcoholic beverages, their various uses, and 
the various circumstances in which they may be used. 

(c) Composition, or affirming of the totality that which is true 
only of the parts taken distributively; "All the angles of a triangle 
are less than two right angles " is true of any angle taken separately, 
not of their sum. 

{d) Division, or affirming of the parts distributively that which 
is true only of the totality. "All the angles of a triangle are equal 



OBSTACLES 259 

to two right angles " is true of the totality, not of any one angle. 
From the collective vote, i.e. the vote of the majority of Congress, 
or from the verdict of a jury, I cannot infer the votes of the 
various members taken individually. 

(e) Accent, or the ambigmty arising from the difference in the 
stress laid on a particular syllable of a word, or on a special word 
in the sentence. 

5. Real Fallacies — fallacies extra dictionem, or material fal- 
lacies — depend not so much on the form as on the matter of 
the syllogism. Hence they suppose the knowledge, not only 
of the rules of syllogism, but also of the subject with which 
the syllogism deals. 

(a) The fallacy of accident — a dicto simpUciter ad dictum 
secundum quid — consists in the erroneous inference of a special 
or conditional statement from a general and unconditional state- 
ment. " In a repubUcan government, subjects have the right to 
vote; criminals are subjects; therefore they have the right to vote." 

(6) The converse fallacy of accident — a dicto secundum quid ad 
dictum simpUciter — is the reverse of the preceding. " We must 
avoid intoxication; wine produces intoxication ; therefore we must 
not drink wine." Only a certain use, or rather abuse, of wine 
produces intoxication. 

(c) Begging the question — petitio principii — is a fallacy in 
which the truth of the conclusion itself is presupposed in the 
premises, that which is to be proved being assumed as the very 
ground of proof. This occurs frequently when the principle of 
proof is a popular axiom accepted a priori and without question- 
ing. "Nothing exists but what the senses can perceive; the 
senses cannot perceive God; therefore God does not exist." The 
major cannot be true unless we already suppose the conclusion 
that an invisible God does not exist. This fallacy is also called 
cir cuius in probanda, vicious circle, or argument in a circle. The 
really identical propositions are generally separated by several 
intermediate steps, and expressed in different forms, so that the 
fallacy is not always easy to detect. 

(d) Irrelevant reasoning, or evading the question — ignoratio 
elenchi — consists in arguing — perhaps validly — to the wrong 



26o LOGIC 

point; in proving a conclusion which was not in question, in such 
a way that the right conclusion seems to have been proved. If 
a man is accused before the court, the lawyer may praise his 
family, his moral and civic virtues and quaUties, or appeal to 
feelings, instead of proving that he is not guilty of the offence for 
which he is tried. It is the great resource of those who have a 
weak cause to defend, and is used in many ways. 

6. Special Fallacies of Induction. — (a) Referring to observa- 
tion, (i) Non-observation of instances. We are incHned to notice 
affirmative rather than negative instances, coincidences rather 
than their absence, especially when they suit a preconceived 
theory. Or certain relevant facts or groups of facts may be over- 
looked. (2) Non-observation of circumstances. One may neglect 
the circimistance which is the true cause, or which is important 
for the explanation of a fact. (3) Mal-observation, either because 
of the imperfection of the senses and instruments, or because of 
intellectual dispositions which make man see what he is anxious 
to find, and prevent him from seeing what he does not want to 
find. This leads to the fallacy of the false cause — non causa 
pro causa, post hoc ergo propter hoc — which considers as the true 
cause a fact or circumstance which is a mere accidental coinci- 
dence. One must always be careful to distinguish between 
what is really perceived or observed, and what is inferred from 
such observations. 

(b) False analogy and example, or the exaggeration of the 
points of Ukeness or difference, as " Ab uno disce omnes.'^ 

(c) The wrong application of inductive methods; hastiness; the 
exaggeration of the value of theories and hypotheses. 

II. Error 

I. Causes. — Error is a false judgment. Its main causes may 
be assigned as follows: 

(a) External causes, (i) In the object: The difficulty and 
complexity of the object under investigation. Hence the neces- 
sity of a long, complex, and manifold process of inference at any 
step of which error may creep in and vitiate all subsequent results. 
(2) In the means used to reach the object: The reliance on incompe- 



OBSTACLES 261 

tent authority and on customary views; language, which may be 
ambiguous, and hence a source of many misunderstandings; the 
impossibiUty of reaching the same certitude and of using the same 
methods in all sciences. 

(b) Internal or subjective causes (see Psychology), (i) Intel- 
lectual: (a) In general, the weakness and fallibility of the human 
mind; its dependence on organic conditions; preconceived ideas, 
prejudices, and intellectual surroundings; education and the result- 
ing habits of thought, (b) In a more special manner, the senses 
and imagination which should be, but are not always, guided 
by the understanding; the defects of memory, forgetfulness and 
inaccurate memory; the lack of attention and of the power of 
observation and inference; irreflection and hastiness in judging 
things and persons. (2) Moral: In general, the passions, which 
prevent us from seeing things in their true light; especially pride 
and exaggerated self-confidence, which cause a man to affirm or 
deny rashly, and make him loath to abandon a position once he has 
taken it; love and hatred, that make him exaggerate or mini- 
mize; the will, in things that are practical; the desire to prove 
instead of investigating, owing to which the value of reasons is 
overestimated, and facts are adapted so as to fit in with a pre- 
conceived theory. 

2. Remedies. — The main remedies of error are easily inferred 
from what has just been outlined concerning its causes, (i) Try 
to apply the rules of logic, both of induction and deduction. Use 
definitions and divisions. (2) Pay attention to the validity of 
every step you take. (3) Without falling into scepticism, be 
careful in receiving information from others, and be not always 
ready to swear by it. In matters where proofs are possible and 
where you can appreciate them, ask for them. Always examine 
the value of a testimony before you accept it. (4) Acquire habits 
of reflection, calmness of judgment, steadiness and seriousness of 
study. They are indispensable to success. (5) Endeavor to 
develop intellectual feeUngs, especially a great disinterestedness 
and a sincere love of truth. 



CONCLUSION 

Main Rules to be Observed in Controversies and Discussions. — 
Discussions arise from the diversity of opinions. They are very 
useful when carried on with the proper spirit and disposition. But 
in many cases, a discussion becomes a dispute and an intolerant 
altercation, in which the purpose is not so much to find the truth 
or inculcate it as to triumph over and to down an opponent, cost 
what may, and even should the truth suffer thereby. In some 
cases, on certain subjects, or with certain persons, it will be much 
more profitable to avoid any discussion, because it is sure to be 
useless, and may be harmful. Some rules will be stated to be 
followed before, during, and after a written or oral discussion. 

I. Before. — "Id faciam quod in principio fieri in omnibus 
disputationibus oportere censeo, ut quid illud sit de quo disputa- 
tur explanetur, he vagari et errare cogatur oratio, si ii qui inter 
se dissenserint non idem esse illud de quo agitur intelligant" 
(Cicero, De Oratore, I, c. 48). This precept is very prudent, and, 
if it were always followed, many discussions would become need- 
less. It often happens that, for lack of previous understanding, 
two bitter opponents come to find out, at the end, that they fight 
for almost the same ideas. Hence (i) Ascertain the meaning of the 
terms, especially of those that are vague and ambiguous. (2) 
Ascertain the meaning of the propositions on both sides. See 
whether they are universal or particular, or restricted in any 
manner, etc. (3) To avoid the ignoratio elenchi and the petitio 
principii, see to what school of science, philosophy, religion, etc., 
the adversary belongs, so as to start from principles admitted on 
both sides. Against an atheist I cannot suppose the existence of 
God. Against a rationalist I may suppose the existence of God, 
but I cannot argue from divine revelation, and so on with other 
classes of men. No discussion is possible unless it is based on 
principles common to both parties. 

262 



RULES OF DISCUSSION 263 

2. During. — Logical and moral rules are to be observed. 

(a) Logical, (i) Take care that all the rules of logic are ob- 
served on both sides. Keep a close watch on all the facts brought 
forward and on all the principles used. Examine whether they 
are clear and certain. (2) Frequently facts and personal inter- 
pretation of facts are presented together as one. Keep them 
distinct. (3) Keep yourself and your opponent to the point at 
issue. A man who feels the weakness of his position frequently 
will tend to shift the problem to some other point, and drift away 
from the main question. (4) Avoid, and make your opponent 
avoid, verbosity, that is, an abundant flow of words making up 
for the paucity of ideas. Hence, after a long presentation, sum 
up the ideas expressed, and reduce them to stricter forms of syllo- 
gism in order to test their value more easily. See also that the 
same terms are always used in the same sense. (5) When con- 
tending against a view, beware of the common tendency to go too 
far, to fall into the opposite extreme, and to try to prove too much. 
(6) While following the preceding recommendations, avoid the 
ridicule of rigid formalism that wants to use none but perfect 
syllogisms, and affects pedantry. 

(b) Moral, (i) Practise moderation. Avoid the anxiety to 
make your opinion prevail. Look for light, not for triumph. 
(2) Avoid anger and impatience. To abuse an adversary is 
not to prove the truth of one's contention; on the contrary, it is 
frequently a sign of weakness. Truth stands in no need of in- 
jurious and ungentlemanly remarks and abusive epithets. More- 
over, passion has for its effect to blind the mind and prevent it 
from seeing things in their true light. (3) Avoid intolerance. 
All men are fallible. Practise the great principle: "In dubiis 
libertas." Do not try to impose your view simply because it is 
yours, but because you are convinced that it is true. (4) Honesty 
and fairness must be practised all the time. It is always dis- 
honest knowingly to use inaccm*ate statements or distorted facts 
in order to prove one's contention. It is the more so when arguing 
against uneducated persons, who cannot see the falsity of such 
assumptions, and are more easily misled. 

3. After. — (a) If victorious, practise modesty. Nothing is 



264 LOGIC 

more cowardly than to abuse a defeated opponent. Arrogance is 
a sign of conceit, and indicates that a man loves his own satis- 
faction more than the truth, (b) Be not depressed by defeat, 
and be honest enough to accept the truth. Always remember 
Cicero's maxim: "Cuiusvis hominis est errare, nullius rir^ insipi- 
entis in errore perseverare " (Philipp. XII, c. 2). 



yESFHETICS OR THE NORMATIVE 
SCIENCE OF THE FEELINGS 
OF THE BEAUTIFUL 



INTRODUCTION 

I. What is Esthetics? 

1. The term "Esthetics." — Etymologically, "aesthetics" 
(ais^T^TiK?;, from ahOdvofmi , to perceive) is an adjective form now 
used substantively, and indicates that which has reference to 
sensation or perception. Its meaning has been narrowed down 
to a special kind of feelings or sentiments, namely those originating 
from the perception of beauty. As an adjective, " aesthetic " 
has either a subjective or an objective meaning. We speak of 
an aesthetic taste, i.e. a just and keen appreciation or judgment 
of beauty; and we also speak of a thing as being more or less 
sesthetic. As a substantive, "aesthetic," or more frequently 
"aesthetics," is objective, and includes the science of beauty, the 
rules of taste and of art. It is the normative science of the (Esthetic 
feelings. 

2. .Esthetic Feelings. — If we examine the whole group of 
mental states known as feelings or the affective life, we find that 
the feelings proper — pleasure and pain — cannot be assigned 
any special norm. Experience and association manifest which 
things or uses of things are pleasurable, and which are painful. 
All that can be done is to seek the former and avoid the latter. 
To a great extent emotions are also subjective. In so far as they 
can be controlled and governed, they fall under the rules of morality, 
politeness, decency, sociability, etc. Besides these general norms, 

265 



266 ESTHETICS 

no other can be assigned to either self-regarding or altruistic emo- 
tions. The will to subdue them if they are wrong or excessive, 
and the will to acquire them if they are good and lacking; in every 
case, the will to control them — as explained in psychology — 
is about the only rule that can be given for this class of feeUngs. 

Intellectual, moral, and religious sentiments must be governed in 
accordance with the principles of logic, ethics, and religion. 

There remain therefore the aesthetic feehngs which require a 
special treatment here, but which can be allowed but a few pages 
in this elementary course. 

3. The Science of iEsthetics. — ^Esthetics is the science which 
tries to determine the conditions of beauty, to analyze the elements 
that constitute it and enable it to produce aesthetic feelings. 
Beauty may be natural or artificial; aesthetics deals with both. 
Because tastes and appreciations differ, it has been said that 
aesthetics cannot be a science, and that no rules can be given for 
aesthetic feelings. But the fact that, notwithstanding many 
divergences, there are certain objects which practically all men 
agree in finding beautiful, and others which all agree in finding 
ugly, shows that there must be some reason in the subject, or in 
the object, or in both, for this uniformity. Moreover, without 
considering how other individuals are affected, I find different 
types of beauty, and I may ask in what respect those different 
objects — a piece of music, a statue, a building, a person, a poem, 
etc. — agree so as to deserve the common adjective "beautiful" 
which I apply to them. Undoubtedly there is a science of the 
beautiful. Even if conclusions are not always clear and cogent, 
there are reasons accounting for the aesthetic feeling. -Esthetics 
is not a strict science like mathematics or even like physics. The 
rules of art cannot compare with the laws of chemical combina- 
tion. Yet certain principles must be observed, although they 
may be applied differently, and much is left to individual con- 
ception and interpretation. 

II. The Place of ^Esthetics 

The object of logic is the true, that of ethics, the moral good, 
that of aesthetics, the beautiful. Logic is the normative science 



NATURE OF .ESTHETICS 267 

of the intellect, ethics, of the will, aesthetics, of the feeHngs of the 
beautiful. This leads us to inquire into the relations of the beau- 
tiful with the true and the good. 

I. Relations Between Beauty and Truth. — (a) Beauty can- 
not be identified with truth. Some beautiful things, like poetry, 
romance . . . are not true, but fictitious. Others, without being 
fictitious, cannot be called true, e.g. music. On the other hand, 
some truths are not beautiful, or may be positively ugly. We 
do not find any beauty in the truths "four and four are eight "; 
"the straight line is the shortest distance between two points"; 
"it rained yesterday "; "John Smith died last week," etc. 

(b) Yet there are relations between the true and the beautiful. 
(i) That which is false, unlikely, and unnatural is not beautiful. 
A picture in which the proportions are not kept, a novel in which 
events appear impossible or unlikely, produce a disagreeable im- 
pression. A statue or drawing with certain defects and depart- 
ures from nature will be pronounced ugly, etc. 

(2) Many truths of the intellectual order, when taken together 
systematically, are beautiful for those who can understand and 
penetrate them. There may be no beauty in a geometrical axiom, 
yet the science of geometry, with its numerous deductions, is not 
without beauty. There may be no beauty in a single physical 
conclusion, e.g. that heat expands metals, or that matter attracts 
matter in direct ratio to its mass, and in inverse ratio to the square 
of the distances. But certainly physical sciences reveal the beauty 
and harmony of the material world, either in the largest bodies 
(like astronomy), or in the smallest (like the science of radio- 
activity). 

(3) The effort, success, and power of certain minds in grasping 
the truth, in passing from truth to truth and in perceiving rela- 
tions, is also worthy of admiration. 

(4) The perceived beauty of a science is an incentive to its 
pursuit. The man who admires the laws of nature, the marvellous 
structures of Uving organisms, etc., will become more enthusiastic 
for the study of physical and biological sciences, because every 
new step discovers some new harmony and some new beauty. 

(5) However, even where the true and the beautiful coincide, 



268 .ESTHETICS 

the formal reason of the true and the formal reason of the beauti- 
ful are not identical, and the effects produced on the mind by these 
two aspects are not the same. I may perceive the truth without 
admiring the beauty, or admire the beauty without reference to 
the truth. 

2. Relations Between Beauty and Goodness. — Good means 
(i) agreeable, (2) useful, (3) conformable to the rules of morality. 

(a) The sentiment of beauty is always pleasant and agreeable, 
but many things are agreeable without being beautiful. The 
taste of an apple, a walk in the country, the smell of a rose, rest 
after fatigue, etc., are agreeable, yet not beautiful. Beauty is 
one special source of pleasure. An object is not beautiful because 
it is agreeable; it may be agreeable because it is beautiful. 

(b) The useful is not always beautiful; instrvunents, tools, 
clothes, etc., are useful; they frequently are not beautiful. On 
the other hand, many beautiful things have no practical use in 
themselves besides satisfying man's aesthetic taste or giving him 
some recreation, e.g. a statue, a picture, a flower-bed, etc. Or 
they may be useful indirectly by reminding one of noble examples, 
and inciting to follow them. It may even happen that the beauty 
of a thing seems to make it less useful, as certain architectural 
ornaments, or the hart's antlers which hinder him. Even where 
the two coincide in the same thing, the reason why it is beautiful 
is not the same as that for which it is useful. Beauty is an end 
in which the mind rests without looking beyond. The feeling of 
beauty is disinterested and stops at the contemplation and enjoy- 
ment of its object. Utility is essentially the quality of a means. 
A thing is not useful purely and simply ; it is useful for this or that 
end. A plain dress, a simple house may be as useful as, and even 
more useful than, other dresses and residences which are much 
more beautiful. Where beauty and utility are combined, beauty 
is added as something distinct from utiUty. 

(c) Not all actions morally good are beautiful. To speak the 
truth, to return a lost article to its owner, to respect one's parents, 
to give alms, are good actions which, under ordinary circumstances, 
excite in us no feelings of admiration. On the contrary, certain 
hideous characters in a novel or a drama, moral monsters, may 



NATURE OF ESTHETICS 269 

contribute by contrast to foster the total aesthetic satisfaction. 
But immorality as such cannot be beautiful either in real life or 
in works of art. 

The close relations of beauty and morals were emphasized by 
the Greeks, who frequently put together the beautiful and the 
good. They speak of koAos Kdya^os, or even in one word 
KaXoKayaOo^. To KaXov is frequently moral beauty or virtue, and 
in fact the Stoics identified the two. Without going to this 
extreme, the influence of artistic beauty on morals cannot be 
denied. The beautiful, being agreeable and attractive, is a spring 
of action. To represent the immoral as beautiful and attractive 
is therefore morally wrong. Art may be of great service in moral- 
izing, as is clear from experience, and from the principles laid down 
in psychology concerning the influence of imagination and feelings 
on the passions, the will, and the character. Art need not always 
be at the service of morals, and all works of art need not be under- 
taken for the purpose of teaching lessons. But at least art must 
never be immoral, nor represent that which is wrong under the 
aspect of beauty. 

By way of comparison and elimination, the preceding considera- 
tions have already given some ideas concerning the nature of 
beauty. We shall now proceed to a more positive analysis. 



CHAPTER I 

BEAUTY 

Whatever is agreeable is not thereby beautiful. Yet the aes- 
thetic feeling is one of the forms of agreeable feehngs. What are 
its special characteristics? Both a subjective and an objective 
analysis will help in finding them. 

I. Subjective Aspect 

We shall recall and complete what has been said in psychology 
on the aesthetic feeling (p. 155). 

I. Several Mental Factors contribute to produce aesthetic 
feelings. 

(a) The senses through which the beautiful object is perceived. 
They are sight and hearing. 

(b) The imagination and, with it, the association of ideas and 
suggestion. The perceived object arouses in the mind images of 
objects already perceived or constructed by the imagination, and 
ideals formed by the higher mental powers. All these give a 
certain coloring to the actual perception. Hence the feeling of 
beauty is the combined result of the actual perception and of the 
images and ideals which the object recalls or suggests. 

(c) The intellect. The object must not only be perceived, but, 
to some extent, understood. Its elements must be known in their 
mutual relations. The harmonies of the world are beautiful only 
for those who understand them. The intellectual element appears 
also in the absolute judgment which every man, rightly or wrongly, 
has a tendency to pass on the aesthetic qualities of an object. 
When perceived, beauty seems to have such a character of evi- 
dence that one is inclined to suffer no contradiction on this point. 

(d) Activity. What is so simple and obvious as to leave no 
room for personal activity produces no feeling of beauty. This 

270 



BEAUTY 271 

feeling is greater when the beauty is discovered httle by little, and 
when it requires a certain appHcation to perceive it. If we are 
almost exclusively passive, to glance rapidly at a painting, or to 
listen distractedly to a musical composition, will produce little or 
no aesthetic feeling. A man must work his own way into the 
object in order to grasp its inner beauty. 

2. Essential Factor. — From the preceding remarks we infer 
that the feeling of beauty results from the harmonious activity of 
several mental faculties. However, the fundamental, or rather 
essential, process seems to be the understanding of the object, which 
depends on natural endowments and on aesthetic education. 
Why is it possible for children, and even for a number of adults, 
to find the music of the street-organ as beautiful as — perhaps 
more beautiful than — the first-class performance of a master- 
piece? Undoubtedly because they cannot understand the latter. 
In the same way some will derive more aesthetic satisfaction from 
a ten-cent picture with glaring colors than from a real work of art. 
The aesthetic feeling is greater in proportion as the object is under- 
stood better and as the relations of its parts among themselves 
and with the totality are grasped and mastered more completely. 

3. Diversity of .Esthetic Judgments. — The diversity of these 
individual factors in different persons accounts for the diversity 
of aesthetic judgments. Appreciations vary with individuals, 
countries, races, degrees of civilization, and periods of time. With- 
out referring to the caprice of fashion in dress and ornamentation, 
it is otherwise evident that tastes vary. The source of this diver- 
sity is to be found in the complexity of mental factors that influ- 
ence the feeling of beauty. Every individual has his own ideals 
to which he refers objects, and his own images with their different 
associations. As a consequence, actual perception will arouse 
various ideas and images in the mind. Education, surroundings, 
character, habit, novelty, etc., will also exercise a marked influence 
on the aesthetic judgment. 

II. Objective Conditions 

Besides these subjective factors, objective elements must be 
admitted. Certain things are beautiful for all men and at all 



272 ESTHETICS 

times, although their beauty may not always be fully appreciated. 
Moreover, men are agreed that there is a good and a bad taste. 
The possibility of developing the aesthetic taste means again that 
there are some rules for the beautiful. It was said above that the 
chief source of aesthetic pleasure is the understanding; but the 
understanding of what? Not of the truth of the object, since 
the beautiful is not to be identified w4th the true. There are 
therefore other aspects in the object which account for the sub- 
jective feeling. To these we now pass. 

I. Three Conditions are Required in the Object: (i) Ful- 
ness, perfection, and completeness, (2) unity amid variety, (3) 
splendor and clearness. 

(o) To be beautiful, an object must not lack any of its essential 
parts, functions, or elements. It must possess a certain perfection, 
completeness, energy, and life, varying of course with the t^-pe to 
which it belongs. Incompleteness and deformity are always ugly 
and displeasing. The appHcation of this is clear in the natural 
order. See why one horse is pronounced beautiful, and another 
not; why a fertile cornfield, or a forest with abundant vege- 
tation, or a high mountain, etc., are beautiful, whereas the field 
with brambles or a few corn-stalks, the small elevation and hill, 
produce no such impression. We rather call pretty (not to say 
cute) that which is of small proportions. The elements or aspects 
of the whole object may be considered apart, and found beautiful, 
e.g. the fafade of an edifice, the face of a hunchback, etc., but then 
they are considered as complete in themselves. Again, and for 
the same reason, an ugly person may perform a beautiful action; 
in an ordinary composition there may be found beautiful passages, 
etc. What is true of material objects is true also of intellectual 
and moral beauty. It requires some perfection, power, or special 
greatness. 

{b) Variety means a multiplicity of parts, or a successive change. 
There is variety in an edifice because it has several parts, several 
ornaments, windows, doors, columns, etc. There is variety in 
poetry or in a novel because different ideas, events, circumstances 
. . . are evolved successively. There is variety in music because 
there is at the same time a multiplicity of combined sounds, and 



BEAUTY 273 

successive changes of sounds, tempo, rhythm, etc. Generally, 
monotony, sameness, and lack of change are tedious and disagree- 
able. The variety and number of parts must be in proportion to 
the nature of the object, and must not be exaggerated. Too 
many parts, too many successive changes, a superfluity of orna- 
ments, decorations, and colors are also opposed to beauty, because 
generally they are obstacles to the unity which is also required. 

It is not enough to have many elements, they must harmonize 
together in some unity. Many disparate things, unconnected parts 
and incoherent details, are not beautiful; there must be symmetry, 
proportion, order, and adaptation. A common centre, a unity 
of action and of plan are required to prevent the attention from 
being diffused. This harmony must be found not only between 
the parts of the object, but also between the object and its surround- 
ings. A statue or ornament will produce a different effect accord- 
ing to the objects found around it. High-flown eloquence is out 
of place in conversation. A beautiful frame may not be adapted 
to a certain painting, etc. 

(c) Finally, a certain splendor, neatness, or clearness is required. 
The qualities mentioned above must be sufficiently apparent. 
There must be enough light to see a picture or a drawing; its lines 
and colors must be visible without too much strain, etc. The 
unity amid variety should be perceived without too great an 
effort and tension. 

2. There are Various Types of Beauty. — (a) Ideal beauty is 
a type or, as the word itself indicates, an ideal according to which 
beautiful concrete objects are judged, or which the artist strives 
to realize and express. Real beauty is that which is found in 
existing objects. It is more or less perfect according as it realizes 
more or less completely the conceived ideal. 

{b) Beauty is natural or artificial according as it is found in 
nature without man's intervention, or, on the contrary, is the 
work of man. The sea, mountains, animals, the songs or colors 
of birds, are natural. Statues, buildings, music . . . are artificial. 
Man may embellish nature, and the result is partly natural and 
partly artificial. 

(c) Physical beauty is expressed in matter; intellectual beauty 
19 



274 ESTHETICS 

results from the exercise of reason; moral beauty depends on the 
mode of exercise of free activities. 

(d) Finally, we mention again the distinction already explained 
in psychology between the simply beautiful, the sublime, and 
the pretty (p. 156). We need not discuss the question whether 
these objects produce more or less intensive forms of the same 
feeling, or specifically distinct feelings. 



CHAPTER II 
THE FINE ARTS 

I. Nature of the Fine Arts 

1. Meaning of Art. — In general, art means a collection of rules 
or of activities necessary for the skilful production of certain works. 
Art is frequently contrasted with nature, and artificial with natural. 
The former is produced by human activity, the latter without it. 

Art is also opposed to science. The fundamental difference 
between them is that science refers to knowledge; art, to practice. 
Hence arise two other points of difference, (i) True science is 
based on universal laws, and is vaHd for all men and at all times. 
Art is more personal, and more changeable according to times 
and places. (2) Science is acquired by study; art, chiefly by 
practice. Science also, it is true, may have a practical purpose, 
and in fact certain sciences, e.g. logic, medicine, etc., may also 
be arts, but the formal difference remains. As sciences they deal 
with what is, with the truth, and with the reasons of things. As 
arts they deal with the production of what does not yet exist, 
with the practice and the action. A man may have the com- 
plete science of medicine without ever applying it. He knows the 
causes and remedies of diseases without using this knowledge. 
On the contrary, a man may possess only the art of medicine. His 
own experience or that of others may have taught him the value 
of certain plants or remedies which he may use to good effect 
without knowing the reasons why they are beneficial. 

2. Meaning of Fine Arts. — Arts are divided into useful or 
mechanical, and aesthetic or fine arts. The former tend to the 
production of something useful; the latter to the production of 
something beautiful. The artisan will select materials such as 
wood, steel, or stone in order to make something useful, a table, 

27s 



276 ^ESTHETICS 

a saw, or a house. This object itself is destined to serve a purpose; 
it is a means to something else, not an end in itself. The artist 
tries to produce something which is an end in itself, and not simply 
a means. It is often difficult to draw the line between the two 
because the beautiful is also frequently useful, e.g. a building; 
but, as already indicated, the two aspects must be distinguished. 
From what precedes it may be inferred that eloquence is not, 
strictly speaking, one of the fine arts, for it aims at persuading 
others. The same is true of the history of heroic deeds, and the 
lives of the saints, which are written for the purpose of instruction. 
However, these may become arts if the grace of the gestures, the 
harmony of vocal inflections, the charms of the style and composi- 
tion, etc., are intended. Fine arts tend primarily to the produc- 
tion of beautiful works without regard to any other purpose except 
the satisfaction of the mind's aspirations toward beauty. 

II. Art and Nature 

I. Realism and Idealism. — Beauty is found both in nature 
independently of human intervention, and in art, that is, in works 
which are intentionally produced by man. Moreover, we have 
said that beauty always supposes two elements, one sensible and 
real, the other ideal and intelligible. Hence the questions: Must 
artificial beauty be a simple imitation of natural beauty? Must 
it reproduce the real and the sensible of nature as closely as possi- 
ble? Or, on the contrary, must the artist overlook nature so as 
to form higher and independent ideals? Realism chooses the first 
alternative; idealism, the second. In their extreme forms, both 
are to be rejected, and the true answer is found between them. 
Works of art must be based on nature and inspired from it. Yet 
they must not be mere imitations or copies, but idealized repre- 
sentations. 

(a) Art borrows its materials — sounds, colors, etc. — from 
nature. Moreover, what is against nature is never beautiful, e.g. 
a statue without due proportions. Finally, pure ideaUsm tends to 
abstraction, i.e. to the absence of reality and life, and therefore 
has less power to arouse aesthetic feelings. 

(b) But art cannot be a sterile imitation of nature, (i) Music 



THE FINE ARTS 277 

is not a mere imitation of natural sounds; nor architecture, of 
natural forms. Painting and sculpture are not the same as photo- 
graphing and casting. (2) Nor can art, if it merely imitates nature, 
be as beautiful as nature, for, in many cases, it is incapable of repre- 
senting the details, greatness, life, and movement that are found 
in nature. It represents only some of the realities of nature. 
(3) Not everything in nature is beautiful; nor is any object per- 
fectly beautiful, for none realizes completely the type of beauty 
of the class to which it belongs. 

(c) Art, therefore, must borrow its materials and objects from 
nature, but also idealize, purify, and refine them, making abstrac- 
tion of certain features and emphasizing others. 

2. Advantages of Art over Nature. — Art cannot reproduce 
all the realities of nature. Thus sculpture reproduces forms, but 
not colors. Art, however, has several advantages. 

(a) It is not subject to the same laws of space and time that 
are found in nature. A landscape covering in reality many square 
miles, which cannot be embraced at a single glance, may be repre- 
sented on a small canvas where its harmonious beauty will be 
grasped at once. A multitude of events which would require a 
long period of time may be condensed in a theatrical play. The 
deterioration which occurs in nature, especially in living organ- 
isms, is avoided in art, etc. 

(b) Art is not subject to the physical laws which prevent nature 
from realizing a complete and perfect type. Art supposes abstrac- 
tion, and represents only certain features which it idealizes. 

III. The Production of Works of Art 

We shall examine the conditions required in the work itself and 
the processes by which the artist produces it. 

I. Qualities Required in the Work. — The object must be one, 
true and good, and, in general, have the qualities of the beautiful. 

(a) We have already spoken of unity in variety as one of the 
conditions of beauty. Thus, in an edifice we require the unity 
of style and architecture, and the proportion of the various parts, 
for if the style is not the same, or if the parts are out of proportion, 
the result is not harmonious. In a play or a novel we require the 



278 ^ESTHETICS 

unity of composition — one plot around which other events are 
centred. In a picture we require things that are not disparate, 
but can associate together to form one complete whole. In a 
volume of essays we do not expect one unit, but several. We 
expect a sequence throughout a novel. 

(b) Truth does not mean that the work of art must be a mere 
imitation of nature, for art idealizes nature. Yet it must be what 
we generally call natural or likely. Thus a personage supposed 
to be gifted with a certain quality, to have a certain character, or 
to be subject to a certain passion, must be made to speak and act 
naturally, i.e. in conformity with these endowments. To fail in 
this, or to exaggerate beyond measure, shocks the aesthetic feelings. 
The statue or painting of a man need not represent any man who 
exists or ever existed, but it must represent a human form with 
all its essential features. 

(c) Vice and immorality as such cannot be beautiful. If they 
cause pleasure, it is either on account of the skill of the artist, or 
because of the passions of those who perceive such works. It is 
not allowable to represent as beautiful and worthy of admiration 
that which is in opposition to the rules of morality. But, with 
due caution, it may be represented as an object of aversion 
which, by contrast, makes virtue more beautiful. 

2. The Realization of Beauty. — The artist must form an ideal, 
find the means of expressing it, and use these. 

(a) The conception of an ideal is based on the study of nature. 
Before applying the colors to the canvas, the painter must have 
in his mind the representation of the figure or the objects which 
he wants to paint. Before starting to write, the poet, novelist, 
or playwright must know what himian passion he will describe, 
what plot he will unravel, and what circumstances he will 
represent. This ideal is higher or lower according to the artist's 
power to understand the beauties of nature, rise above them, and 
abstract the beautiful features from the common, insignificant, or 
ugly features with which they are mixed. The nature and loftiness 
of the ideals and interpretations will vary with the personal 
qualities of the artist. 

In their relation to nature, the artist and the scientist have an 



THE FINE ARTS 279 

altogether different attitude. The scientist's aim is to know what 
is, and his mind must, as far as possible, grasp the whole reality 
in all its complex details. He must express his knowledge accu- 
rately, neglecting nothing, and describing facts, events, and things 
in their various aspects. In scientific books, illustrations are not 
necessarily beautiful, they may even be positively repugnant, for 
instance in books on medicine, but they must be true to nature. 
The artist selects only what suits his purpose, and is free to change 
and adapt the materials found in nature. He is original, and 
supplies something out of his own mind. In this process of con- 
ception, imagination, sensibility, and artistic taste are the most 
prominent factors. 

(b) The artist must find the means and materials best adapted 
to express his ideal. He follows general rules already mentioned, 
and more special rules like those of concord and discord, rhythm 
and tempo in music; unity, rhythm, and rhyme in poetry, etc. 
In this process of finding and choosing the means, the main faculties 
necessary are imagination and memory, association, attention, 
sensibility, and the aesthetic taste which directs the selection. 

(c) Execution is the expression itself of the ideal. To a great 
extent it is a question of practice and of the proper use of instru- 
ments. The artist's purpose is to reproduce in matter that which 
he has conceived in his mind, and the perception of which will 
produce in others the same emotions and arouse the same ideals. 
Hence, as far as possible, the work of art must be animated, 
resplendent, and have a soul that reveals itself through sense- 
perception. 

IV. Classification of the Fine Arts 

I. General. — (a) It is difficult to give a satisfactory classi- 
fication of the fine arts; difficult also, and even impossible, to give 
a complete enumeration of them, for it is not always possible to 
establish a clear distinction between several minor subdivisions; 
nor is it always possible to determine whether a given art should 
be counted among the fine arts. 

(b) It is generally admitted that there are five principal fine 
arts: architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry. Among 



28o ^ESTHETICS 

the secondary or auxiliary fine arts, mention may be made of 
dancing, which is subordinate to, though widely different from, 
music; acting, which is auxiliary to poetry; embroidery, pottery, 
jewelry, gardening, park-making, dress-making, house-ornament- 
ing, cabinet-making, etc., which are subsidiary to painting, sculpt- 
ure, and architecture. We shall not attempt to give any definition 
of these several arts, still less their special technical rules. Their 
mutual relations will be shown best by indicating the most impor- 
tant principles of classification which have been proposed. 

2. Principles of Classification. — (a) The first and most com- 
mon distinction is derived from the senses by which the work of 
art is perceived. These are vision and hearing. Hence there 
are: (i) Visual arts — sculpture, architecture, and painting. (2) 
Auditory arts — music and poetry. Acting and dancing are visual 
and also auditory, since they are subsidiary to music and poetry. 

(b) In a similar way are distinguished: (i) The arts of repose, 
plastic or formative, in which all the parts may be perceived simul- 
taneously. (2) The arts of motion and speech, in which the parts 
are successive and can be perceived only after one another. The 
former have reference chiefly to space; the latter, to time. 

(c) Considered in their relation to nature, arts are either imita- 
tive (representative), or non-imitative (presentative), according as 
they imitate natural objects — painting, sculpture, poetry, drama; 
or are in a stricter sense creative — music and architecture. 

(d) We have seen above that beauty is essentially distinct from 
utility. Yet, although the special point of view of beauty is always 
different from that of utility, the two may be combined in the 
same object. A new principle of classification may be derived 
from this fact. Architecture is generally serviceable. Even if 
there are exceptions for certain monuments, its object is generally 
to build that which is both useful and beautiful. The other 
principal arts are primarily non-serviceable. Of the minor arts, 
many are serviceable, hke pottery, embroidery, jewelry, glass- 
making, dancing, and many others which tend to produce or 
ornament objects which have a practical use. 



ETHICS OR THE NORMATIVE 
SCIENCE OF THE WILL 



INTRODUCTION 

I. THE MEANING OF ETHICAL SCIENCE 
I. Facts 

Certain facts of internal and external experience with which 
ethics is concerned must first be mentioned. 

I. The Ethical Aspect of Human Actions. — (a) Besides their 
psychological aspect, i.e. their nature as processes and the mode 
of their actual production, human actions have other important 
aspects or relations. Besides the manner in which they are per- 
formed and actually take place, there is the manner in which they 
should take place in order to reach certain ends, and to have 
certain quahties that are considered as good or advantageous. 
In other words, there are rules or norms of action. 

In the ball player, it is not so much the psychological or physio- 
logical processes that are of interest as their special adaptation to 
the end in view, which is to score or help team-mates to score runs, 
and to prevent the opposing team from scoring, according to the 
rules of the game. The value of the complex actions performed 
on the diamond is judged by this standard. We speak, not only 
of what is done, but of what should be or should have been done. 
Again, to be successful, the merchant must act according to certain 
principles. We call men good or bad in their respective occu- 
pations, fit or unfit for their business, prudent or imprudent in 
their transactions, when we compare what they do with what 
they ought to do, and when we examine their action to see whether 
it is adapted to the end which they have in view. 

281 



282 ETHICS 

(b) There is another sense — the ethical or moral sense — in 
which actions are called good or bad, right or wrong, praiseworthy 
or blameworthy. Whatever this may mean — a question to be 
examined later on — it does not appear at first sight to have an 
immediate reference to utility or advantage, at least not in the same 
sense as the actions mentioned above. However useful it may hap- 
pen to be for an individual, stealing is wrong, and helping those 
who are in need is right, even if giving alms imposes some sacrifice. 
I do not consider in the same light the failure to avail myself of 
a good business opportunity, and the failure to keep my contract 
made with, or even my word given to, my fellowman. 

(c) All actions which, considering all circumstances, are wrong 
must always be omitted. I must never commit perjury or act 
unjustly. But all right actions do not appear obligatory. Some, 
it is true, seem to impose themselves on man in such a way that to 
omit them is to fail in one's duty. Others, on the contrary, seem 
to be optional; to perform them is good; to omit them is not 
wrong. Thus, even if I do not comply with the obligation, I 
consider myself obliged to restore that which is clearly somebody 
else's property, and to abide by my valid contract. I do not feel 
obliged in all cases to give alms to every poor man whom I meet on 
the street, or, if I have the means, to endow hospitals or educational 
institutions, although all this is good. 

(d) The question here is not: Which actions are good, and 
which are bad; which are obligatory, and which are free? The 
standards vary with the different degrees of culture and with differ- 
ent classes of persons. History also shows that there has been a 
great diversity in the past. The question is: Are some actions 
morally good, and others morally bad? The fact is universally 
true that man, everywhere and at all times, recognizes the distinc- 
tion of right and wrong, and has a sense of duty. 

The consequence of this sense of obligation is the feeling of re- 
morse or satisfaction which is experienced according as one has 
acted wrongly or rightly, and the bestowing of blame or praise 
on other men. 

2. Moral Law. — From what precedes, the common notions of 
good, obligation, and duty are sufficiently clear as facts. Now 



NATUREOFETHICS 283 

there is no obligation without a principle of obligation, without a 
law, and consequently without a lawgiver. At this point, if asked for 
an explanation, the ordinary man, and very frequently even the 
most learned, will hardly be able to give a satisfactory answer. 
Of course it is wrong to exceed the speed limit with your motor 
car and to sell certain articles without a license. But wrongness 
here means rather imprudence and liability to the penalty pro- 
vided by the law in such cases. I do not mean the same when I 
say that it is morally wrong for me to set fire to my neighbor's 
house, or to steal his purse. 

Hence what is commonly called the law, namely the civil law, 
is not always assumed and accepted as the standard of moral 
obligation. Who then is the judge of this moral obligation? 
What is its standard? And when you tell another man: You 
must not do this, it is morally wrong; or when you accuse him of 
being unjust, on what authority do you pronounce? How do you 
know that it is so? What is your standard? And is your standard 
necessarily the same as his, or any other man's? Is it universal 
and must it be accepted by all? In a word, what is the supreme 
court that is to decide on the question of right and wrong? This 
is an important problem suggested by obvious facts. 

3. Conscience. — It is clear that, in order to make its deci- 
sions known, the law or supreme tribunal, whatever it may be 
ultimately, must do so through the human mind. When applied 
to human actions, the decision must always appear in himian 
consciousness in the form of a judgment. This is what we call 
conscience, the application to a concrete action of the general 
principles concerning its moral character. Conscience is the 
actual judgment regarding the morality of actions, and every indi- 
vidual man has his own conscience just as he has his own under- 
standing. In the same way that, if I do not see, I may rely on, 
and be guided by, those who do, and that my eyes may be treated 
by the oculist, and my errors corrected by others or by my own 
deeper study and reflection, so my moral judgment may be based 
on another man's authority, changed, improved, and corrected; 
but I can no more judge with another man's conscience than I 
can see with his eyes. 



284 ETHICS 

4. Meaning of Morality. — The special relation of an action 
to the rules of right and wrong is what we call its morality. 
"Moral" comes from the Latin "mos" (plural, "mores"), which 
signifies habit. Applied to actions, it means, (i) that which has 
relation to the rules of duty and obligation, (2) that which is in 
conformity with these rules. 

(a) In the first sense, moral is opposed to non-moral, that is, to 
that which has no reference whatever to any rules of right and 
wrong. Only human actions are called moral. A stone or bullet 
that kills a man is not blamed, but the man who wilfully threw 
the stone or fired the pistol is considered as having done wrong. 
Morality supposes some psychological conditions which are not 
found in beings inferior to man. Nor are all human actions moral, 
but only those of which man is truly the cause and the free agent, 
and which he commits with sufficient knowledge and freedom. 
The man who is under coercion, and, for instance, is carried to a 
certain place against his will, is not the real agent; the action is 
not his, and, for him, is not moral. (Cf. p. 167 if.) There is no 
morality in the actions of a man who accidentally falls and kills 
himself, or who speaks and walks in his sleep. Such actions are 
non-moral. 

{b) In the second sense, moral is opposed to immoral, that 
is, to that which is in opposition to the rules of morality and 
therefore is bad and wrong. In order to be moral in the second 
sense, or immoral, it is clear that an action must be moral in 
the first sense. 

II. The Science of Ethics 

I. Nature of Ethical Science. — (o) Ethics (from ij^os, 
character) means the same as moral science, namely, the science of 
right and wrong, or the science of right conduct. It endeavors 
to account for the facts which have been indicated above, and to 
explain their nature, origin, and bearings. It also endeavors to 
direct human actions, to find the general moral laws by which they 
should be governed, and to apply these laws to the various cir- 
cumstances of life. Hence ethics includes two parts, or has two 
ftmctions; one is essentially practical, and tries to determine what 



NATURE OF ETHICS 285 

we should do and avoid; the other is more speculative, and tries 
to determine why ultimately we should do or avoid it. 

(b) From this it follows that, as a whole, ethics is a normative 
science. It deals with human actions, to find out, not how they 
are actually performed, but whether and how they should be per- 
formed. History and psychology are not directly normative 
sciences. They simply state what takes or took place, and how 
events or processes occur or occurred. Ethics passes a judgment 
on the moral value of these actions and determines whether they 
are right or wrong. 

(c) The term "law" does not apply to human actions and to 
physical events in the same sense. Physical laws are abstractions 
for the facts; they are not rules to which events ought to conform, 
but to which we see that events do in fact conform. And when 
what was thought to be a law is found to conflict with facts that 
are certain, the law has to be abandoned or modified. Not so 
with moral laws. They are ideals to which human actions do not 
necessarily conform, but to which they should conform in order 
to be good. 

2. Importance of Ethics. — From the scope of ethics its impor- 
tance may be inferred. In order to live well, perform his duty, 
and shape his conduct aright, man must first know in what these 
consist. It is true that there is innate in every man a certain moral 
sense which tells him his duty, but, on many points, it is vague, 
and, even where it is clear, one must examine whether and why 
its dictates are legitimate. It is not enough to feel that an action 
is right or wrong, one must know that it is so. Moreover, the moral 
feeling, precisely because it is a feeling, is often uncertain and mis- 
leading. It has to be interpreted, justified, and directed. Although 
knowledge is insiifficient for good conduct, — one may know the 
good and fail to practise it — it is an essential condition of morality. 

3. The Relations of Ethics to Other Sciences will now be 
understood easily. 

(a) Physical sciences have only a remote relation to ethics, 
inasmuch as the knowledge or ignorance of physical laws may 
change the morality of an action by modifying the intention, 
motives, and foresight of the agent. Thus, according as one is. 



286 ETHICS 

or is not, aware of the poisonous nature of a certain substance, the 
morality of giving it to a fellowman to swallow will differ. Bio- 
logical sciences also are indirectly connected with ethics. Many 
obligations refer to human life and health, but generally they may 
be known and discussed without any detailed physiological knowl- 
edge, 

(b) Psychology is much more closely related to ethics, and for this 
reason a few pages will be devoted to the psychological impUca- 
tions of morality. At present we shall limit ourselves to pointing 
out the difference between psychology and ethics. The psychol- 
ogist studies human actions as processes, to find out how mental 
functions are related. The moralist tries to regulate human actions. 
Psychology gives to ethics its materials, but ethics does not place 
the same value upon all. The psychologist is like the botanist 
who studies the growth, nature, and characteristics of all plants. 
The moralist is more like the gardener who arranges certain plants 
according to an order, cultivates some and carefully excludes 
others. No action is moral which is not also in some way 
psychological. 

(c) Pedagogy and ethics should also be kept in close contact. 
A complete education trains the whole man, and moral character 
is essential to man. Man must be accustomed not only to think 
consistently, but also to act rightly. 

(d) Esthetics and logic, although different from ethics, agree 
with it in being normative sciences, or in dealing with ideals and 
standards, the first with the ideals of beauty, the second of truth, 
the third of moral goodness. Frequently terms are transferred 
from one science to another. A man who is true to himself is one 
who acts according to his principles; a beautiful soul or character 
is one that includes certain moral characteristics, etc. 

(e) Sociology is also related to ethics, since it considers man in 
his social aspect, which is the source of many duties. Society is 
an important factor in the morality of individuals on account of 
the laws by which it is ruled and of the mere fact of men 
associating with one another. 

N.B. We shall see later that ethics is also related to meta- 
physics and religion. 



CONDITIONS OF MORALITY 287 

4. Division of This Treatise. — Ethics will be divided into two 
parts; the first more speculative and more formal, dealing with 
duty in general, its nature and conditions; the other more practi- 
cal, more detailed, and dealing with the various duties and obliga- 
tions. Before passing to these, however, it is necessary to indicate 
the main psychological conditions of moral life. 

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF MORALITY 

Psychological conditions and influences may be grouped under 
the three headings of knowledge, feeling, and will. 

I. Knowledge 

1. Knowledge Necessary to Morality. — In general, from what 
was said above and in Psychology on the relations of intellect and 
will, it is evident that knowledge is a condition without which 
an action cannot be voluntary. A man cannot be morally bound 
by an obligation unless this obligation is known to him. It is 
impossible to conceive that a man should be responsible for failing 
in a duty of which he has no knowledge. Moreover, a man must 
be aware of what he is doing. For instance, he is not responsible 
for an action performed automatically during sleep. The killing 
of a man by the accidental discharge of a pistol which was thought 
to be unloaded may be the result of imprudence, but, as such, it 
is not morally imputable. Hence a twofold knowledge is required, 
(i) of what one is doing, (2) of the relations of this action to 
the rules of morality. These general principles need a little 
further explanation. 

2. Effects of Ignorance. — (c) Ignorance may be involuntary 
or voluntary. It may be unsuspected and unavoidable, when 
sufficient care has been taken to know one's duty; or it may, to 
some extent, be due to negligence in investigating one's duty when 
there was a suspicion of it, or, worse still, when the investigation 
was omitted precisely in order to act more freely and without 
restraint. The action due to involuntary ignorance is itself invol- 
untary, and the will has no share in it. The action due to volun- 
tary ignorance is not voluntary in itself, yet the will has a share in 



288 ETHICS cbi^ 

it inasmuch as the ignorance from which it proceeds was voluntary. 
Hence such an action is called voluntary in its cause. Thus the 
physician who is aware of his incapacity and incompetence, either 
in general or in special cases, is accountable for the lives he loses 
since he knows that he lacks the sufficient knowledge of his art. 
It is clear that the amount of diligence to be used depends on the 
importance of the interests in question, the time at one's disposal, 
the qualifications and opportunities for investigating, the urgency 
of the action to be performed, and so on. 

(b) The effects of ignorance are the same whether it affects the 
nature and consequences of an action, or the existence of a law 
which commands or prohibits it. I may speak an untruth in 
good faith thinking that it is the truth — ignorantia facti — or 
may fail to see that in the present circumstances lying is wrong — 
ignorantia iuris. *■ 

(c) In order to prevent possible confusion, it must be noted 
that we speak here of the moral obligation, and not merely of the 
obligation to obey the civil law in any concrete case. When duly 
promulgated, the civil law is supposed to be known by all the 
citizens for whom it is intended. Hence a penalty may be inflicted 
on a man for breaking a law of which he was bona fide ignorant. 
But if the ignorance is involuntary, there is no moral wrong, 
although the civil law may be the source of a moral obligation 
and bind in conscience. 

II. Feelings 

Feelings exercise a great influence on the intellect and the will. 
Among them the most important in the present question seem to 
be love, fear, and anger. A great love or passion blinds the mind 
more or less completely. The fear of losing that which one loves, 
or the anger caused by a sense of injury, frequently influences man 
to take a certain course of action. This action is less voluntary 
than it would be if performed coolly and deliberately. It will 
perhaps be performed with greater vehemence and stronger inch- 
nation, but this incUnation proceeds from feeling, not from reason. 
In the case of the fear of an impending danger, however, a man 
may freely and deliberately choose a less evil, e.g. promise a liberal 



CONDITIONS OF MORALITY 289 

reward to his rescuer, allliough he would not otherwise do so. How 
far, in concrete instances, responsibility is lessened by passions and 
emotions is frequently impossible to determine exactly. Their 
influence varies from the slightest, and even imperceptible, im- 
pulse to a complete blinding of the mind, absence of mastery over 
oneself, and consequently of freedom and responsibility. 

III. Will 

1. Coercion. — An action may be due to violence or coercion. 
Instead of proceeding from the command of the will, it may pro- 
ceed from some external power opposed to the will. Such an action 
is therefore involuntary. The real agent is the external power, 
and if this be a person, he alone incurs the responsibility. Thus 
a man may be dragged to a forbidden place, or compelled to per- 
form unjust actions. Provided of course that he resists as much 
as the nature of the case allows, the action cannot be attributed to 
him. The gravity of the obligation to offer resistance varies with 
the nature and circumstances of the case, the chances of success 
in overcoming the violence, and the necessity of showing one's 
opposition and reluctance. If the possible resistance is not 
offered, the action is voluntary to some extent, and the responsi- 
bility remains in varying degrees. The physical violence of which 
we speak here is actual, and must not be understood in the sense 
of a mere fear referring to the future, which, as said above, generally 
leaves the action voluntary. 

2. F^bit. — (a) As explained in Psychology (p. 175 ff.), habit 
produces uniformity of action, facility and pleasure in acting. 
Hence it lessens the control of the will, both because the action 
proceeding from a habit is frequently performed without conscious- 
ness, or at least without distinct consciousness, and because, 
even if there is distinct consciousness, the impulse toward the 
action is greater, and consequently more difficult to overcome, 
in proportion as the habit is stronger and more inveterate. The 
influence exercised by habit vacips in nature and intensity accord- 
ing to the nature, origin, and strength of the habit. 

{b) A habit may be (i) acquired and preserved wilfully; (2) 
acquired wilfully and preserved unwilfully, when one is making ,^. 



290 ETHICS 

serious efforts to overcome it; (3) acquired and preserved un wil- 
fully. The ''wilfulness" in all these cases is itself more or less 
perfect. 

In the first instance the morality of the habitual action is not 
diminished by the fact itself of habit. "Qui vult causam vult et 
effectum"; the actions due to habit are rightly attributed to the 
man who consents to the good or bad habit from which they pro- 
ceed. In the second, the morality is lessened in various degrees 
according to the strength of the habit, the actual consciousness 
and consent, and the amount of effort made to resist and uproot 
it. In the third, the morality is still more reduced, and may even 
be totally destroyed. The liquor habit may be given as an illus- 
tration of these various cases. A man may acquire this habit 
knowingly and freely, and indulge in it although he realizes that 
it is bad. Or he may acquire it almost without noticing it, owing 
to physiological conditions, to circumstances, to the presence of 
alcohol in medicine which he had to use, etc. As soon, however, 
as he becomes aware of it, he is under the obligation of resisting it 
and of taking the proper means to overcome it. 

(c) Habit is a very complex factor in human actions, and it is 
frequently impossible to trace back all its antecedents in all their 
details and ramifications. A habit may be so strong as to be 
almost invincible. But generally it can be overcome by good 
resolutions and the use of proper means. Even when the individual 
declares it invincible, in most cases his "I cannot" is to be inter- 
preted as meaning "I do not want to." The man who is not 
willing to try seriously and use his best effort shows that, in reality, 
he consents to the habit. 

3. Freedom is an indispensable condition of the moral char- 
acter of human actions. This has been indicated already in 
Psychology (p. 180 ff.), and only a few considerations will be 
added here. 

(a) At all ages and in all places mankind has recognized two 
distinct orders of facts. Some are necessary and worthy of neither 
blame nor praise. Others are free, and their agents are held account- 
able for them. A man is not blamed for being sick or for acci- 
dentally hurting himself. He is blamed for wilfully killing his 



CONDITIONS OF MORALITY 291 

fellowman, stealing his neighbor's property, indulging in vices 
which caused the disease or accident. 

(b) Obligation supposes the power to do or omit the obligatory 
action, and hence postulates freedom. There can be no obliga- 
tion if human actions are necessarily determined and are ruled by 
laws as necessary as those which are found in the physical world. 
Obligation is an absurdity if man is not the master of his own 
actions, and if all are strictly and necessarily determined. 

(c) The same consideration applies to the notions of right and 
duty as correlative. A man has a right when he can exact some- 
thing from his fellowman; he has a duty when he ought to give 
that which is exacted. The right to exact and the duty to give 
suppose the actual power to give what is exacted. 

(d) Responsibility, merit, virtue or vice, self-satisfaction and 
remorse suppose freedom. 

(e) Hence freedom is at the very basis of the essential factors of 
morality. Without it, the terms "obligation," "responsibility," 
"right" and "wrong," are meaningless, and every action takes place 
with the same necessity with which the stone falls to the earth 
and obeys the law of gravitation. Such actions can neither be pre- 
scribed nor forbidden; they are neither right nor wrong, and deserve 
neither blame nor praise. It is true that some actions performed 
by man are necessary, but neither does he feel himself responsible, 
nor is he held responsible for them. If they are bad, he regrets 
them as he would regret an unavoidable misfortune or bodily 
deformity, not in the same way that he is sorry for an action 
known to be wrong, and yet freely committed. On this point the 
practice of determinists agrees with the practice of those who 
admit freedom. The inconsistency of the former is a sign of the 
connection which exists between the fact of freedom and the 
facts and elements of morality. 



CHAPTER I 

FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS 

The object of this chapter is to indicate the bases on which 
moraUty rests, and to discuss briefly the problems suggested by 
the obvious facts mentioned above. Although this chapter is 
rather theoretical, its practical importance is evident, since, in 
order to be effective, the rules of morality must rest on secure 
foundations. 

ARTICLE I. THE MORAL NORMS OR LAWS 

The idea of obligation supposes that of a law to which actions 
should conform, and of a rule which they should follow. This 
rule may be considered in its external reality, as a law properly so 
called, and in its internal application or conscience. 

I. LAW 

I. Definition and Divisions 

I. Meaning of Law. — In general, law signifies a constant or 
uniform rule according to which actions take place. A distinc- 
tion is to be made between physical, civil, and ethical laws. The 
first apply only to material beings, the second and third to men 
as intelligent and free agents. 

(a) Physical laws are abstract expressions or formulae for the 
constant, necessary, and uniform mode of happening of phenomena; 
thus the laws of gravitation, attraction, chemical affinity, etc. 
Ethical laws do not express what necessarily and constantly hap- 
pens, but what should happen. They are not indicative, but 
imperative formulae. 

(b) When asked why I have certain documents signed before 



THEMORALLAW 293 

a notary public, or why I do not build a house without a permit 
from the city authorities, I answer that it is the law, and that its 
violation would make me liable to a penalty. This answer refers 
to what is called the civil law, i.e. a set of rules promulgated by 
competent authorities, varying with different countries and govern- 
ments, and the violation of which is punished in different ways. 
Were I in another state or country, or at another time, I would 
not have on this point the same obligations under which I am 
now. 

(c) If asked why I do not steal my neighbor's property, or kill 
my innocent fellowman, I may also answer: Because the law for- 
bids it. But I feel that the meaning is not the same as above, 
that the obligation is of a higher character, that it would follow 
me everywhere and at all times, and that it would continue to 
exist even did the civil code make no mention of it and inflict no 
penalty for its transgression. It is based on human nature itself, 
and for that reason called natural law. 

(d) The civil law supposes the natural law. In certain cases 
it is only the expression or enforcement of what human reason it- 
self dictates, as when it forbids to kill. In other cases, it is reason 
again that requires obedience to any just command of the civil 
power, and to any law enacted by the proper authority for the 
welfare of the subjects. 

2. The Natural or Moral Law in the strict sense is that which 
imposes a imiversal and strict obligation. It indicates an ideal 
to be reaUzed, and, although one may fail to submit to its com- 
mands, yet, in failure, one always has the consciousness of a dis- 
order and of a lack of harmony between what is done and what 
should be done. As the term indicates, the natural law is derived 
from our rational nature itself; it is based on man's essential rela- 
tions to other beings, and manifested by the light of reason. Some 
of its fundamental and general precepts are self-evident, like: "Do 
good and avoid evil; " "Do unto others as you would like to have 
others do to you." Others are less general and already touch 
upon something concrete like: "Honor thy father and thy mother"; 
" Thou shalt not kill " ; " Thou shalt not bear false witness. ' ' Other 
points, finally, are very complex, and, in many concrete cases, 



294 ETHICS 

their morality may seem doubtful, e.g. lying to procure a great 
advantage; committing suicide to avoid shame, etc. 

Natural law and moral law have almost the same meaning, 
yet the latter term seems to have a greater extension, for civil 
laws may also impose a strict moral obligation. But, even here, 
this obligation is based on the natural law commanding to obey 
superiors when they give just orders. The civil law rules only on 
matters that refer to the pubUc material welfare. The moral 
law reaches a number of other actions, even internal feelings like 
hypocrisy, dissimulation, and evil desire; and some external 
actions Hke ingratitude, egoism, gluttony, which the civil law does 
not consider. What follows applies strictly to the natural law. 

II. Characteristics of the Moral Law 

The moral law is given in consciousness with the following 
characteristics. 

1. Obligation. — The moral law is not, like physical laws, the 
expression of what happens fatally and unavoidably, not merely 
a generalized fact. It is a rule which does not register a fact, 
but commands, although, even when acknowledging this rule, 
man may depart from it and disobey. Obligation is distinct both 
from the determinism of the laws of nature, and from a mere 
attraction, desirabiHty, or counsel, which does not command strictly 
in the form of a "Thou shalt . . . ." In a word, it is an imper- 
ative. 

2. Absoluteness. — The moral law is a categorical, not a 
hypothetical, imperative. A law is conditional when it enjoins 
a certain means to reach an end. It is absolute when it enjoins a 
thing as an end in itself independently of any condition. In the 
former case the obligation may be shirked by renouncing the con- 
ditioning end. In the latter, the obligation, even if not complied 
with, is unavoidable. Thus, "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt 
not kill," are absolute commands. But if I say: "You must work 
in order to preserve your health, or to become rich," or "Avoid 
defrauding others if you want to increase your business," I use a 
conditional form, and the command depends on a supposition which 
may or may not be verified. The moral imperative imposes itself 



THE MORAL LAW 295 

simply because it is good and necessary, and because doing other- 
wise is acting against one's nature, reason, and conscience. I may 
not feel obliged to be a healthy or rich man, but I feel obliged to 
act as a man. This is expressed by the proverb: ''Do your duty, 
come what may." 

3. Universality. — (a) The moral law is independent of indi- 
vidual character, persons, countries, and times. It may pre- 
scribe different things according to different circumstances, but it 
is independent of personal interests and passions. Its principles 
are unchangeable, since they are based on human nature itself. 
Interests, pleasures, and desires vary with every individual. Not 
so the moral law which Kant sums up in this maxim: "So act that 
the maxim of thy will can at the same time be valid as the prin- 
ciple of universal legislation," i.e. act in such a manner that all 
men can act in the same manner; or again, in a more personal way: 
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Thus even 
if it were my own interest to steal, I do not wish others to steal 
from me. I know the law, and may not wrongfully make an 
exception in my own favor, 

(b) It is true that practical applications vary almost endlessly 
with times and places. The law: "Thou shalt not kill," may be 
interpreted in many ways, and admit of many excuses. More- 
over, it may seem to conflict with other principles and thus become 
obscured. Thus in certain tribes it is deemed lawful to kill parents 
in old age so as to avoid their falling into the hands of the enemy, 
or to shorten their sufferings. These excuses are understood as 
applications of the law which obliges us to love parents and do 
them good. Variations in practice are accounted for by (i) the 
misinterpretation of certain principles; (2) the real or apparent 
conflict of several principles; (3) the difficulty in agreeing on some 
points of morality which are obscure in themselves; (4) the deprav- 
ity of the will which makes it disobey known laws; (5) habits and 
customs which modify or deprave the moral sense. 

III. Existence of the Moral Law 

In the second article we shall speak of the basis on which 
the distinction between right and wrong rests. For the present 



296 ETHICS 

we want to show that such a distinction exists. Two points 
must be estabHshed, (i) that this distinction is recognized in 
consciousness; (2) that it is vaUd. 

I. Testimony of Consciousness. — To formulate the moral 
law and explain its characteristics is already to demonstrate its 
existence. The distinction between right and wrong conduct is 
as natural and as evident for man as the distinction between true 
and false assent. Both impose themselves with the same cogent 
force, and neither can be denied without renouncing human 
reason itself. Let us, however, sum up a few facts which will 
illustrate this conclusion. 

(a) Everywhere and at all times we find this distinction recog- 
nized, praise or blame bestowed, honor or disgrace attached to cer- 
tain actions. In all languages expressions are found for these ideas. 
Standards differ, it is true, yet the fact at issue is admitted, for 
we are not concerned at present with the practical determination 
of what is right and what is wrong, but only with the fact that there 
are right and wrong actions. 

(6) The testimony of individual consciousness is equally clear. 
The consciousness of freedom is inseparable from the conscious- 
ness that freedom is restricted by the moral law which it may trans- 
gress. Sometimes at least, before acting, there is a feeUng that 
one of two possible courses of action is right and honorable, the 
other wrong and dishonorable. After acting, feelings of self- 
approval or self-blame are experienced. These feelings are not 
merely feeUngs of joy and regret, such as might be experienced on 
the occasion of some fortunate or unhappy event, success or fail- 
ure, luck or accident. In these latter cases, unforeseen circum- 
stances, or even personal imprudence, may be deplored, but we 
do not feel that our real value, moral worth, intrinsic and genuine 
honorableness, have been lost or lessened. 

From being rich a man may become poor, and in consequence 
receive less external honors; he may regret the loss of wealth, 
advantages, and honors, but he may feel nevertheless that his own 
personal worth remains what it was before. On the contrary, the 
man who, from being poor, becomes rich by using unjust means, 
may receive honors; yet he has lost some of his essential worth, 



THE MORAL LAW 297 

and feels it unless he has stifled his moral sense by depraved habits 
of thought and will. It is possible to hush the voice of conscience 
and become hardened against its warnings. Monsters are found 
in the moral as well as in the physical world, men who commit 
the greatest crimes without experiencing any shame or remorse. 
A man may be born sickly, or deprived of some external sense; 
or disease and the loss of a sense may develop later. So also a 
man may be born a moral monster owing to organic or mental 
defects; or he may httle by little allow his moral sense to be 
destroyed. These are exceptions, and no more proofs against 
the reality of the moral law than the existence of insane or sick 
persons is a proof against the reality of sanity and health. 

2. Attempts to Explain Away This Fact. — How will these feel- 
ings or data of consciousness be accounted for? Can we ascribe 
to them an artificial origin, or must we say that they are nat- 
ural, innate, and rooted in human nature itself? Some facts are 
important and must be admitted. 

(a) Education contributes to develop and direct the moral 
sense. According as the child is taught by word and exampk^ 
he will in life consider certain things as right or wrong. The 
influence of education on morality is an obvious fact. 

(b) Owing to habit and custom, actions which, at first, shock the 
moral sense in time appear quite natural and indifferent; or actions 
performed previously without any sense of wrong-doing appear 
blameworthy. Hence attempts have been made to explain the 
moral law by education, habits, surroundings, and by the exist- 
ence of the civil law. 

(c) According to the schools of positivism and associationism, 
all actions are originally indifferent. Some become indissolubly 
associated with pleasurable or displeasurable feelings and with 
useful or harmful results. Gradually such associations of actions 
with their consequences cause men to look upon the actions as 
good or bad in themselves. These estimates of the value of actions 
are transmitted by education. Parents, instructed by their own 
experience, give orders to their children, and rulers lay down laws 
for their subjects; or contracts are made by which men bind them- 
selves to behave in certain ways toward their fellowmen. These 



298 ETHICS 

associations become necessary and indissoluble, and thus are 
explained the universality and absoluteness of the moral law. 

3. The Preceding Explanation is Insufficient. — (a) Education 
may make the child look upon certain actions as good, and upon 
certain others as bad. It may direct the moral sense, but supposes 
already in the child's mind the distinction between right and wrong, 
between praiseworthy and blameworthy actions. It influences it, 
strengthens it, and directs it, but does not create it. The animal 
may be "educated," or trained, but it can be taught only the util- 
itarian expediency of certain actions, because it lacks the necessary 
foundation for morality. Moral education is not simply a matter 
of prudence, expediency, or interest. These are at most hypothet- 
ical imperatives, not moral laws. Moreover, wherefrom would 
the educator derive the idea of obligation, morality, and responsi- 
bility? No associations can change the idea of useful into that of 
right, nor the idea of harmful into that of wrong. As a matter of 
fact — at present we deal with morality only as a fact — conscious- 
ness refuses to identify these two aspects of human actions. Edu- 
cation is for morality what logic is for the intellect. Logic supposes 
the distinction of truth and falsity, but does not create it. Moral 
education also supposes the distinction of right and wrong. 

{b) We need not insist on the supposition that the sense of obli- 
gation arises from contracts. It is clear that contracts presuppose 
the obligation of observing them. What is the use of giving my 
word, if I feel that it is indifferent to break it? Justice alone, i.e. 
moral law, can imite human wills in one common agreement. 

(c) Finally, the civil law gives no satisfactory explanation, 
(i) The civil law may be just or unjust, tyrannical or advanta- 
geous; it may respect or disregard individual rights, etc. To say 
this is to appeal to a higher law as criterion. (2) The authority of 
the civil law is derived from the natural law, which tells us that it 
is good and obligatory to obey legitimate authorities. If obedience 
is not already due to a civil law, it ceases to be a law at all. (3) 
There are good and evil actions, both internal and external, about 
which the civil law says nothing. (4) If morality is derived from 
the civil law, the door is opened to all forms of tyranny, since, 
in this case, there is no higher standard of morality than this law. 



CONSCIENCE 299 

(d) In conclusion, if morality had an artificial origin, the notion 
of moral obligation would vanish from the mind as soon as one 
would come to know this fact. On the contrary, it always persists, 
thus showing that it comes from human nature itself. 



n. CONSCIENCE 

I. Nature of Conscience 

What has been said so far applies as much to conscience as to 
moral law. Even if the moral law is imposed on man from without, 
— - a question which is out of consideration here, — it remains cer- 
tain that it cannot reach and affect man except through the knowl- 
edge of it, that is, through conscience. And the arguments which 
prove the existence of the moral law do so by proving at the same 
time the fact of moral conscience. What then is conscience? 

I, Conscience Implies Two Elements, one belonging to the 
intellect, the other to the feelings. 

(a) Conscience appreciates the moral value of human actions. 
This judgment is not merely logical, it is imperative. It does not 
simply state what takes place, it dictates what should take 
place. 

(b) Conscience produces feelings of joy or blame according as 
the recognized obligation has been complied with or not. This 
element is the consequence of the former, which is the more 
important. 

(c) Hence conscience may be defined as the practical jtidgment 
which dictates what is good and what is bad, what is obligatory and 
what is optional, in every individual case. Such at least is the strict 
meaning of the word. But frequently it is used to denote, not so 
much the act of judging as the habit of forming correct judgments 
on the moraHty of actions. Thus we say of a man that his con- 
science is erroneous on certain points, meaning that he habitually 
has misconceptions of their moral aspect. Sometimes also con- 
science refers to the agreement between a man's conduct and his 
principles. To say of a man that he has no conscience generally 
implies that he knows what he ought to do, but fails to act 



300 ETHICS 

accordingly. Conscientious and conscientiousness refer also to 
the same idea. 

2. Conscience and Reason. — From what precedes, conscience 
is not simply, nor even primarily, "moral feelings," or "moral 
sense." An action is not primarily looked upon as good or bad 
because it is attractive or repulsive, or because it produces feel- 
ings of self-approval or self-blame, but rather these are felt because 
the action is judged to be good or bad. Moral judgment, or con- 
science, is an intellectual judgment proceeding from reason, based 
on implicit or explicit, actual or habitual, deliberation, compari- 
son, and reasoning, and capable of truth and error. In order to 
answer the question: Is this action which I propose to do right or 
wrong? I appeal to reason and try to solve my doubt by making 
use of higher, better known, and more certain principles. All this 
is essentially the function of reason. 

II. Value of Conscience as the Rule of Actions 

I. In General, since conscience is a function of reason, its dic- 
tates are not necessarily true. The very fact that judgments on the 
morality of the same action vary with times and places indicates 
that some must be false. Sometimes also personal experience 
shows clearly how difficult it is to reach a conclusion, and how 
uncertain this conclusion may remain after the most careful investi- 
gation. But from these facts it cannot be inferred that conscience 
has no value at all, and that its dictates are always arbitrary and 
never to be relied on. To reason this way is no more justifi- 
able than to disclaim the validity of all scientific conclusions be- 
cause some are false, or to deny absolutely that highly probable 
conclusions have any value because they are not certain. 

In some cases duty is certain, and conscience manifests it clearly. 
As to the variations in moral estimates, they do not apply to the 
first principles of morality, such as the distinction of right and 
wrong, the obligation to avoid moral evil, and so on. The differ- 
ences in their practical applications are due to habits, circum- 
stances, modes of life, civil law, and chiefly to the real or apparent 
conflict of duties. The murder of enemies taken as prisoners 
may seem legitimate to tribes which are constantly at war; weak 



CONSCIENCE 301 

children or old people may be looked upon as hindrances to public 
welfare, etc. (cf. p. 295). 

2, Various Kinds of Conscience. — Conscience may be true or 
false; ignorant, doubtful, or probable. It is important to note the 
difference between speculative and practical reason. The solution 
of a problem of mathematics or natural science may be postponed 
indefinitely, or even never be reached. But action cannot always 
wait. In a concrete circumstance, I must do one thing or abstain 
from it, perform one action or another. To doubt is possible; 
to do nothing is not always possible, and may be wrong. 

(a) // conscience is certain, leaves no doubt, and shows clearly 
what should be done, it must be followed. What it commands 
must be done; what it forbids must be omitted; what it allows may 
be done or omitted. This is true even in the case of unsuspected 
or invincible error. When a man, after taking all prudent avail- 
able means — available means will of course vary with the intel- 
lectual capacity and special disposition of the agent, and with 
the urgency of the action — judges bona fide that he should do 
so or so, he is obliged to follow his conscience, since it is the only 
rule he can apply to his actions. Nor is absolute certitude required 
such as would exclude completely every doubt, but only such as 
would exclude every prudent doubt. In moral questions it would 
be useless to look for mathematical certitude. A greater certitude 
is required in actions which have more serious consequences. 

(b) Where no certitude is possible and yet it is necessary to take 
a course of action, man must do his best. An obligation which 
is strictly doubtful cannot be said to be a real obligation and there- 
fore to bind. In such cases, especially where great interests are 
at stake, the best rule is to take the course which appears the 
safest and least Ukely to injure anybody's rights and interests. 
But it is always necessary to ascertain carefully which course 
should be pursued, and, if possible, to delay until this has been 
done. How is it to be done? 

3. The Formation or Education of Conscience is general or spe- 
cial, (a) The general education of conscience consists in the habit 
of forming correct practical judgments. Besides the external 
helps, such as studying, reading, consulting, inquiring on ethics 



302 ETHICS 

in general or on special matters, it is important for the individual 
to be careful about the acquisition of intellectual, volitional, and 
emotional habits, since all these, as explained previously, influence 
moral judgments. 

(b) In special cases, when a man doubts whether a given action 
is right or wrong, he must, as far as time allows, reflect, consider, 
and consult. Especially when one's own interests are engaged, and 
when, in consequence, there is danger of passing a less correct 
and less impartial judgment in one's own cause, the consultation 
of trustworthy and prudent persons is preferable to reflection. 
We may and must consult competent morahsts as we may and 
must sometimes consult a physician, lawyer, or scientist. The 
more important the action, the greater must be the diligence in 
ascertaining its morality. 

4. Determinants of Concrete Morality. — From the preceding 
doctrine it follows that the morality of a concrete action depends 
on several factors, the nature itself of the action, the intention, 
and the circumstances. 

(a) Since certain actions in themselves are good, and others bad, 
it is clear that moraUty depends on the nature of the action itself, 
that is, on its relation with human reason. From this exclusive 
point of view a number of actions are neither good nor bad in 
themselves, but indifferent, or, rather, non-moral, hke walking, 
sitting, singing, etc. But they become moral, i.e. good or bad, 
owing to the intention of the agent and the circumstances in which 
they are performed. 

{h) For instance, walking to relieve a poor man is good; walking 
to commit a theft is wrong. It may even be said that the inten- 
tion is the primary determinant of concrete morality, since con- 
science is the immediate norm of human actions. The final 
purpose, being that on which the will is fixed, is really the directive 
principle of everything else. This must not be imderstood in 
the sense that the end justifies the means, or that any means, 
even those that are wrong, may be taken in order to reach a 
good end, but in the sense that means known to be indifferent in 
themselves derive their morality from the end in view. 

(c) Circumstances of time, place, person, quantity, quality, 



OPINIONS ON MORAL STANDARD 303 

etc., may also increase, diminish, or change the moraUty or immo- 
rality of an action. We often hear the plea of aggravating or 
extenuating circumstances. To kill unjustly is wrong; to kill in 
self-defence is lawful. To give alms is right in general; to give 
alms when a bad use will certainly be made of it is wrong. 



ARTICLE IL THE MORAL STANDARD 

I. THE QUESTION STATED 
I. The Object of the Present Article 

1. Necessity of a Rule. — The proximate rule of morality is 
the actual dictate of conscience. But on what basis does this 
dictate itself rest? Or rather, on what basis should it rest? 
Men act for certain motives, and in order to secure certain 
ends, and yet some of these motives and ends are approved as 
good, noble, and moral, while others are condemned as bad, base, 
and immoral. A man who always acts for his own personal satis- 
faction, in whose conduct no place is found for a disinterested 
motive and for self-sacrifice, will generally be looked upon as a low 
type of morality to be shunned and despised. There are there- 
fore rules that govern conscience and guide it in pronouncing on 
the morality of the end which a man proposes to himself. There 
is a standard to which we do and must refer human actions, mo- 
tives, intentions, and ends. Why are some actions morally good, 
and others morally wrong? 

2. What is a Rule? — (a) In a material sense, a rule or ruler 
is a straight-edged instrument used as a measure, or as a guide in 
drawing straight lines. A standard is a measure or value estab- 
lished by law or by universal consent, to which other things are 
referred. By analogy these material meanings are applied to 
immaterial things, and especially to human actions. In the school, 
the child uses his ruler to draw a straight line. If the pen or pencil 
fails to follow it, the line is no longer straight; it becomes crooked 
or curved. So also the action which deflects from the rules of 
morality is crooked and wrong. Measures are referred to a stand- 



304 ETHICS 

ard. The length of all foot-rules must agree with the standard 
foot accepted by law. 

(b) When we speak of morality there is no positive law, nor 
universal agreement establishing a moral standard. In fact, we 
shall see that philosophers have proposed different systems. This 
is not to be wondered at, as we deal here with ideals, the determina- 
tion of which is influenced by many circumstances, and especially 
by the whole complex psychology of the individual. Sometimes 
also, apparent contradictions are only at the surface, while at 
bottom there is essential agreement. Some divergences may be 
radical; others may come either from the incomplete expression 
of a view, or from laying too much stress on what is only a 
secondary aspect of the question. Thus theories become one-sided. 

3. Conditions Required in the Standard. — The moral stand- 
ard cannot be: (i) A mere consequence of morality. Thus remorse 
and self-approval are only effects of moral actions, and cannot be 
the standard we are now looking for. (2) Something variable and 
changing. Morality is not something dependent on individual 
peculiarities, interests, or character. There is not one moraHty 
for one man, and another for another man. The ultimate stand- 
ard of moraUty is universal. (3) Something merely optional 
which man can accept or renounce. The laws of moraUty are 
frequently obligatory. In some cases, it is true, they are per- 
missive, but in others, man is not given the moral choice between 
doing or omitting; he is under the obligation of acting so or so, 
and of omitting such or such an action. 

II. Different Views Classified 

I . Logical Classification. — It is almost impossible to give a 
logical classification of the various systems of morality. They 
merge insensibly into one another. 

(a) In the first place one may claim that we have a direct appre- 
hension, or intuitive knowledge, or feeling, of morality. But evi- 
dently, if a man claims to know in the strict sense, he may be asked 
for the grounds of his knowledge, and unless he appeals to imme- 
diate evidence — in which case he will be in near agreement with 
some feeling-theory — he will appeal to some form of reasoning. 



OPINIONS ON MORAL STANDARD 305 

Iff on the contrary, a man claims that he feels an action to be right 
or wrong in the same way that he feels an impression to be pleas- 
urable or painful, no more questions can be asked him, although 
such an assertion may be discussed. 

In the second place, morality may be determined by a calcula- 
tion of, or reasoning upon, the fitness of an action to reach a certain 
end which is conceived as a bonum in se. From this point of 
view it is clear that the discussion of the criterion of morahty 
centres around the end itself which determines the morality of 
actions. 

(b) Looking at the question from another point of view, all 
will agree that, in acting, man always looks for some good, since by 
all it is admitted that morality enables us to classify actions as 
good or bad, and goodness is the quality which all must strive 
to realize. This good may be (i) the satisfaction of the senses 
or that of reason; (2) my own good (egoism) or the good of others 
(altruism). Hence the following synopsis. 

I. According to the mode of knowledge of morality. The dis- 
tinction between right and wrong may be known 



(i) immediately. Intuitionalism 
(2) mediately 



emotional 
intellectual 
by reason. Rationalism 
by experience. Empiricism 



II. According to the good which morality must realize. This 
good is 

(i) the pleasure of the senses. Sensualistic ethics 

(2) the satisfaction of rational aspirations. Rational ethics. 

In either case one may seek ' 

(i) personal good. Egoism Itt,-;., . • 

(2) the good of others. Altruism] 

2. Order of the Following Questions. — Combining these dif- 
ferent aspects and points of view, we shall examine successively 
(i) the true nature and foundation of duty and moral obligation, 
and we shall try to determine the true standard and criterion of 
morality; (2) the other systems, which contain only a part of the 



3o6 ETHICS 

truth, or one aspect of the answer, and which, therefore, may be 
false in their exclusiveness, i.e. not so much in what they as- 
sert as in what they deny. Here we shall consider the theories 
basing morality on (a) feelings; (b) pleasure and utility; (c) 
reason. (3) Finally, we shall attempt to determine the ultimate 
foundation of morality. 

n. THE QUESTION DISCUSSED 

I. Positive Determination of the Moral Good 

I. The Notion of End. — (c) All actions which belong to mo- 
rality are purposive, and frequently the reason why they are good or 
bad is that the purpose is good or bad. The purpose or end toward 
which an action is directed may be objective, or subjective, or 
both. Thus an action may be wrong because it leads of itself to 
some bad result, or because the agent intends to produce some re- 
sult which he looks upon as bad; and if this estimation is cor- 
rect, the action is both objectively and subjectively wrong. The 
science of ethics determines objective morality. It cannot 
reach subjective moraUty, which depends on psychological, and 
therefore individual, factors. 

(b) Since morality is determined by the nature of the purpos- 
ive action, the notion of end is essential in the question of the moral 
good. If an action, by its very nature, deprives my fellowman of 
an essential right, this result makes the action wrong. Thus, load- 
ing a pistol and firing are wrong, if the result of it is murder by 
which an individual is deprived of his essential right to live. 
In this case, the several actions leading to the final result are 
coordinated by a preconceived mental purpose. 

(c) To answer the question: What is the standard of morality? 
it is necessary to answer this other question : What are the legit- 
imate ends of human actions? To what final result must they 
tend? Ends may be proximate or remote according as they are 
reached immediately or only after a succession of coordinated 
actions. One may eat to support the body, thereby to make men- 
tal work possible in order to acquire riches and finally enjoy one- 
self. For the present we shall Umit ourselves to natural ends, 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 307 

attainable on this earth, as our previous studies do not yet en- 
title us to speak of God as the natural end of man, still less of the 
supernatural end to which man has been raised. 

2. Morality Relative to Human Nature. — Whenever man acts 
as a man — that is, uses his faculties with a sufficient knowledge 
of what he is doing, and a sufficient consent of the will — what he 
seeks is always the satisfaction of some of his aspirations and 
desires, i.e. the reaching of some end. But human aspirations 
correspond to human faculties and, like them, are very com- 
plex. Man desires happiness, but this may be the happiness of 
sensual pleasure or that of reason; it may be his own selfish hap- 
piness or also that of others. For, not only is man complex within 
himself, but living, as he does, amid complex social surroundings, 
many new relations arise from this social aspect of life. It is im- 
possible to satisfy all human faculties because frequently they 
stand in opposition to one another. Reason and the senses are 
in many cases antagonistic, reason dictating duties which impose 
a restriction on the senses, and the senses craving for gratifications 
which reason condemns. If man had only one faculty, the devel- 
opment and perfection of this faculty would be his duty and the 
source of his legitimate happiness. In the real complexity and 
frequent opposition of his faculties, what is he to do? To "fol- 
low nature " may be a good precept, but what is it to follow nature 
when nature is so complex? 

(a) Human nature is human owing to that which distinguishes 
it from other natures. It possesses certain properties identical with 
or analogical to those of other beings. Like the stone, the human 
body obeys the law of gravitation. Like the plant, it assimilates 
foreign substances, grows, etc. Like the animal, man sees, hears, 
remembers, etc. /These faculties, therefore, are not special to man; 
they do not make of man a being distinct from other beings. As 
we proceed upwards in the scale of beings, we find that every su- 
perior degree shares in the properties of the preceding one and adds 
something to them. The perfection of every being consists prima- 
rily in the degree of perfection of its specific properties and 
faculties. 

{b) The perfection of man consists, therefore, not in the satis- 



3o8 ETHICS 

faction of such faculties as he possesses in common with lower 
beings, but of such as are special to him, that is, reason and will, 
together with the sense of obligation and duty which is based on 
these. The body, the senses, and the feelings have their claims, 
it is true, but they must always be subordinated to those of rea- 
son, and, in case of conflict, the former, not the latter, must yield. 
Whatever man does he does in order to complete and perfect his 
nature, since he does it in order to satisfy a desire and an as- 
piration, i.e. in order to fill a deficiency. Every desire and aspi- 
ration is essentially the avowal of the lack of something. A man 
can desire only what he does not yet possess, and his actions tend 
to acquire it. 

(c) Hence the primary duty of man is to preserve in himself the 
essential harmony and subordination of his faculties. Both in 
the individual and in society reason discovers a certain order which 
imposes itself. Every faculty in the individual and every member 
in the society have their proper nature and place. Reason commands 
us to respect this order, and to give to every faculty and to every 
fellowman their dues. From this general principle are derived 
the complex duties relating to self or to other men. Concrete 
moral good includes both that which is necessary and that 
which is permitted according to the general principle just 
mentioned. 

3. Morality is not Obedience to Law, whether external or inter- 
nal. This is a consequence of what has been said above, since 
law, whatever it may be, is itself the expression of a good, and 
obligatory only in so far as it commands some good. Obedience 
to law is itself dictated by reason, and hence not primary. More- 
over, laws, divine or human, contain points which are evidently 
of unequal importance, and which may come to conflict with one 
another. Thus the law forbidding homicide may conflict with 
the duty of self-preservation. This is true not only of external 
law, but also of the internal law or conscience, for conscience is 
largely a matter of education, feeling, and habit, and these may con- 
flict with reason. If, however, by conscience be meant reason it- 
self as applied to a line of conduct, we come back to the solution 
given above. In practice the separation of reason from other 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 309 

mental faculties is never perfect; hence the diversity of moral 
standards. 

To sum up: The moral good for man is to live in accordance with 
his specific nature, to perfect it as much as possible, to respect the 
nature of other beings, to treat his own faculties and every other 
being according to the place which they occupy. This is the ideal 
which one cannot conceive without feeling the obligation of reaUz- 
ing it as far as possible. Whatever system does not take all this 
into consideration will be false or incomplete, as will appear more 
clearly from the following discussion. 

II. Morality Based on a Special Sentiment 

I. Importance of Feelings. — (a) Undoubtedly feelings are 
very important in morality. Merely to perform one's duty, or to 
perform it reluctantly, hesitatingly, and faint-heartedly, is less 
easy and less noble than to love it and perform it with readiness. 
Not that all duties are agreeable, but the sense of duty and the love 
of whatever is known to be right make man fulfil it with the pleas- 
ure of doing right, and the satisfaction of obeying conscience. 
When duty is found agreeable, this feeling can in no way destroy 
the value of the action by which it is accomplished. Man is not 
merely a rational being, but a feehng being as well, and even if 
the ideal of morality does not consist in acting for pleasure, yet 
the pleasure found in right conduct is a sign that the principles 
of morality are interwoven with other elements in the human 
mind. 

FeeUngs increase the energy, and make it possible to accomplish 
actions that would otherwise be above human strength. St. 
Augustine's words express a truth which is daily experienced: 
"Ubi amatur non laboratur, aut si laboratur labor amatur." A 
cold idea has but little motor power, but it derives much strength 
from the feeling that accompanies it. All noble and heroic ac- 
tions proceed from the idea of duty, the will to accomplish it, and 
also a certain passion that impels to it. To try to eliminate all 
feelings from morality, and look upon them as obstacles to be 
removed, as the Stoics and Kant did; to look upon duty as being 



3IO ETHICS 

by its very nature a burden to be carried painfully and by dint of 
effort; to place the ideal of man in a state of perfect calmness and 
rest undisturbed by any feeling or emotion, is to misunderstand 
human nature, to overlook human psychology, and to give a rule 
unfit to guide men, since it fails to take men as they are essentially. 

(b) But if feelings play an important role, this role must not 
be exaggerated, (i) Feelings are blind; they must be controlled 
and guided, and hence cannot be the standard of moraHty. (2) 
They attract, but do not command or create any obligation. (3) 
They are not universal, but vary with every individual. (4) What 
is agreeable to all men is not thereby obligatory. (5) It must be 
noted especially that moral feelings presuppose the idea of morality. 
Why do we experience moral pleasure, if not because we know that 
we are doing right? Why do we experience moral displeasure, 
if not because we know that our actions are against our duty? 
Why do we love duty, if not because duty appears to us as good? 
Feelings do not explain the moral standard, but presuppose it. 
They are not its basis, but its derivatives. Yet certain theories 
propose feelings as the very basis of morality. To these we now 
pass. 

2. Moral Sense. — (a) Some philosophers like Shaftesbury, 
Hume, and especially philosophers of the Scottish school, after 
Reid, assert the existence of a special moral sense which intuitively 
distinguishes right from wrong in about the same way that the 
sense of taste distinguishes bitter from sweet, and the sense of 
vision, blue from red. It is a kind of natural instinct which reveals 
what is good and what is bad. It may also be compared to the 
aesthetic sense or taste which at once makes us find certain objects 
beautiful, and others ugly. Among Greek philosophers we already 
find the identification of the good with the beautiful, and it must 
be admitted that ethics and aesthetics have many points of con- 
tact. Some actions are beautiful or sublime on account of their 
moral excellence and they cause feelings of admiration akin to 
purely aesthetic feelings. 

(b) Criticism. — It must be admitted that the habit of respect- 
ing the moral law, and the spirit of obedience to it, contribute to 
develop in man something like an instinct, a kind of moral taste, 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 311 

or moral sense, by which, in ordinary cases, he is guided in the 
choice between right and wrong actions without any effort of 
reasoning. Education and social surroundings create in man a 
second nature, moral as well as psychological. 

But, precisely because it is a second nature, it cannot be looked 
upon as primary. It depends on something else. As it is neither 
obligatory nor constant, this taste cannot be the moral standard. 
Still less can it decide which of two feelings must prevail in case 
the same action is both agreeable or disagreeable from different 
points of view. Thus a physician may have to choose between 
self-sacrifice in relieving the sufferings of a man having a conta- 
gious disease, and the love of his own life and of his family. In 
such cases appeal must be made to some other norm and ideal. 
In other words, we may speak of moral taste, but a rational ex- 
planation of it must be given. It must be determined why certain 
actions are in conformity with, and others in opposition to, the 
moral sense. Thus it becomes possible to criticize the actions of 
others, and to refer them to certain rules which are not, like indi- 
vidual feelings, subject to endless variations. In fact, all admit 
that there is a depraved and a correct moral taste, and therefore 
refer it to some higher norm. 

3. Benevolence. — (a) According to Hutcheson, man is moved 
by two kinds of affections, self-love and benevolence. In case of 
conflict between them, the moral sense decides in favor of benevo- 
lence, for it approves actions which follow from a desire to do good 
to others without regard to any personal advantage to be derived 
from them, 

(b) Criticism. — This is only one side of the question. It leaves 
out the duties toward self, and fails to account for the obligatory 
character of the moral law. If self-abnegation is sublime, its foun- 
dation should be the more secure, since the principle of obligation 
must be more certain in proportion as the sacrifice imposed is 
greater. And are there no duties toward those with regard to 
whom no benevolent feelings are experienced, but who excite 
feelings of antipathy, often unexplainable? 

4. Sympathy. — (a) Adam Smith proposes the feeling of sym- 
pathy as fundamental in ethics. By sympathy is meant the ten- 



312 ETHICS 

dency to share the feelings of others, to suffer when they are 
afflicted, and to rejoice when they are joyful. It is a fact that 
man naturally sympathizes with other men, and chiefly wants 
them to sympathize with him. According to Smith, sympathy 
is not only a fact, but a principle of morality. To approve or 
condemn the actions of others is simply to recognize that we are, 
or are not, in sympathy with them, and that we also should feel 
right or wrong if we performed the same actions. The sentiment 
of obligation is simply the fear of exciting antipathy in others. 
Hence one must endeavor to have the sympathy of the greatest 
possible number of men. As those who judge the value of actions 
may be more or less depraved and prejudiced, and as the danger 
of prejudice is greater when a man passes a judgment on the value 
of his own actions, an appeal must be made to an ideal onlooker, 
disinterested and impartial. It is his sympathy which man must 
try to deserve. 

(b) Criticism. — Sympathy as the rule of moral conduct is 
insufficient, (i) Like all other feehngs it varies with indi- 
viduals and their surroimdings. Those who live in corrupt com- 
pany would win their fellowmen's sympathy by doing wrong. 
(2) It is not obligatory. It is at most a fact, not a law. To make 
it a guide is to expose oneself to the danger of going astray, for 
not all forms of right excite sympathy, nor all forms of wrong, 
antipathy. (3) To appeal to an impartial onlooker and judge is 
hardly consistent with Smith's theory. This ideal judge is pre- 
cisely one in whom abstraction is made of the feelings of sympathy 
and antipathy. He is a judge who bases his judgment on delib- 
erate reasonable evidence. Hence the criterion of feeling is aban- 
doned for that of reason. How can I know that my action wiU be 
approved by an ideal and impartial onlooker? The only means 
is to reason out for myself whether it is worthy of praise or of 
blame, that is, to find out by reason whether it is morally good 
or bad. 

5. Honor. — (a) What has been said so far appUes also to all 
theories which base moraUty on a sense of honor. Honor is a 
vague term, but, in its most common meaning, it applies to a 
man's reputation as based especially on social relations. Every 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 313 

condition of life has its own special line of honor. The soldier's 
honor, the gentleman's honor, the citizen's honor, nay, even the 
thief's honor, are not according to the same standard. These 
meanings, however, are not strictly ethical — not all, at any rate 
— but conventional. They are based on custom, etiquette, habit, 
etc. If they are ethical, they do not refer to the basis oj moral- 
ity, but only to certain applications of it, to some special virtue 
or behavior characteristic of this or that profession. Hence honor 
is neither a universal nor a constant norm. Nor is it obligatory 
in all cases; frequently one feels that its precepts are not at all 
moral obligations, but simply rules established by custom and 
convention. There is also the danger of making of this sense of 
honor a purely external affair, and of paying no attention to secret 
wrong-doing as long as reputation is intact. 

(6) This, it is true, is a false and hypocritical sense of honor. 
True and genuine honor is based on human dignity. It refers to 
self-approval and is not satisfied with merely external decorum. 
As such again, it is not fimdamental. True honor is distinguished 
from false honor by reason, not by feeling. To live according to 
true honor and true human dignity is to live according to duty 
and reason. The sense of honor, although it must be inculcated 
and cultivated as early and as carefully as possible, will always 
remain something accessory and require another basis. 

III. Morality Relative to Pleasure and Utility 

I, Theories Outlined. — (a) There is no a priori reason to 
oppose duty and morality to pleasure and utility. There seem 
to be no contradictory elements in these two notions. Nor is there 
any reason a posteriori, i.e. from experience. The accompHsh- 
ment of duty is frequently pleasurable, and may become so by 
practice and habit. Even when the action is difficult and cannot 
be performed without checking some natural tendency, it produces 
the nobler and purer happiness resulting from the satisfaction 
of the sense of duty, whereas acting in a contrary manner will 
produce the painful feeling of remorse and self-condemnation. 

{b) From this it does not follow that pleasure and duty are 
identical. There are many kinds of pleasure, all of which per- 



314 ETHICS 

haps are not in conformity with duty. Even if it should be proved 
that in all circumstances duty is pleasurable, the two notions 
would nevertheless be distinct. Duty imposes itself as an obli- 
gatory end; pleasure does not. Even where right conduct is 
pleasant, consciousness testifies that it is not right because it is 
pleasant, but pleasant because it is right. 

(c) Hedonism (vBovij^ pleasure) is a doctrine identifying the 
moral with the pleasurable, and holding that actions are good or 
bad according to their pleasurable or painful results. It has two 
main forms: (i) Egoistic or individual hedonism, which considers 
only the agent's personal happiness. (2) Altruistic or universal 
hedonism, which considers the happiness of others, or of the great- 
est number of men. This latter form has been called Utilitarian- 
ism by Stuart Mill, its chief exponent. 

2. Egoistic Hedonism. — (a) We need not insist on systems 
looking upon morality as an affair of personal pleasure, chiefly 
of sensual pleasure. These systems have come to be condemned 
imiversally as lowering man to the level of the brute, (i) In 
antiquity, Aristippus of Cyrene gives as a rule to look only for the 
present and immediate pleasure to be derived from an action. 
The end of man is happiness, and, as the future is uncertain, 
man must always follow the instinct that prompts him to strive 
after the greatest sum of pleasure in the present. The same doc- 
trine found advocates among the French materiaUsts of the eigh- 
teenth century. (2) Epicurus insists more on the happiness of 
Ufe as a whole. True happiness does not consist so much in sen- 
sual pleasure as in the calmer, purer, and more lasting pleasure 
of the soul. Hence, although pleasure is the end of man, not all 
pleasures are to be placed on the same level, because many pleas- 
ures are followed by pain, and pain is often followed by pleasure. 
Prudence and judgment are necessary to know which pleasures 
are to be chosen, and which pains are to be avoided. Hence, 
also, the necessity of virtue, temperance, honesty, justice, etc., 
which are conditions of true pleasure. This moral principle is 
much higher and nobler than that of Aristippus. 

(b) Criticism, (i) To identify rightness with the pleasure of 
the senses is to vilify human nature, to look merely at its lowest 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 315 

aspect, and to neglect its highest aspirations. (2) Pleasure is 
not an end but a means; not a principle but an efifect. The end 
of man is to act in conformity with his nature, and thus to exercise 
his activity and develop his faculties. Pleasure may result from 
this, and the desire of pleasure may stimulate it, but it is not the 
end. (3) Consciousness shows that pleasure is not obligatory, 
absolute, and universal, hence not a standard of morality. Fre- 
quently pleasure is followed by remorse of conscience. (4) To 
apply this principle of hedonism is to open the door to all abuses. 
If pleasure is the end, it has to be sought and enjoyed at whatever 
price, and in whatever circumstances. No room is left for dis- 
interested motives and self-sacrifice. Personal pleasure may be 
procured, even should pain be thereby inflicted on others. 

3. Bentham's System is fundamentally egoistic and seconda- 
rily altruistic. His main principles are the following: 

{a) Pleasure is the only good; pain, the only evil. From this 
principle is to be derived the only standard of the value of actions. 
An action is useful, and consequently good, when the sum of its 
pleasurable consequences is greater than the sum of its painful 
consequences. 

{b) Pleasures are to be chosen prudently. Attention must be 
paid to their (i) intensity; (2) duration; (3) certainty or. uncer- 
tainty; (4) propinquity or remoteness; (5) fecundity, i.e. capacity 
of producing other pleasures; (6) purity, according as they are, 
or are not, mixed with pain; (7) extent, i.e. the number of per- 
sons who enjoy them. On these bases Bentham builds an arith- 
metical determination of good and bad actions, of virtues and 
vices, according to the quantity of pleasure and pain that results. 

(c) Personal and universal utility are inseparable. Man can- 
not live and be happy except in society. Hence it is necessary 
to procure pleasure for others in order to receive some from them. 
Altruism is a condition of true egoism. 

Criticism. — (a) To this system are opposed all the reasons 
given against making pleasure the standard of morality. Per- 
sonal interest is not: (i) Obligatory absolutely, hut only hypothet- 
ically. In order to succeed, perhaps the merchant must be honest, 
but he is not obHged to succeed. (2) Absolute and universal. 



3l6 ETHICS 

It is hardly possible to find anything more changeable according 
to persons, conditions, times, and places. (3) Practical. Often 
the consequences are unforeseen before acting, and yet it is from 
them alone that the action is supposed to derive its whole value. 
(4) Safe. If personal utility and pleasure are always the goal of 
man, it will not always be true that "honesty is the best policy." 
It will be true only when the lack of honesty would be known to 
others so as to become a source of pain. 

{h) Bentham's arithmetic of pleasures is impossible because 
there is no common measure applying to all. Pleasures vary with 
individuals. Consequently Bentham's calculations to show, for. 
instance, that drunkenness is immoral because, notwithstanding 
the pleasures which it procures, the pains of which it is the source 
are more numerous, will fail to convince a large number of indi- 
viduals who will calculate on a basis different from that of Bentham. 
This whole arithmetic is a matter of personal taste. 

{c) From egoism it is impossible to derive altruism. Even if 
praise and reward, or blame and pimishment are sources of pleas- 
ure and pain, and if man must seek the former and avoid the lat- 
ter, the following facts remain, (i) Secret actions, like theft or 
murder, would be good if productive of pleasure. (2) If self- 
interest is primary, it is primarily worthy of praise. Frequently 
a man knows his action to be right or wrong before being praised 
or blamed for it. (3) Why should men be so inclined to praise 
self-sacrifice and benevolence? Benevolence or altruism is not to 
be derived from a purely egoistic starting-point. In this view, it 
always remains a means toward egoism and toward securing per- 
sonal pleasures. It is at most an indirect altruism in the service 
of egoism. 

4. Stuart Mill. — While admitting also that happiness is the 
end of man and the supreme test of morality, Stuart Mill modifies 
the hedonistic doctrine on two important points. 

{a) It is not enough to pay attention to the quantity of pleasure, 
as Bentham had done, but pleasures also differ in quality. Some 
are higher, nobler, and more refined, and hence to be preferred to 
others, not because they are greater, but because they are superior 
in quality. This quahtative determination depends both on the 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 317 

pleasurable object and on the faculty in which the feeling resides. 
"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig sat- 
isfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." 
(Utilitarianism, ch. II.) 

(b) It is not true that individual and general interests are insep- 
arable; they may conflict. The aim of man is to work, not for any 
personal interest, nor even for the private interest of a family or 
a nation, but for the general good of htunanity. The standard of 
morality is the greatest and truest happiness taken altogether. 
Hence "to do as you would be done by, and to love your 
neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian 
morality." (Utilitarianism, ch. II.) 

(c) Mill's system of morality must be taken together with his 
psychological doctrine of associationism. Moral feeling, duty, 
conscience, self-approbation, remorse, etc., result from the asso- 
ciations of certain actions with the subsequent feeling of pleasure 
or displeasure. Hence actions performed at first for the sole mo- 
tive of personal interest, are little by little considered as good. 
Morality is thus largely, if not exclusively, dependent on associa- 
tion and habit, and consequently arbitrary and artificial, varying 
with times, places, and other circumstances. 

Criticism. — This conception of morahty is nobler than that of 
Bentham, and, on many points, will give a satisfactory line of 
conduct. Yet it is insufficient. 

(a) To appeal to a distinction between the quantity and the 
quality of pleasure is to renoimce the principle that pleasure is 
the end of man and the norm of morality. Some pleasures are 
said to be more desirable than others, not on account of their pleas- 
antness, but on account of their purity, nobleness, disintereste'd- 
ness, beauty, etc., i.e. on account of something else which is itself 
primarily desirable. How shall we know which pleasures are 
qualitatively superior unless we appeal to reason, which, indepen- 
dently of the pleasant character of experiences, pronoimces that the 
satisfaction of some faculties and aspirations is preferable to that 
of others? How shall we convince the thief and the sensual man 
that their pleasures are inferior in nature to other pleasures unless 
we go beyond the hedonistic principle? 



3l8 ETHICS 

(b) If interest is the only standard, why should an individual 
prefer the general good to his own private advantage? This can- 
not be shown to be obligatory without introducing again some 
higher standard. If pleasure is the end of man, my pleasure is 
my end, and it is what / am entitled to reach, even if I do not thereby 
foster the happiness of mankind. On a mere utilitarian basis, 
nobody can show me that I am, in any circumstance whatsoever, 
obliged to sacrifice myself for the good of others. It is necessary 
in this case to show that there is an absolute order, an ideal of 
reason, and a duty different from pleasure. The principle of altru- 
istic utiUtarianism throws no light on the duties of man toward 
himself. Even with regard to altruistic duties, it is far from clear, 
for it is dif&cult to estimate what will be the good of mankind in 
general. 

(c) Undoubtedly the association of ideas is an important factor 
in ethics, and on it, to a great extent, current ideas of morality 
depend. But it is insufficient, (i) Certain principles of morality 
are demonstrable, and based on reason. As was shown in Psychol- 
ogy mere habitual sequence will not of itself produce the feehng of 
"oughtness" any more than it can produce a universal and neces- 
sary judgment. When I reflect on it, the habit of lying does not 
destroy the conviction that it is wrong, even though lying 
should bring me some advantage. On the other hand, the habit of 
washing one's face and hands every morning, of smoking tobacco, 
etc., produces no feeling of moral obligation. Moral obligation, 
therefore, rests on something else. (2) If habits are the very start- 
ing-point of morality, they are of themselves indifferent or non- 
moral. Hence I may change them as I please. Thus it becomes 
perfectly lawful to stifle the voice of conscience and to refuse to 
heed remorse, since all these are simply results of non-moral asso- 
ciations. Conscience will disappear by the same means which 
gave rise to it, and with equal right. 

5. Spencer's addition to utiHtarianism, namely, the position 
he gives it in his general scheme of universal evolution, does not 
remedy its intrinsic weakness. According to him, primitive man 
is exclusively egoistic. Soon he perceives that his own personal 
interest will gain by associating with others, and doing them good. 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 319 

Little by little, altruistic feelings arise and struggle with egoism. 
This is the present state of humanity, but the day will come when 
altruism will have conquered, and be natural to man. Then, 
and only then, will Comte's fundamental principle of ethics be 
realizable: "Live for others." 

This system does not explain the character of obligation. It 
tells us what conscience dictates; it cannot tell us why it has the 
right to dictate. Moreover, as was remarked against Mill, if 
the moral views which man has to-day are the artificial products 
of evolution and of adaptation to surroundings, man cannot be 
obliged morally to respect them. There can be at most a certain 
organic and mental necessity resulting from habit. All that man 
can do is to follow blindly his hereditary tendencies, good and bad, 
and this is precisely against true morality. 

6. Solidarity. — A word must also be said of solidarity. It is 
a fact that no man is independent. All men form one body, and 
receive advantages from the other members of society. Hence 
man is obliged to return these, to work for others as others have 
worked for him, to behave, not merely as an individual, but as a 
part of a whole. He must respect others, as well as himself. 

There is much that is true in this view; but it presupposes a 
deeper basis. Even if solidarity is a fact, it is not a duty until 
appeal is made to higher principles of justice which oblige a man 
to return what he receives. And even this justice and obligation 
must rest on some other principle of reason antecedent to the 
fact of solidarity. 

rv. Morality Dependent on Reason 

Morality is dependent on reason, but how? We have now to 
examine briefly the various systems proposed in this direction. 
" Morality for its own sake, and independently of the results which 
the moral action may have," such would be the motto of those 
moralists whom we are to study. They stand at the opposite ex- 
treme of those according to whom, as we have seen, morality 
depends primarily on the results of human actions. The moral 
action is an end, not a means subordinate to something else, as 
hedonists assert. Resulting pleasure and utility have nothing 



320 ETHICS 

to do in the determination of the moral aspect of an action. The 
norm of moraUty is reason alone with its practical dictates. 
* I. Stoics. — (a) According to the Stoics, virtue, i.e. action in 
1 conformity with the laws of human nature, is the only good, and. 
vice, i.e. action against the laws of human nature, the only evil, 
(i) Since himian nature consists essentially in reason, which dif- 
ferentiates it from other natures, virtue is a mode of action in con- 
formity with reason. (2) Virtue must be sought for its own sake, and 
is its own reward and the only happiness. To act for any ulterior 
end and any other reward or happiness is wrong. (3) All other 
things, sometimes called good, like health, reputation, pleasure, etc., 
are not really so; nor are pain, disease, ignominy, etc., real evils. 
They are given no attention by the wise. (4) All feelings and 
emotions are opposed to reason. To subdue them, and reach a 
complete apathy is the duty of man. The wise man is not subject 
to, or rather not affected by, pleasure or pain, fear or desire, etc. 
Even the pleasure found in the practice of virtue should never 
be an end, but only a consequence of virtue. 

{b) This view, however much truth it may contain, is based on 
an incomplete psychology. Virtue is necessary to happiness, but 
other conditions are also required. The man who suffers physi- 
cally or mentally is not completely happy. Pain is a true evil, 
although not a moral one. Moreover, human nature includes emo- 
tions no less essentially than it includes reason. That feelings should 
be controlled is true. That they should be suppressed is against 
reason itself, which must recognize them, and finds in them, 
sometimes enemies, it is true, but sometimes also allies. 

2. Kant. — The essential points in Kant's fimdamental ethics 
may be summarized as follows: 

{a) The existence of the moral law is a primitive fact of con- 
sciousness, imiversal and necessary. "Oughtness" manifests it- 
self clearly to the mind. It is not derived from any motive Uke 
pleasure or happiness, but is autonomous, and imposes itself for 
its own sake, independently of anything else. 

(J) Hence the moral law is a categorical imperative. An imper- 
ative because it does not merely advise or recommend, but 
commands strictly, and imposes an obligation. A categorical 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 321 

imperative because it is unconditional. A conditional imperative 
would make the command dependent on a condition, as "Trans- 
act this business in such or such a way if thou wouldst be 
successful." But the categorical imperative is subject to no 
condition, and, for instance, without any restriction or ulterior 
end, commands: "Thou shalt not lie." 

(c) The only moral action is that which is performed out of 
respect for the moral law itself, and disregards all other ends and 
results. "Good-will," i.e. the will to act in conformity with duty, 
is the only real good. Goodness or rightness is not antecedent, 
but consequent to obligation. An action is not obligatory because 
it is good, but it is good because it is obligatory and performed out 
of respect for the moral law. 

{d) The two most important principles which must be kept in 
mind for the concrete determination of moral actions are: (i) "So 
act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of 
any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." 
Reasonable and free will is that which constitutes essentially human 
personality, and since it is absolute, it should never be made an 
instrument destined to gratify passions or desires. (2) "So act 
that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good 
as a principle of universal legislation," i.e. Never perform an action 
which thou wouldst not allow to be performed by everybody else. 
Thus, in my individual case, breaking a promise is wrong, because, 
if it were admitted to be right for me, it should be right for all 
men. Hence there could be no faith at all in promises. Promises 
themselves would therefore cease to be made, and the maxim that 
promises may be broken lawfully would thus destroy itself. Hence, 
since it is not lawful for all men to break promises, it is not lawful 
in my individual case. This principle is the practical test of mo- 
rahty, and its application will lead to the realization of the 
supreme moral ideal, a "repubHc of ends," in which men will re- 
spect and help one another out of pure respect for the moral law. 

Criticism. — Kant's system contains a great number of true and 
noble principles. He brings duty to the foreground instead of 
making it a mere result derived from utility, and subordinated 
to it. He shows the dignity of the human person and insists on 



322 ETHICS 

its intrinsic value. Without showing here the place of ethics in 
Kant's whole system of philosophy, we shall Umit ourselves to 
some remarks concerning his moral teaching. 

(a) Human nature, precisely because it is reasonable, will always 
ask for the reason why any command should be obeyed. To obey 
blindly a law which man finds within himself, without inquiring 
if the law is vaUd and binding, is not reasonable. The law must 
exhibit its claim to man's obedience. To examine this claim is 
to examine something anterior to the law, some good which the law 
presupposes but does not create. The principle that this law 
makes the goodness of actions is therefore in contradiction with 
reason. Far from being autonomy, as Kant calls it, it is pure 
despotism. 

(b) Moreover, if the will is autonomous, it is so for all men, 
good or bad; for all consciences, right or wrong; and Kant has no 
means of proving the existence of the categorical imperative which 
he experiences to another man who does not experience it. Even 
when the categorical imperative is accepted, since man is autono- 
mous, and since the will is the only principle of obligation, he may 
transgress its commands without any injustice. Hence Kant's 
categorical imperative is really hypothetical: "Obey duty if thou 
wilt live conformably to reason." Why should I treat humanity 
in myself and in others as an end, and not as a means, if not because 
this is recognized as good before my practical reason commands it? 

(c) Good-will, says Kant, is the will of performing duty for its 
own sake, independently of any feeling. This exclusion of pleas- 
ure as vitiating morality is excessive. A mother attends to her sick 
child because she loves him. Who will condemn her on that 
ground? And who will say that the philanthropist is not perform- 
ing moral actions, or that his will is not good, when he helps his 
fellowmen out of sympathy and pity? 

(d) Kant's ethics fail to distinguish between the obligatory 
and the non-obligatory good. There are things which I may do, 
although I am not obliged to do them, like helping the ordinary 
poor man on the street, or giving him more than he strictly needs. 
Even if the categorical imperative clearly commands or forbids 
certain actions, conscience does not merely command; some- 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 323 

times it permits or counsels, and this is no less an immediate 
fact than the categorical imperative. To fulfil all strict obliga- 
tions is only one aspect of morality. Many morally good actions 
are not obligatory. 

(e) The norm of the morality of individual actions, namely, the 
possibility of their being universalized into general principles, good 
as it is as a negative guide telHng what to avoid, is insufficient 
as a positive guide telling what to do. In short, Kant has not taken 
a complete view of man and of all the exigencies of human nature. 

V. The Ultimate Foundation of the Moral Law 

1. Human Nature. — The moral good consists essentially in 
the conformity of an action with human nature considered both in 
itself and in its relations with other men. Human nature is not 
merely reason, nor feelings, nor will, and on this ground we reject 
the systems mentioned above. All contain some truth, but con- 
sider only one aspect of human nature. Their point of view is 
too narrow. Emphasizing the claims of the feelings, utilitarians 
neglect those of reason. They fail to see the intrinsic value of 
actions, and look only at the value of their results. Kant, on 
the contrary, considers only reason and will, and has no regard 
whatever for the results of actions. 

The view which was explained above recognizes the claims of 
both. It is more complete, and more in accordance with human 
nature as a whole. It alone accounts for the distinction between 
that which is obligatory and that which is good without being 
imposed, because certain things are strictly required by human 
nature, while others are in accordance with it, but not necessary. 
Right and wrong are known by comparing actions with the exi- 
gencies of man's rational nature. This is the true norm or stand- 
ard according to which the morality of actions should be judged. 

2. Reason Not Autonomous. — Hence morality rests on human 
reason as the standard according to which the value of human ac- 
tions is measured. But is reason the ultimate and self-sufficient 
foundation of morality? To this question we must answer that, 
while reason manifests what is right and what is wrong, what is 
obligatory and what is optional, it does not make it so. It shows 



324 ETHICS 

in what direction we should act, but does not create the obUga- 
tion. We have here something similar to what takes place 
in the knowledge of truth. Reason is not free to declare certain 
things true or false, but it must conform to evidence. It perceives 
truths that exist independently of itself. In the same way, the 
moral good is not made, but only perceived, by reason. Hence 
in neither case can reason be called autonomous, since it must 
conform to the nature of things. 

3. The Ultimate Basis of Morality. — (a) Can we say that the 
will is autonomous and, of itself, obliges man to act according to 
the dictates of reason? In other words: Why is the moral good, 
in some cases at least, obligatory ? Whence comes the strict duty of 
acting in conformity with our rational nature? No man can give 
me a binding order without showing his credentials, and without 
being my superior. I will not consider a law as valid unless it is 
enacted by the proper authority. There is no law without a law- 
giver. Who is the lawgiver in the moral order? (i) Some 
answer that obligation results from the very nature of the moral 
good, which is sufficient to give rise to a strict duty. (2) Kant, 
on the contrary, asserts that duty is the primitive fact, and that 
an action is good because it is prescribed. (3) In both cases, 
reason is looked upon as independent of any higher authority, 
and as the sufficient and ultimate source of obligation. 

{b) This view cannot be accepted. The moral law is not explain- 
able finally without rising above human nature to God Himself as 
the author of human nature and of every reality, and as the 
supreme ruler of the world. Duty necessarily implies two terms, 
an authority and a subject, a superior who imposes the law and an 
inferior who must comply with it. Hence man cannot be his own 
lawgiver. An obligation which would arise primarily from human 
reason or will leaves man alone with himself, and consequently 
ceases to be a real obligation. "It is good" does not mean the 
same as "You ought." An action is good because it is in conform- 
ity with himaan nature, but the duty to live in conformity with 
human nature supposes a superior intelligence as the source of the 
moral order, and a superior will as the lawgiver who commands 
us to respect this order. 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 325 

(c) We are thus led to this dilemma: Human reason either 
makes the law or simply perceives it. In the first supposition, 
the law ceases to be authoritative and stable. What reason has 
done it can undo and modify; duty no longer exists. We must 
therefore accept the second supposition, that reason knows a law 
which is universal, superior to the reason that perceives it and to 
the will on which it is imposed; and which, consequently, comes 
from God Himself. It is in my power to break the moral law, but 
I know that it persists even when it is violated. If the moral 
order does not rest on God, it is but an abstraction, an idea of the 
human mind, and why should we bow before it? Shall we be 
accountable to a mere idea for our actions? If this idea is able 
to rule, and to impose an obligation, it is because it is the idea of 
God Himself, the source of the moral order. 

(d) Hence God is not necessary as the criterion of our knowledge 
of right and wrong, but as the only foundation on which the moral 
law can rest ultimately. Without knowing God, I may know 
my duty, but I cannot account for it. God's law is not given 
from without — except in the case of positive divine law, with 
which we are not concerned here — but from within, through 
our reasonable nature. Yet this natural law must rest on, 
and derive its validity from, the eternal law, i.e. the wisdom 
of God ordering all things, and the will of God commanding 
that this order be preserved. The binding force of conscience 
can come only from the fact that it is the voice of God within 
ourselves. 

4. Summary. — We may therefore conclude that psycholog- 
ical analysis alone does not suflEice to furnish us with the ultimate 
foundation of morality. Good as far as it goes, it necessarily 
leaves something unexplained. Human reason gives only the 
contents or material elements of morality: namely, it tells us what is 
right and what is wrong. The formal element of morality, or duty, 
which is known through reason, can be derived only from God. Hence 
ethics is intimately bound to metaphysics and religion. An im- 
manent obligation, i.e. an obligation which is recognized within 
oneself, supposes a transcendent ruler, i.e. a superior being dis- 
tinct from human reason and will. To discover a true law, a true 



326 ETHICS 

obligation, is ipso facto to find oneself in presence of a higher 
intelligence and will, in presence of God Himself. 

VI. Conclusion 

1. Responsibility. — From the existence of duty follows respon- 
sibility, i.e. the imputability to the agent of the actions which he per- 
forms. Responsibility presupposes the knowledge of the moraHty 
of an action, and freedom in performing it. Hence responsibiHty 
varies with the degree of freedom and knowledge. Whatever 
affects these conditions affects also responsibiHty. As these 
conditions are not known to any one but the agent, it follows that 
others, while being justified in passing judgment on the value of 
an action in itself, should abstain from passing judgment on the 
agent. "Judge not," since you have no sufficient data to judge 
others. You know what they do, but you are ignorant of the 
hidden springs that prompt them to act. 

2. Virtue is the habit of doing right; vice, the habit of doing 
wrong. Virtue has many degrees. It may stop at that which is 
strictly obligatory, or may extend to actions that are good, but not 
prescribed. In every case, it must avoid extremes. The prin- 
ciples "Ne quid nimis " and "In medio stat virtus " express an 
important truth. In all things, not only defect, but also excess, 
is reprehensible. 

3. Sanction. — (a) Every law must have a sanction; rewards 
for those who respect it, and penalties for those who violate it. 
A sanction is a necessity of justice, since, without it, the law can 
be violated with impunity. To be perfect, it should be universal, 
i.e. reach all men and all actions, and be proportionate to the 
degree of merit or demerit. 

{h) The main sanctions of the moral law are: (i) The legal 
sanction, i.e. that which, in some cases, comes from the civil law. 
(2) The social sanction, i.e. of public opinion. (3) The natural 
sanction, i.e. the various physical, physiological, and mental ad- 
vantages and disadvantages resulting from the observance or 
neglect of moral laws. (4) The moral sanction, i.e. satisfaction 
and remorse. 

(c) That none of these sanctions is sufficient is almost self- 



DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 327 

evident, for they are neither universal nor proportionate. Human 
justice can reach neither all men nor all actions, and is sometimes 
mistaken. The same is true of public opinion, of natural sanctions, 
and of satisfaction and remorse. Their value depends on habit 
and on the delicacy of one's conscience. Nor are such sanctions 
in proportion to merit. Hence, if there is a true sanction, if 
ultimately all things are to be righted, there must be a final 
sanction beyond this life. Otherwise the moral world lacks 
rationality and order. And here again we are led to God as the 
Supreme Judge, who alone, in His infinite science and justice, can 
give to every man what he has merited by his deeds. It is not to 
himself, nor to other men, but to God, as the author of the moral 
order, that man is ultimately accountable for his actions. 



CHAPTER II 

APPLIED ETHICS 

We shall now endeavor to indicate man's most important duties, 
and this determination will be based on the principle enunciated 
above, namely, the exigencies of the rational nature of man as the 
basis of his rights and duties. First, however, it is necessary to 
say a few words about rights and duties in general. 

Right and Duty 

1, Meaning of Right and Duty. — All men and societies insist 
on their rights. Disputes, lawsuits, and wars are undertaken in 
order to protect real or imaginary rights. Less, perhaps too little, is 
heard about the correlative of right, namely, duty, and we are more 
prone to assert our rights than to think of our duties. As a sub- 
stantive, a right is the moral power which a person has to do, omit, 
or exact certain things. Duty corresponds to right. Whenever a 
man has a right, others have the duty to leave him free in the 
exercise of it. Duty, therefore, is the moral obligation to do or 
omit certain things. 

A right is called a moral, not a physical, power. Yet rights 
may be exacted; and the power of coercion, especially by legal 
authority, is a consequence of the moral power. Duty is also a 
moral obligation, not a physical necessity. Man is free to fulfil 
it or not. A right is inviolable, i.e. even if another man fails to 
respect it, it nevertheless remains; for instance, stolen property 
continues to belong to the original owner. 

2. Division of Rights and Duties. — (a) Rights are: 



I. 



(i) natural, i.e., resulting from human nature itself, and the essential 
order of things; hence they are equal in all men. They are the rights 

(a) to be, i.e. to life and the necessaries of life. 

(b) to do, i.e. to the free exercise of one's faculties within due limits. 

(c) to have, i.e. to the possession of the means of living. 
328 



RIGHT AND DUTY 329 

(2) acquired, e.g. the right to own a determined property, to exact cer- 
tain work from a hired servant, to exact wages for one's labor, etc. 

II. (i) absolute, which involve duties on the part of all other persons, e.g. 
the right of ownership of a certain property. 
(2) relative, which involve duties only on the part of some, e.g. the 
rights of parents with regard to their children, of a buyer with 
regard to the vender, etc. 

III. (i) real, i.e. to possess a thing already acquired. 

(2) personal, i.e. to acquire a thing by compelling a person to give it. 

In the former case, the object is mine, in the latter, I can force a 
person to do certain things in my behalf. 

(6) Duties are: 

(i) positive, when they command what must be done. 
(2) negative, when they forbid what must not be done. 

N.B. Many duties may be expressed in both a positive and a 
negative way. Positive duties bind to act in such or such a way 
only at the time for which the action is commanded. Negative 
duties oblige at all times. For instance, it is never lawful to steal, 
whereas a man is not bound to give alms all the time. Negative 
duties are more elementary; they simply forbid evil. Positive 
duties command to do good. 



II. 



(i) natural, based on natural rights. 
(2) positive, depending on positive laws. 



Note the two meanings of positive, one opposed to negative, 
the other to natural. 



III. 



(i) personal, toward self. 
(2) social, toward others. 



IV. regarding 



(i) external goods (property). 

(2) bodily goods (e.g. life, health). 

(3) spiritual goods (e.g. truth, dignity, freedom). 



N.B. The duties toward God, which are the most important, 
should occupy the first place here. As, however, they suppose 



330 ETHICS 

some knowledge of the nature of God and of the relations 
of man to God, it will be more convenient to speak of them in 
Theodicy. 

3. Relations of Rights and Duties, (a) In the same person, 
right and duty are intimately connected. A right is generally 
based on a duty, and man has the duty before he has the right. 
In other words, the reason why man has rights is that their 
exercise is necessary to fulfil certain duties. Thus the rights of 
parents are based on their duty to educate their children; the 
rights of civil authorities are based on their duties toward 
society, etc. All rights are based on the fundamental duty of 
every man to reach his rational end. 

(b) In different persons, right and duty are correlative, in such 
a way that a right is prior to the corresponding duty, since the 
duty is the obligation to respect the rights of others. To all rights 
correspond duties. To all duties do not necessarily correspond 
rights in the strict sense, but only to duties based on justice. 
Thus it may be my duty to give alms, yet another man has not, 
on this ground, any right to my property, nor can he, for instance, 
exact it before the courts. 

(c) Rights are subordinated, not opposed. Hence in the case of 
apparent conflict, one predominates, namely, the stricter — e.g. 
life compared to property; the more extensive — e.g. social 
compared to individual good; the clearer — e.g. parents have a 
clearer claim to be helped by their children than strangers. The 
same is true of duties. Sometimes they seem to be opposed and 
cannot be fulfilled at the same time. In this case, their relative 
value or excellence and their extension must be considered, and the 
more important must prevail. Thus moral is to be preferred to 
temporal good, life to riches, etc. 

4. The Subjects of Rights and Duties are only persons, i.e. in- 
telligent and free agents. Rights and duties suppose a capacity 
for moral obligation and moral power. Hence, strictly speaking, 
animals have no rights, and man has no duties toward them. 
However, man owes to himself and to his reasonable nature to 
treat animals according to their nature, not to ill-treat them or 
make them suffer uselessly, etc. 



DUTIES TOWARD SELF 331 

The two following articles will deal with personal and with 
social ethics. 

ARTICLE I. PERSONAL ETHICS OR DUTIES TOWARD 

ONESELF 

Existence of Duties toward Oneself 

1. Has Man dny Duties to Fulfil toward Himself? — (a) Since 
man is obliged to act in conformity with reason, and to respect 
in himself the dignity of the moral person, he is obliged to use his 
faculties in the manner which reason dictates. As Kant expresses 
it, he must treat human nature, wherever found, as well in himself 
as in others, as an end, not as a means. 

(b) Some duties toward others suppose duties toward oneself; 
for instance, unruly passions like anger, intemperance, sloth, 
carelessness, are obstacles to the fulfilment of duties of justice and 
charity toward others. 

(c) The objection that man, being identical with himself, can- 
not be obliged toward himself has no value, for man is bound 
always to act reasonably. Nor can man renounce all his rights, 
as some of these are essential, and to renounce them is to renounce 
his own reason. Nor, finally, can it be said that man, by fail- 
ing in his duties toward himself, injures himself alone, and is 
at liberty to do so. On account of the law of solidarity among 
members of a society, on account also of heredity, scandal, etc., 
the harm of one member is also the harm of others. Moreover, 
the neglect of duties toward self tends to make man incapable of 
fulfilling duties toward others, as was said above. Finally, the 
moral law does not merely forbid to injure oneself, it commands us 
to perfect our own nature. It may be added that these duties 
are closely related to, and based on, man's duties toward God, for 
man owes it to God to make good use of the faculties received 
from Him. 

2. Basis of These Duties. — The primary root of man's duties 
toward himself is the duty of self-respect. Self-love is a natural 
fact which cannot be eradicated; but self-love must be according 
to reason. Man is a very complex being, and he must love in him- 



332 ETHICS 

self that which is loveworthy, and in the relative degree in which 
it is loveworthy. "Charity begins at home" is a very ill-used 
proverb, yet it is true that, unless we first know, revere, and perfect 
human nature in ourselves, we shall never do so in others. 



I. DUTIES REFERRING CHIEFLY TO THE MIND 

I. Personal Dignity 

I. Self -Respect. — (a) By his reason, will, and freedom, man 
is superior to other beings. He must always keep in mind this 
dignity, and not lower himself, nor suffer himself to be lowered, 
to their level. Hence self-respect will always make man place 
duty before pleasure, reason before the senses, and the will before 
the lower appetites and tendencies. It will prevent him from 
being arrogant and proud, and from exacting from his fellowmen 
more than is due to him, and even from claiming every possible 
advantage and pleasure which he may think himself entitled to. 
It is in conformity with human dignity to forbear and overlook a 
great many things. This shows better man's mastery over himself. 
But there is one thing which it would be against his essential dig- 
nity to surrender, namely, the right and freedom to perform his 
duty, whatever it may be. This right, man must vindicate against 
all who would prevent its exercise. 

(b) Due self-respect and self-esteem will proceed from self-knowl- 
edge. Cicero says: "Illud Tv<i>6l aeavrov noh putare ad arrogan- 
tiam minuendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra 
norimus " (Epist. ad Q. Fratrem, III, 6). Self-knowledge makes 
man aware of what is respectworthy in himself, chiefly his moral 
nature, and prevents him from lowering or allowing anybody to 
lower his hmnan personality. At the same time it prevents him 
from glorying in small advantages which neither come from him 
nor add anything to his real worth. Pride and vanity not only 
cause men to place their dignity in those advantages in which it 
does not consist, but tend to make them "trust in themselves 
and despise others," and thus neglect in others the esteem due to 
their hiunan dignity. Bodily advantages, wealth, dress, etc.. 



DUTIES REFERRING TO MIND 333 

should be of small importance to a man who knows himself and 
his true value. Both in yourself and in others, respect and esteem 
the human person. Humility is truth, and while making man 
aware of his own weakness, failings, and defects, it must not make 
him forget his prerogatives. 

2. Honor and Reputation. — "A good name is better than great 
riches" (Prov. xxii, i). Man must be jealous of his honor and 
good name. He must not do anything that would lessen the 
good opinion others have of him. We speak here of true honor, 
that is, of the homage due primarily to genuine excellence, sec- 
ondarily to old age, excellence, authority, etc. We do not speak 
of the worldly praise bestowed too often on external and vain 
advantages. Frequently the sense of honor degenerates into a 
base human respect which makes one pay undue attention to prej- 
udices and fashions, and even, in consequence, omit what is known 
to be one's duty. At times human judgments are based on ap- 
pearances, wealth, etc., while the real value is overlooked. Hence 
too much attention is not to be paid to the opinions of men. 
Perhaps a man will not be honored when he deserves it, but he 
must be honorable. His endeavor, according to St. Thomas, must 
be "ut studeat facere ea quae sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut 
pro magno aestimet humanum honorem " (Summa Theologica, 
H-H, Q. 129, Art. I ad 3). 

II. Intelligence 

I. In General. — Since intelligence is a fundamental prerog- 
ative of man, and on it depends his whole reasonable conduct, it 
is important to cultivate it, both negatively and positively. Neg- 
atively, by avoiding everything that would tend to obscure it and 
prevent its legitimate exercise, like the undue influence of pas- 
sions or imagination. Positively, by exercising the intelligence, 
developing habits of attention and reflection, and acquiring the 
science of general duties common to all men, and of duties special 
to every man's vocation. All men need not and cannot have 
the same instruction, but all men must know (i) the general 
duties of all men toward God, themselves, and their fellowmen, 
(2) the special duties incumbent upon them on account of their 



334 ETHICS 

condition in life, e.g. the duties of a lawyer, physician, professor, 
etc. The more a man knows, the better able he is to discharge 
his obligations, and be useful to his fellowmen. (Cf. p. 133 ff.) 

2. Veracity, Sincerity, Intellectual Honesty, must always be 
practiced. Man ought not to deceive others, still less deceive him- 
self, by his imprudence and temerity. Avoid temerity in assent- 
ing, dissenting, and doubting; in thinking and reading. Above all, 
avoid stifling the voice of conscience, and making up your mind 
that your action is right and legitimate simply because you want 
to perform it. 

As to veracity toward others, it is not necessary in every case 
to speak the whole truth, still less to try by all possible means 
to make one's opinions prevail, but dissimulation and lying make 
a man abominable in the eyes of others, and should make him 
abominable in his own eyes. On this duty more will be said 
later. 

3. Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue which enables 
man to know where his true interests and those of others are to 
be found. It supposes habits of deliberation, discernment, and 
rectitude of judgment. It excludes rashness and precipitation. 
The greater the interests at stake, the more prudent should one 
be in finding out the means to safeguard them. Intuitions of 
genius are rare. In most cases the rule is that man does not at 
once see the path to be followed, but has to reflect, consult, and 
deliberate. Little by little the mind acquires habits of perspicac- 
ity, sagacity, and sound judgment. The subordination of inter- 
ests is always to be kept in mind, so that lower interests will be 
subordinated to higher ones, (i) Prudence makes man foresee. 
It is not enough to see present advantages or disadvantages. 
Attention must be given to consequences so as to compare the pres- 
ent with the future, and, later on, to have no occasion to be sorry. 
(2) Profit by every experience, happy or unhappy, so as to compare 
the present issue with past success or failure. 

III. Will 

The will must always follow reason, hence avoid precipitation 
and obstinacy. It is above the senses, the passions, and the imag- 



DUTIES REFERRING TO MIND 335 

ination, hence let it guide and rule them. Its main prerogative 
is freedom, hence it must not allow itself to be enslaved by external 
surroundings and human respect, nor by internal influences like 
passions and lower tendencies. (Cf. p. 185 fif.) 

1. The Will must be Strong. — The coward who fears to assert 
himself when duty requires it, and has not enough courage to fol- 
low the dictates of his conscience, is despicable if his weakness is 
voluntary, and worthy of pity if it is not voluntary, 

(fl) Courage is necessary not only to the soldier on the battle- 
field, nor is it the exclusive virtue of some classes of men; it is 
necessary everywhere, since everywhere there are duties to perform, 
and obstacles to overcome in order to fulfil these duties. To resist 
corruption and bribery, to attend to one's duties notwithstanding 
perhaps the attacks and mockery of others, to resist the tempta- 
tion of human respect, to acknowledge one's mistakes and wrongs, 
to watch constantly and resist energetically the lower tendencies 
of human nature, in a word, to proceed manfully along the path of 
duty in spite of all contrary influences, requires courage at every 
instant, a courage which is not the result of a transitory impulse 
or of the hope of glory, but of a calm deliberation, a determined 
will, and strong moral habits. In every condition of Ufe, courage 
and strength of will are indispensable. 

(b) Courage is needed also, not merely to act, but to sufifer. 
Patience, equanimity, and strength in adversity are signs of a strong 
mind. The will must strive to create better conditions, but 
the inevitable cannot be remedied. The will shows courage in 
accepting it with resignation. 

(c) Perseverance in spite of difficulties is an enduring courage, 
both in action and resignation. Courage and perseverance are 
not obstinacy. If a man comes to see that he is wrong, his duty is 
to come back to the right path, and, at times, this also may require 
an uncommon courage. 

2. Moderation and Equality of Temper are signs that the will 
controls the lower tendencies. Irascibility and passion show that 
man is subject to, and ruled by, them. Exuberant joy in prosper- 
ity and depression in adversity indicate the undue influence of 
external circumstances on the will. 



336 ETHICS 

Temperance, both in its most general sense as the avoidance of 
every form of excess, and in its more special application as the 
avoidance of excess in drinking, is an indispensable virtue. Noth- 
ing is more degrading to man than the abuse of intoxicating 
beverages which ruin his health, obscure his mind, weaken his 
will, are sources of innumerable evils both individual and social, 
and lower him to the level of the lowest brute, "Principiis 
obsta," for, chiefly on account of the physiological effects of alco- 
hol, the habit of excess is easily contracted. Gradually a need is 
created which soon becomes too strong for the will. "Modera- 
tion in all things" should be the principle guiding all men, since 
lack or excess are opposed to the dictates of reason. 

3. Self-Control. — All the duties concerning the will may be 
reduced to mastery of and control over oneself. The man who is 
even-tempered, whom prosperity, favor, praise, and success do 
not blind or make proud and arrogant; whom adversity, contra- 
diction, and failure do not make impatient, angry, or discouraged; 
the man who tries to overcome all obstacles that oppose his prog- 
ress on the road of duty; the man who truly possesses his own soul 
and mind and is his own master, this man is truly great and worthy 
of the admiration of all. 

IV. Conclusion 

I. Realization of a Moral Ideal. — One must have a high moral 
ideal, and constantly keep it before his eyes. It will be reaUzed, 
or at least approached, by constant effort and work. Work, 
mental or bodily, is both a pleasure and a necessity, and the idle 
man is a danger to himself and to society. Idleness lessens the 
will's strength, and leaves it unprepared for the time of struggle. 
Like tools which become rusty for lack of use, the faculties be- 
come dull for lack of exercise. All men have duties to fulfil, 
and to fulfil them requires work and effort. In themselves all 
useful works are noble, and all occupations, intellectual or manual, 
praiseworthy. The first place must be given to necessary work, 
then to useful work, and finally leisure may be employed in agree- 
able work, in healthy and becoming recreation which rests the 
mind and the body, and prepares them for further labor. 



DUTIES REFERRING TO BODY 337 

2. Self-Examination. — It is necessary for success to keep busi- 
ness accounts. It is no less necessary to keep ethical accounts. 
Know how you stand with regard to your duties and resolutions; 
verify your gains and losses so as to repair mistakes and prepare 
the future. Examine your conscience frequently, and always 
strengthen your will more and more by new resolutions and by 
fidelity in keeping them. Know your principal defect, and coura- 
geously lay the axe to the root of the tree. Resist your evil 
habits, and endeavor to contract only those that are praiseworthy. 
Know yourself, and always keep your eyes turned on the feelings 
and desires of your heart. 

Thus by constant attention in cultivating his faculties and per- 
fecting his nature will man rise higher and higher, and enjoy the 
happiness which comes from the satisfaction of fulfilling his duties, 
and from the feeling that he is truly the master of all that is in 
himself. 



II. DUTIES REFERRING CHIEFLY TO THE BODY 

These duties do not refer to the organism independently of the 
mind, but in so far as the organism is the necessary condition of 
life, and therefore of the fulfilment of all duties. Health, strength, 
and life are valuable as instruments of the human person. Duties 
referring to the body are negative or positive. 

I. Negative Duties 

The chief negative duty of man is to avoid taking his own life 
by suicide. 

I. Suicide is direct and intentional self-murder committed on 
one's private authority. We say "direct and intentional" to 
indicate that the natural result of the action is the destruction of 
life, and that, in fact, no matter what reason or motive one may 
have, such is the purpose for which the action is performed. Hence 
it is not suicide for a man to endanger his own life when there is 
a sufiicient reason to do so, or a higher duty to fulfil. The soldier 
on the battlefield, the physician treating contagious diseases, the 
man who exposes his life in order to save that of another, do not 
23 



338 ETHICS 

directly kill themselves, but indirectly, by exposing themselves 
to danger. Nor do they intend to do away with their hves, but 
they have in view the good of their country and of their fellow- 
men, which requires this sacrifice. In some cases this sacrifice is 
obligatory, namely, when required by one's strict duty. In other 
cases it is praiseworthy, and may be an act of heroism. Suicide, 
instead of proceeding from noble feelings of self-sacrifice on behalf 
of others, generally proceeds from egoism, fear, weakness, and 
false honor. It has been excused by the Epicureans, the Stoics, 
and some modern philosophers, as at least a remedy against the 
evils of life. When life becomes unbearable, they say, man is 
at liberty to renounce it. 

2. The Reasons Against Suicide are of two kinds. Some may 
be used as arguments ad hominem because they are suited to the 
frame of mind and principles of certain individuals. Others are 
more fundamental and apply to all men. Among the former may 
be mentioned the following. For the Christian, this life is but a 
preparation for a future endless life. Man must not pay too 
much attention to the transitory sufferings of this life which are 
means of purification for his immortal soul. Moreover, man is 
not the master of his own life. It belongs to God who gave it to 
him, and reserves for Himself the right of life and death. He has 
assigned a post to every man, and man has no more right to aban- 
don it than the soldier has the right to abandon the post assigned to 
him by his superiors. Frequently, also, suicide may be shown to be 
an act of cowardice; the motives that prompt to it may be proved 
to be valueless, and the need which others have of one's life may 
be pointed out. 

The foUowihg reasons apply to all. (c) The natural wish to 
live, which is experienced by all, prevents man from committing 
suicide as long as life is enjoyable. Suicide is committed in order 
to avoid shame, misery, or suffering of some kind. But to leave 
man free to take his own life in such cases is to constitute him a 
judge in his own cause, — and no man can be a good judge in his 
own cause — and therefore permit suicide whenever, for any 
reason, a man is tired of life. 

{h) Man's life has a moral purpose, and the moral law is 



DUTIES REFERRING TO BODY 339 

absolute and categorical. Suicide withdraws man from all these 
duties, and therefore makes the moral law merely hypothetical; 
it commands if man does not choose to shirk its obligations. Man 
thus fails to respect in himself the moral person; he makes it a 
mere instrument; a thing instead of a person. 

(c) To commit suicide is to injure others, for it is a bad example; 
it deprives society of one of its members who might still be useful, 
were it only as an example of courage, patience, and resignation. 

The main reasons against suicide are derived from religious 
considerations, as God positively forbids it. Those we have just 
given will be made clearer by answering the main objections. 

3. Objections. — (a) Suicide is a courageous action. — Answer. 
In reality it is cowardice, for it is a sign that man lacks 
strength and energy to bear the trials and difficulties of life. 
The suicide avows himself vanquished since he abandons the 
struggle. 

{h) Life is miserable; sufferings are too great; the disease is 
incurable, or the failure irretrievable. In short, life is an unbear- 
able burden for the individual and for society. — Answer. The 
purpose of this life is not immediate happiness. Moreover, suffer- 
ing is made intolerable largely because it is thought to be so. The 
patience of a number of men amid the greatest and most excruciat- 
ing pains and afflictions shows that, with courage, everything is 
possible. As St. Paul wrote (II Cor. vii, 4) : "I exceedingly abound 
with joy in all our tribulation." And such patience is always a 
great edification for others, while for the sufferer it is a source of 
moral perfection. 

(c) Death is preferable to shame. — Answer. Suicide adds 
another shame to the former. If a man has done nothing wrong, 
the testimony of his conscience is enough, and life will give him 
the means of proving his innocence. If he has committed some 
blameworthy action, life will be an expiation, and will enable 
him to give an example of repentance and of effort toward a 
better life. 

{d) Man may desire death, therefore he may cause it. — Answer. 
It is true that in some cases death appears as a deliverance ; but as 
the soldier may wish to be relieved from a certain duty, and yet 



340 ETHICS 

is not free to leave it, so man cannot, on his own authority, renounce 
his own life. 

4. The Main Causes of Suicide are: (i) Insanity, perpetual or 
temporary. The mind may be so disturbed as to lose its freedom. 
This insanity make take the form of despondency and melancholia, 
which deprive the mind of energy; or that of exaltation and pas- 
sion, which blind the mind and deprive it of the power of reflec- 
tion. Ordinary dispositions and character, temperament, nervous 
diseases, as well as other special circumstances, may lead to suicide. 
A good moral education of the intellect and the will, a physician's 
care, bright surroundings, healthy exercise and distraction, sound 
advice and encouragement, will be useful to do away with ideas 
of suicide. (2) A sensual life, which looks for present happiness, 
prefers it to duty, and makes man too weak to bear disap- 
pointment and suffering. (3) The example of others. Smcides, 
especially sensational suicides, when published, are generally fol- 
lowed by others. It becomes like a contagious disease. Avoid 
sensational reading. 

To counteract these, religious and moral education showing the 
true value of life both in its present and future aspects, the culti- 
vation of the will by the practice of true virtue and courage, will 
prove auxiliaries. 

5. Self-Neglect. — For the same reasons for which suicide is 
immoral, any mutilation of the body and unjustified danger of 
death are also forbidden. Hence temperance, sobriety, modera- 
tion, etc., are duties based on the duty of self-preservation. There 
are cases, however, where it is necessary to remove a part of the 
body in order to save life; and there are circumstances in which 
the temporary loss of reason, e.g. by the use of anaesthetics, is 
also necessary. The body is the instriunent of the soul, and must 
be treated as such, i.e. preserved in its integrity and normal condi- 
tion unless the higher interests of life require that a part of it be 
sacrificed. Nor is this duty opposed to the discreet and prudent 
use of mortification and austerity by which the will is strengthened, 
and the spirit of self-renunciation and self-sacrifice is acquired. 
A little violence to one's natural inclinations, even if they are not 
bad, prepares man for the greatest acts of virtue. 



DUTIES TOWARD OTHER MEN 341 

II. Positive Duties 

1. Care of Life. — Man must not only avoid whatever would 
injure his health, he must also preserve it by hygiene, cleanliness, 
exercise, etc. He must take ordinary care and precaution when 
sick. Extraordinary means, such as very expensive cures or dan- 
gerous operations, are not obligatory. Two extremes must be 
avoided: (i) excessive care and fear, which make one indulge in 
every little comfort, and dread the slightest privation and 
inconvenience; (2) excessive carelessness and negHgence, which 
make one abuse one's strength by intemperance, privation of 
sleep, unnecessary exposure to heat and cold, etc. In all things, 
the body is to be treated according to its nature, as inferior to the 
mind, and as an instnunent which must serve the mind, but also 
as the mind's auxiliary, and as the condition necessary for the mind 
to fulfil its duties. 

2. External Appearance. — What is true of the health of the 
body is true also of its external appearance. Extremes are to be 
avoided by the practice of modesty and moderation. If neglect, 
carelessness, and lack of cleanliness are to be avoided, to put 
one's pride in external advantages and ornaments is no less to be 
blamed. The mind manifests itself in these details. Show that 
yours is orderly and careful, yet withal simple, unostentatious, 
and that its first care is for internal beauty and nobleness, in which 
man's real worth consists. 



ARTICLE II. SOCIAL ETHICS OR DUTIES OF MAN 
TOWARD OTHER MEN 

Existence and Nature of These Duties 

I. In General. — Man does not and cannot live alone. From 
his necessary intercourse with his fellowmen a great number of 
duties arise, some toward all men in general, others toward mem- 
bers of the same group or society. The former may be called social 
duties, social indicating a special reference to all men. It is 
better, however, to refer to them as duties toward individual men 



342 ETHICS 

irrespective of the various groupings, and to reserve the term "so- 
cial " for duties that arise from such groupings. Since all men have 
the same essential nature, all have the same essential rights. Too 
often man is inclined to look upon himself as a privileged person, 
insisting on his own rights and on the duties of others, forgetting 
that he must also consider their rights and his own duties toward 
them. These duties may be summed up in the two fundamental 
maxims: (i) "Do not to others what you would not have them 
do to you." (2) "Do to others what you would have them do 
to you." These two maxims are but the application of the 
Christian precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." 

2. Justice and Charity. — (a) The first maxim refers especially 
to duties of justice. Justice is the respect of the strict rights of 
others, and rests on the equality of all men. The duties which it 
commands are chiefly negative, and determined: "Thou shalt not 
injure thy neighbor " is their general expression. They forbid any 
action which would be against the rights of others, and hence are 
strictly binding, always, in every case, and toward everybody; 
and as a consequence they can be exacted. 

{h) The second maxim refers especially to duties of charity, 
which rest on the community of nature of all men, and on human 
brotherhood. Charity consists in helping others and giving bodily 
and spiritual assistance. Its duties are chiefly positive and in- 
determined. "Thou shalt help thy neighbor" is their general ex- 
pression. They prescribe some action, but do not oblige always, 
nor in every case, nor toward everybody; and as a consequence, 
they cannot be exacted. For instance, justice forbids killing or 
stealing; charity commands to help a sick man and to give alms. 
In the former case, I am forbidden to be an obstacle preventing 
my neighbor from exercising his essential rights. In the latter, 
I am bound to help him although he has no strict right to exact 
this help from me or from any determined man. I must pay my 
debts exactly and at the appointed time. There is no fixed amount 
or time for my obligation of giving alms. However, as noted 
already, the same duty may be both positive and negative from 
different points of view. I am obliged to pay a debt (positive 
action) because I must not keep my fellowman's property (nega- 



DUTIES TOWARD OTHER MEN 343 

tive). Moreover, there are also positive duties arising from jus- 
tice, and negative duties arising from charity. 

(c) Distinct though they are, justice and charity are in close 
relation. Charity supposes justice. Before helping others, it 
is necessary to do them no harm; a man cannot steal in order to 
give alms. A strict and determined obligation comes before a 
general and indetermined one. Even in the exercise of charity 
there may be some kind of justice or equity; certain persons, e.g. 
members of the same family, have a special title to be assisted in 
their needs. On the other hand, justice is not complete without 
charity. Strict rights should not always be exacted, because in 
some cases other men's rights would thereby be injured. Thus 
for the rich man to refuse food to the hungry, or for the employer 
to exact too hard or too long a labor from the workingman, is a 
real injustice. Justice must always be tempered by equity, which, 
before applying the strict rights of justice, considers all circum- 
stances of time and person. In this sense Cicero quotes the ax- 
iom: "Summum ius, summa iniuria" (De Officiis, I, c. 10). To 
be strict to the extreme in matters of justice is to become unjust. 

It may be noted that what is a duty of charity for one may be 
a duty of justice for another on account of his special position. 
An ordinary man is not bound in justice to prevent a criminal 
from wrong-doing, but this is the strict duty of the policeman. 

3. Love. — (a) "He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the 
law" (Rom. xiii, 8). We do not speak here of the special love 
due to some individuals who are "nearer" or more strictly "neigh- 
bors" than others (cf. p. 151), but of the love due to all men in 
general simply because they are men having the same nature as 
ours, and moral persons enjoying the same prerogatives. Hence 
this duty extends even to enemies, because of their human nature 
with its inalienable rights, though not in the sense that we must 
love their depravity or offences. The love of others excludes 
hat-red and the spirit of revenge, although a man may by lawful 
means seek redress for the wrongs he has suffered. It also ex- 
cludes scandal, bad advice, and in general whatever would lead 
others to harm themselves in any manner. 

(b) There are several degrees of love. i. Negative: (i) Not to 



344 ETHICS 

return evil for good, i.e. not to be ungrateful. This is the mini- 
mum and the lowest degree. (2) Not to injure those who have 
not injured us, i.e. to avoid injustice and cruelty. (3) Not to 
return evil for evil, i.e. to avoid vengeance; a man's wrong-doing 
is not excused or justified by that of others. — All these duties 
refer to strict justice. 2. Positive: (i) To return good for good 
— gratitude. (2) To do good to those who have done us neither 
good nor evil — charity and benevolence. (3) To return good 
for evil. It is the most sublime degree of virtue. — These duties 
refer to charity. 



I. DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUAL MEN 

These duties may refer to their persons and personal faculties, 
or to their property. 

I. Duties Toward the Person of Others 

I. Life. — The first right of man, and the condition of all other 
rights, is the right to live. Hence the taking of human life on 
one's private authority, and apart from the necessity of self- 
defence, is always an injustice. 

(a) This does not apply to the killing of another man by public 
authority, as in the case of the executioner, or of soldiers during 
war. If the state has the right to inflict the death penalty 
and to protect its rights by war, it also has the right to the 
necessary means. The individual acts as the agent or instrimient 
of pubhc authority. 

(b) In the case of self-defence, the principle: "Prima sibi cha- 
ritas " may be applied. As pubHc justice would be too late in pro- 
tecting my life and property, I may protect it myself, provided 
the two following conditions be verified: (i) There must be actual 
danger. If the danger is passed, there is no longer self-defence, 
but homicide and vengeance. (2) The violation of the rights of 
others must be as limited as possible. Whatever is not necessary 
is unjustified; it is intentional wrong-doing. An adversary who 
can no longer do any harm because he is wounded or without power, 
ought not to be killed. This right of self-defence extends — in 



DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 345 

justice — not only to the protection of life, but also to that of great 
interests, fortune, freedom, or property; and — in charity — to 
the defence of others. 

(c) Duelling is the meeting of two parties in order to fight with 
weapons apt to kill, after a private agreement as to the time, the 
place, and the weapons. The motive of duels is generally to avenge 
an insult. But this reason has no value whatever, and a duel 
is a most unjust and unreasonable action. It can decide at most 
which of the two adversaries is the more skilful or the stronger. 
It can never decide on whose side right and justice are found. It is 
an act of vengeance, which makes of justice a private affair, and 
constitutes a man a judge in his own cause. It exposes him to the 
danger of suicide by exposing his own life without reason, and 
to that of homicide by exposing himself to the danger of killing 
another on his own authority. 

N.B. What has been said of the life of others applies also, in 
varying degrees, to any action by which their body would be 
injured, or their health impaired. 

2. Dignity and Freedom. — The respect for essential human dig- 
nity forbids any action by which others would be deprived of the 
legitimate use of their freedom. 

(a) Slavery, which makes of man the thing or property of another 
in such a way that the master may dispose of his slave as he pleases, 
and almost without any restriction, is against morality. It lowers 
man to the level of animals, and even of inanimate tools, deprives 
him of his essential dignity, and prevents him from being a truly 
human person. ** 

(b) Man has the right to work, to choose his own profession, 
exercise it, and enjoy the fruit of his labor, since work is but the 
extension and product of his own faculties. 

(c) Conscience, which applies in every case and for every man the 
laws of morality, must not be violated. In things which are not 
otherwise against the rights of other men, or against public order, 
the individual is entitled to freedom of conscience. He may be 
shown that he is mistaken, but, after due investigation, the voice 
of his conscience is for him, and must be for others, sacred. 

(d) Freedom of thought cannot mean that human intelligence is 



346 ETHICS 

free to accept anything as true or false as it pleases, but that man 
has the right to use his faculties in order to discover the truth, 
to examine the foundation of his beliefs, and to stand by his con- 
clusions. It even implies the spreading of his opinions by publi- 
cation. But this right is limited, because certain opinions, even if 
adhered to honestly and bona fide, would be injurious to society, 
for instance, when they encourage immoraUty or excite to crime 
directly or indirectly. 

3. Honor and Reputation. — Man has a right to his honor and 
reputation. Honor is based on excellence, and hence varies with 
individuals. The same marks of honor are not due to a stran- 
ger and to a high public official. Yet to all men some honor is 
due. Reputation or good name is acquired. Hence, although 
some honor is due to a stranger, he has no reputation with those by 
whom he is not known. 

Detraction, which reveals the real defects and faults of a man 
to those who do not know them, and calumny, which falsely attrib- 
utes defects or faults to others, are opposed to the right which all 
men have to their reputation. Calumny is never lawful. In 
some cases, and for serious reasons, it may be justifiable to reveal 
the real wrong-doings of others, e.g. for the sake of good order, to 
preserve the innocent, etc. 

Rash judgment is against both the good use of our faculties and 
the rights of others to our good opinion of them. A little reflection 
will suffice to convince man that many of his judgments concerning 
others are without sufficient basis, and therefore rash, for man is 
ignorant of all the subjective conditions which influence the con- 
duct of others. Only by one who would know all the hidden motives 
and springs of action could an equitable judgment be passed. No- 
body can determine how far another man is personally responsible 
for his actions, and how much must be attributed to his surround- 
ings, education, native disposition, and in general to circumstances 
that do not depend on him. This should make man very careful 
in judging, and especially in expressing unfavorable judgments. 

4. Truthfulness. — (a) Man owes it to himself and to others 
to speak the truth. To himself, because it is a disorder to use 
words that express ideas contrary to those that are present in the 



DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 347 

mind. To others, because social relations and contracts are impos- 
sible if man is allowed to lie. A man may deceive others in good 
faith when he is himself mistaken. This is not a he; to he is to 
speak intentionally against one's mind. 

{h) The obligation to speak the truth does not always imply 
the obligation to speak the whole truth. Discretion is also a neces- 
sary virtue, and frequently a man would be wrong if he told all 
he knew. Things are to be kept secret (i) on account of their 
nature, when their revelation would be injurious to others, and 
when the person whom they concern is known to be opposed to 
their manifestation; (2) hy promise, when the engagement has 
been taken not to reveal a certain imparted information; (3) by 
trust, when the information is given only on the expressed or im- 
plied condition that it will not be communicated. Such are pro- 
fessional secrets, e.g. of lawyers and physicians. All secrets must 
be kept unless there should be serious reasons, proportionate to 
the nature of the case, which make it obligatory to reveal them. 

(c) Whenever a man speaks imtruly without being questioned 
he is guilty of lying. He also hes when he deceives those who 
have the right to know the truth. But, for good reasons, the truth 
may be concealed by giving the questioner to understand that 
we are not at liberty to speak, or by using expressions which are 
understood by all. Thus a servant answers that his master "is 
not at home," meaning that he is not at home to receive visitors in 
general, or this visitor in particular. Expressions even more mis- 
leading may be used if the circumstances justify it. In the con- 
flict of two rights, the right of my neighbor not to be deceived, 
and my right to keep a secret, the former must yield, since, as we 
suppose, my neighbor has no strict right to know the truth, whereas 
I have a strict duty to keep a secret. But in all things acquire 
habits of rectitude and truthfulness. You may not say everything 
you think, but generally let everything you say be the true 
expression of your thought. 

II. Duties Toward the Property of Others 

I. Fact of Ownership. — (a) Men look upon certain things as 
their property (proprium, one's own exclusively). They claim and 



348 ETHICS 

exercise the right to use these things and dispose of them as they 
please. This right is called the right of ownership, and the limits 
of its exercise are determined by the natural laws of justice and 
charity, and by civil laws such as those concerning contracts, wills, 
etc. 

(b) Ownership is private or public according as the property 
belongs to the individual or to the community (municipality, 
state, nation). Public property is sometimes used for specified 
purposes and by certain individuals only (e.g. certain public 
buildings and ofl5ces). Sometimes the free use of it is allowed to 
all (e.g. streets, parks). 

(c) Private ownership extends to whatever is useful or pleasur- 
able and capable of being appropriated. It does not extend to 
those things which are necessary to all and the supply of which is 
sufiicient for all, like air, the heat and light of the sun, etc. Ob- 
jects of ownership may be reduced to (i) natural products, indepen- 
dent of man's industry (e.g. fruit, fish, game) ; (2) the products of 
labor and industry (e.g. machinery, manufactured articles); (3) 
mixed products (e.g. domestic animals, vegetables in a garden, 
land which is improved by culture). From another point of view 
the objects of ownership are either non-productive, when they 
are owned simply for the enjoyment which may be derived from 
them; or productive (capital), when they are used as means of 
production. 

As a matter of fact such objects have been appropriated; whether 
justly or not remains to be seen. 

2. Socialism. — It is needless to speak of the extreme views of 
communism according to which not only should private ownership 
be abolished, but the state should have perfect control of every- 
thing, including labor, religion, social relations, marriage, etc. 
Such theories are commonly abandoned to-day, even by the adver- 
saries of private ownership, whose views are generally included 
under the general term of socialism. 

But it is very diflScult, not to say impossible, to give a definition 
of socialism because of the many forms which it takes. In general 
it is the tendency to reduce individualism and to increase the rights 
of the community in matters referring to ownership. It denies all 



DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 349 

or some forms of private ownership. In general it allows it for 
objects that are non-productive, e.g. books, pictures, food and 
drink, etc. On the contrary, capital, that is, all means of pro- 
duction, such as mines, canals, railroads, mails, telegraphs, land, 
machinery, factories, etc., should be owned collectively, and man- 
aged by the rulers of the community. Some, however, would allow 
the private ownership of everything except land. 

Thus primarily socialism advocates economical reforms. But 
in many instances, it has also advocated moral and religious re- 
forms, and manifested unequivocal hostility to Christian beliefs 
and practices. With these extreme views we have nothing to do 
at present. 

3. Foundation of Private Ownership. — The following rights 
are natural to man, and must always be respected. 

(a) Man has a strict right to the necessaries of life, not only for 
the present, but also for the future, (i) Sickness and want may 
come, and old age will certainly come. The prudent man fore- 
sees and prepares the future in a stable and permanent manner. 
(2) Moreover, the healthy man's work is not always actually 
remunerative. Time is required for planning, trying, and experi- 
menting. During this interval it is necessary for man to have 
the means of subsistence. To permanent needs must correspond 
permanent resources. (3) Finally, progress requires a certain 
freedom from need, and even from the care concerning the means 
of living. Frequently the best works of art "don't pay," and even 
the most useful inventions are not recognized at once. Happiness 
requires some leisure and freedom. If following always one's own 
good pleasure is not the highest ideal, the other extreme, doing 
always what pleases others, is still farther from giving satisfaction 
to human aspirations. 

(b) What is true of the individual is true also of the family. 
Man must not only provide for himself, but for his wife and 
children. To this end he needs property which he can keep 
permanently and of which he can dispose. 

(c) Any theory of property must safeguard these rights. It 
seems evident that some kind of private ownership is required, 
since otherwise man does not obtain the full value of his labor, 



350 ETHICS 

laziness and crime are encouraged, and it becomes impossible to 
provide for one's own welfare. This is commonly accepted by 
moderate socialists, who admit the private ownership of commod- 
ities, but reject the private ownership of capital. The question 
thus becomes chiefly a social and economical problem which 
cannot be discussed at length here. Only a few indications will 
be given. 

4. Discussion. — By capital is meant any source of wealth and 
any means of production. That the state may own some of these 
goes without saying. The state owns land. Monopolies are 
restrictions of the rights of individuals to manufacture and sell 
certain articles. Whether, how far, and in regard to what articles 
state-monopoly is expedient is a question to which no general 
answer can be given, as expediency varies with times, places, and 
conditions. But the question is whether all means of production 
should be common property administered by the state authorities. 

(a) With regard to production, better care is taken of what is 
one's own than of what is common property. More labor will be 
given, and greater diligence will be used by the individual, if the 
products are to remain his own than if they are to be shared in 
common. The hope to turn again the fruit of one's labor into new 
capital is a great incentive to work and application. Capital is 
generally transformed labor. It is a surplus which the individual 
does not need, and which belongs to him as the product of his own 
faculties. Competition, notwithstanding its disadvantages, serves 
a good purpose in stimulating activity and inventiveness. 

{b) With regard to consumption and distribution, common owner- 
ship is open to many objections. Will the products be divided 
among all equally, or according to merit, or according to need? (i) 
Equality will tend to make man lazy. Moreover, it seems unjust 
to treat all men alilce, whether they be dihgent or careless. (2) On 
the other hand, who will pronounce on respective merits and needs? 
Here the door is open to innumerable abuses. How can the merits 
be estimated? On the quantity or the quahty of the work? In 
both cases there will be dissatisfaction. 

(c) With regard to the work to be done. Some kinds of work are 
agreeable; others disagreeable. Some are looked upon as noble; 



DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 351 

Others as menial. How will it be possible to give satisfaction to 
everybody? There is too much room for discrimination and 
favoritism. 

(d) The same arguments apply to land. Even if it is not to- 
tally the fruit of labor, it has been improved by labor, and of itself 
would produce very little. In many cases land has been acquired 
with one's earnings. It must also be noticed here that the common 
right to live does not mean the right to the same means and mode 
of Uving. It is true that ultimately everything necessary to life 
comes from the land, but man can live without actually owning 
any land, for he can procure its products by exchange. 

5. Conclusion. — (i) In conclusion we may note that social- 
ism tends to lessen individual freedom. (2) If the exclusive 
right of o^vnership is unjust, socialism, which advocates state- 
property, is also imjust. Even then property is held exclusively 
by a certain group of men, and the same inequality which socialism 
seeks to remove recurs on a larger scale. Logically socialism leads 
to the abolition of national ownership. (3) Finally socialism 
supposes falsely that, according to the doctrine of private owner- 
ship, the rights of owners are unlimited, that the owner can use, 
misuse, and abuse his property. It insists on present social evils 
which cannot be denied, but suggests an extreme and dangerous 
remedy, worse perhaps than the evil itself. Inequality and dis- 
satisfaction will always be found, and perfection is not attainable. 

Moreover, it is important to distinguish between (i) getting rich 
by making others poorer, e.g. by theft, open or concealed; (2) get- 
ting rich without changing the condition of others; (3) getting 
rich while helping others, e.g. manufacturers, railroad companies. 
Laws must be made to prevent the first of these modes, which is 
strictly unjust, and to protect the interests of the working classes. 
Present conditions may be bettered by wise legislation and by 
the prudent intervention of the state. Owners must be reminded 
of their duties of justice and charity. Generally a sound view 
is to be found between extreme and radical theories. 

6. Main Rights and Duties of Proprietors. — (a) Rights: (i) 
To give, exchange by contract, and bequeath by will. This right 
is not unlimited, but restricted by the natural laws of justice and 



352 ETHICS 

charity, as well as by civil laws enacted for the common good. 
(2) To exclude others. Hence theft, open robbery, fraud, cheat, 
are against justice. (3) These rights must be exercised according 
to reason, and with due respect for the rights of others. 

(b) Duties: (i) All men have a strict right to live. Hence in 
case of extreme necessity they mai-i 'appropriate what they strictly 
need, and this help cannot be refused without injustice. (2) In 
labor contracts both parties must jtand by their mutual agreement. 
The workingman must respect his employer's person and property, 
and use diligence in fulfilling his duties. The employer must give 
a just salary to the workingman, respect his human dignity, and 
consequently give him necessary rest, as well as the time and 
opportunity to fulfil all his duties. (3) Charity commands alms- 
giving and beneficence. (4) Those who are rich and influential 
are more strictly obliged to give good example. 

II. SOCIAL DUTIES 

Society in General. — (a) Social duties result from man's condi- 
tion as a member of society. As understood here, society is the 
permanent union of several men working together to reach a 
common end. (i) Members of the society supply the capital, 
will, energy, activity, etc., necessary to the common purpose. 

(2) The permanence that is required varies with the different kinds 
of societies. A mere fortuitous meeting and cooperation do not 
constitute a society. (3) The community of end brings about 
the union, but this union cannot subsist without some authority 
which will preserve it, prevent abuses, keep the members together, 
and give to all a uniform direction. Without it, individual 
members could never cooperate effectively. 

{b) Societies differ: (i) According to their origin. They are 
natural when required by human nature itself, like the family; 
conventional when based on a free agree nent, e.g. a scientific 
or industrial association. (2) According to their purpose. They 
may be religious, moral, scientific, benevolei ', commercial, etc. 

(3) According to the mode of union. They may be based on 
justice, when the members have strict rights, e.g. partnership, 



SOCIALDUTIES 353 

insurance companies, etc; or on merely friendly or charitable 
relations, when the union can be broken without injustice because 
the members have no strict rights. 

Here two societies only deserve our attention, the family and 
the state, which are natural societies. The others are more 
arbitrary, and depend on special free agreements. 

I. Tip: Family 

I. Nature. — (c) Sometimes the term "family" denotes a group 
or succession of persons connected by blood relationship, and 
includes even distant relatives and ancestors. It may even be 
restricted to a distinguished and ancient lineage. Properly it 
means a natural group of persons consisting of parents and chil- 
dren, especially children who still live with their parents. 

(b) A family is constituted by marriage, i.e. by a contract which 
unites a man and a woman for the special purpose of raising chil- 
dren, (i) Marriage is a union contracted freely, to which neither 
party is compelled. (2) In most civilized countries marriage is 
contracted between one man and one woman. Polyandry or plu- 
raUty of husbands is not practised. Polygamy or pluraUty of 
wives is recognized in a few nations, but is opposed not only to 
peace and harmony in the family, but to the dignity of the 
woman, who is bound where the man is free. 

(c) Marriage is a lasting and permanent union, for both parents 
are necessary to the welfare and education of their children. Di- 
vorce, however, is not strictly, essentially, and in all cases, opposed 
to the essential purpose of marriage, (i) Indissoluble marriage 
is better, and almost indispensable for the nurture and education 
of childisn. (2) The possibility of divorce suggests the adoption 
of the means necessary to secure it. (3) Most domestic troubles 
would be adjusted if divorce were impossible. Marriage would not 
be looked upon as so light and easy an affair, nor contrad;>ed so 
carelessly. (4) Divafse is a source of dissension among families; 
it lowers the sense of duty and responsibility. 

N.B. Looking. i tot marriage as a sacrament under the legisla- 
tion of the Church, absolute divorce with the freedom to marry 
again is unlawful. 
24 



354 ETHICS 

2. Duties of the Members of the Family. — (a) Duties of 
married persons, (i) Before marriage great care must be taken 
by them to know each other well, and not to be prompted by mere 
motives of passion. They must also preserve their health and 
purity, and do nothing which they would be ashamed to have the 
other party know. (2) After marriage they must keep the mutual 
faith which they have pledged to each other. Disguised or secret 
polygamy is an injustice for both the husband and the wife, who 
have the same rights. They also owe to each other mutual love 
and assistance. The husband, because he is stronger, contrib- 
utes more to the material means of living and to the protection 
of the family. He is the head, but must remember that the wife 
in her household duties, does a work equally essential, that she is 
not a slave, but a companion equal in rights and dignity. Finally, 
husband and wife must always keep in view the essential end of 
marriage and do nothing that would be opposed to it. 

(b) Duties of parents. Children require the care of their parents 
for their physical, mental, and moral development. Hence the 
natural duties of parents are to give to their children the neces- 
saries of Kfe, instruction, moral and reHgious education. They 
must remember the importance of good example and of the early 
education of both the intelligence and the will. On these the 
child's future depends. The authority of parents decreases as 
the child grows older and better able to guide and direct himself. 

(c) Duties of children. Children owe their parents (i) love, 
respect, and gratitude; (2) obedience, except where the command 
would be opposed to moraHty and the dictates of conscience; (3) 
help and assistance in their need. Moreover, duties of charity 
bind children of the same family among themselves in a special 
manner. 

II. The State 

I. Nature. — (a) Obvious facts, (i) Men live in certain groups 
determined by territories with natural or conventional hmits, by 
community of language and of interests, etc. (2) Some of these 
groups are under the same government. They vary in size, popu- 
lation, and form of government. (3) A state is one of these groups. 



SOCIAL DUTIES 355 

with a certain number of men, in the same territory, and under the 
same authority. 

(6) Explanation of terms. The Greeks used the word ttoXis for 
both the city and the state. (Cf. "poHcy," "poHtic," and deriva- 
tives.) The Roman " civitas " was the body of citizens, and also the 
city as the nucleus of the state. (Cf. "citizen," "civil," and deriva- 
tives.) The res publica referred to the good of the state in general, 
and did not, Uke our term "republic," mean a special form of gov- 
ernment distinct from monarchy. (Cf. the EngUsh term "common- 
wealth.") To-day the term "state," which originally means any 
condition, is appropriated to mean the political organization, and 
chiefly those who exercise authority. "Nation" refers to all 
aspects of the state's collectivity, and "people" to the persons 
living in the same state. These terms, however, are frequently 
used for one another. Other terms like "empire," "kingdom," 
"republic," "country," "land," "fatherland," have a more re- 
stricted meaning. 

{c) The essential elements of a state are: (i) A plurality of men 
and families, the number of which varies greatly. (2) A unity 
and cohesion under the same common authority and with the same 
organization. (3) A fixed territory. Nomadic peoples are not — 
or rather were not — perfect states. (4) Independence and 
freedom in administration and government. Colonies are not 
perfect states, and, as in our Republic individual states have only 
a limited autonomy under the same constitution and the same 
federal authorities for points determined by their mutual agree- 
ment, the "United States" is the true and perfect state and 
nation. 

2. Origin. — Without discussing at length the various theories 
concerning the origin of civil society, it may not be without interest 
and utility to mention briefly the most important. 

(a) Hobbes, in England, and Rousseau, in France, are the most 
conspicuous advocates of the theory according to which the origin 
of civil society is not to be sought in human nature itself, but in 
a free agreement or social contract. 

Starting from the principle that the end of man is pleasure and 
happiness, and that every man is the judge of what makes him 



356 ETHICS 

happy, Hobbes infers that man has a natural right to whatever is 
conducive to happiness. Hence all men have natural rights to 
all things. This necessarily creates an antagonism, or "the war 
of every man against every man." Such an individuahsm is 
natural to man, and the state of society is against nature. This 
condition, however, being an obstacle to happiness, men, by mutual 
agreement, surrender their rights and estabhsh a power which 
must be strong enough to paralyze individual forces. Hence the 
stronger, the more extensive, and the more absolute the power 
of the state, the better will it be able to fulfil the purpose for 
which it was instituted. Thus are justified the most abso- 
lute despotism and tyranny which man can no longer resist or 
change, since he permanently renounced his rights. 

According to Rousseau, all men are equal by nature, and no 
man has the right to command another. Society which sup- 
poses superiors and inferiors cannot therefore be natural. It 
originates from a free contract by which men surrender their 
individual rights to a common authority constituted, not necessarily 
by all men unanimously, but by the majority. Hence Rousseau's 
conclusion is diametrically opposed to that of Hobbes: Au- 
thority is binding only as long as the individuals want it. What 
the majority has done it can undo at will, and the state is 
complete and absolute democracy. 

(b) What is to be thought of these views? (i) Historically 
they are gratuitous — for there is no record of such a contract; 
and false — for history shows that man, at all times and every- 
where, lived in society, and traces back the state to an extension 
and a development of the family. (2) The assumptions of the 
system are either contradictory or impossible. Thus the right of 
every man to everything amounts to the negation of rights, since 
a man cannot have a right unless other men have the duty to 
respect it. That all men are born equal is true only if we speak of 
an equaUty of nature; but is there equality of health, intelligence, 
will, capacities, power, etc.? That all men are bom free is true of 
psychological freedom, not of moral freedom. The very nature 
of man imposes duties on him. (3) Such a contract is impossible, or 
rather invalid, both because the parties did not know the extent 



SOCIAL DUTIES 357 

of the obligations which they were assuming, and because, in order 
to be binding, a contract supposes at least some general duties of 
justice, and the general obligation of abiding by contracts. But 
this is impossible if, as it is claimed, the social contract is the 
principle of all determined rights and duties. (4) The conse- 
quences of the system are either despotism (Hobbes), or anarchism 
(Rousseau). 

(c) To live in society is natural to man, i.e. required by man's 
very nature, (i) At all times, history shows man living in society. 
(2) Social organization is needed for the complete physical and 
mental development of the individual. Otherwise the individual 
and the family are left to their own private resources, which are 
uncertain and frequently insufficient. In other words, human 
progress requires organization, diversity and subordination of 
functions, analogical to those which take place in the human 
organism. (3) Freedom, far from being destroyed by the social 
organization, is really preserved. Without such an organization, 
the weaker is at the mercy of the stronger; his life and property 
are insecure. (4) The social feelings of love, sympathy, etc., 
manifest the nature of man. Progress and civilization in their 
various aspects result from combined efforts. 

3. Civil Authority. — (a) As civil society is natural to man, 
so also is civil authority, for there can be no organization without 
a directive power. "The^pgrsons in whom such authority will be 
vested are designated by the community. The methods of designa- 
tion and of transmission of power vary with the different political 
constitutions, the power being sometimes hereditary, sometimes 
elective. The people are not the government, but simply indicate 
those who will govern. 

(b) There are three elementary types of government: (i) Mon- 
archy, when the authority resides in one man. (2) Aristocracy, 
when it resides collectively in several citizens. (3) Democracy, 
when all the citizens take a more or less direct part in the govern- 
ment. These elementary forms may be combined in varying 
manners and degrees. Absolute monarchy has disappeared from 
the civiUzed world. The monarch's power is limited by a 
constitution, and by parliaments composed of the people's repre- 



358 ETHICS 

sentatives. Every one of these forms has its advantages and 
disadvantages, and consequently it is impossible to determine 
universally which is the best. It depends on the aptitudes, 
aspirations, traditions, etc., of the various nations. 

(c) The government includes the legislative power, i.e. the power 
to make laws; the executive power, which enforces these laws and 
takes the means to have them respected; the judicial power, which 
applies the laws to particular cases and punishes the offenders. 
(See the Constitution of the United States.) 

4. Functions and Rights of the State. — (a) The function of 
the state is twofold: (i) To protect the rights of individuals and 
families by imposing the respect of these rights, determining them 
when they are uncertain, and settling the various conflicts of rights. 
(2) To help and promote public interests in the intellectual and 
the economic order. 

{b) The state has the rights necessary to the exercise of these 
two functions, namely, the rights: {x) To impose certain conditions 
respecting contracts, sales, wills, etc., and to make other regulations 
for the public good; to settle disputes, e.g. between capital and 
labor; and to determine and protect the rights of all. (2) To 
promote public welfare by encouraging private enterprises, and by 
undertaking what is impossible for individuals, e.g. roads, canals, 
etc. (3) To help parents in the fulfilment of their duties referring 
to the physical, intellectual, and moral education of their children. 
(4) To punish all infractions of laws by inflicting just penalties, 
proportionate to the gravity of the offence, and capable of pro- 
tecting society. As far as possible penalties must be of such a 
nature as to deter others, repair the wrong caused, and give the 
offender chances and opportunities to amend. Whether or not 
the death penalty is advisable depends on how far it is neces- 
sary to prevent crime. (5) To protect the rights of the whole nation 
by war. But war being a duel of nations, the same objection 
already given against the duel applies here also. War manifests the 
strength, wealth, and military organization, not the moral right 
or wrong, of a nation. Moreover, the harm done by war is in- 
calculable, and for this reason, war, especially offensive war, is 
not to be undertaken except for the gravest reasons. It is to be 



SOCIAL DUTIES 359 

hoped that some other means of settling international disputes 
will soon be universally agreed upon. 

(c) What are the limiis of the rights of the state ? How far must 
it allow individual liberty? This question cannot be given an 
answer applying to all nations. It must vary with the circum- 
stances, traditions, degrees of civihzation, modes of government, 
and a number of other influences. What would be looked upon as 
tyranny in one nation may be the wisest course in another. 

5. The Rights and Duties of Citizens are especially the follow- 
ing: 

(a) To obey laws and respect the authority of those whose duty 
it is to enforce them. A law is for the common good, and enacted 
by those to whom the people themselves have delegated the legis- 
lative power. The only exception is for obviously unjust and 
tyrannical laws. 

{b) To pay taxes. The state needs resources to protect the 
rights and freedom of the citizens, and to foster their welfare. 

(c) To show their patriotism, both in time of peace and in time 
of war; to love and revere the flag which is the emblem of the 
nation. 

((f) To take part in government affairs as much as the constitu- 
tion allows; hence, in a democratic state, to vote for worthy 
officers and representatives. 

Although, in general, obedience is due to civil authority, resist- 
ance becomes lawful when the government is habitually tyrannical 
and unable to fulfil its functions. However, there must be a 
chance of success, and all possible moderation is to be used. A 
government which is no longer fit to fulfil its mission, which 
destroys instead of building up, is no longer for the good of 
the people. (Cf. Declaration of Independence of the United 
States.) 



CONCLUSION 

The faithful fulfilment of all his duties increases man's moral 
worth. Acting according to the dictates of his conscience cannot 
fail to make man better. This increase constitutes essentially 
what is called merit. Merit is also frequently used to mean 
the right to the retribution due to good and to bad actions. The 
degrees of merit vary in proportion to (i) the importance of the 
duty which is fulfilled and of the good which an action realizes; 

(2) the difficulty of the duty and of the effort which it requires; 

(3) the intention of the agent. Thus it is more meritorious to 
sacrifice oneself for common than for private interests; to give 
alms out of pure charity than out of vanity; to resist a strong 
passion than to do good without effort, etc. It is more blamable 
to kill than to hurt a man; to hate one's parents than to hate 
strangers; to fail in one's duty through malice and wickedness, 
than to do so out of weakness and human respect, etc. 

Virtue is the habit of acting according to the dictates of con- 
science. It is not merely an external appearance, but an intrinsic 
reaUty. It does not make man act well "in order to be seen by 
men," but out of respect for the moral law; not because otherwise 
he would be punished, but because the dictates of his conscience are 
higher for him than anything else. The moral law extends farther 
than the civil law, and governs even the hidden motives and secret 
thoughts. The virtuous man does not ask himself whether human 
justice can and will reach him. He simply acts according to what 
he knows to be his duty. Virtue is susceptible of progress, and, 
since the noblest prerogative of man is his moral nature, his highest 
ambition should be to become greater, worthier, more and more 
perfect, and to be instrumental in helping others toward the same 
end. 

From what has been said in psychology and in the present 
treatise, the student will easily infer the importance of giving an 

360 



CONCLUSION 361 

early attention to the moral nature of man, and the most important 
means by which this should be done. The facts of imitation and 
example, the influence of early impressions, the necessity of con- 
sistency between a man's principles and his conduct, cannot be 
insisted upon too strongly. The good should not only be known, 
but loved and practised. Let every man work constantly; effort 
strengthens the will and increases the energy. Let the effort be 
generous; it cannot fail to bring its reward. 



EPISTEMOLOGY OR THE THEORY 
OF KNOWLEDGE 



INTRODUCTION 



I. THE NATURE OF EPISTEMOLOGY 

I, The Aim of Epistemology, — (c) Among the various mani- 
festations of conscious activity psychology numbers cognitive 
processes, and examines their nature and development. Logic 
deals with the rules to which such processes must conform in order 
to avoid contradiction and reach valid conclusions. But neither 
psychology nor logic touches upon the question of the relation of 
ideas and judgments in the mind to the reality of things outside 
the mind. Both remain confined within the mind itself. They 
do not examine whether knowledge, which they assiune to be 
objective, is so in reality; whether, how far, and imder what 
circumstances we may be said truly to know extramental objects; 
whether the facts and principles which are looked upon as true are 
anything but a dreamlike mental play, a product of our own facul- 
ties, springing from the very nature of o\xr minds; whether, in 
other words, we do not know things as we are rather than as 
they are. 

ib) Both in the course of ages as well as at the same period of 
time, the ceaseless contradictions of men on almost every point 
of science and philosophy, the changes of opinion that take place 
in the same mind and on the same subject, the munerous illusions 
of both senses and intellect, the influence gf a miiltitude of cir- 
cumstances, especially of intellectual surroundings and education, 
on all our judgments, arouse in the mind the suspicion that perhaps 
knowledge in its totahty, not only needs a thorough revision, but 

362 



NATURE OF EPISTEMOLOGY 363 

is only an illusion of the mind that mistakes for objective realities 
that which is merely subjective. The purpose of epistemology is to 
ascertain the validity of knowledge and the conditions of this validity. 

2. The Term "Epistemology." — Etymologically, epistemology 
(iTna-rrjfir], knowledge or science, and Aoyos, speech or thought) 
means the science of knowledge, i.e. the part of philosophy which 
deals with the value of human knowledge. It is also called the 
"Theory of Knowledge," "Criteriology," or "Critical Philosophy," 
because its aim is to criticise the faculties of knowledge and to 
indicate the signs or criteria of valid knowledge. The names of 
"Applied," "Material," or "Critical Logic" are unsatisfactory 
because logic, as understood to-day, deals exclusively with the 
formal laws of thought. Nor is epistemology to be identified with 
metaphysics. It is rather an introduction to metaphysics which 
studies reaUty in order to determine its true nature. Epistemology 
completes psychology and logic, and leads into metaphysics, since 
the value of knowledge can hardly be examined without saying 
something on the objects of knowledge. Here epistemology will 
be treated as a transition from the subjective to the objective world. 

3. The Importance of Epistemology can hardly be overesti- 
mated, although, as a special science, it is of comparatively recent 
origin. Partial discussions are found in older philosophers, but 
Locke is the first clearly to state the problem, and Kant the first 
to attempt its solution on epistemological and critical principles. 

In the beginning of philosophical speculation, as well as in the 
beginning of the individual man's cognitive Ufe, knowledge in 
general is accepted as valid without any discussion. Soon, how- 
ever, contradiction, error, conflicts of opinion, the necessity of 
discarding as worthless some assents formerly looked upon as valid, 
lead the mind to compare, test, and revise these assents. If what 
was thought to be a truth is later on proved to be an error, it 
becomes necessary to find out whether there is any kind of knowl- 
edge which is certainly valid, and what are the tests of valid truths. 
This is the fundamental problem of epistemology and the basis 
of every investigation, rational or religious. That opinions change 
on a great number of points is undeniable. A truth for one is 
an error for another. A truth at one time is an error at another 



364 EPISTEMOLOGY 

time. Does everything change? Are there truths the assent to 
which is and always should be unanimous? If so, what are they? 



n. FACTS AND PROBLEMS 

I. Facts 

All men desire to know, but not the same things, nor through 
the same means; there is no man whose curiosity is not frequently 
aroused, and who is not eager to see, hear, understand, obtain 
information, reach the truth, do away with doubt and perplexity. 
In order to be understood, this fact supposes some definitions of 
truth and certitude — not final and forever settled definitions; 
this is impossible now — but definitions of the terms as commonly 
understood by all men. 

I. Truth. — The term "truth," clear as it may seem at first, 
is difficult to define, and has several meanings. Thus we say of 
a man that he is a true orator; of a metal that it is true or genuine 
gold; of a man that he knows the truth, i.e. that liis ideas corre- 
spond to reality and are such as they should be; of a man that he 
is truthful, i.e. that he speaks according to what he thinks. We 
are thus led to distinguish three kinds of truth, every one of which 
consists in the relation of something extramental to something mental. 

(a) Moral truth, referred to in ethics, is the conformity of the 
expression with the thought. We need not stop to consider this 
meaning. 

{h) Ontological truth is a relation of conformity between a thing, 
as existing outside the mind, and the representation of it in the 
mind. True wine is for me what I consider as essential to wine, 
namely, a certain composition, certain properties, etc. True gold 
is a substance corresponding really to the definition given by the 
physicist. I may mistake an adulterated product for wine, or 
another metal for gold, or an imitation for a precious stone. The 
error will be in the mind, yet the thing itself will be truly what 
it is. 

(c) Logical truth is the conformity between the subjective or 
mental representation and the objective reality or ontological 



FACTS AND PROBLEMS 365 

truth. Thus, if adulterated wine is oflfered as true or genuine, and 
I accept it as such, my judgment is false; if I recognize it as an 
adulteration, my judgment is true. If I believe that true gold 
is only an imitation, I am mistaken; if I admit its genuineness, 
I judge truly. 

(d) Thus ontological truth resides primarily in things; logical 
truth, primarily in the mind. The former, however, implies the 
comparison of a concrete object with something mental, namely, 
with a definition, an abstract type, and certain characteristics 
conceived by the mind as essential. The latter implies the com- 
parison of a concrete idea with things themselves as known, for 
instance, by the manufacturer in the examples given above. A 
true photograph or statue represents faithfully the features of the 
original; a true Murillo is a painting which is really the work of 
this artist; true wine is really made of grapes, etc. True in this 
sense may be synonymous with such terms as genuine, original, 
faithful, etc. It always implies that a thing is what it should be 
when judged according to a certain mental standard or ideal, 
which, of course, may vary indefinitely. A true judgment is one 
that corresponds to the fact or the thing as it is. Thus I buy a 
picture as a true Murillo, and if it is so in reality my judgment 
is true. 

(e) The epistemological problem goes farther than these simple 
facts. Epistemology investigates whether our standards them- 
selves have anything objective, and how much; whether what we 
conceive as true is in reality what it seems to be. Soluble or 
insoluble, this problem has been raised and must be examined. 

(/) From what has been said it follows as a conclusion that both 
forms of truth consist in a certain conformity between external 
things and the mind, a relation which goes from things to the mind 
in ontological truth, and from the mind to things in logical truth. 
Primarily ontological truth is found in things; logical truth, in 
the mind. With regard to the logical truth contained in a given 
judgment, mental attitudes vary greatly and include many degrees 
of confidence or distrust. The assent or dissent may be more or 
less firm and stable. There may be certitude or incertitude. In 
other words, the attitude of the mind varies. 



366 EPISTEMOLOGY 

2. Mental Attitudes. — (a) Before a question or fact is pre- 
sented to my mind: "Is it so or not so? " I am in the state of com- 
plete ignorance concerning such a question or fact. "I don't 
know," and I am not even aware of my ignorance on this special 
point, since, in order to be aware of it, I should at least be aware 
that such a question or problem may be raised. 

(b) As soon as the question is asked, I may have no reason to 
afl&rm or deny; I answer again: "I don't know." Properly 
speaking, this is negative doubt, frequently also called ignorance, 
the state of a mind totally ignorant of the reasons pro and con, 
and hence unable to give any assent owing to the lack of evidence 
on both sides. 

(c) Reasons may be given in favor of one alternative, which 
would sway the mind in this direction, were it not for reasons 
equally strong on the opposite side. As it is, reasons pro and con 
balance each other, and again the same answer is given: "I don't 
know." Although I do know a great deal, perhaps even all that 
can actually be known on the subject, I cannot give my assent 
either to the afl&rmation or to the negation. This is positive doubt, 
a state of suspense because the mind is unable to pronoimce 
on account of the equal weight of reasons for the opposite 
alternatives. 

(d) The reasons on one side may clearly outweigh those on the 
other. The latter, however, retain some force, and, when I give 
my adhesion to the former alternative, it cannot be an unlimited 
and perfectly secure adhesion. I may answer that "I know," 
but, strictly speaking, I should answer that "I think it is so," or 
that "I believe it." This is opinion, the state of a mind assenting 
to a proposition (which is called probable), knowing that the 
opposite proposition has also good reasons in its favor, and, in 
consequence, fearing lest the judgment it pronounces be erroneous. 
Frequently this will be expressed by saying: "I think so, but 
have some doubts about it." 

(e) Finally, I may see the truth clearly and evidently. There 
are no reasons against my adhesion, or these reasons have lost 
their value so completely that they can in no way influence my 
assent. Now properly I say: "I know it is so," or "I am certain 



FACTS AND PROBLEMS 367 

and sure," "It is beyond doubt." This is certitude, the state 
of a mind assenting unreservedly, fearlessly, without thinking that 
it is possible for it to be mistaken. 

3. Various Kinds of Certitude. — (a) I say that ''I am cer- 
tain," and also that "Something is certain." "Certain" applies 
both to the mind or subject, and to the proposition or object. 
Thus a first distinction is to be made between subjective certitude 
or simply certitude, and objective certitude or rather certainty. 
Compare the three statements: "It is true"; "It is certain"; 
"I am certain that it is true," and see their relations. 

(b) I may be certain either spontaneously or after mature 
reflection. Hence certitude is direct or reflex. Reflex, philosoph- 
ical, or epistemological certitude is the certitude to be examined 
here, for reflection changes many spontaneous certitudes into 
incertitudes. Frequently spontaneous certitude is hardly a certi- 
tude at all, but an assent which may be changed readily. Thus 
I have no doubt about the news which I read in the morning news- 
paper, although I am ready to disbelieve it if denied in another 
paper, or in a later issue of the same paper. 

(c) Certitude is immediate or mediate according as it is obtained 
immediately — as when I say: "This is my friend John," because 
I see him; or mediately — as when a conclusion is reached through 
a process of reasoning. 

{d) Finally, certitude, although always excluding the fear of 
error, has various degrees according to the nature of the objects to 
which it applies. All objects are not capable of the same evidence, 
and, in a long series of reasonings, the evidence may become less 
and less clear. I may be certain, on the one hand, that two and 
two are four, that the whole is greater than any one of its parts, 
or that the man I see is John; and, on the other, that a personal 
God exists, that Napoleon campaigned in Egypt, or that honesty 
is the best policy. Yet, owing to the nature of the mental processes 
by which I know the truth of the latter propositions, I feel that 
there is a difference in the assent given to them, and the assent 
given to the former. 

4. How the Epistemological Problems Arise. — As a fact, 
spontaneous certitude must be accepted. It is the natural 



368 EPISTEMOLOGY 

tendency of the mind. Doubt arises only later through reflection. 
But is certitude justified? Such is the question suggested by many 
facts equally certain, and already mentioned in Psychology and 
Logic (pp. 117 fif. 256 fit.). Whatever is mental depends on many 
psychological variations due to heredity, education, environ- 
ment, etc. We think as we are, and, to a great extent, we are 
what circumstances and surroundings have made us. What is 
truth for one individual is error for another; and what is accepted 
at one time of life is rejected at another time. Even the senses, 
on which the whole mental life depends, are subject to illusions, 
and always depend on the physiological conditions of the organism. 
Defects of vision, such as color-bUndness, long or short sightedness, 
etc., prevent a man from seeing things as others do. Certain 
diseases, drugs, or conditions will change the trend of mental Ufe, 
and affect assent and dissent, certitude and incertitude. Hence 
arise epistemological problems. 

II. Problems 

Since, in many known cases, the mind is certain where it should 
not be, is it not so in every case? Since frequently it tinges reality 
with its own coloring, does it not always do so? Since the subjec- 
tive mingles so closely with the objective, is not all knowledge 
subjective? And where shall we stop? Where and how shall 
we draw the line between the objective and the subjective? We 
distrust the man who has deceived us several times. Should we 
not distrust our faculties that have also misled us? It may be 
the very nature of the mind to represent things as it does, and to 
picture them, not as they are, but after its own fashion. Even the 
normal mind, apart from external influences, always mixes its own 
activity with objective reality, and in a proportion which cannot 
be determined. What we are aware of is always a mixture of 
subjective and objective elements, and, in a mixture, the pro- 
portion of the elements cannot be determined unless the elements 
are known separately. Here we know only the total result, or 
combination of the two elements. The object can never be known 
except in the subject. 

(a) The first question then is: Does reflection justify certittide? 



METHOD 369 

Is man capable of certain knowledge? In a general way, dogma- 
tism answers, "Yes," scepticism, "No," while agnosticism 
endeavors to define the limits of the knowable beyond which 
lies the unknowable. 

(b) This leads to a second problem: Which certitudes survive 
the scrutiny of reflection ? If there is any vaUd knowledge, how can 
it be acquired, and what kind of knowledge is vahd? The data 
of experience alone are declared valid by empiricism, while the 
claims of reason are urged by rationalism. 

(c) Strange as it may seem to have postponed this question so 
far, we have now to ask: What is knowledge? Since knowledge 
as a mental function is within the mind, yet with a peculiar essen- 
tial relation to some extramental reality, it becomes necessary to 
examine the value of this representative aspect. Idealism claims 
that it is merely the result of the mind's inner activity, while 
realism admits some external reality which is reflected in the mind. 
And, if such an external reality exists, what can be known about 
it? What is the relation between the idea in the mind and the 
thing outside? 

{d) Even if knowledge — some knowledge at least — is valid, 
since error is also undeniable, how will truth be distinguished from 
error? How shall we ascertain which certitudes are justified? 
What are the signs or criteria of truth? Such systems as intellec- 
tualism, mysticism, pragmatism, traditionalism, etc., ofifer different 
answers. 

Before studying these problems, a few words on the method to 
be followed are necessary. 



III. METHOD 

I. Positive Starting-point. — (a) Epistemology starts with the 
obvious fact of spontaneous certitude, which cannot be denied. By 
a critical and reflective analysis it endeavors to find out if this certi- 
tude is legitimate. Unless we start with this fact, no solution can 
ever be reached. But we neither affirm nor deny that this certitude 
is valid, or that our mind can reach objective truth. Nor do we 
pretend to investigate whether the mind can know things-in-them- 

2S 



370 EPISTEMOLOGY 

selves, as they are in reality, and apart from their mental represen- 
tations. First to isolate the mind from external reality, and then 
ask how it can nevertheless come in contact with this reahty, makes 
the problem forever insoluble. 

(b) Hence Locke's principle that "knowledge is conversant 
only about our ideas" is opposed to facts. Knowledge is essen- 
tially representative. The idea imposes itself as the idea of some 
reality. Knowledge becomes conversant with ideas later, by 
reflection. For any unprejudiced mind, knowledge is conversant 
primarily with external things. 

(c) To speak of things-in-themselves, i.e. apart from the ideas 
we have of them, is nothing short of an absurdity, since evidently 
the mind can only reach things-in-the-mind, i.e. things as repre- 
sented. As the Scholastics so often repeat, knowledge, being an 
act of the mind, partakes of the nature of the mind: "Cognitum 
est in cognoscente ad modum cognoscentis." The idea is one 
thing; the object represented is another; but the object is never 
reached by the mind except through the idea. Hence the question 
is whether the idea, though conforming to the nature of the 
knowing mind, conforms also to the nature of the known object, 
or whether, on the contrary, it is a mere mental product. 

2. Descartes' Universal Doubt. — (a) In order to examine 
the problem of certitude, Descartes begins by emptying the mind 
completely of all that it had formerly accepted as vaHd knowledge. 
Reflecting that we are frequently mistaken, he rejects every form 
of knowledge as uncertain, so as to be sure that the mind, being 
emptied of all its contents, will be free from every source of error. 
This universal doubt, it is true, is not real, final, or sceptical, but 
methodical. It is an expedient in order to find a safer basis for 
certitude. This basis Descartes finds in the undeniable fact that 
he thinks and therefore exists: "Cogito, ergo sum." 

(b) This method has for its most serious defect that it makes 
any subsequent certitude impossible. In fact it is only through a 
glaring inconsistency that Descartes emerges out of his doubt. 
Like everything else, the fact of thought may be a dream, and the 
necessary connection between thinking and existing may be illusory. 
How in fact can such a necessity be asserted without assuming the 



METHOD 371 

principle of contradiction which, with every other principle, has 
been rejected by Descartes? Consistent thinking can never take 
place without supposing the laws of thought. If the facts of 
thought and personal existence lawfully emerge out of a universal 
doubt, a number of other facts have the same right, because their 
evidence is no less clear. And if the necessity of the connection 
between existing and thinking is admitted, a number of other 
necessary principles must also be accepted. As it is, Descartes' 
method necessarily goes around in a circle (circulus in probando). 
Starting then from the obvious fact of spontaneous certitude, 
we shall examine successively the problems mentioned above. 



CHAPTER I 

IS CERTITUDE JUSTIFIED? 

The fact has already been pointed out that a distinction is to 
be made between the spontaneous or natural certitude of the mind 
and its reflective certitude which persists even after its value has 
been tested. Reflection may show that the mind was mistaken, 
and that assent has to be refused to propositions to which it 
had been given formerly. More frequently it will be found that 
former certitudes are only opinions; truths, only probabiHties. 
Generally speaking, mankind is misled, not by too much doubt, 
but by too much certitude, or rather by states of mind which man 
spontaneously calls certitude, and which even a summary 
analysis reveals to be only more or less firm opinions, accompanied 
by a great deal of doubt. Both for speculative, and chiefly for prac- 
tical, truths, man has to be satisfied in the majority of cases with 
assents that fall short of perfect certitude, and that may be called 
either highly probable opinions, or perhaps "moral" certitudes. 
Assents are morally certain when they are warranted by sufficient 
evidence, although there is some very remote possibiUty of 
their being given wrongly. Thus opinion gradually merges into 
certitude, and no strict line can be drawn between them. 

The questions to be examined now are not: Of what truths can 
we be certain? Are they many or few? Which certitudes are 
justified? and the Uke; but simply: Is the state of mind called 
certitude ever justified? Can we be certain of anything? Strictly 
speaking, only two answers can be given: (i) "Yes," and (2) 
"No "; or rather, since even a negative answer imphes the certi- 
tude of the impossibility of certitude, (i) "Yes," or "No," and 
(2) "I do not know." For the present we shall speak briefly of 
Scepticism, Agnosticism, and Dogmatism, but many questions 

372 



CERTITUDE 373 

referring to these systems will necessarily have to be left over for 
subsequent chapters. 

I. Scepticism 

1. Meaning. — (a) The many uses of the terms "scepticism," 
"sceptical," etc., make it almost impossible to give any definition 
of them. I call a man sceptical when he does not believe my 
present assertion of which I am certain. Again I call sceptical a 
man who is generally hard to convince, requires strict proofs, and 
discusses every point before he gives his assent. I also call scepti- 
cal the man who says that nothing is certain, disbeHeves every- 
thing, is inclined to disregard the opinions of other men, and is 
generally ready to answer "I don't know," to every question. 

(b) Etymologically, "scepticism" is a Greek word (o-Ket^ts, 
doubt, from a-KeirTecrOai, to look at carefully, to scrutinize), 
which even in philosophy has more than one meaning. In general 
it is opposed to dogmatism, and denotes the doctrine denying the 
aptitude of the mind to reach truth, or at least to be aware that it 
has reached it, so that no certitude can be justified. 

(c) Theoretically, we may imagine a man who professes to be 
certain of nothing, not even of his existence, of the first principles 
of reason, of the distinction between the state of sleep and the state 
of wakefulness, nor of his own doubt. This, however, is merely 
an abstract supposition. The existence of such out-and-out 
sceptics seems impossible, and no instance justifies it historically. 
As it presents itself in history, scepticism is only relative. It 
admits some facts and principles as certain, otherwise thought and 
speech are utter impossibilities. The very fact that sceptics argue, 
discuss, and write, shows that they pretend to know something, 
were it only that knowledge is not possible. Scepticism, however, 
is distinct from agnosticism. The latter admits the validity of 
some forms of knowledge, but draws a strict Une beyond which 
everything is unknowable. The former attacks knowledge and 
certitude in general, and tries to show the incapacity of all cognitive 
faculties, senses as well as reason, 

2. Historical Outline. — (a) The Sophists, especially Protagoras 
and Gorgias, point to the contradictions of earher philosophers, 



374 EPISTEMOLOGY 

and reach the practical conclusion that, in regard to any ques- 
tion, both the negative and the affirmative answers are equally 
plausible. 

(b) Pyrrho professes that real things are inaccessible to human 
knowledge because, on the one hand, the senses manifest only 
appearances, and on the other, reason rests on custom, habit, and 
education. Hence man must abstain from pronouncing on any- 
thing. To abstain from defining and judging (inix^iv) will give 
peace to the mind {dTapa4ta), and hence true happiness. 

(c) Arcesilaus and Carneades also reject the possibihty of knowl- 
edge and certitude, but admit that some probability, sufficient in 
practice, may be attained. Since, according to them, the criterion 
of truth is perception, and perception may be irresistibly false, it 
follows that unreserved assent must always be refused. 

(d) The main school of scepticism is that of Alexandria, with 
iEnesidemus, Agrippa, and Sextus Empiricus, who systematize 
scepticism, and, under the name of tropes, classify the reasons 
leading to doubt. All conclude that assent should always be 
withheld. Scepticism proper is restricted almost entirely to Greek 
philosophy. Elsewhere doubt assumes a special character, and 
appHes only to certain forms of knowledge. 

3. Criticism. — Nothing could be said to a man whose answer 
to every question would be: "I don't know." A common ground 
which is indispensable for every discussion could never be found. 
It may be added that any such sceptic could be placed in constant 
contradiction with himself, both in his practical Hfe and in his 
theoretical views. The man who knows nothing has no right to 
think or speak. Finally, as the fact of spontaneous certitude is 
undeniable, it suffices briefly to examine the objections of scepticism 
against the validity of knowledge. 

(a) Fact of error. It is certain that sometimes man mistakes 
falsity for truth, and adheres to error with the same tenacity with 
which he adheres to truth. Both the senses and reason are sources 
of transitory or permanent error. 

Answer. — To this it may be answered that error supposes truth. 
Since these two ideas are correlative, if nothing is true, nothing is 
false. If sometimes man recognizes that he errs, it is a sign that 



CERTITUDE 375 

sometimes also he knows that he does not err. From the fact that 
we sometimes err nothing can be inferred, except that we should 
be prudent in affirming and in giving our unreserved assent. 

The same is true for probability. It is a participation of, or an 
approach to, certainty; and the certainty of some propositions is 
the only ground for affirming that others are more or less probable. 
Thus the certitude that a bag contains more red than white balls 
is the only ground for affirming that the probability of drawing a 
red ball is greater than the probability of drawing a white one. 
There could be no participation if there was nothing to be parti- 
cipated in, no justifiable probability if there was no justifiable 
certitude. 

(b) Facts of contradictions and of the diversity of human opinions; 
in space — different contemporary individuals; in time — succes- 
sion of opinions; in objects — science, politics, religion, morality, 
etc. ; in the same individual — changes in his views. All are 
convinced that they possess the truth, yet it is certain that some 
do not, since contradictories cannot be true at the same time. 

Answer. — (i) There is agreement on certain general truths, 
principles, axioms, and facts. Thus men have in common the per- 
ceptions of color, solidity, etc. All are certain of their own exist- 
ence and of the immediate data of consciousness. All admit some 
principles of reason; for instance, all look for the causes of what- 
ever happens (principle of causality). There is also agreement 
on many points of abstract sciences, e.g. of mathematics. (2) 
As stated elsewhere, on many questions, especially in practical 
matters, we have to be satisfied with more or less probable opinions. 
Contradictions are more numerous in proportion as these questions 
are more complex and more influential on practical life. 

(c) Diallelus, or Circulus in Probanda. The reliability of 
human faculties cannot be proved except by using these same 
faculties whose validity is still doubtful. Some reason must be 
given for admitting the value of human faculties. This reason 
itself, since it proceeds from the same faculties, must rest on 
another reason, and so on ad infinitum. 

Answer. — (i) This argument leads to absolute and universal 
scepticism, which is absurd. The sceptic uses his reason to prove 



376 EPISTEMOLOGY 

the weakness of reason, and hence also supposes its vaUdity. To 
be consistent, he must doubt even his own doubt. (2) The 
objection assumes wrongly that demonstration is the only source oj 
certitude. Demonstration is only an indirect means of throwing 
light on a hidden truth. Where there is full hght, such a means 
is unnecessary. While most propositions do not at first clearly 
appear as true or false, others have in themselves the stamp of 
truth or error, which is obvious to all men. It must be admitted 
that the reliabihty of human faculties cannot be proved, but it 
need not be. In some cases the use of them is its own justification. 

II. Agnosticism 

1. Meaning. — (a) Like the term "scepticism," the term 
"agnosticism" is vague, and applies to different views and sys- 
tems. Etymologically it means the attitude of one who does not 
know (a and yvwo-riKos), and thus would denote something even 
more radical than scepticism, since the sceptic is simply one who 
"examines." As used to-day, however, agnosticism is a milder 
term than scepticism, and, whereas scepticism is looked upon as a 
term of reproach, many pride themselves on being called agnostics. 

(6) The term "agnosticism," coined by Huxley in 1869, has 
been appUed to the views of thinkers whose opinions were and are 
greatly at variance on many points. The feature common to all 
is an attitude of doubt or denial toward certain objects of knowl- 
edge. The agnostic assigns limits to the mind's knowing powers, 
beyond which lies an imknowable region. There is Ught up to a 
certain point which can he determined^ and beyond which the human 
mind finds itself in complete darkness. The recognition of some 
unknowable seems to be the essential feature of agnosticism. But 
the dividing line between the knowable and the unknowable 
occupies different places according to different agnostics. 

(c) Thus, in its mildest form, agnosticism joins hands with 
gnosticism — this term being taken here in its etymological signifi- 
cation — since every man must confess that many things are 
beyond the human grasp. The man who says: "I do not know," 
and chiefly, "I cannot know," or, "Nobody can know," assigns 
limits to human faculties of knowledge. The agnostic goes farther. 



CERTITUDE 377 

He has found the exact boundaries of the realm of the knowable, 
and the range of human faculties. Beyond the knowable objects 
there are others which the mind cannot reach. 

(d) For all agnostics, that which is primarily unknowable is the 
Absolute, the First Cause, the unconditioned ReaUty, God. Hence 
sometimes agnosticism has been identified with atheism. Yet 
they are distinct. An agnostic, Spencer for instance, may admit 
the existence of the Absolute, although he denies the mind's power 
to know its nature. Frequently also agnosticism coincides with 
positivism and empiricism. It admits the value of empirical 
science, and denies that of every form of metaphysics. 

2. Critical Remarks. — A thorough criticism of agnosticism 
would include the whole of epistemology, together with meta- 
physics and theodicy. Here we shall limit ourselves to a few 
remarks of a general nature. 

(a) The agnostic attitude is attractive on account of its apparent 
humility. In reality it includes a great presumption, that of deter- 
mining exactly how far human reason can go. There is some 
humility in saying: "I do not know," but it is quite different to 
say: "It is unknowable." 

(6) In fact, how can one say of a thing that it is unknowable 
without having made a comparison of it with the capacity of the 
human mind, and therefore without having already some accurate 
knowledge, not only of the mind's power, but also of the object 
which is supposed to transcend this power? 

(c) Can we know the existence of a thing, and at the same time 
be utterly ignorant of its nature? Do not the facts by which it 
manifests its existence necessarily manifest also something of its 
nature? The same mental processes used in natural science will 
necessarily lead higher into metaphysics. The knowledge of 
physical causes will lead to the First Cause, and so on. 

III. Dogmatism 

I. Meaning. — (a) As understood here, dogmatism is opposed 
to scepticism, and means the system that admits some principles 
or facts as certain, or more generally, the possibility of certitude. 
In a more restricted sense, which is in frequent use, dogmatism 



378 EPISTEMOLOGY 

applies to systems or assertions that are altogether uncritical, 
make unnecessary assumptions, and fail to give proofs where they 
are needed. In this sense dogmatism is a term of reproach, whereas 
in the former sense, which alone will be used here, it simply stands 
for the admission of valid knowledge. 

(b) Dogmatism does not claim that everything can be proved, for 
this would involve an endless regressive process of demonstration. 
It admits that certain principles or facts need no proof, but stand on 
their own merits. To prove is to borrow light from principles, 
so as to throw it on the conclusion which otherwise would remain 
in the dark. These principles either have hght in themselves 
or derive it from some other source. Ultimately principles must 
be reached whose light is not derived from any other principle, 
which shine of themselves, are clearly seen by the mind, and 
shed their light around on other objects. We say: "It is as clear 
as daylight," to mean something which everybody must admit. 
We are certain of these principles because their truth manifests 
itself directly and immediately to the mind, and because it mani- 
fests itself in the same way to all men. 

(c) Nor can it be said that, in such cases, the mind knows things, 
not as they are, but as it is, and that cognition is determined only 
by the mind's nature. We are conscious that such truths are 
imposed on the mind from without. My judgment must agree 
with the reality of things, otherwise it is pure fiction, and all men 
make the distinction between fiction and reality. The present 
question, however, is not that of the nature of knowledge, but 
that of certitude. No matter whence this certitude comes, reflec- 
tion, as well as spontaneous adhesion, justifies it. Why? 

2. Two Classes of Judgments are Pronounced with Certitude. 
Some are facts. Thus I say: "I am as sure as if I had seen it 
with my own eyes," or "I am certain that I did or said so and so." 
Others are principles. Thus I say: "I am as certain of this as I 
am of the proposition: two and two are four." In both cases I 
oppose my knowledge, as true, to something fictitious. I appeal 
to propositions which everybody must accept, to a standard which 
all men admit and on which all are agreed. 

These facts and principles are true because I see that they are, 



CERTITUDE 379 

because they shine to my mind like daylight to my eyes. No 
amount of reflection can ever make me depart from them. To 
deny them is to commit mental suicide, and to place oneself in the 
absolute incapacity of ever thinking and speaking. That I exist, 
think, and act; that two and two are four; that the whole is 
greater than any of its parts, etc., are truths that are certain and 
beyond the possibility of any doubt, although men may dispute 
as to the real meaning of such propositions, and examine what 
correspondence is found between the mental representation and 
the objective reality. This is a different question, which will be 
raised later on, when we shall examine the nature of knowledge. 
At present the fact of certitude stands the test of reflection. If 
the extent of certitude has been questioned, we may say that its 
existence has never been doubted seriously. All men hold some 
truths as certain, nor can they be thinking men without certitude. 



CHAPTER II 

CERTITUDES 

I. Facts 

I. Existence of Certitude. — (a) Upon reflection many spon- 
taneous certitudes resolve themselves into higher or lower proba- 
bilities, that is, into incertitudes. The absence of doubt was due 
to the fact that the value of the evidence had not been weighed 
with sufl&cient accuracy, or evidence to the contrary had been 
neglected, or the possibilities of error overlooked. But, as was 
said in the preceding chapter, there are certitudes which persist, 
and which even the most radical sceptic cannot but imply in his 
very denials. These certitudes belong to two groups: Facts of 
experience and principles of reason. In any scientific investigation, 
both are combined in varying degrees. Thinking is not a merely 
mental function, proceeding independently, and free to follow its 
own caprice. It must conform to something which is extramental. 
I am not free to think that two and two are four. This truth 
imposes itself on my mind from outside. I do not make it, but 
recognize it. 

{b) Truth is the right which a certain proposition has to be accepted, 
and this right, like the right of ownership, persists even when it is 
ignored or violated. In some cases this right is not clear, and, even 
after a diligent investigation, may not become evident. In other 
cases, it is in itself shining for the mind, and immediately mani- 
fest. Facts, i.e. concrete experiences, both internal and external, 
and principles, i.e. self-evident propositions, are the necessary 
bases of thought. If they are rejected, nothing is left but to stop 
thinking altogether or go to an asylum. 

Not that some propositions may not at first seem self-evident 
without being so; nor that facts may not be investigated to dis- 
tinguish true immediate experience from the interpretation which 

380 



CERTITUDES 38I 

the mind may rashly add to it. But even after this sifting is done, 
there is left a residue of facts and laws, of concrete experiences and 
abstract principles, which are absolutely certain, and about which 
no other state of mind is possible but certitude. 

(c) Later on we shall have to examine whether and how far 
the mental representation corresponds with external reality. For 
the present we simply observe that the mental attitude is one of 
absolute and unreserved certitude which nothing can shake. "Two 
and two are four"; "a, straight line is shorter than a curve uniting 
the same two points"; "the same thing cannot at once be one 
way and the contradictory way"; "I am now thinking and writ- 
ing"; "the paper on which I am writing is white, and the ink 
I use black;" "I experience a headache," etc., are so many 
assertions of which I am so certain that, should any one try to 
destroy or even weaken this certitude, I should at once suspect 
his seriousness or his mental sanity. 

2. Facts of Experience and Principles of Reason. — (a) Under 
certain conditions, inferences from self-evident facts and principles 
lead to unreserved certitude, while, in other cases, the conclusions 
are accepted with more or less fear of error. In many circum- 
stances, I may be certain that my fellowmen do not deceive me 
in what they claim to have seen, heard, or experienced. Although 
the fact itself to which they testify is not directly evident for me, 
I can entertain no doubt about it. Again, once the demonstration 
is understood, I am certain that the sum of the three angles of a 
triangle equals two right angles, because the connection of this 
assertion with self-evident principles is clear. Once I have studied 
physics and chemistry, I cannot doubt that this pure water, which 
I have not analyzed, and which I have never seen frozen, is com- 
posed of oxygen and hydrogen in the proportion 1:2, and that it 
will freeze at 32 degrees Fahrenheit. Should the event prove 
otherwise, it would be a sign for me that the water is not pure, 
or that my thermometer is at fault. Few perhaps are the laws 
estabhshed beyond doubt, but the certainty of some cannot be 
denied. 

(b) The mind proceeds, and this very advance supposes some- 
thing fixed and settled, both as a starting-point and as a guiding 



382 EPISTEMOLOGY 

light. Remove these, and science becomes at once an impossibility, 
man must renounce thinking, since every step would involve him 
in a contradiction. Or rather there is no vagary which could not 
be indulged in, since there would remain nothing to go by, no 
directive principle. Whether we proceed from experience — as 
in the sciences of nature — or from self-evident principles — as 
in geometry — the starting-point must be stable, firm and certain. 
In its inductive and deductive processes, the mind has to avoid 
contradiction and be guided by the sideUghts of truth and facts 
already ascertained. Certitudes of abstract principles must 
always be verifiable in all concrete instances, and facts must be 
organized with the help of principles. 

But are facts and principles irreducible to each other? If so, 
will either one suffice, or are the two necessary? 

II. Empiricism 

1. Meaning. — As its name indicates, empiricism derives all 
valid knowledge from experience (ifiireipta), either internal or 
external. It is opposed to innatism, which admits innate ideas 
independent of experience, and to rationalism, which admits that 
th?A&Jnd possesses some knowledge, which, even if it depends 
on the senses, is irreducible to sense-knowledge. According to 
empiricism, the knowledge of universal and necessary principles 
is simply a strong association which, by repetition, has become 
indissoluble. Every form of knowledge is ultimately reduced to 
concrete experience, the laws of the mind being alone responsible 
for their abstract, general, and necessary character. 

2. Criticism. — (a) In Psychology we have shown the irre- 
ducibility of the concept to the image (p. 94 fiF. 102 flf.) and of 
necessary judgments to associations, (p. 112 ff.). Only a few 
words will be added here. The perception of what is cannot give 
the certitude of what must be. Knowledge of what happens cannot 
give the knowledge of what will necessarily happen. The empiricist 
takes it for granted that concrete knowledge alone is true knowl- 
edge. But this a priori assertion is far from self-evident, and no 
argument is forthcoming to demonstrate it. There are, on the con- 
trary, self-evident principles which we do not even think of testing 



CERTITUDES 383 

by experience, because their certitude is immediate. Two and two 
are known to be four as soon as the terms are understood, and this 
assertion is at once accepted as applying universally, at all times 
and everywhere. It is known simply by comparing the predicate 
with the subject. 

(b) To become orderly and scientific, experience constantly needs 
principles which are not given in experience, like those of con- 
tradiction, causality, etc. Experience and reason are not used 
successively, that is, reason does not only continue, surpass, and 
transcend experience. In any science, the use of the two is 
simultaneous, and they compenetrate each other at every step. 
Scientific experience is impossible without the use of principles 
transcending experience. 

III. Rationalism 

1. Meaning. — We are certain of concrete facts, but there is 
another certitude, namely, that of principles, which is acquired as 
the result of a direct intuition of the intellect. As understood 
here, rationalism is opposed to empiricism, and denies that every 
form of knowledge can be reduced to experience. It admits the 
radical difference between the concrete and the abstract, . J 
refuses to identify the universal with the collective. It asserts 
that the certitude of principles is not the direct result of experience, 
but of an intuition of the understanding. It is the theory ex- 
plained in Psychology when we spoke of the origin of necessary 
principles (p. 112 ff.). 

Hence rationaHsm here does not mean the abuse of rationalism, 1 
which consists in relying exclusively on reason and neglecting 
experience, or in relying exclusively on human reason and denying 
the possibility, fact, or usefulness of a divine revelation. Ration- 
alism may or may not admit the innateness of ideas and principles. 
This is an independent question which has been answered in Psy- 
chology. Rationalism is not opposed to the legitimate use of 
experience, but admits the certitude of principles transcending 
experience. The union of the two is indispensable in science. 

2. Value. — Rationalism is the only satisfactory explanation 
of the certitude which we have of principles. (See Psychology.) 



384 EPISTEMOLOGY 

Nor does it lessen the value of knowledge, since it does not profess 
to create anything new, but simply to apprehend aspects of reality 
which are already found in sense-experience, hidden, as it were, 
under the concrete envelope which limits such reaUty in space 
and time. Reason goes deeper, to the core itself, which, once the 
outer envelope is removed, is no longer restricted to one individual. 



CHAPTER III 

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 

So far we have simply analyzed our certitudes and shown that 
the human mind cannot possibly remain in the state of doubt, 
but that, even in its denials, it impUes the power to know with 
certitude. There remains the crucial question of epistemology: 
What is it to know? And what is the value of the relation estab- 
lished in knowledge between a knowing mind and a known object? 

I. FACT OF KNOWLEDGE 

I. Nature of Knowledge. — (a) Knowledge is essentially the 
awareness of an object, i.e. of anything — fact or principle — which 
may in any manner be reached by our cognitive faculties. The 
existence, size, and color of the tree out there, a geometrical theo- 
rem, the existence of God, etc., may be so many objects of knowl- 
edge. Knowledge always impUes both the antithesis of a knowing 
activity and of a known object, and their close union. The known 
object must in some way be present within the knowing subject. 
I can know the tree out there only in so far as it acts on me, and 
thereby contributes to produce in my mind a representation of 
it. Any activity which may be conceived as purely subjective 
can never be a cognitive process, and any attempt to identify the 
object of knowledge with the subjective experience by which it is 
known, leads to destroying the fact itself of knowledge, which 
implies the object as essentially as it does the subject. 

(i) This objective relation is expressed in an implicit or explicit 
judgment by which the perception or intuition is referred to the 
object. Thus in sense-perception, there is implied the assertion 
that my sensations refer to this or that object. "I see a tree out 
there" means that the color-sensations which I experience are 
referred to an object with certain characteristics, which I call a 
26 38s 



386 EPISTEMOLOGY 

tree, and which is located in a certain direction, and at a certain 
distance. (Cf. Psychology, p. 62 ff.). 

2. Truth and Certitude are Conditions of Knowledge. — (a) 
A man may be under the irresistible illusion that he knows, when 
he mistakes error for truth, and gives an unconditional assent to 
a false statement. Here we have only the appearance of knowledge. 
The man thinks that he knows, but a better informed man is aware 
of the mistake. Even if the error is common to all men, it remains 
true that the knowledge is not real, but only apparent. 

(b) As long as a serious doubt remains in his mind, a man 
cannot say that he knows. "I think so" is far from meaning "I 
know it is so." The mental attitude of a man who "thinks so" 
is that of opinion, not that of certitude, and for this reason he does 
not strictly know. He passes a judgment on an object, it is true, 
but a judgment which is always subordinated to the implicit 
condition: "If I apprehend this object correctly." 

II. VALUE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE ASPECT OF 
KNOWLEDGE 

There is agreement on the fact that knowledge as a conscious 
process is essentially objective, as has been explained above, but 
the questions remain : What is the meaning of " objective "? What 
is the object of knowledge? What is the value of the claim of the 
knowing mind that it apprehends an extramental reality? 

I. In General 

I. The Question Stated. — As remarked already, the object 
of knowledge may be something concrete — internal or external, — 
or something abstract — either a physical law, found and verified 
through experience, or a self-evident principle admitted simply 
because of the rational intuition of its truth. This object seems 
to exist apart from the knowing process, to impose itself on the 
mind from without, and to have an existence and a nature inde- 
pendent of the fact that it is known. On the other hand, the 
knowledge of an object depends also on the mind. Otherwise 
how would the fact of error be explainable, and how would it be 



OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 387 

possible to change one's judgment? These facts have led to 
theorizing on the real meaning of the "object of knowledge," 
and the solutions that have been proposed may be reduced to 
three: Idealism, Criticism, Realism. 

2. Idealism. — It is almost impossible to define idealism. It 
presents so many varieties — sometimes hardly reconcilable with 
one another; it receives so many qualificatives which indicate 
every individual author's point of view, that any attempt to give 
a definition is sure to fall short of embracing the various meanings 
of the term. 

(a) If we proceed etymologically, "idealism " applies primarily 
to Plato's view, according to which this world which we perceive 
with the senses is only a shadow of the real world, or world of 
ideas. In the world of ideas, the types — like beauty, goodness, 
virtue — of which the concrete realities of our world are only dim 
participations, are really existent. This, however, is realism par 
excellence, recognizing the true and exclusive reality of objective, 
absolute, and self-existent ideas. 

(b) It is on our own mental and subjective ideas that idealism 
insists. Its motto is Berkeley's: "Esse est percipi." The whole 
reality of a thing consists in the idea which we have of it. It 
starts from Locke's principle that "knowledge is conversant only 
with ideas," or that "the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings 
hath no other immediate object but its own ideas which it alone 
does or can contemplate" (Essay concerning Human Under- 
standing, IV, I, i). Hence the idea, it is true, has a character 
of objectivity, but, as the object is within the knowing subject, 
and as the subject cannot go out of himself, it follows that human 
knowledge is necessarily limited to the knowledge of the mind's ideas. 

(c) Should ideas have any objects outside of the mind these 
objects could never be reached by the mind, since the mind is 
necessarily confined within its own sphere, and can never go out- 
side of it. Ideas are objective, but the object itself has no reality 
outside of the idea. What we call the external world is a mental 
idea, or rather a system of ideas; and what we call truth is the 
consistent working of the mind in this complexity of ideas. What- 
ever we know, we know in and through the mind. To know a 



388 EPISTEMOLOGY 

thing is to have an idea of it. But as the idea is the only reality 
we are aware of, no matter what it represents or claims to represent, 
it follows that knowledge is only a series of conscious representa- 
tions. There is nothing else, for, what reason could there be to 
assert the existence of what we know absolutely nothing 
about? Not only is the mind active in knowledge, but it alone 
is active. 

3. Realism. — (a) Realism admits that objects exist outside 
the mind, and that ideas represent them. Not only in the mind, 
but also in nature, the tree is green and occupies such or such a 
place. Not only in the mind, but in reality also, two and two — 
whatever objects they may be applied to — are four. It is true 
that my knowledge is in myself, that it is a part of my mind; but 
what I know exists independently of the fact that I happen to 
know it. Its "esse" is not its "percipi." It would be, even if 
it were not perceived. In this case it would not be for me, since it 
would have no relation to my mind, but it would be in itself 
as an external reality. 

{b) Realism does not claim that we know things in their absolute 
reality — for, evidently the known object must be in relation with 
the mind — but that we really know things which, in addition to 
their mental existence as ideas, have also an existence outside the 
mind, and that, finally, the fact of its being known does not make 
or change the object of knowledge. There is an external world which 
we really perceive in experience — how and how far will be seen 
later. And there are absolute truths which the understanding 
apprehends by a direct intellectual intuition. 

4. Criticism. — (a) Criticism is the name given to the philoso- 
phy of Kant. In itself it signifies neither realism nor ideaUsm, but 
a method which consists in criticising our faculties of knowledge 
in order to test their objective value. Kant speaks of his own 
system as "transcendental idealism," and also as "empirical 
realism," thus indicating that it partakes of both idealism and 
realism. In fact Kant admits the existence of something external, 
but this is, and will forever remain, an unknown X, because it 
cannot be reached except through a priori mental forms or cate- 
gories. The mind does not conform to things, but our knowledge of 



OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 389 

things conforms to the mind. We do not think objects according 
to their laws, but according to the laws of our minds. 

(b) Whatever appears necessary and universal in knowledge 
cannot come from experience, which is always contingent; it comes 
from the mind itself. Thus space and time, which are necessary 
and universal elements of sensation, are not real attributes of 
things-in-themselves, but a priori forms of sensibility. Facts 
given in experience are coordinated and unified in thought by the 
categories, or a priori forms of the understanding, which estab- 
lish relations, — e.g. of causality, inherence, etc. — between the 
various phenomena given in sensation. Hence knowledge is always 
a synthesis of two elements, one of which is given from outside and 
the other is an a priori mental form through which the former 
is perceived. The result is the "phenomenon," or thing-as-it- 
appears, the only thing that we can know. The " thing-in-itself " 
is forever unknowable, since we cannot think except through the 
mind's a priori forms. 

II. The External World 

1. The Problem. — Knowledge begins with the senses, and the 
senses are commonly assumed to manifest the existence and prop- 
erties of an external world. All men agree in making a distinction 
between their own bodies and other bodies; to both they attribute 
reality and materiality. Solid matter around us is believed to 
manifest itself primarily through the sense of touch, and later by 
association, through other senses, especially sight. To fall on the 
ground, to receive a blow, to strike some part of one's body against 
something else, show with clearness the hardness and resistance of 
both. Through the other senses this matter manifests itself as 
colored, sonorous, hot, etc. Are these perceptions manifestations 
of real objects and quaUties? Sense-perception is in the mind. It 
is a conscious state, and how can a conscious state represent any- 
thing material, when the antagonism and irreducibility of mind 
and matter are facts admitted by all? 

2. Arguments for Realism. — The arguments on which realism 
is based are but an emphasis of the fact itself of knowledge as 
manifested in consciousness. Even if this fact is mysterious; 



390 ' EPISTEMOLOGY 

even if no good account of it can be given, it cannot for this reason 
be denied. 

(a) Both common and scientific experience make a distinction 
between ideas and things, between the mental and the physical 
world, (i) There is a real book here on the table, nine by six 
inches, with a red binding, near another book, etc. When I grasp 
it, I grasp something real. When I read it, I believe that the 
black characters are really printed on the white paper. (2) The 
scientist always assumes that his studies are about real matter, 
and that the laws which he discovers or appHes — e.g. the laws 
of gravitation or of chemical composition — are not mere mental 
formulas, but expressions of the way according to which things 
really happen in nature. Science can foresee and generalize, not 
on mental laws, but on natural laws. 

My idea of a foot is not longer than that of an inch. Yet every 
man with his senses knows that the foot is twelve times as long 
as the inch. The association of ideas in the mind produces 
expectation, but the expected result takes place in nature. It is 
to physical, not to mental, realities that knowledge is referred 
in perception, and every man is convinced naturally that his 
mind comes in contact — it may be difiicult for him to say how — 
with material objects outside of it. 

(b) Mental processes are essentially private. They may even 
differ in regard to the same object. But objects are common. 
Even if my idea of an object which we are now looking at is differ- 
ent from yours, it will never occur to anybody to say that we are 
not looking at the same object. Even if other minds do not 
perceive exactly as I do, they nevertheless perceive the same world. 
No amount of effort can ever make two men walking together 
think that they are not perceiving the same objects with their 
respective minds. 

(c) The distinction between percepts and images is an evident 
one. My images are largely dependent on my will. By imagi- 
nation I may travel where I please, as I please, with more or less 
rapidity; or I can see and hear things which I choose to recall to 
my mind, and as I choose to recall them. Perception is indepen- 
dent of me. I must travel where and when the train carries me. 



OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 391 

and my various perceptions are dependent on something external 
which determines what I shall see, hear, or experience. I cannot, 
by taking thought, change the color of the paper before me, nor 
the sound of the church bell. I light the fire, place a kettle of 
water on it, go away, and come back a little later. During my 
absence, while I had no perception of it, there was a real action 
of the fire on the water, which is now boiling. Independently of 
perceptions, material beings persist and act upon one another. 
Before there was any human mind at all, these beings were evolving 
toward their present condition, as astronomy, geology, and other 
sciences now teach. 

(d) In perception, consciousness testifies that the mind is 
passive, i.e. acted on by something else. This can be accounted 
for only if there is something outside the mind, capable of a-cting 
on it. 

(e) Unless I fall into absolute solipsism, and deny the existence 
of any mind except my own, — a step which no sane man will 
be wilHng to take — I must admit that I am not alone. Besides 
myself there are oilier men. How do I know it? Minds do not 
communicate with one another immediately, but only through 
the organism, by speech, writing, or gestures. If I admit that 
there are other men, with bodies like mine, I admit also that the 
report of the senses which manifest their bodies is valid. The 
senses therefore give me valid information about the external 
world, of which the bodies of my fellowmen are a part. 

(/) Psychology — whether of realists or of idealists — admits a 
certain correlation between mental processes and hrain processes. 
The brain and its processes are assumed by the idealist to be 
mere representations in consciousness. For him, to say that 
mental processes depend on cerebral processes simply amounts 
to saying that a conscious process, e.g. a sensation, depends on 
another conscious representation, e.g. of a motion or change 
in the idea called brain. This surely is not the meaning of psy- 
chologists, who distinguish the relations of mind and organism 
from a mere association of ideas, and claim that the organism 
is really the physical instrument of sensations. 

3. Objections. — It seems to be almost a defiance to common- 



392 EPISTEMOLOGY 

sense to reject these arguments for realism. Yet the objections 
of idealists oblige us to emphasize them. We shall briefly exam- 
ine some of the objections of idealism, and thus see how a man may 
come to contradict so openly common-sense and experience. 

(a) The main argument of idealism is the supposed impossibil- 
ity for perception, as a conscious process, to reveal anything exter- 
nal to the mind. The mind is aware only of its own contents, i.e. 
of ideas. And since it can no more step out of its own mental 
limits than the organism out of its skin, it follows that we are for- 
ever restricted to the awareness of conscious processes, which are 
toto coelo different from any external and material reality. 

Answer, (i) Were the fact unexplainable, no right would be 
given thereby to deny it. Here the fact is obvious. When, for 
instance, I shake hands with, and speak to, a friend, I cannot 
doubt his real presence; I feel his touch, and he feels mine; I hear 
him and he hears me. 

(2) The mind perceives external objects through the organism 
with which it is united intimately. Obviously man is not a pure 
spirit separated from the organism, but a living organism united 
to a mind. What we perceive as external is not only extramental, 
but also extraorganic. 

(3) The mind does not know only its own ideas. It does not even 
know them primarily, but through reflection. What I am aware 
of primarily in perception is an external reaUty, and subsequently, 
by reflection, I consider the mental process of perception. 

(4) The perception of external objects is immediate because ex- 
ternal objects act on the organism. The organism is not simply 
a physical reality, but matter animated by the soul. To a great 
extent idealism is the outcome of the Cartesian doctrine relegating 
the soul to some part of the brain, and thus cutting it off from every- 
thing external. But, in fact, the "action" of the external object 
is at the same time the "passion" of the organ. Both are one, 
since they are united in this common process, and the "patiens" 
need not go out of himself to perceive the foreign action which is 
in himself at the time of sensation. The abyss between the sub- 
ject and the object is imaginary. Imaginary also, therefore, the 
need of a bridge which idealism declares to be an impossibility. 



OBJECTIVITY or KNOWLEDGE 393 

This fact is clear in perceptions of touch, but from psychology we 
know that the other senses also require some immediate contact. 
The organic stimulation is not a mere mechanical process, for the 
soul is wherever the animated organ is, as we shall see in the 
Philosophy of Mind (p. 480 ff.)- 

(5) Consciousness, it is true, takes place only when the external 
impression has been conveyed to the brain through the sensory 
nerve. Yet it is the hand that feels, the eye that sees, etc. The 
brain is necessary, but of itself insufficient for sensation. The 
complete organ includes the peripheral apparatus, the afferent 
nerve, and the brain centre. 

(6) If it were not so, the objectivation or exteriorization of sen- 
sations, i.e. the fact that they are spontaneously referred to an 
external reality, would be unexplainable. (a) The habit of exteri- 
orization supposes a first exteriorization, which is impossible, 
(b) The association of internal images can never give anything 
but complex internal images, (c) An inference, by which ideas 
would be referred to some external object as their only adequate 
cause, already supposes the knowledge of an objective cause, and 
of the existence of something real, external, distinct from the 
mind, material, and capable of acting. — Hence these three 
theories which have been proposed to accoimt for the fact are 
insufficient. 

Briefly: It is true that the external world is not known except 
through sensations, but it is true also that a sensation is always an 
experience of the external world. 

(b) Mental dispositions influence perception. Perception is dif- 
ferent according as the organs are in a normal, or in a more 
or less abnormal, condition. It varies with mental attitudes, 
feelings, actual contents of the mind, etc. 

Answer, (i) Even then sensations are always referred to 
external objects. (2) The mind has its share in determining 
the nature of perception, but is not the only factor. (3) In most 
cases we can point out the physiological or mental causes that 
modify perception. Moreover, we are not concerned here with 
determining where and when the senses are trustworthy. 

(c) What appears in consciousness as color, sound, heat, etc., 



394 EPISTEMOLOGY 

is reduced by physical science to vibrations of ether, air, and 
molecules, differing in length and number, and totally unlike the 
sensations. 

Answer, (i) At present we are concerned only with the exist- 
ence of the external world, not with the nature of the properties 
manifested in sensation. This is a task for inductive science. 
But it is clear that if there is movement, there is something mov- 
ing, and that if there are vibrations, there is something vibrating. 
(2) It is by using their senses that scientists come to know the real 
nature of physical quaUties. To admit the validity of this objec- 
tion is, therefore, sheer contradiction for the ideaUst. (3) Other 
qualities, Uke resistance, relative size, etc., cannot be reduced to 
something depending on the percipient organism. I see plainly 
that a foot is longer than an inch. For all men it is true that 
water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen. 

4. Kant's View. — A few words will suffice on Kant's view of 
external perception. According to him, two elements are found 
in external perception, one varying with every perception, the 
other necessary and common to all perceptions, namely, space. 
The same is true of the consciousness of every mental process, 
the invariable element being time. Hence the ideas of space and 
time are not derived from experience. They are conditions of ex- 
perience, and a priori mental forms. The ideas of space, extension, 
geometrical figure, etc., cannot be derived from the perception 
of bodies; nor those of "before" and "after" from the con- 
sciousness of mental processes. Things and processes cannot be 
perceived without these spatial or temporal relations, which are 
therefore in the mind as a priori forms antecedently to sensations. 

Answer, (i) The "where" and "when" are given in percep- 
tion, and spontaneously attributed to things and events. This event 
took place at such a date, before this, and after that. Historical 
events are not given their dates by the mind. It is not through 
any a priori form that President Taf t succeeded Roosevelt, or that 
the discovery of America took place before George Washington 
commanded the troops of the United States against the forces of 
England. Again, this object is really square, higher or lower, on 
the right or on the left of this other object; its relative position is 



OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 395 

independent of the mind. Such, at any rate, is the universal 
consent of men. 

(2) That sensations necessarily manifest things in space and time 
may be accounted for by the fact that things really are always in 
space and time, as well as by any a priori forms. Both are pos- 
sible explanations, and the former is the one which experience 
suggests. 

(3) In fact, we make a distinction between objective space and 
time and our perception of it. I want to measure a stick with a 
real objective foot. The same for time: my perception of duration 
may differ greatly from objective duration. 

(4) Kant fails to distinguish space and time as (a) real, i.e. the 
spatial relations of a body and the real successive duration of a 
movement; (b) ideal, i.e. the general concepts of space and time; 
(c) imaginary, i.e. imagined to exist before or after there was or 
will be any real succession, or beyond any real occupation of space. 
In perception, real space and time are given ; the concepts of space 
and time are elaborated by the mind; imaginary space and time 
are altogether unreal, as we shall see in Cosmology (p. 449 ff.). 

III. Ideal Truths 

I. Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. — (a) The difference 
between analytic and synthetic judgments was explained in Psy- 
chology (p. 109). The former are obtained by the analysis of 
the terms themselves, which leads to the immediate intuition of 
their relation. Such judgments are not adhered to because they 
are verified in experience. They are pronounced to be true inde- 
pendently of their application to concrete objects. Even if there were 
actually no divisible substances, it would still be true that the whole 
is greater than any of its parts. Even if there are no perfect 
geometrical triangles, the sum of the angles in any triangle equals 
two right angles. A synthetic judgment depends essentially on 
experience. Analyzing its terms will not reveal their relation, but 
it is necessary to perceive concrete existing objects. The judg- 
ments: "Water boils at 212 degrees"; "birds are oviparous"; 
"Havana tobacco is good," etc., are synthetic. 

(6) Analytic judgments are very important, not only in rational 



396 EPISTEMOLOGY 

sciences, like mathematics, which, starting from them, derive other 
judgments equally necessary and analytic, but also in empirical 
sciences which, as was explained above (p. 383). require principles 
transcending experience. Here we shall not speak of synthetic 
judgments, as they have been dealt with in the preceding ques- 
tion on the knowledge of the external world (p. 389 &.). Nor need 
we come back to empiristic theories concerning analytic judgments, 
as they have been discussed in our second chapter (p. 382), and 
in Psychology (p. 112 ff.). A few words must be said on Kant's 
views, but we shall first establish the value of analytic judgments, 
so as to dispose of idealistic subjectivism, which claims that such 
principles are not objective, but simply laws of the mind. 

2. Objectivity of Analytic Judgments. — Analytic judgments 
are objective, that is, in accepting them, the mind knows truths 
which are independent of the mind itself, and which it does not 
create according to the laws of its owti nature. The analysis of 
the conscious process itself is the proof of this assertion. When I 
say: "The whole is greater than any of its parts," I do so because 
I see clearly the relation between the subject and the predicate 
of this proposition. The understanding of the terms is enough 
to perceive that such a proposition is true, certain, and necessary, 
and that objectively the whole cannot be equal to, or smaller 
than, but must be greater than, a part. I do not merely see that 
it is so, nor is any other relation simply inconceivable and incom- 
prehensible, but it is clearly impossible, and contradictory to the 
terms themselves of the proposition. "The sum of the angles 
in a triangle equals two right angles," or "8 X 13 = 104." These 
propositions may not at first be accepted as true. But as soon as 
they are analyzed, the agreement of the subject with the predicate 
becomes clear, and the assent is given in consideration of this objec- 
tive evidence. As long as I have not perceived this objective evi- 
dence, I refuse my assent. Or the evidence may appear gradually, 
and the mind passes from doubt to certitude through varying 
degrees of opinion. 

3. Kant's View. — Kant admits two kinds of vmiversal and nec- 
essary judgments: analytic and synthetic. The former are those 
in which the predicate is contained in the comprehension of the 



OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 397 

subject. They have no scientific value, since they manifest noth- 
ing new; they are mere repetitions or tautologies. Synthetic 
judgments may be simply matter-of-fact, contingent, a posteriori 
and empirical, like: "This man is tall." Or they may be neces- 
sary and a priori like: "7-1-5=12" (mathematical) ; "the straight 
Hne is the shortest distance from one point to another " (geomet- 
rical); "through all changes in the material world the quantity of 
matter is constant"; "in every transmission of motion, action and 
reaction must be equal to each other" (physical); "everything 
that begins to exist has a cause " (metaphysical). 

These judgments, according to Kant, are not analytic. They 
really combine or synthetize a subject with a predicate taken out- 
side of the comprehension of the subject. Hence they are syn- 
thetic. As, however, the synthesis is not given a posteriori, i.e. 
from experience, — since experience cannot give universality and 
necessity — they are a priori, and suppose in the mind the exist- 
ence of categories or a priori forms of the understanding. Such 
judgments are the most important in science, which is universal 
and necessary. 

Criticism. — (a) An analytic judgment is not merely that in 
which the predicate is already contained in the subject, but also 
that in which, from the analysis of the subject and predicate in 
their essence and essential properties, their necessary relation is 
perceived by the mind. (Cf. Psychology, p. 109.) 

(b) Such judgments are not acquired from experience alone, but 
by the mind abstracting and generalizing, i.e. elaborating the 
data of experience. 

(c) With his a priori forms, Kant cannot explain the fact that 
sometimes we arrive at the knowledge of analytic truths Httle by 
little and through various stages of opinion. The only explana- 
tion of this fact is that the objective light is seen more or less 
clearly. 

(d) There is no room for synthetic a priori judgments. All 
judgments are either analytic, a priori, and independent of their 
empirical verification; or synthetic, a posteriori, and dependent on 
experience. The examples given by Kant do not prove his con- 
tention, (i) The judgment "7 -|- 5 = 12" is analytic. It does 



398 EPISTEMOLOGY 

not mean, as Kant claims, that 7 + 5 is a sum which experience 
alone can verify to be 12, but it means that 7 + 5 and 12, when 
compared together, are necessarily found to be equal. In fact, 
it means (i+i + i + i + i + i + i) +(i + i + i + i + 
i)=i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i, which 
shows the judgment to be analytic and pronounced on objective 
evidence. (2) "A straight line is the shortest distance from one 
point to another" is also analytic. It means that, compared to 
other lines, the straight line is the shortest, and this is evident 
when we consider that not to go straight is to cover more space. 
In the straight line we have only one spatial relation and the same 
direction throughout, whereas in the curve the direction changes 
at every point, and, in the broken line, at every angle. (3) Both 
principles taken from physical science are synthetic, but not at all a 
priori. There is no a priori contradiction in denying them. As far 
as they are to be admitted, these principles are verified by experi- 
ence. (4) The principle of causaUty is analytic, and based directly 
on the principle of identity, " A = A," which means that, of itself, 
a being is always itself, and that there must be some foreign addi- 
tion or subtraction to make it more or less. Thus when we have 
o = o, we cannot have = 1 unless to o we add a new factor, 
o -f X = I. The predicate is not contained formally in the sub- 
ject, but is seen to be essentially and necessarily connected with it. 
4. Objectivity of Concepts. — Ideal truths express the rela- 
tions of agreement or disagreement between concepts. What is 
the value of concepts? For Kant, the intelligible object is unreal 
because the activity of the mind consists precisely in creating ap- 
pearances or phenomena. As long as judgments are referred only 
to phenomena, they are correct, but the noumena or things-in-them- 
selves are unknowable. In Psychology we have discussed the 
theories proposed to explain the concept (p. 98 ff.). From the 
conclusions reached there it may be inferred that concepts are not 
mere names (nominalism) or labels to which no idea corresponds 
in the mind; nor merely collective and associated perceptions 
{associationism); that concepts are not simply ideas in the mind 
without any corresponding reality (conceptualism) ; that con- 
cepts do not correspond to realities as they exist outside of the 



OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 399 

mind {exaggerated realism); but that nevertheless some reality 
corresponds to concepts {moderate realism). 

Concrete reality is determined and individual, while, owing to 
mental abstraction, concepts are abstract and universal. When 
the notes which individualize an object are mentally removed, 
what remains is abstract, and no longer restricted to one individual. 
The concrete is real, and really contains the object of our concepts. 
This man, with all his concrete determinations, is a being, a sub- 
stance, a living organism, etc. Hence the objects of these 
abstract concepts are really found in the concrete man, but under 
a multiplicity of other characteristics. 

IV. Summary and Corollaries 

1. What is Knowledge? — (a) To know is to he aware of an ob- 
ject, concrete or abstract, individual or universal, which does not 
exist in the mind alone, but is a reality independent of the fact 
that it is known. The mind does not make the truth, but becomes 
aware of it; facts and laws are imposed on it from without. That 
knowledge is a conscious process is true, but it is only a part of 
the truth. Knowledge is a mental process conditioned by external 
evidence. The right of a proposition to be accepted as true persists 
even when the mind fails to accept it. The law of gravitation 
was true before it was discovered by Newton. 

(ft) Knowledge may be intuitive or discursive, more or less cer- 
tain, and more or less immediate. The really objective may be 
difficult to disentangle from subjective influences. Yet it is there, 
and under proper conditions may be found. To be known, the 
object must be present in the mind, but ideas and judgments 
truly represent objects. The mind contributes its share in the 
act of knowledge, but is not the only factor. 

2. The Relativity of Knowledge. — Knowledge is necessarily 
proportioned to the capacity of the mind and the manifestation of 
the object. 

{a) Owing to native and acquired dispositions, minds — both 
senses and intelligences — differ in keenness, perspicacity, and 
power. Not all men have the same keenness of vision or hearing, 
nor the same intellectual aptitudes. Certain animals are endowed 



400 EPISTEMOLOGY 

with keener senses than those of man. We may imagine senses 
much more perfect than those with which we are acquainted. 
We may even imagine that the material world is endowed with 
properties which none of our senses is adapted to perceive. 
Understandings more powerful than ours would discover laws 
and relations of which we are ignorant. 

These limitations do not invalidate the knowledge which we 
acquire with the faculties with which we are endowed, any more 
than a man's horizon, or the presence of fog which bounds his 
view, prevents him from seeing more or less distinctly the objects 
found within his range of vision. The fact that we do not know all 
things is no justification for the assertion that we know nothing. 

It is true also that knowledge depends on subjective conditions, 
but this must not be exaggerated. Men agree on many proposi- 
tions both of the ideal and of the empirical order. They dij^er 
not so much on objects of knowledge as on objects of opinion; not 
so much on what they really know as on what they think they 
know; not so much on immediate evidence as on more remote con- 
clusions reached after difficult and complex processes of inference. 
In immediate sense-perception or intellectual intuition, the 
"fringe" of consciousness may vary with the different mental 
attitudes and acquired dispositions, but the "focus" is essentially 
the same for all minds. 

(b) Reality manifests itself in different ways. Sometimes it is 
bright in itself. Sometimes light must be thrown on it from else- 
where by reasoning, analogy, etc. One professor may give clearer 
explanations than another. Text-books on the same matter are 
not equally suited to meet the needs of students. A landscape is 
seen better on a clear day than through a misty atmosphere. 
The manifestation of the object must be adapted to the mind. A 
demonstration which is clear for one mind may not be sufficient 
for another. Some truths are hidden and to be sought for. In a 
word, truths are more or less easily accessible. 

3. The Limits of Knowledge. — Knowledge is limited. We do 
not and cannot know everything. Nor can we know any object 
perfectly, in all its relations, and with all its properties. Human 
knowledge is always inadequate. But, with the agnostic, to assign 



OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 401 

clearly defined limits to our power of knowing is unjustifiable. 
Without break we gradually pass from one object of knowledge 
to another. The limits of both the range and the perfection of 
knowledge vary with every individual mind. Yet the same prin- 
ciples which the agnostic uses in acquiring what he admits to be 
valid knowledge will necessarily lead him higher into regions to 
which he arbitrarily applies the name of unknowable. Starting 
from self-evident facts or principles, we may proceed, inductively 
or deductively, as far as we can. As we go along, the progress will 
become more and more complex and difficult; dangers of error 
will be greater. Hence greater caution will be needed. But no 
one has the right to say: "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." 
Objects of knowledge are common property, and we may always 
go farther in exploring them. 



27 



CHAPTER IV 

THE CRITERIA OF VALID KNOWLEDGE 

The Meaning of Criterion. — (a) The human mind is nat- 
urally qualified to know. As, however, the facts of error, of 
change in the successive assents of the same mind, and of dissent 
among several individuals, are undeniable, there must be a stand- 
ard or test by which truth is distinguished from error. In fact, 
we make a constant use of such tests. I say: "Such a man is tall, 
black-haired; his voice is deep, etc." — "How do you know?" 
some one asks. — "Because I saw and heard him." Again: 
"Water freezes at 32 degrees." — "How do you know? " — "Be- 
cause I have observed it in a sufiicient number of cases and condi- 
tions to warrant this general assertion." Again: "The sum of the 
angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles." — "How do 
you know?" — "Here is the demonstration." And so on. 

A criterion (KpivcLv, to judge) is necessary as the distinctive sign of 
truth, and as the basis on which it rests. In the instances just 
given, different criteria were used: the testimony of the senses, 
induction, and demonstration, which justified my assertions. But 
why are these criteria accepted? Are they self-sufiicient, or do 
they themselves rest on something else? 

{b) This leads us to distinguish /wo HwJ5 o/m/ma, one supreme, 
ultimate, universal, and applicable to all kinds of truths; the other 
derived, proximate, and applicable only within a restricted field. 
How do I know that Peking is a city of China? Because witnesses 
have told me. Why do I believe them? Because they are trust- 
worthy. Why are they trustworthy? Because they know and 
would not deceive me. Why? . . . Why? ... In a series of 
"whys " the ultimate criterion is the answer to the last. All the 
others, like senses, induction, demonstration, derive their value 

402 



ULTIMATE CRITERION 403 

from it. It is common to all, and, without it, proximate criteria 
would serve no purpose. Hence the division of this chapter. 



I. THE ULTIMATE CRITERION 

Three theories or groups of theories are to be examined. Some 
claim that the supreme criterion is to be found outside both the 
knowing subject and the known object. Others place it within 
the subject, but outside the object. Others finally make it both 
subjective and objective, intrinsic to both the knower and the 
object of knowledge. 

I. Theories of a Criterion Extrinsic to both the Knowing 
Mind and the Object known by this Mind 

1. Traditionalism. — Various systems, which we may group 
together under the name of traditionalism, agree in asserting the 
radical incapacity of personal reason for knowing with certitude 
either any truth at all, or at least the truths of the metaphysical, 
religious, and moral order. Hence appeal is made to tradition, 
i.e. to universal reason, to the consent of mankind, or of the 
majority of men, which manifests a primitive divine revelation 
made to man. The ultimate criterion is a divine revelation. Ac- 
cording to Lamennais the sign of this revelation is the common 
agreement of men, i.e. general, as opposed to individual, reason. 
De Bonald argues from the fact that man has the power of speech. 
According to him, speech is indispensable to, and precedes, thought, 
and consequently could not have been acquired by man. It must 
have been revealed by God together with the ideas which it 
expresses. 

2. Criticism of Traditionalism. — It is true that divine revela- 
tion is a great help to the human mind in acquiring moral and reli- 
gious truths. True also that in many cases individual reason feels 
uncertain, whereas the agreement with other men increases its 
confidence, and, under certain conditions to be mentioned later, 
may become a sign of truth. Actual knowledge is the accumu- 
lated wisdom of preceding ages. Man's plight would be a sad one, 
could he not avail himself of the results obtained by those who have 



404 EPISTEMOLOGY 

gone before him. Yet tradition cannot be the ultimate criterion 
of truth. 

(c) In general, (i) This system is opposed to the testimony 
of consciousness, which certifies that, in some cases at least, knowl- 
edge is acquired independently of any external teaching. (2) Cer- 
titude cannot be based on faith in a divine revelation. This faith 
is either certain or uncertain. In the latter case, it cannot be the 
criterion of certain knowledge. In the former, it supposes the cer- 
titude of God's existence, of His knowledge and truthfulness, and 
of the fact itself of a revelation, hence of reason by which these 
are demonstrated. (3) This criterion, even if admitted, is not 
universal. It does not apply, for instance, to conscious facts, 
actual experiences, historical events, etc. Hence all other cri- 
teria are not participations of this one. No authority, divine or 
human, can be the final test of truth. 

{b) With De Bonald we may admit that without speech thought 
would be very difiicult. But it does not seem true to say that 
it would be absolutely impossible. Moreover, if it were not asso- 
ciated already with the thought it expresses, language would be a 
mere physical sound. Hence thought precedes language. (Cf. 
Psychology, p. 126 ff.). Finally, even if God revealed language, 
He would not necessarily reveal ready-made propositions. Lan- 
guage may express error as well as truth. 

(c) Common consent, however useful it may be, cannot be the cri- 
terion we are now looking for. Even if it is a criterion, it is de- 
rived, not ultimate, (i) It supposes the rehabiUty of the senses 
through which a man is aware of the existence of other men, and 
the certitude that, under some circumstances, and under these only, 
the unanimous consent of man is an infallible source of truth. 
Hence personal reason precedes universal reason as a test of truth. 
(2) The reason of all men is but the sum of the reasons of every 
individual. If all individually are incapable of certain knowledge, 
how can the collection give certitude? (3) How can this unanim- 
ity or quasi-unanimity be ascertained? A whole lifetime would 
be spent before any truth would be known with certitude. Must 
it be understood of all men at all times? Then the task is utterly 
impossible. Must it be understood of all men living together at 



ULTIMATE CRITERION 405 

the same time? Then history shows that common and universal 
errors are possible. 

II. Theories of a Subjective Criterion, Intrinsic to the 
Knower, but Extrinsic to the Object 

TraditionaHsm failed to recognize the fact that, since the mind 
knows by its own faculties, the criterion must be intrinsic to the 
mind. We pass now to subjective theories. 

1. Common Sense and Feelings. — (a) Some philosophers 
have appealed to a bUnd impulse or instinct which prompts man 
to accept spontaneously the truthfulness of his faculties. It 
is a common law of our nature, and no account of it can be given. 
Reid speaks of a "common sense," i.e. of an invincible propen- 
sity common to all men; Jacobi, of a "feeling," or affective disposi- 
tion of the mind, which makes it assent to the reality of what the 
senses and reason manifest. 

(b) This criterion is insufficient. Everybody, even the sceptic, 
admits this natural impulse, but the question remains whether it 
is justified or not. If it is not, it cannot be a criterion. If it is, 
an appeal must be made to something else by which it is justified. 
This view is rather a refusal to meet the epistemological issue than 
a solution of it. The fact manifested in consciousness is that we 
are certain, not because a blind impulse makes us assent, but 
because we see the truth. While we may be aware of impelling 
motives within us, we are also aware that we are not only impelled 
from within, but also drawn from without. Many subjective 
motives, like interest, utility, habits of thought, education, etc., 
may impel man to accept error, and there must be something 
whereby he may recognize the object itself as true or false. 

2. Clear Idea and Divine Veracity. — (a) Descartes emerged 
from his methodical doubt through the affirmation: "I think, 
therefore I am," which he accepts because, in the fact of thinking, 
he clearly sees the necessary implication of being. Hence the 
general rule that "whatever things we conceive very clearly and 
very distinctly are true." According to Descartes, the guarantee 
of truth is ultimately the perfection, wisdom, and veracity of God, 
who cannot be the cause of error, and cannot endow us with 



4o6 EPISTEMOLOGY 

faculties that would deceive us. Ontologists asserted that all 
things are seen in God, who is known to man immediately. 

{b) Criticism, (i) The clearness of an idea as such cannot be 
the criterion of truth. It is merely subjective, and varies with 
individuals. It is not primitive, but must itself be tested. More- 
over, if clear means certain, nothing is explained. If it means dis- 
tinct, the fact that we may be certain of things which we do not 
perceive distinctly and adequately is overlooked. (2) The guar- 
antee mentioned by Descartes is insuflScient. The existence and 
perfections of God are not known intuitively, but by demonstra- 
tion; and demonstration must be based on principles that are 
certain. If the certitude of these principles is said to depend also 
on God's veracity, we are involved in a petitio principii. If it is 
said to depend on something else, certitude may be derived from 
our own faculties. (3) The same applies to ontologism. We do 
not see God immediately, but know Him only by a process of 
reasoning. 

3. Consistency, and Inconceivability of Negation. — (a) Con- 
sistency, i.e. the harmony between judgments, has been proposed 
as the criterion of truth by certain philosophers imbued with ideal- 
istic or agnostic tendencies. If knowledge is limited to our own 
mental states, what other criterion can be given? Spencer writes: 
"There is no mode of establishing the vaHdity of any belief except 
that of showing its entire congruity with all other beliefs. ... If, 
by discovering a proposition to be untrue, we mean nothing more 
than discovering a difference between a thing expected and a thing 
perceived, then a body of conclusions in which no such difference 
anywhere occurs must be what we mean by an entirely true body 
of conclusions." (First Principles, § 40.) 

Yet Spencer himself goes farther, and gives another criterion, 
namely, the inconceivability of the negation of a proposition. This 
inconceivability comes from hereditary associations, so strong 
that the associated ideas can no longer be thought of as separated. 
"To assert the inconceivableness of its (a cognition's) negation is 
at the same time to assert the psychological necessity we are under 
of thinking it, and to give our logical justification for holding it 
to be imquestionable." (Principles of Psychology, § 426.) 



ULTIMATE CRITERION 407 

(6) Criticism. — Inconsistency is a sign that one of the incon- 
sistent propositions is false. Consistency is a useful, but second- 
ary, test of validity. Nor is it infallible. A whole system of 
errors may be consistent, the falsity being at the starting-point. 
Consistency shows that the rules of logic have been observed, 
not that knowledge possesses objective vaHdity. If it must be 
the criterion of validity, it must have something else to rest on. 
Moreover, several facts or principles may be perceived sepa- 
rately, so that their consistency will not be known. They may 
nevertheless be true. 

As to inconceivability: (i) Sometimes Spencer confounds it with 
the incapacity for imagining. Many things are conceivable for 
the intellect without being imaginable, e.g. a polygon with a thou- 
sand sides. And the impossibility of imagining the contradictory 
of a statement is no sign of the truth of that statement. (2) In- 
tellectual inconceivability may be subjective or objective, i.e. it may 
depend on the mind's lack of power to unite both terms of a judg- 
ment, or on the fact that these terms are mutually exclusive. In 
the former case, it is purely negative and proves nothing. The 
incapacity to see how a thing could be otherwise than it is con- 
ceived does not prove that it cannot really be otherwise. What is 
inconceivable for one mind may be conceivable for a more perfect 
mind. In the latter case, the inconceivability is positive, and we 
see why a thing cannot be otherwise. In this supposition, incon- 
ceivability is a criterion of truth, but not the first criterion. It 
supposes that we know the necessity for the object of being as it 
is conceived. Two and two are four, and it is inconceivable that 
it should be otherwise. Why inconceivable? Because I perceive 
the necessary equality of 'Hwo plus two" and of "four." The 
truth of this statement is not tested by the inconceivableness 
of its opposite, but this inconceivableness results from the clear 
perception of the truth. 

4. The Exigencies of Practical Life. — (a) The conclusion of 
Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" is the mind's utter incapacity 
to acquire valid knowledge. We must be satisfied with knowing 
things-as-they-appear, and they appear in consciousness accord- 
ing to the mind's a priori forms or categories. Kant, however, 



408 EPISTEMOLOGY 

does not stop at this sceptical conclusion, but emerges out of 
his doubt in the "Critique of Practical Reason." On the fact of 
the categorical imperative as a foundation (see Ethics, p. 320 ff.) 
Kant builds up again three central truths: the freedom of the will, 
the existence of God, and the immortahty of the soul, which are 
necessary postulates of the categorical imperative as given in con- 
sciousness. Of these truths Kant professes to have a true cer- 
titude which nothing can shake, but not a scientific certitude 
reached by demonstration. He calls it "moral" certitude, faith, 
or "beUef of reason." 

(b) The many contradictions of thinkers have led some modem 
philosophers to doubt the ability of human reason to reach cer- 
tain knowledge. There is a wide-spread tendency to follow Kant 
in attributing to practical reason a superiority over pure reason. 
This tendency manifests itself in various ways which are more or 
less divergent, but all of which start from the same assumption 
of the weakness of reason, and tend to the same end of reconstruct- 
ing knowledge on a practical basis; on action rather than in- 
tellect, on practice rather than speculation. Since all this is 
dynamic and ever-changing; since, moreover, the mind's relations 
to objects of knowledge may change, the term belief rather 
than the term knowledge is held by many to express the mind's 
attitude in regard to truth. 

(c) The main aspects of this general tendency are the following: 
(i) Since the intellect is unable to give certitude, and yet moral 
life has imperious exigencies, the will is the main cause of our as- 
sents. Such is the position of Neo-criticism, with Renouvier, and 
of many who advocate a voluntaristic as opposed to an intellectual- 
istic primacy. (2) Not only the will, but all the complex exigen- 
cies of human nature lead man to assent, and a great prominence 
is given to the satisfaction of human feelings and aspirations, 
especially of the need of belief and certitude. (3) Action may also 
be made the central element. Thought, they say, caimot reach 
objects, because it is immanent in the mind. But action reaches 
external reality, and establishes the contact with it, which is 
impossible to reason. The consciousness of activity leads to 
the knowledge of objects. This view is completed again by the 



ULTIMATE CRITERION 409 

theory of the primacy of the will. (4) Somewhat along the same 
lines, Pragmatism claims that the criterion of truth consists in 
practical results. By these are meant not only external useful 
results, but also subjective satisfaction, consistency, good influ- 
ence on moral life, etc. An assertion is worth its results. It is 
to be tested by its effects; and its meaning itself can be expressed 
only in terms of its practical results. 

Criticism. — (a) Kant's attempt at reconstructing certitude with 
practical reason alone is a failure. In practical as well as in spec- 
ulative matters, the same reason judges and decides. There are not 
two reasons in man, but only one reason with a twofold function, 
speculative and practical. If liberty, immortality, and God are 
realities, the categorical imperative on which they rest must itself 
be, not only an appearance, but a reality, and the nexus between 
these truths and the imperative must also be real. How is all 
this perceived with certitude? The postulates of practical rea- 
son resort naturally and necessarily to the logic of pure reason. 
Morality cannot be blind; it must be enlightened and reasonable. 
If the noumena are not accessible to the pure reason, they cannot 
be accessible to the practical reason. 

(b) We shall not discuss the general question of the primacy of 
will and intellect. It has too many points of view from which 
it may be considered, and according to which the answers must 
vary. In epistemology, when we speak of the test of truth and 
certitude, and of the justification of our assents, it is impossible 
to give our preference to will, action, or practice. We always find 
ourselves in the same dilemma: Either these are enlightened or 
blind. If blind, they can give no certitude of the truth. If en- 
lightened, tested, and shown to be correct, where is the light, and 
where is the test? Of itself, the will is blind, and what we mean 
by mental light is the knowledge of the "why" of an assent, i.e 
the objective reason of its truth, not the subjective motives of 
the assent. 

(c) The intellect is falsely declared incapable of giving any cer- 
titude. Few, perhaps, are the legitimate certitudes, but it has 
been shown that, in some cases, they are possible. Moreover, 
why should the will impose on the mind's assent inevident certi- 



4IO EPISTEMOLOGY 

tude? Experience teaches that we are not free to think as we 
please. Our assents are motived by something which is not within 
us, and the will cannot force us to accept the uncertain. Certain 
truths are accepted because they are evident for the intellect. 

(d) It must be admitted that truth satisfies the exigencies of 
human nature. We need certitude. Scepticism is opposed to the 
very nature of the mind. But it is also the nature of the mind 
to require that this certitude be justified intellectually. At 
times, truth, even opposed to feelings, imposes itself on our accept- 
ance. Why, if not because it has rights which we may be forced 
to recognize, and because primarily our assents are rational? 

(e) We have discussed already the postulate that thought is 
immanent in the mind, and cannot reach external reaUty. How 
can action, which alone is supposed to place the mind in contact 
with external objects, be taken cognizance of, if not by an intel- 
lectual process of reflection and thought? Here again the intel- 
lect must be called in as the ultimate test, unless we rest satisfied 
with a blind assent. 

(/) Pragmatism seems to identify truth with goodness or use- 
fulness, and this is, to say the least, a gratuitous postulate. More- 
over, granting that truth always has good results, it does not 
follow that it is to be identified with them, but rather that it is 
distinct from them as a cause from its effects. A statement is not 
true because it is useful, but rather it is useful because it is true. 
Many subjective influences impel us to believe or assent. But re- 
flection is not satisfied with spontaneous assents. In order to 
test their value, the mind endeavors to rid itself of these influ- 
ences and to consider the object on its own merits. It may be 
added that, in order to know which results and consequences are 
good, a test distinct from them, or another criterion, is required. 
Finally, self-evident statements are accepted independently of 
whatever results they may have, simply because they are seen to 
be true. 

5. Conclusion. — The conclusion seems now justified that 
subjective criteria, whatever they may be, are insufficient as tests 
of objective truth, and cannot produce more than probable beliefs. 
In fact, among those who propose them, many claim no more 



ULTIMATE CRITERION 411 

than a higher or lower degree of probability for all our knowl- 
edge. However, it must be recognized that these various systems 
which insist on practical reason, will, action, etc., rightly empha- 
size the great influence of subjective dispositions on all assents, 
and the necessity for man of seeking the truth with his whole mind. 
If we deal with practical truths, it is not enough for the intellect 
to accept them, the whole man must comply with them. Will, 
action, feelings, too frequently prevent man, not only from acting 
according to his knowledge, but even from seeking or accepting 
the truth. All this, however, is the psychological, not the episte- 
mological, point of view. (Cf. p. 117 ff.) When applied as tests 
of truth, these systems fail. They do not show where the truth 
is, but only why, how, and by what process we accept certain 
things as true. 

III. Theory of a Criterion Intrinsic to the Object and, in 
A Certain Sense, also to the Knower 

As the criterion which we seek must be the distinctive sign of 
truth, it must be in the object which it distinguishes from others, 
and on which it imprints the characteristic stamp of truth. It 
must also be somehow in the subject, since it is the motive 
justifying certitude. This is possible if we look upon knowl- 
edge as the vital union of subject and object in the cognitive act. 

I. Nature of Evidence. — (a) Evidence (e, videre) etymolog- 
ically refers to the light of truth, and hence to its visibility. Many 
current expressions are borrowed from the sense of vision. After 
giving an explanation, a man asks: "Now do you see? " that is, do 
you understand? Or one says: "See how this tastes," or "Let us 
see how these men sing, play, etc.," i.e. let us hear, etc. To see 
is used of every sense-perception and of every function of the 
understanding. Evidence is the property of truth — fact, prin- 
ciple, or argument — by which it is enlightened so as to be 
perceived by a knowing power. It includes three elements: an 
object, its light, and the mind's perception of such light. Evidence 
is the object itself, shining and manifesting itself to the mind so as 
to determine the mind's assent. 



412 EPISTEMOLOGY 

(b) Evidence may mean the proof by which a claim is established, 
or a claim which needs no proof because it is self-evident. In other 
words, it may be mediate or immediate, according as the object 
possesses full light in itself, or must borrow it from other sources. 
In any discursive process, the self-evident must ultimately be 
reached, and there are different degrees of evidence according as 
a statement is more or less closely connected with something 
self-evident, and the nexus itself perceived more or less clearly. 
: 2. Evidence is the Criterion of Truth. — (a) This is hardly more 
I than a corollary of the preceding pages in which scepticism, ideal- 
ism, and various theories of criteria were discussed. Subjectively 
we know that our assents must be justified, and rest on some 
foundation distinct from ourselves. We feel that we have to con- 
form, not only to the laws of thought, but also to the laws of things. 
We are compelled to accept truth as it is. Objectively we per- 
ceive clearly at times the necessity of truth. We see it because it 
is shining, and we can no more see it otherwise than we can see as 
red the wall which is white. 

{b) Hence it is always to evidence, mediate or immediate, 
that we appeal when asked to give an account of our assents. To 
justify a statement, I may say: "It is so because I see that it 
cannot be otherwise, because it clearly manifests itself." Or I may 
answer by a series of "becauses," the last one of which will be 
something self-evident. The mind may see more or less clearly, 
and the firmness of its assent should be in proportion to the degree 
of evidence. But surely we need not ask ourselves why we see in 
broad daylight. We see because we have the power of vision, 
and the proper external conditions are verified. Asking the reason 
of self-evidence would be tantamount to asking to light a candle 
in order to see the light of the sun. 

3. Difficulties Examined. — This will be made clearer by answer- 
ing a few difficulties. 

(a) Evidence may be apparent and illusory, as it is in hallucina- 
i tion and delusion. A man may mistake subjective phenomena 
I for objective facts and truths, and invincibly believe that he has 
full and satisfactory evidence. 

Answer. — These are abnormal cases in which the causes of 



ULTIMATE CRITERION 413 

error are frequently known and traceable to some definite organic 
defect. They may be corrected by other evidences. For instance, 
a visual hallucination may be corrected by using the sense of 
touch, or even the sense of vision itself when it recovers its nor- 
mal condition. The problem here is psychological rather than 
epistemological, 

(b) How, then, can the mind be sure of objective evidence? As 
noted already, evidence cannot be proved; it is perceived, (i) 
One must be careful not to exaggerate it. Frequently rashness 
impels to assents which objective light does not warrant. (2) It 
must be ascertained that the object perceived is really external. 
Judgment must control the data of the senses, and the under- 
standing must proceed with caution. (3) A complex object 
must be analyzed, and every one of its elements examined. As 
remarked in Logic, one small error at a given point of the process 
may ultimately lead far astray. 

(c) If evidence is the test of truth, how can there be error ? Dif- 
ferences of opinions, as remarked elsewhere, are chiefly on matters 
in which we have only probabilities, and they depend on innate 
and acquired dispositions. On evident truths there is agree- 
ment. We are not concerned at present with their number. Even 
if they are few, they are accepted because of their evidence. Error 
may come from rashness, and from subjective dispositions which 
blind man, and impel him to assent without sufficient evidence. 
This will happen especially in questions which have a practical 
bearing. Moreover, owing to the complexity of the object, the 
need of long demonstrations, the difficulty experienced in extri- 
cating various elements of a complex process, the mind may 
be led astray without being aware of it. But the progress of 
science consists largely in ascertaining, verifying, and correcting 
conclusions already reached. 

In many cases we must rest satisfied with a greater or smaller 
probability, and admit the possibility of error. He is a wise man 
who does not give to his assents more firmness than evidence 
entitles them to, and knows how to doubt when there is not 
enough light. 

Error may be caused by the nature of the object, or by influ- 



414 EPISTEMOLOGY 

ences within the subject. It is a judgment which exceeds that 
which is really given in intuition or reasoning. But the fact that 
all men speak of error indicates that all have a test of truth. Error 
could never be mentioned if truth were unknowable. The proc- 
ess of detecting error always consists in applying evidence, in its 
various forms, as the criterion of truth. 

n. DERIVATIVE CRITERIA 

As the ultimate criterion, evidence manifests itself to different 
faculties, and in various ways. We shall now speak of these de- 
rived criteria. They may be reduced to two groups according 
as the truth is reached by one's own personal effort and seen 
in itself, or, on the contrary, is reached only through mediate 
contact, i.e. through another mind that has perceived it in itself. 

I. Personal Faculties Coming in Direct Contact with the 
Known Object 

I. Senses. — (a) The reliability of the senses has already been 
asserted against idealism. They rightly testify to the existence 
of our own body and of an external world. The subject and the 
external object being united in the "action" of the object which 
is at the same time the "passion " of the subject, no bridge is neces- 
sary between the two, and no transformation of the physical 
cause into a psychical result. 

Each sense manifests only some aspects of objects. Knowl- 
edge is thus acquired in a fragmentary way, but the intellect 
combines these fragments and reaches a more complete knowledge 
of reality. It is true also that individual perceptions may differ 
owing to the condition and the degree of perfection of the senses, 
but this does not invalidate perception. The distinction must 
also be remembered between what is actually perceived and what 
is imagined or inferred. We naturally interpret and complete 
perceptions. (See Psychology, pp. 62 ff., 79 ff., iiS flf.) 

(b) Some conditions are necessary for the trustworthiness of the 
senses, (i) Each sense is fully reliable only within its o^\ti spe- 
cial sphere, for what has been called in psychology its sensile 



DERIVATIVE CRITERIA 415 

per se proprium. The sensile commune should be ascertained by 
more than one sense. As to the sensile per accidens, it may be 
the occasion of many errors. Wrong habits and accidental causes 
of error are frequent; hence great caution is required in inferring 
the nature of objects. The eye may mistake salt for sugar owing 
to their common whiteness. The ear may mistake one man's 
voice for another man's owing to their likeness, etc. (2) The 
object must be within due limits of distance, intensity, etc., and 
there should be no obstacle between the object and the sense. 
Owing to its distance, the moon looks like a disk, and not like a 
sphere. Owing to a refracting medium, a stick half-dipped in 
water, not perpendicularly, appears broken to the eye, and rightly 
so, since, in fact, the rays are refracted. (3) The organ must be 
in a normal condition. Many physiological influences modify 
perception. Error is due to rashness in judging hastily that 
sensations are objective. 

(c) Induction must complete the immediate data of the senses 
to ascertain the physical nature of the perceived qualities, cor- 
rect illusions, and verify the reports of an "educated" sense by 
those of another. The evidence in sense-perception is sometimes 
direct and intuitive, sometimes indirect and mediate. 

2. Consciousness, by which we become aware of our own in- 
ternal states, ideas, emotions, volitions, etc., is an infallible cri- 
terion. I may err in referring these processes to wrong causes, 
but, as far as consciousness manifests my present subjective experi- 
ences, e.g. my feeling of pain, my thinking, imagining, doubting, 
etc., its evidence is intuitive, and can be denied by no one, not 
even by the out-and-out sceptic. Illusions and hallucinations are 
real for consciousness; the images are really present in the mind. 
The error consists in referring them wrongly to external objects, 
and in judging that they are faithful representations of exter- 
nal reality. Consciousness also apprehends vaguely the ego or 
subject, but not its nature. 

3. Memory. — {a) Memory includes both the recall of the past 
and its recognition as past. Its veracity is to be admitted, and in 
many cases can be verified. I may, for instance, note my impres- 
sions, and later on compare what my memory recalls with what 



4l6 EPISTEMOLOGY 

I have written. Or I may compare my impressions with those of 
others who have perceived the same object. Without memory, 
comparing, identifying, distinguishing, reasoning, etc., would be 
impossible. The validity of memory is thus shown in its 
very exercise, and may be tested by experiments proving its 
agreement with past perception. 

(b) However, it has its limitations. We do not recall at wdll 
everything we have perceived or known; and we may recall an 
image of the past without recognizing it. But these limitations 
are negative, and do not affect the trustworthiness of memory, as 
far as memory goes, any more than the ignorance of certain things 
affects the validity of the knowledge one possesses. 

(c) It is also to be admitted that there are not only limitations, 
but also positive errors of memory. Memory may combine a repro- 
duction of the past with fanciful additions and changes, and yet 
we may be led to think that the whole is a faithful copy. This 
simply shows that an imprudent use of memory is possible, and 
that, owing to habit, lack of care, of exactness and reflection, 
one fails to verify the elements of an image before passing a judg- 
ment on its value. Because of the close relation between memory 
and imagination, great caution is necessary. But, if proper care 
is taken, in normal conditions at least, the evident testimony of 
memory is reliable. If it remains doubtful — and frequently it 
should be held as such — assent must be suspended until further 
research by means of the laws of association brings full light. 

4. Reason. — Enough has been said on the objective value of 
concepts and of intuitive necessary judgments. As to judgments 
derived by inductive or deductive reasoning from self-evident 
facts or principles, the degree of their validity depends on the 
necessity by which they are connected with the self-evident 
starting-point. The nearer such judgments are to self-evidence 
and the more necessary their connection, the greater also is their 
evidence, and consequently the firmer should be the mind's assent. 
Here, as well as in the use of other cognitive faculties, error does not 
come from the instrument itself of knowledge, but from the bad 
use that is made of it. In inference we connect facts and principles 
with other facts and principles. Not only must these be certain 



DERIVATIVE CRITERIA 417 

and valid, but the application of them must be made with pru- 
dence. In a series of inferences, principles that are not demon- 
strated, and yet that are far from self-evident, are sometimes 
used or implied, and the rules of logic also may be violated. 
(Cf. Psychology, pp. 115 ff.) 

II. Indirect Relation of the Mind with the Known 

Object 

I, Authority. — (a) Agreement with others always strengthens 
personal conviction. But there are cases in which the testimony 
of others does not merely strengthen, but also is a valid motive of, 
assent. A truth may not have been perceived directly by me, 
yet I accept it because it has been perceived by others who tell 
me, i.e. I accept it on their authority. For me, the evidence is 
not in the object itself, since none of my cognitive faculties has 
come in direct contact with it. What must be evident is (i) that 
those who tell me really know, and (2) that their testimony is 
reliable. By far the greater part of human knowledge is acquired 
on the authority of others. Not only is history in all its branches 
dependent on it altogether, but even the majority of contempo- 
rary facts, events, and circumstances are known from the rela- 
tion of others. Personal experience is restricted within narrow- 
limits, and would give but little knowledge, if it were not possible 
to profit by the experience or science of others who live at present 
or have lived in the past. Personal experience lasts only a short 
time and extends to only a small space. 

(b) In practical as well as in scientific life, man must believe 
his fellowmen. The physician believes the chemist; the chemist 
trusts the physician's knowledge; the physicist accepts the conclu- 
sions of the mathematician, and so on. Even the greatest sci- 
entist and philosopher is obliged to believe his cook on many 
points. All records of transactions between individuals or na- 
tions depend on testimony. The decisions of courts are given in 
view of the testimony of witnesses. At all its stages, education 
depends on the authority of parents and teachers. History is 
essentially based on human testimony. Faith in other men is 
implied in every endeavor of life, and without it progress would 
28 



4l8 EPISTEMOLOGY 

be an impossibility. Who can estimate the influence of the daily 
newspaper or the magazine on human assents and on human con- 
duct? Think a moment of the number of things which we have 
to take on authority, and of the number of things which we do take 
on authority so as to save ourselves the trouble of ascertaining 
them. 

(c) (i) Belief is the assent given to testimony. It may be 
certain, but frequently is more or less probable. (2) Testimony is 
the communication of some information by a witness. (3) The 
authority of a witness, or his reliability, is based on the fact that he 
knows, or is not deceived, and that he speaks the truth, or does not 
deceive. (4) The matter of his testimony may be a universal law 
— e.g. that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen; a per- 
manent fact — e.g. that Washington City is on the Potomac; or a 
transient fact, — e.g. an eclipse, a battle, an earthquake. (5) These 
facts may be contemporary or more or less remote. (6) The wit- 
ness may be an eye-witness (immediate), when he has been present 
at the occurrence which he relates, or he may rely on the testi- 
mony of others (mediate witness). (7) Finally, the testimony 
may be given in speech, writing, or in the form of monuments, 
coins, statues, etc, 

2. On Questions of Fact. — (a) The nature of the fact itself 
must be taken into account, and compared with the competence 
of the witness to observe it. The observation of some facts and 
experiments requires a special training of the observer's mind. 
Furthermore, if the fact is unlikely and extraordinary, a higher 
authority or a greater number of witnesses will be required. 

{h) If there is only one witness, his qualifications must be ascer- 
tained. Some men lack the power of attention, judgment, and 
memory. Others have it only along certain lines. Hence the 
special aptitudes and dispositions of the witness must be consid- 
ered in reference to the special fact which he relates. His verac- 
ity is also to be ascertained. To this end it may be necessary to 
know his moral character, to find out whether he had any interest 
in deceiving, etc. When there is only one witness, greater 
severity is required in testing his authority. 

(c) Several unanimous and independent witnesses give a greater 



DERIVATIVE CRITERIA 419 

certitude than one witness. If they disagree, it is necessary not 
so much to number those on each side as to weigh their author- 
ity. They must he independent, i.e. not prompted by the same 
interests or passions, nor following the same original witness, 
for otherwise there is really only one testimony Frequently the 
impossibility of deception is certain, for instance, when wit- 
nesses relate important contemporary events, and their testimony 
has not been contradicted. In general, the greater the number 
of witnesses, their independence, and their competence to observe 
the fact, the greater also the certitude. 

3. On Questions of Doctrine, human authority has less value 
than on questions of fact, because the human mind is more fallible 
in its deductions and inductions than in ordinary easy observa- 
tions, and because there is less agreement among men. Yet in 
every discussion, men appeal to authorities, and rightly so, for a 
specialist has more chance to reach the truth in his special branch 
than another man. However, the general principle to be applied 
here is that the authority of a man is worth the reasons which he 
gives, at least for one who can understand these reasons. As to 
those who cannot understand, they must accept the statements 
with more or less reserve according to the qualities, fairness, prej- 
udices, etc., of the man who makes them. The common consent 
of mankind, in questions on which man in general is competent, 
shows, not only the propensity of human nature, but also objective 
evidence. 

4. Oral Tradition is a difficult criterion because it is too vari- 
able. By passing from man to man, the same fact may become 
gradually distorted by additions, subtractions, and changes. 
Experience shows that if the same fact is narrated by one person 
to another, by this one to a third, and so forth, the narration made 
by the tenth person may be greatly different from the original. 
Hence the greatest care must be used in distinguishing truth from 
legend. Yet, as a rule, even after a long time of oral tradition, 
there remains a nucleus of truth which may be disentangled by 
controlling oral tradition with the help of written documents, 
and comparing one line of oral tradition with other lines indepen- 
dent of it. If the tradition happens to be mentioned in writing. 



420 EPISTEMOLOGY 

the circumstances of the writing are to be taken into considera- 
tion. Moreover, the nature of the fact must be examined, as also 
the customs and characteristics of the people by whom the tradi- 
tion has been preserved. When the tradition is a popular one, 
known to all, adulterations are less likely to occur, because the 
statement of one man is corrected by the statement of others on 
the same point. 

5. Written Documents. — The conditions required in a written 
document are its authenticity, integrity, and veracity. 

(a) The authenticity or genuineness of a book, that is, the fact 
that it has been written by the author whose name it bears, is es- 
tabUshed by (i) internal evidence: its style as compared to the 
style of works that are certainly genuine; the agreement of its 
contents with the time and place at which it is supposed to have 
been written; the agreement of its contents with the author's 
views and opinions, etc.; (2) external evidence: the testimony of 
other writers, oral tradition, the silence of those who would be 
interested in denying its authenticity, etc. 

(b) The integrity of a book, that is, the freedom from additions, 
subtractions, or changes, is proved by different circumstances: 
the multiplicity of independent editions, the comparison with 
manuscripts, the difficulty of introducing interpolations or mutila- 
tions, the importance of the contents, the comparison with other 
documents, etc. 

(c) The veracity is ascertained by showing the author's knowl- 
edge and fairness, and by comparing the book with other docu- 
ments. 

N.B. A general principle to be observed in the application of 
the criterion of authority is that one must always guard against 
both excessive credulity and exaggerated scepticism. Few 
sciences are more difficult than history, which endeavors to find 
out the truth of facts related in written documents or oral 
traditions. 

To discuss here the question of the authority of divine revela- 
tion would be to anticipate a niunber of conclusions on the exist- 
ence and the attributes of God, and on the criteria of revelation. 
All we can say at present is that, granting God's omniscience and 



CONCLUSION 421 

sanctity, and also the fact of revelation, divine faith gives to man 
the highest possible certitude. 



CONCLUSION 

The conclusion of this treatise is that certitude is possible for 
man, but that it requires some conditions. Not only is certitude 
possible, but it is the indispensable condition of thought. Knowl- 
edge is a complex process. It always needs correction and read- 
justment, but its bases are secure. Man's endeavor should be to 
build as strong and as high an edifice as possible on the twofold 
foundation of facts and principles that are certain. He must 
know the limitations, and imperfections of his own mind, and hence 
be satisfied with opinion and even doubt where certitude is not 
justified. He must also proceed cautiously, and use all possible 
tests of his knowledge. But the field to be explored has no lim- 
its, and, provided the mind starts from evidence and proceeds with 
evidence, there is no reason to assign any border line beyond 
which would lie the unknowable. What is unknown for the 
science of to-day may be known for the science of to-morrow. 



COSMOLOGY OR THE METAPHYS- 
ICAL STUDY OF THE 
PHYSICAL WORLD 



INTRODUCTION 



I, General Introduction to Metaphysics. — (c) The name 
"metaphysics" owes its origin to the arrangement of Aristotle's 
works by Andronicus of Rhodes (first century B.C.), who gave the 
general title of ra fiera to. ^vo-iko. to all the treatises that fol- 
lowed Aristotle's treatise on Physics. The name given by Aris- 
totle himself was that of "First Philosophy." Metaphysics 
means the science which rises higher than physical sciences, and 
considers things from a more abstract, hence more general, point 
of view. 

All sciences are more or less abstract, and all suppose general 
principles. But physical sciences use experience as their chief 
instrument, and call upon experience to test and verify their con- 
clusions. Moreover, every science considers only certain classes of 
beings, and from a special point of view. Metaphysics endeavors 
to complete special sciences by a higher unification. Thus all 
physical sciences deal with material substances; but what is matter 
which is common to all? They use the principle of causality; 
but what is a cause? and so on. Physical sciences are empirical; 
the present science is metempirical or metaphysical. Its con- 
clusions cannot be verified directly by experience, yet must be 
based on it and harmonize with it. Metaphysics is not, and 
cannot be, divorced from physical science. 

(b) That its object is real has been shown in epistemology, and 
those who claim that metaphysics is an impossibility, or deals 

422 



NATURE OF COSMOLOGY 423 

with the unknowable, do so on account of preconceived ideas on 
the nature of knowledge. In a series of subordinated "whats" 
the mind is not satisfied till it reaches the last. What is ice? . . . 
What is water? . . . What are oxygen and hydrogen? . . . What 
is an element? . . . What is matter? . . . And although it is 
more abstract, the object of metaphysics is nevertheless real. 
Hence metaphysics is not a mere science of words and ideas, and 
the discredit into which it has fallen is due to agnostic tendencies, 
and also to the abuse which has sometimes been made of meta- 
physics, by asking and trying to solve idle questions, or by making 
it a purely a priori and ideal construction. 

(c) The objects of metaphysics may be reduced to three main 
groups: the physical world, the human soul, and the ultimate 
ground of all things. Hence we shall have three parts: Cos- 
mology, Philosophy of Mind, and Theodicy. The method will 
be both inductive and deductive, i.e. proceed from experience and 
from self-evident principles. But everywhere we shall ^eep in 
touch with concrete reality. 

2. Cosmology (Koa-fxos, mundus, universe) is the philosophical 
science of the physical world, (i) It deals with the physical 
world, and, in this respect, its object is the same as that of natural 
sciences, with this difference, however, that it deals with all physi- 
cal realities, while each of them is concerned only with certain 
groups. (2) It is a philosophical science, and, in this, its point 
of view differs from that of the other sciences. Thus physics 
deals with the common properties of matter; chemistry with its 
changes; mineralogy with the description and classification of 
minerals; geology with the formation of the crust of the earth, 
etc. None touches upon the higher questions of the intimate and 
ultimate constitution of matter. They assume that matter exists, 
and they show its various properties and activities, but do not 
consider its essential nature. 

Cosmology, therefore, completes natural sciences. It endeavors 
to answer questions which they do not answer. Yet it evidently 
depends on them, since it tries to explain the real world. Its method 
is chiefly inductive, starting from common experience or from 
scientific conclusions, and rising to higher generalizations, by 



424 COSMOLOGY 

the use especially of the principles of causality and of sufficient 
reason. 

3. Division of Cosmology. — (a) To be complete, cosmology 
should include the following subjects: (i) Inorganic beings; 
their properties and nature. (2) Organic beings; life in general; 
plants, and animals. (3) Man; his activities and nature. (4) 
Genesis and evolution of the world, both of the individual beings 
that compose it and of the universe as a whole; of life and of the 
various forms of life; of man. (5) The end or purpose of the 
world. (6) The cosmos, or the universe considered as a whole, 
and the relations by which its unity is realized. 

(b) Of these questions, however, some, like the question of 
evolution, belong chiefly to natural sciences, and cannot receive 
a full treatment here. Others, like the ultimate efficient or final 
cause, will find a more suitable place in Theodicy. The questions 
referring to man, owing to their special importance, will be the 
special object of the next treatise. Hence we shall have the four 
following chapters: (i) Inorganic beings. (2) Life. (3) Origin 
and evolution, (4) The Cosmos. 



CHAPTER I 

INORGANIC SUBSTANCES 

I. PROPERTIES 

The properties of inorganic substances may be reduced to two 
groups, passive and active properties, or extension and energy, 

1. Extension. — (a) All material substances are endowed with 
extension. Such, at any rate, is the constant testimony of the 
senses of touch and vision. Such also is the assumption of sciences, 
Uke mechanics, physics, and chemistry. Psychology itself would 
be at a loss to account for the perception of extension, if extension 
were a reality neither in the external world nor in the organism. 
For the present it is enough to note that the phenomenon of ex- 
tension is undeniable. Whether extension be real or not, its 
appearance at least will have to be explained. 

(b) However, extension cannot constitute the whole essence 
of bodies, as Descartes claimed. He based this conclusion on the 
fact that, even if all quahties — temperature, shape, resistance, 
etc. — of a material substance be changed, its extension always 
remains. But (i) when, for instance, a stone is broken into several 
parts, every part has the same essential nature as the whole, 
although not the same extension. Large or small, it has the same 
essence. (2) When we want to distinguish one substance from 
another, we never do so by its extension alone, but by other prop- 
erties, which, therefore, are more characteristic than extension. 

(c) In consequence of their extension, bodies occupy a certain 
space, have a multiplicity of parts distributed in this space, and 
although, in a continuous body, such parts are mutually exclusive, 
they exist only potentially before an actual division takes place. 
The right is not the left, but actual division alone makes a 
determined number of parts. 

2. Activity. — Material substances act, i.e. are endowed with 

42s 



426 COSMOLOGY 

forces and energies by means of which they cause changes in other 
substances. Thus electricity, heat, etc., are powerful agents; 
the forces of attraction, resistance, repulsion, etc., are constantly 
at work. Substances act upon one another in a multitude of ways, 
and man strives to master and control these forces so as to make 
them subservient to his ends. That these forces are real is evi- 
dent from the testimony of consciousness, for we are aware of the 
actions — heat, resistance, electricity, etc. — of external bodies 
on our own, and from the testimony of external senses which mani- 
fest the interaction of all material substances. These forces are 
distinct from extension, and physicists commonly oppose matter 
to energy. 

II. CONSTITUTION 

I. The Question Stated 

I. The Problem. — The present problem is that of the ulti- 
mate constitution of material substances in general; not of this 
or that special substance, but of all bodies. Chemistry resolves 
certain substances, called compounds, into others which can be 
analyzed no further, and are called simple substances or elements. 
Both physics and chemistry agree in admitting that material 
substances are not continuous, but composed of distinct molecules 
(smallest units of compound), and atoms (smallest units of ele- 
ments). And even what until recently was looked upon as the 
atom, i.e. the indivisible imit, is now, owing to the discovery of 
radio-activity, looked upon as made up of a number of corpuscles 
or electrons. 

Our point of view here is different from that of physical and 
chemical sciences. The element is a specific material substance. 
The atom or electron is also a physical reality. Hence concerning 
both the element and the atom the questions may be raised : What 
are they? What is their nature? These questions cannot be 
answered by natural sciences, for their methods will always lead 
them to something physical, and what we want to know is whether, 
starting from physical facts, reason cannot proceed farther in the 
mental analysis of substances, and discover principles which, 
although they may be inseparable, are nevertheless distinct. 



CONSTITUTION OF MATTER 427 

2. Theories. — The theories may be reduced to three, two of 
which advocate one single principle, whilst the other advocates a 
twofold principle. One insists on quantitative properties, ad- 
mits extension, and denies real energies. The other insists on 
energy, and denies real extension. The third tries to account for 
extension, energy, and specific properties. 

(a) As a philosophical system, atomism not only admits the 
physical reality of atoms endowed with extension, but asserts 
that we can proceed no farther in our rational analysis. The 
atom is the ultimate reality of matter. Atomism is a very 
ancient theory, advocated in Greece by Leucippus, Democritus, 
and Epicurus, and in Rome by Lucretius. These philosophers 
hold that atoms are eternal, infinite in number, and that their 
fortuitous meeting formed the various substances. Gassendi 
modified the theory on minor points in order to reconcile it with 
Christian dogmas, but admitted also a pure atomism. To-day, 
owing to the discredit into which metaphysical investigation has 
fallen, there is a tendency to stop at the atoms as physical units, 
without pushing the analysis any further. Atomism may attempt 
to explain everything with atoms of the same kind, endowed with 
various motions (mechanical atomism), or it may admit different 
kinds of atoms, with specific properties (d3mamic atomism). 

(b) Dynamism in general holds that matter consists essentially 
of simple, and consequently indivisible, units or forces. Extension 
is not real, but only apparent. The first vestiges of dynamism 
may probably be found in the school of Pythagoras. It is only 
later, however, that this doctrine is held explicitly by some Arabian 
philosophers. In more recent times, Leibniz claims that matter 
is composed of "monads," i.e. of simple substances without parts 
or extension, all dissimilar, and endowed only with an internal 
activity. Matter can never act on other matter. Boscovich 
reduces matter to an aggregate of homogeneous points without 
extension, which, by their different numbers, groupings, distanceSj 
and interaction, produce the diversity of so-called material sub- 
stances. To-day many scientists advocate an electrotonic theory 
of matter according to which matter is ultimately reduced to elec- 
trons which have no real extension. Under the name of energetism, 



428 COSMOLOGY 

an attempt is also made to reduce the concept of matter to that 
of energy. 

(c) Hylomorphism, or physical dualism, holds that no theory 
can account for all the properties of matter by one principle only. 
It admits a twofold principle, matter, or rather primary matter 
(vXr;), and form {iiop^-q). This applies to all substances, even 
to the "elements" of chemistry, and the "atoms" of physics and 
chemistry. Matter is the principle of quantity, but is of itself 
indetermined, the same in all substances, and incapable of exist- 
ence apart from the form. The form is the specific or determining 
principle, the source of all determinations. The union of both 
principles, each of which is incomplete in itself and inseparable from 
the other, gives the complete specific material substance. The 
two always go together, and cannot be perceived separately by 
the senses. What we call matter in the usual sense is always 
primary matter together with the substantial form with which it 
is intimately united. This theory was proposed by Aristotle. 
It was the common doctrine of the scholastics in the Middle 
Ages, after which it was almost forgotten until recently. 

II. Discussion of the Systems 

I. Atomism has the general defect of not answering the question 
proposed. To say that what we call matter, and what appears to 
the senses as one material substance, is in reality composed of a 
multitude of smaller bodies leaves the problem without solution, 
for this problem refers to the smallest body or atom as well as to 
the largest. Physical division cannot here substitute itself for 
reasoning. The atom is one and supposedly indivisible. Yet, 
however small it may be, it occupies space, has different parts, 
and a point on its surface is not the same as another point. Atoms 
are real, but their reality must be explained. 

(a) If different forces and properties are admitted, one may 
ask: Where do these come from? What is their ultimate source? 
If the atoms are of different size, why are all equally indivisible? 

{b) Mechanical atomism rejects all specific properties, admits 
that atoms are all of the same nature, and tries to explain all the 
facts by their different motions. But it fails in this attempt. To 



CONSTITUTION OY MATTER 429 

mention only a few facts: (i) Chemical affinity, in virtue of 
which certain elements combine only with certain others, and 
always in definite proportions, supposes laws which the atoms 
invariably obey, and which their motions alone cannot account 
for. (2) Whatever explanation be given of the difference between 
a chemical nuxture and a chemical compound, this difference 
imphes in the elements the presence of specific properties which 
do not manifest themselves in a simple mixture, but only in a com- 
bination. If the elements have been completely altered in the 
compound, how do they always reappear in the analysis? If 
they have not been altered, where do the new properties come from? 
(3) Affinity, cohesion, molecular and molar attraction, cannot 
be explained satisfactorily by mechanism. They suppose an 
internal principle of tendency. (4) In a word, chemical and 
physical laws are not reducible to mere mechanical movements. 
(5) Even if they were, mechanism would still be inadequate, for 
motion itself cannot be communicated without supposing intrinsic 
forces. The commimication of a movement supposes in the mobile 
an aptitude and power which is actualized by the impulsion of 
the motor. When the actual impact of the two has taken place, 
and the mobile keeps on moving, its motion cannot actually come 
from the motor, with which it is no longer in communication. It 
is therefore the imfolding of an intrinsic energy. (6) In general, 
as will be explained later, there is in every substance an internal 
principle of tendency. (Cf. pp. 452, 455.) 

2, Dynamism. — (a) Dynamism cannot explain real exten- 
sion. It is clear that a multitude of ''naughts" of extension put 
together can never give a positive quantity. If points without 
extension are supposed to touch one another, all necessarily coin- 
cide in the same point. If they are supposed to be at a distance 
from one another, it becomes necessary to admit an actio in distans, 
the possibility of which is generally denied by physicists. More- 
over, this would not give real, but only apparent, extension, and it 
is difficult to understand this appearance or illusion of extension, 
if there is no extension anywhere, not even in the sense-organs. 

(b) It is true that matter does not manifest itself to the senses 
except through its activities (radiations, vibrations, resistance, 



430 COSMOLOGY 

heat, etc.), but it does not follow that real extension is to be denied. 
Without matter it is difficult to understand energy, for in this 
case, what is it that moves, rotates, vibrates? 

(c) The recent discoveries in radio-activity are not given the 
same interpretation by all. Some deny, while others admit, 
that the electron has extension, and it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to answer this question from the physical standpoint. 

3. Hylomorphism. — (a) We distinguish the matter and form 
— i.e. the materials and shape — of any object, e.g. of a marble 
statue. We may go farther, and ask what the substance which 
we call marble is itself composed of. We shall find that it is 
composed of carbon, calcium, oxygen, etc. These may be vari- 
ously combined with other elements so as to form new compounds, 
with properties different from those of the former compound, and 
from those of the component elements themselves. The element has 
in itself a principle which may indifferently be this or that spe- 
cific substance, and which is called "primary matter" as opposed 
to "secondary matter" (marble or any other substance). That 
by which it is determined as marble, and not anything else, is 
the "substantial form," as opposed to "accidental forms," i.e. 
the various determinations like shape and physical properties, 
which the marble may receive. 

Thus physical matter is composed of a deeper reality, indeter- 
mined, and capable of being indifferently one substance or another 
(primary matter), and of a determining principle by which it is 
a special kind of substance (substantial form). The many changes 
which the same elements undergo in forming different compovmds 
lead to the admission of a twofold principle. The element itself 
always has a principle of indetermination, and a determining 
principle; a principle common to all substances, and a specific prin- 
ciple which differentiates one substance from another; a principle 
of passivity capable of receiving successively different modifica- 
tions, and a principle which makes it to be what it is. 

(b) It is true that, understood in this way, matter and form 
are only abstractions. They do not exist separately as physical 
realities, and cannot be perceived by the senses. But, like all 
abstractions, they are not purely mental products; they are 



CONSTITUTION OF MATTER 431 

realities that compose the physical substance and cannot exist 
apart from each other. 

In fact, even atomism and dynamism are obliged to admit that 
homogeneous units, by their movements, groupings, and activities, 
form substances that are widely different in their properties. Hence 
they must admit some kind of a form or law according to which 
these differentiations take place. Should various substances 
ultimately consist of only one kind of elements, that is, should it 
be ascertained that the elements of chemistry are reducible to 
identical units Uke the electrons, it would still be necessary to 
explain how these ultimate identical materials are what they are, 
and how they unite to form the various substances. They always 
obey certain laws which indicate a true determination or formal 
principle. Hence this would always lead to a duaUsm of the 
indetermined and the determinant, of the common and the specific, 
of a substratum and its superstructure, of matter and form. 



CHAPTER II 
LIVING BEINGS 
I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LIFE 

I. In General 

I. Common Idea of Life. — (a) A distinction is made by all 
men between certain beings — animals and plants — which are 
called living, and certain others which are called lifeless. It may 
not always be possible to indicate which beings have Ufe, and 
which are deprived of it — especially in the case of micro-organ- 
isms where the biologist himself is not always able to make this 
distinction with certainty — yet a sharp distinction is always 
recognized between Uving and dead, and between organic and 
inorganic matter. 

(b) The common basis of this distinction is the presence or the 
absence of movements or changes which originate within the being, 
that is, the principle or cause of which is not, or at least does not 
seem to be, external. Thus an animal is distinguished from an 
automaton because the latter must be pushed or "wound up." 
Were not this necessary condition known, the automaton would 
easily be mistaken, e.g. by the child or ignorant man, for a living 
being. An animal or a man ceases to live when he ceases to move, 
when the respiratory process stops, when the heart ceases to beat, 
etc. A plant ceases to live when the sap no longer circulates, 
when ordinary changes in the growth, foliage, etc., no longer take 
place. Many metaphorical expressions are derived from this fact. 
We speak of a living fountain as opposed to stagnant water; we 
say of a man, animal, or plant that they are full of hfe when they 
change rapidly. (Compare such expressions as "lively imagina- 
tion," "living faith," "Uve wire," "Hve coal," "the company was 
alive," etc.) 

To live, therefore, is to move, and to imdergo changes due to an 

432 



CHARACTERISTICS OF LIFE 433 

internal principle, although an external stimulus may be present, 
as in the case of a rabbit running away from a dog. In the same 
circumstances, lifeless matter would not move or change. It 
must be pushed or acted upon by some mechanical force. 

(c) The changes that are most commonly taken as signs of life 
are local movements of the whole being, or of some of its parts 
(heart, head, arms, etc.); the functions of nutrition and growth, 
and various modifications in the general appearance (foliage, 
flowers, fruits, etc.); a certain shape, size, and organization; 
and consciousness, which some of these changes manifest. 

2. Scientific Conception of Life. — The following points sum- 
marize the differences which biological science observes between 
living and inorganic substances. 

(o) Chemical composition. Evidently living matter as such 
cannot be analyzed, since the process of analysis deprives it of 
life. The analysis of an organism yields primarily the following 
elements: carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, sulphur, and phos- 
phorus. In living beings, the elements unite to form proteids, 
and these compounds are always highly unstable and constantly 
changing. A mere glance at the formulae of organic and of in- 
organic chemistry shows how much more complex the former are 
than the latter, and how many more atoms are required. 

{h) Shape and structure, (i) Whereas the organism always 
has a special determined shape according to its kind, the mineral 
has no determined shape, except in crystals. The shape of crystals 
is always angular; angles are generally excluded from the shape 
of the whole organism and of its elementary structures. The 
outlines, both of the organism and of its parts, are generally curve 
Hues. (2) The mineral is homogeneous; the organism is difer- 
entiated. This is clear for higher organisms, in which a cross 
section will reveal a multitude of different tissues. It is true of the 
lowest also, for the cell, which constitutes the whole of unicellular 
organisms, and which is the last unit in multicellular organisms, 
is itself already heterogeneous and very complex in its structure. 
Its natural shape is spheroidal, and it possesses the essential 
properties of nutrition, growth, multiplication, irritabiUty, etc. 

(c) Origin. Life cannot be produced in the laboratory. The 
29 



434 COSMOLOGY 

rule is general: "Omne vivens ex vivo," or "Omnis cellula ex 
cellula." A crystal is but a special regular arrangement of a 
substance under certain conditions. ' 

(d) Nutrition, growth, duration, (i) Living substances alone 
have the power of assimilation, i.e. they manufacture proteids out 
of inorganic matter, and elaborate foreign substances which they 
incorporate into their own. (2) Minerals are stable, and inorganic 
matter always tends to the most stable equilibrivun. Living 
matter changes constantly. A continual decay and a continual 
repair take place within it. Living matter returns to the inorganic 
world, and, from the inorganic world, new living substances are 
formed. (3) The growth of minerals is not Hmited to any size 
or shape. Living matter has a maximimi for every species, and 
is always shaped according to a specific type. (4) The growth of 
minerals — crystals included — takes place by accretion, i.e. 
juxtaposition of particles; that of living beings takes place by 
intussusception, i.e. assimilation. (5) Inorganic substances, of 
themselves, have no limited or definite duration; they change 
only when they are acted upon by external agents. In living sub- 
stances, the period of growth and of life itself is subject to laws 
varying with the different species. 

3. Philosophical Notion of Life. — If we now try to find out the 
essential characteristics of living beings, all the special properties 
of living beings have the following points in common, (i) They 
imply changes that are constant and uninterrupted, owing to the 
unstable equilibrium of hving matter. This is the fimdamental 
characteristic of nutrition which is the first vital function. (2) 
They are immanent, i.e. they modify and perfect primarily the 
living substance itself. There are many transitive activities, but 
the final term of these is within the organism itself. Inorganic 
substances, on the contrary, (i) tend to the most stable combina- 
tion and equilibrium; (2) act only on one another. They do not 
modify or perfect themselves, but other substances. 

II. Manifestations of Life 

I. Hylozoism (vXrj, matter, and ^wrj, Hfe) asserts that matter is 
essentially living, and hence that even so-called inorganic matter 



CHARACTERISTICS OF LIFE 435 

possesses a very low degree of life. This name is sometimes re- 
stricted to the system according to which, not only some degree of 
life, but also some degree of consciousness, must be attributed to 
all forms of matter. Proposed in various forms by ancient philoso- 
phers, this view has been advocated recently under various names 
like the German " Allbeseelung " (all-animation), or Panpsychism. 

From the point of view of science, this assertion is evidently 
gratuitous, and even contrary to facts. It is advocated on a priori 
groimds, such as monism, or the assumed identity of all things; 
evolution, or the assumed necessity for life and consciousness to 
have originated from lower forms of matter; and the endeavor 
to exclude every intervention of God. The main differences 
pointed out above between living and non-living substances show 
their irreducibihty to each other. 

2. Plants and Animals. — Living beings may be divided, 
according to their complexity, into unicellular and multicellular; 
according to their size, into visible and miscroscopic. But the 
main division, according to their functions, is into plants, animals, 
and men. The reason for assigning to man a special place will be 
given in rational psychology. There are many differences between 
plants and animals. The main difference, however, consists in 
the absence or the presence of consciousness. Animals, at least the 
higher forms of animals, give unmistakable signs of consciousness. 
They have sense-organs, and respond to stimuli in the same way 
as man. By analogy, we know that they experience sensations, 
that they have imagination, memory, feeling, and instinct. Other- 
wise their behavior is unexplainable. Plants, on the contrary, 
give no signs of consciousness. They have no nervous system, 
with which consciousness is always connected in animals, and 
there is no reason whatsoever to attribute to them what they do 
not manifest. Sometimes, it is true, the scientist may not be 
certain whether a living being (especially among microbes) is a 
plant or an animal, but this can in no way be given as an objection 
against the distinction of both kingdoms. The degrees of conscious- 
ness vary greatly in animals, but the question may always be asked, 
if not answered: Is consciousness present? Then we have an 
animal. Is consciousness absent? Then we have a plant. 



436 COSMOLOGY 

II. NATURE OF THE LIVING BEING 
I. Theories 

Sometimes a distinction is made between living beings that are 
endowed with consciousness and those that are deprived of it. 
As consciousness has characteristics irreducible to those of matter, 
it must also require a distinct principle. This conclusion seems 
correct, but, for the present, we Umit ourselves to the lowest degree 
of Ufe, vegetative life, the main manifestations of which have been 
described above. 

(a) Some refuse to admit the existence of a special principle 
of life. Life is explained adequately by the general properties of 
matter, either by its mechanical motions, or by its physical and 
chemical properties, which manifest themselves in various ways 
according to the adaptation of the various organs. But the point 
on which all agree is that life results simply from the greater com- 
plexity of matter in living beings, and from the natural play of 
its mechanical, physical, and chemical energies. 

(b) Others admit that special forces are necessary to explain 
life. These vital forces are distinct from, irreducible and fre- 
quently antagonistic to, the ordinary properties of matter. As 
inorganic forces rather tend to destroy life, vital forces must 
constantly resist them. Some look upon this special energy as a 
spiritual, intelligent, and directive force (Stahl); others, as in- 
herent in matter, but yet superadded to its ordinary properties 
(vitalism). All agree that organized matter and the vital principle 
are two distinct realities, irreducible to each other. 

(c) Others finally take a middle course. Life is not merely the 
result of mechanical forces; nor does it require any special forces. 
The living substance is composed, like every other material being, 
of a twofold principle, matter and form. The form, or vital prin- 
ciple, is united with matter, and, together with it, constitutes only 
one complete Uving substance. 

II. Discussion 

I. Physical Energies in Living Beings. — Not only does life 
depend on the various energies of matter, but there seems to be no 



NATURE OF LIVING BEINGS 437 

necessity for admitting in the organism the presence of any energies 
distinct from ordinary physical energies, still less for admitting ener- 
gies antagonistic to these. There is no real opposition or struggle 
between vital phenomena and physico-chemical phenomena. On 
the contrary, we see the physical and chemical properties of matter 
utilized by the living substance, and working together to main- 
tain life. In every vital process, the chemical laws of affinity, 
attraction, cohesion, combination, etc., and the physical laws 
concerning heat, gravity, osmosis, capillarity, levers, etc., are 
obeyed, and numberless applications of them could be made to 
the processes of digestion, assimilation, respiration, circulation, 
etc. As biology proceeds farther in its explanation of vital proc- 
esses, it succeeds better in showing that these processes presuppose 
no forces distinct from the ordinary properties of matter. The 
general laws of the conservation of matter and of the conservation 
of energy seem to hold in the organic as well as in the inorganic 
world. Nothing is created; nothing annihilated. In the living 
substance, and in the laboratory, changes obey the same laws of 
equivalence, and are subject to the same conditions. The dis- 
tinctive property of life, therefore, is not the presence of special 
forces, but the special mode according to which these converge to 
the same end which is the life of the individual. 

2. Their Insufficiency. — (a) Life is not explained by me- 
chanical, physical, and chemical energies alone. Even in the 
lowest organism, they are many and complex; and yet all serve 
the same purpose, the Ufe of the organism. It is precisely this 
harmony and this unity of direction which suppose a directive 
principle. How, for instance, do these forces work together so 
as to form a highly dififerentiated organism, with very complex 
parts (eye, ear, digestive apparatus, etc.), out of one single primi- 
tive cell with which all organisms begin? How are the physical 
materials elaborated so as to furnish every organ with the elements 
it needs? This requires a guiding principle; a principle of unity, 
presiding over the functions of the whole organism; and a prin- 
ciple of formation, presiding over the development of the organism 
itself. And here it would serve no purpose to appeal to the elabo- 
ration of organic substances in the laboratory. Organic they may 



438 COSMOLOGY 

be called, but they are not living, and they lack the essential 
principle of life. 

(b) This principle of unity, directing and subordinating the 
various organs and functions, is not distinct from the living being 
itself. It is an internal principle, tending to the creation and 
preservation of the organism. The Uving being is one, but, like 
the inorganic being, it is composed of a twofold principle, matter 
and form. The substantial form, principle of determination, unity 
and activity, is, in the living being, the "soul," as Aristotle called 
it, i.e. the vital or animating principle. It is not something ex- 
trinsic to living matter, guiding it as the pilot steers his vessel, 
but it is an intrinsic determining principle of matter, which together 
with it forms one complete living substance. (Cf. pp. 428, 430.) 



CHAPTER III 
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION 

I. THE QUESTION STATED 

One of the most striking tendencies of modern science and 
philosophy is to take a dynamic and genetic rather than a static 
and descriptive view of things. Attention is given to the questions: 
What can a thing do? How does it come to be what it is? Things 
are looked upon as moving, changing, becoming. The passage 
from the simple to the complex is followed closely. This tendency 
manifests itself, for instance, in biology, by the questions concern- 
ing the origin of life and of the different forms of life; in astronomy 
and cosmology, by the questions of the formation of the earth and 
the universe; in the various branches of psychology, by thq study 
of mental development, and the genesis of various mental mani- 
festations. This tendency is one of the characteristics of the 
nineteenth century, and continues to manifest itself in the 
twentieth. 

I. The Problems. — {a) The problems of the origin and 
development of the universe are partly scientific and partly philo- 
sophical. Both contributions may be completed by information 
from a higher source, namely, divine revelation, which we have 
not to deal with here, (i) Science records many changes. It 
also examines the origin, natural or artificial, of many things, 
inorganic and organic, and follows their development. In many 
cases it can form, and, to a certain extent, test hypotheses. (2) 
Science always presupposes the existence of matter and its energies. 
The very first origin of things belongs to philosophical research. 

{b) The problem may refer to (i) the world as a whole; (2) 
the earth as a whole, its origin and formation; (3) hfe on the earth, 
either the individual Uving beings, or the first origin of life, or the 
various differentiated forms of life as they exist to-day. 

439 



440 COSMOLOGY 

(c) It will be useful here to recall a few methodological remarks, 
(i) Many arguments being analogical, it is important that the 
analogy should not be carried farther than the facts justify. (2) 
All aspects of the beings under consideration must be examined. 
(3) Care must be taken to distinguish the facts from the interpre- 
tation which they may receive (e.g. the fact of the successive 
appearance of the forms of life from its interpretation as fihal 
descendance). This is necessary especially when an author is 
known to have preconceived ideas. (4) Ascertained conclusions 
of all sciences must be kept in mind. (5) The problems, and chiefly 
the theories, are still young, and many are still under discussion. 
Enthusiasm is frequently a characteristic of youth; hence rash 
assertions must be guarded against. 

2. Meaning of Evolution. — It is important at the outset to 
define the term -"evolution" {e-volvere, to unfold), which is so 
frequently met with, and which is applied to a great number of 
difierent things. 

(a) Formerly it was used in the sense of "preformation" to 
mean the theory according to which the living germ already con- 
tains, in miniature proportions, all the organs of the fully developed 
individual. This is opposed to the view now scientifically estab- 
lished of "epigenesis," according to which the organs become 
differentiated Httle by httle out of a primitive cell. This meaning 
— preformation — of evolution is universally abandoned to-day. 

{b) At present evolution refers not so much to the individual as 
to a successive group of individual substances or processes, the 
complexity and differentiation of which go on increasing from the 
first to the last. It implies succession, becoming, filiation, descent. 
Thus we have cosmic evolution, organic evolution, evolution of 
morality, of religion, etc. 

(c) Sometimes, it is used for "monism," i.e. for the theory of the 
substantial unity of all things, deriving life from inorganic matter, 
and man from lower forms of life, and rejecting any intervention 
at any stage, of a supramundane agency, both as the first origin 
and cause of the world, and as a factor in its evolution. 

(d) Frequently it is applied more particularly to organic evo- 
lution. In this sense, it is synonymous with " transf ormism " 



THE INORGANIC WORLD 441 

or the "theory of descent." "Evolution" refers to the race 
(phylogenesis), whereas " development " appHes to the individual 
(ontogenesis). 

(e) Hence evolution is not, as sometimes popularly misunder- 
stood, the theory according to which "man originated from a 
monkey." Nor is it the same as atheism, for God may be admitted 
as the first cause of the existence of beings, and of their tendency 
to evolve. Nor is it the same as Darwinism, which is only one of 
the theories concerning the mode of evolution. Nor, finally, is 
it the same as imiversal progress; in some cases evolution may be 
regressive. 

II. THE INORGANIC WORLD 

We shall merely mention the question of the evolution of 
the inorganic world, which belongs to natural sciences (physics, 
chemistry, geology, astronomy). Our earth was at one time 
an incandescent mass which, together with the other planets, 
was detached from the original matter forming the solar sys- 
tem, and the crust of which little by little cooled off and became 
solid. As to the solar system, its matter was originally spread 
throughout the space it now occupies. It had a very low den- 
sity, and as yet formed no special bodies. It was endowed with 
a movement of rotation, and parts of it separated, forming groups 
independent to some extent, and yet in constant relation with the 
others (movement, gravitation, etc.). Little by Httle these separate 
groups cooled off and formed solid bodies, while the central por- 
tion, the sun, is still incandescent. This nebular hypothesis, 
which, in its essentials, is commonly received, is extended to all 
stars, which are so many suns. This theory leaves without explana- 
tion the first origin of matter, of the laws by which it is governed, 
and of its first rotary motion. We pass now to the origin of living 
beings on the earth. 

HI. THE ORGANIC WORLD 

Two questions must be distinguished: the origin of life itself, 
and the origin of its various forms. 



442 COSMOLOGY 

I. The Origin of Life 

1, At Present. — (a) Common experience shows that at least 
the higher organisms invariably come from parents of the same 
species, but it does not extend to all forms of Ufe (parasites, insects, 
infusoria, etc.). On the other hand, science teaches that many 
organic products can be manufactured in the chemical laboratory, 
and that the analysis of protoplasm yields only a few inorganic 
elements. Hence the questions: Does life always originate from 
hfe? Does a living being always originate from a living being of 
the same species, or can parasites, for instance, originate from a 
different organism? Can dead matter give rise to inferior forms 
of life? 

(b) In antiquity and in the Middle Ages, spontaneous genera- 
tion and generation from dead matter were commonly accepted as 
facts. Recipes were given to generate such highly organized beings 
as mice, birds, snakes, etc. In 1668, Redi of Florence showed 
that meat, if exposed to the air, is soon full of maggots, but that, 
if it is screened, no maggots are produced. The reason is that 
their germs have been excluded. Little by Uttle the production of 
other animals, such as parasites and others, was also traced back 
to germs. The discovery of bacteria revived the problem, which, 
however, was definitely solved by Pasteur (about i860), who showed 
that, when germs were effectively excluded, no life appeared. 

(c) Hence the law is accepted to-day: "Omne vivens ex vivo," 
and to this rule no exception is known. Notwithstanding all 
efforts, no transitional form from the inorganic to the organic 
world has ever been found. The modes according to which genera- 
tion takes place are different according to the diversity of organisms, 
but "biogenesis," or the origin of every living organism from a 
living organism of the same kind, is the universal law. There 
is no "spontaneous generation." 

2. First Origin of Life. — How far can we go back in this regres- 
sive process, i.e. how far can we trace back the ascending series of 
ancestors? Somewhere we must find an absolute beginning, for 
we know that life did not always exist on the earth, since at one 
time the earth was incandescent, and therefore unfit for life and for 



EVOLUTION IN ORGANIC WORLD 443 

the preservation of any germs of life. To say, with Lord Kelvin, 
that germs were brought down from stars or planets through cosmic 
dust or aerolites, is no solution. How did life originate there? 

Some evolutionistic monists, however, claim that what does not 
take place to-day, namely, spontaneous generation, must have 
taken place in the past. Otherwise, how could life have arisen? 
And Haeckel describes at length the origin and evolution of the 
"moneron" or primitive form of life. This assertion is anti- 
scientific, and rests on the preconception that there is no personal 
God, that the world is not His work, and that spontaneous genera- 
tion is the only possible way of accounting for the existence of life. 
As far as science goes, the origin of life is a mystery. Even should 
life ever come to be produced artificially, only a minor advantage 
would be gained by monism, for the existence of a Creator does 
not hinge on this point. 

II. The Origin of the Various Forms of Life 

I. The Problem. — (a) That the forms, of life are manifold 
is evident, (i) Plants and animals constitute two distinct king- 
doms, and within each kingdom the greatest diversity is observed 
as to size, shape, organization, etc. (2) A still greater diversity is 
observed if the present is compared with the past. The science 
of paleontology, which deals with fossil remains of organisms, 
shows that the species actually existing did not always exist, and 
that many species now extinct have succeeded one another in the 
past. (3) Although living organisms are generated by organisms 
of the same kind, the offspring differs more or less from the parents, 
and certain features are transmitted by heredity. Gardeners and 
breeders constantly use this fact to improve races and create new 
varieties. Hence the questions: How did successive species 
arise? How did life come to be differentiated as it is to-day? 
Are successive species new creations (theory of the fixity, con- 
stancy, or immutability of species), or are they, not only the 
successors, but also the descendants of former species (theory of 
organic evolution, descent, or transformism)? 

(b) The fact itself of transformism must be distinguished from 
the theories by which this fact is explained. There may be 



444 COSMOLOGY 

agreement on the fact without agreement on the influences that 
caused it. And the fact may stand even if it cannot be explained. 

(c) For the present we shall not speak of monism, which not 
only admits transformism, but asserts that life originated from 
inorganic matter, and that the passage from the lowest to the high- 
est forms of Ufe, man included, took place without any extra- 
mundane intervention. We cannot speak of man until we know 
his nature, and this will be considered in our next treatise. As to 
the passage from the vegetable to the animal kingdom, from the 
absence to the presence of consciousness, it is impossible. No 
reality comes from nothing. From vmconsciousness consciousness 
cannot arise. So we Umit ourselves to transformism within each 
kingdom. Scientists are not agreed as to the number of original 
types. Some admit only one (monogenesis) ; others, several 
(polygenesis). As to the mode of evolution, some admit slow 
variations; others the sudden appearance of new features. 

2. Historical Outline. — Only the most prominent names vdll 
be mentioned here. The history of transformism begins with the 
nineteenth century. Before this time we find only hints and vague 
suggestions which have no scientific basis. 

(a) Lamarck denies the fixity of, and the sharp limits between, 
species. Changes in the environment create new needs. New 
needs call forth new activities and create new organs to meet these 
needs. The use of organs perfects them, while their disuse allows 
them to become atrophied. These various modifications are 
transmitted by heredity. 

(b) Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, as partisan of the mutabiUty of 
species, and Cuvier, as partisan of their fixity, opposed each other, 
the latter being victorious over his adversary. 

(c) In his "Origin of Species" (1859) Charles Darwin advocates 
the theory of organic evolution by natural selection. The variations 
which occur in certain cases, if useful to the individual, give it 
an advantage over its competitors in the " struggle for fife." Hence 
such an individual survives, while others become extinct. It is 
the "survival of the fittest." Later Darwin admitted also other 
factors. In his "Descent of Man" (1871), he applies the theory 
of transformism to man. Among other prominent transformists 



EVOLUTION IN ORGANIC WORLD 445 

of the same period must be mentioned Wallace, Huxley, Spencer, 
and Haeckel. 

(d) To-day the fact of evolution is commonly accepted, and is 
hardly ever discussed, although this position seems to be some- 
what rash and premature. The main discussions are on the modes 
and factors of evolution. Darwinism (i.e. the theory of natural 
selection) is generally looked upon as inadequate. 

3. The Reasons for Transformism will only be indicated here. 
Their study belongs to natural sciences. 

(a) Living organisms are plastic, and become modified under 
the influence of (i) surroundings, cHmate, food, etc.; (2) artificial 
selection, especially in domestic plants and animals; (3) natural 
selection, which accentuates useful variations; (4) unknown causes 
which sometimes produce in the offspring sudden variations or 
mutations. To this it is added that, in the beginning, organisms 
must have been more plastic, and the causes of change more active 
owing to greater geological disturbances. Moreover, the divi- 
sions of races within the same species are arbitrary, and many 
races would be looked upon as distinct species, were not their 
common origin known (e.g. the various races of dogs). 

Remarks. — This variability is limited, moves around a certain 
fixed average, and frequently a modified type tends to return to 
the primitive type. Moreover, as even with the best efforts, only 
varieties are produced artificially, how could new species arise 
naturally? There is no proof that a new species has ever been 
produced in this way. And if it had, have we the right to extend 
the fact to all species? Hence this argument does not prove the 
fact of transformism, but offers only a possibiUty. 

(b) Mutual affinities of organic beings, (i) Morphology. The 
various groups (e.g. vertebrates) are built according to the same 
plan, and, from the lowest class to the highest, a gradual increase 
in complexity is observed. The reason is that all have developed 
by successive differentiations from less differentiated types. — 
Remarks. — The analogies must not make one overlook the differ- 
ences. Moreover, it remains to be proved that a closer resemblance 
is due to a closer relationship by descent. (2) Embryology, 
During the period of embryonic development, higher forms of 



446 COSMOLOGY 

life pass successively through inferior stages resembling lower 
forms of Hfe, and little by little become more differentiated. 
Hence ontogeny, or the development of the individual, is a 
recapitulation of phylogeny, or the evolution of the species. — 
Remarks. — In many cases, the resemblance of the embryo with 
lower forms of life has been grossly exaggerated (especially by 
Haeckel). Moreover, resemblances are to be expected in the 
development of organisms of the same type, since all begin with a 
simple cell and develop in similar surroundings. (3) Rtidimentary 
organs, and incipient or nascent organs. In many higher forms 
of life organs are found which are now useless because they are too 
small and undeveloped, e.g. the eyes of the mole, the rudimentary 
hind legs of boas and whales, etc. These must be remnants of 
organs once fully developed and useful. — Remarks. — The con- 
clusion might be true without proving transformism. The ances- 
tors may have been of the same species, though with certain 
organs more developed than those of actual forms. Moreover, 
the uselessness of all such organs at all stages of Ufe is not 
demonstrated. 

(c) Geological distribution or paleontology. Paleontology shows 
that various species have succeeded one another on the earth. 
Although the geological record is very imperfect and difficult to 
decipher, owing to numerous perturbations in the strata of the earth, 
in a general way the lower forms of Ufe appeared first, and little 
by little more differentiated forms succeeded them. In some 
cases, especially that of the horse, a series of closely aUied forms 
can be traced back, leading progressively to actually existing 
species. As research progresses, "missing links," forming transi- 
tions between different species, are discovered. 

Remarks. — Sometimes also, forms of life are found which do 
not progress in one sequence, but, as it were, in parallel lines. Nor 
can succession, when verified, be identified with descent; paleon- 
tology gives only the fact of succession. Moreover, this progressive 
succession is established only in very few cases of species closely 
similar. When we try to apply it to larger groups, evidence is 
lacking, and there is not even a semblance of proof which would 
allow us to connect together all forms of Ufe. To appeal to the 



EVOLUTION IN ORGANIC WORLD 447 

imperfection of the record and the difficulty of the task is no 
proof. Conclusions can be based only on the data at hand, not 
on data which possibly may — or may not — be gathered in the 
future. 

4. Conclusion. — Philosophy has nothing to say for or against 
evolution. It is a scientific question to be answered by a patient 
investigation of the facts. As a scientific conclusion it is, as yet, 
not demonstrated. It is a hypothesis, which, on the strength of 
established facts, extends only to closely allied species. To make 
evolution a universal law by which all forms would ultimately be 
differentiations of one primitive type, is to proceed far beyond the 
conclusions justified by actual evidence. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE COSMOS 

Introductory 

1. Unity and Multiplicity in the "World. — There is plurality 
and variety in nature, yet, in many cases, multiplicity is reduced 
to unity. According to the point of view from which it is regarded, 
the same reality may be spoken of as one or as many. The process 
of vmification has degrees, and is more or less inclusive. Thus I 
speak of the earth as one when I oppose it to other planets or 
heavenly bodies. From the point of view of geography, many 
mountains, valleys, oceans, are on the one earth. From the point 
of view of geology, many rocks of different nature form one moun- 
tain. Every rock in turn may be looked upon as composed of 
many elements, and ultimately reduced to atoms. The same is 
true of the one human organism composed of many organs, every 
organ composed of many tissues^ etc. Thus according as we look 
at things in one way or another, the same reality is called one or 
many. We know that some processes of unification are only 
mental or logical. The genus under which species are classified 
exists only in the mind. Other processes of unification are based 
on real relations of causaUty, dependence, influence, subordina- 
tion, etc. The many existing beings in some way form one universe. 

2. Terms Defined. — (i) Cosmos (Greek equivalent of Latin 
mundus) means the world conceived as an orderly and harmonious 
system of many things, and is opposed to chaos, disorder, or law- 
lessness. (2) Universe means the collection of all material things, 
and indicates completeness and all-inclusiveness. Sometimes it 
is used so as to include even God. (3) World may generally be 
used for cosmos or universe, but its meaning is more vague. Fre- 
quently it is made to apply especially to our earth, or to what is 

448 



SPACE AND TIME 449 

nearer to us on the earth. Frequently also it is restricted to special 
systems, not necessarily material, e.g. the living world, the world 
of art, religion, literature, fashion, etc. (4) Nature has several 
meanings. It appUes either to the whole universe or to the indi- 
vidual beings that compose it. We speak of nature in general, 
e.g. the works of nature, or of the nature of this or that being. 
Nature always has a special reference to dynamic principles which 
enable beings to act in various ways and to modify other beings. 
It is the intrinsic principle of activity. 

The many form one, not through an identity of substance, but 
through their many interrelations which prevent them from being 
isolated. The most important of these relations are space, time, 
causaUty, teleology, and the various laws of nature. Hence the 
following titles. 

I. SPACE AND TIME 

Few notions are more usual than those of space and time. We 
speak daily of things as occupying a definite part of space, and of 
events as occurring at a certain time. Yet, simple and clear as 
they seem to be, these notions become difficult to explain as soon 
as we try to give an accurate definition. 

I. Space 

I. Place. — Space and place are closely connected. When we 
are asked in what place an object is located, we answer by assigning 
a determined portion of space which it occupies, or by referring it 
to other objects the place of which is known, i.e. by defining its 
spatial relations. Place then is a determined part of space. We 
may distinguish the external and the internal place. 

(a) When I say: "The fish is in the water, and the water is 
in the jar," I assign the place of the fish and of the water in refer- 
ence to something external to them, namely, in reference to the 
immediate surface of the water that surrounds the fish, or of the 
jar that contains the water. Not the whole water is, strictly 
speaking, the locus of the fish, but only that which comes in imme- 
diate contact with it. This is the locus proprius. Sometimes a 
30 



450 COSMOLOGY 

locus communis is assigned, as when I say that the chair is in the 
room — together with many other things. 

(b) I may consider the space occupied by an object without 
reference to anything external, but simply as the space occupied 
within the object's limits and dimensions, as when I say that the 
volume of a body is so many cubic feet. This is the locus internus, 
which remains the same even when, owing to some motion, external 
spatial relations change. The fish occupies the same space, whether 
in the water or out of it. 

2. Space. — (a) In general, space implies (i) distance; thus 
^/ we say that there is so much space between two objects, or that 
the train flies through space; (2) capacity and aptitude to contain; 
as when I say that the room is very spacious, or that the stars are 
scattered in space; (3) relative emptiness; thus I say that there 
is no more space in the room, i.e. its capacity is already exhausted 
because it is completely occupied. This emptiness is only relative 
to the use which is to be made of space. 

Space, therefore, supposes bodies with distances between them, 

and consists essentially in the interval, the distance, the capacity, 

j the volume occupied. It almost coincides with place, except 

I that the term " place " emphasizes the bounding surface, while 

i " space " emphasizes the voluminal capacity. 

(b) (i) Concrete space is thus a relation of distance in a threefold 
dimension, or a voluminal distance. It is not the body itself, but 
a special aspect of it. It may refer to individual bodies, but is 
frequently applied to the immense receptacle in which all things 
are contained, i.e. to the sum of all individual spaces. (2) Ideal 
space, or. the concept of space, is an abstract idea. It does not 
refer to this or that space, with such or such dimensions, but only 
to an indetermined distance, capacity, or volume. Like all abstract 
and universal concepts, it exists only in the mind, but is based on 
the concrete perception of space. (3) Imaginary space is the space 
which we imagine to exist beyond the hmits of the real world — 
if the world be Hmited — and which we suppose to extend ad 
infinitum even where there is nothing. 

(c) Hence real space is not an a priori form of external sensi- 
biHty (Kant), but an aspect of real extension; nor the divine 



SPACEANDTIME 451 

attribute of immensity (Newton, Clarke), for God has no extension 
and is not material; nor a distinct reality, an immense receptacle 
independent of bodies (Gassendi); nor finally the extended body 
as such (Descartes). Real space is a special relation based on the 
threefold dimension of matter. It does not exist independently, 
as a special reality in itself, but is directly based on reaUty, namely, 
on really existing bodies which have a real extension. y^ 

II. Time 

1. Nature of Time. — Time has many analogies with space. 
We may state immediately that time, like space, is not an inde- 
pendent existing reality, but that it is based on something really 
existing. Whereas space is based on extension and co-existing 
parts, time essentially implies succession, and is always moving 
on. Its parts — if it may be said to have parts — never co-exist. 
Another obvious fact is that what we commonly call time is meas- 
ured by spatial relations, e.g. of the sun, the hands of a watch, etc. 

(c) In the realities of the world we find duration and change, 
permanence and succession. Things endure, and yet undergo 
successively many modifications in place, quantity, and qualities. 
It is in this fact of succession that we find the idea of time which 
represents a continuous flowing, which never stops, but proceeds 
uniformly while the real changes are not always continuous for 
the senses, and do not take place uniformly. Hence time is the 
same reality as movement or change, but viewed from the special 
aspect of succession, i.e. of an "after" and a "before." The 
perception of time evidently supposes in the mind the power of 
memory. 

{h) Thus conceived, time is composed of the past, present, and 
future. The present alone exists actually; it is an indivisible 
point constantly moving and becoming past. The past has been, 
the future will be, the present instant constantly moves into the 
future, and as soon as we try to think of it, it is already passed. 
Psychologically, however, we give to the present a greater or 
smaller duration. 

2. Various Meanings of Time. — (a) The various meanings 
of time are analogical to those of space, (i) Intrinsic concrete 



452 COSMOLOGY 

time is the time based on varying concrete changes of concrete 
realities. Every substance has its own time. (2) Extrinsic con- 
crete time is the one which has been adopted as a standard unit to 
measure other durations, namely, the revolutions of the earth 
around its own axis (day), and around the sun (year). This time 
is divided into years, months, weeks, days, hours, etc. Although 
it is in itself no more real than intrinsic time, it is, owing to its 
regularity and constancy, more obvious for us, and hence is 
understood as time par excellence. Psychological time is the 
apparent duration as perceived by the mind. (See Psychology, 
p. 88.) (3) Abstract or conceptual time is the idea of time apart 
from all determinations with which changes occur concretely in 
the beings of the world. (4) Imaginary time, in the supposition 
that the world had a beginning and will have an end, is the time 
which we imagine to be prolonged ad infinitum both before the 
world existed and after it will have ceased to exist. 

{h) Hence real time is not an a priori mental form (Kant), 
but is based on something objective; nor the divine attribute of 
eternity (Newton, Clarke) ; nor a reaUty independent of changing 
concrete reaUties (Gassendi); nor the successive duration as such 
(Descartes). It is not a reality as such in itself, but is directly 
based on the real succession of the changes which take place in the 
various beings of the world. 

II. THE LAWS OF NATURE 

I. Meaning and Properties 

I. Meaning. — (a) A law means either a norm for hmnan 
actions, or the constant mode of action of physical agents. (Cf. 
p. 292.) Here we deal with physical laws. A law indicates the 
behavior of certain beings in various circumstances. It reduces 
every manifestation of their activity to more or less comprehensive 
formulae which apply in all cases. 

The term "nature" has special reference to the dynamic aspect 
of beings, and means the substance inasmuch as it is a principle 
of action. Sometimes it applies to individual beings, as when we 
say of a thing that it is natural for it to act so or so, and that every 



LAWSOFNATURE 453 

being acts according to its own nature. Sometimes it applies to the 
whole universe, as when we speak of the beauties of nature, the 
order of nature, etc. A law of nature means a uniformity — more 
or less comprehensive — of physical activity in a given being or 
in the whole universe. 

(b) The existence of natural laws needs no demonstration. The 
uniformity of action in nature is both an obvious fact and a con- 
dition of science. We daily see that the same agents, in the same 
conditions, produce the same effects, and the endeavor of science 
is to formulate the laws according to which these results occur. 
Were there no laws, science could not foresee and predict results. 

"Accidental" effects prove nothing against the existence of 
natural laws, for, although they are not constant and uniform, 
they result from an unforeseen meeting of several causes, every 
one of which acts according to its own laws. Man may act inten- 
tionally, and, in order .to realize his purpose, he uses the "natural" 
activities of various instruments and materials. Physical beings 
act naturally in the same way. But if several physical beings 
combine to produce a result both unusual, because this combina- 
tion seldom occurs, and unforeseen, because unusual, we call this 
result accidental, although it is due to natural causes. Thus death 
in a mine explosion is an accident, although it results from natural 
activities, the presence of which was unknown. The killing of a 
man with a bullet, when the shooter was not even aware of his 
presence, is also called accidental, although it happens in perfect 
accordance with natural laws. Accidental is therefore a relative 
term which applies to results due to an unfamiliar and unforeseen 
concourse of circumstances. 

2. Properties. — Natural laws are necessary and yet contingent. 
We shall explain briefly these two apparently conflicting properties. 

(c) The laws of nature are necessary, i.e. invariable and immu- 
table, as appears both from experience and from reason. From 
experience, because, for instance, everywhere at sea level pure 
water boils at a temperature of 212 degrees, and will always be 
analyzed into the same constant proportions of oxygen and hydro- 
gen. A stone thrown up in the air will always fall down. Fire 
always burns, etc. From reason, because the mode of activity 



454 COSMOLOGY 

must correspond to the very mode of being, and hence every 
individual nature is so determined as to exercise a certain kind 
of activity. 

This activity requires certain conditions, and unless these are 
verified, the result does not follow. Thus conditions of contact, 
temperature, pressure, etc., are necessary for oxygen and hydrogen 
to combine into water. If a piece of wood be covered with asbestos, 
fire will not consume it. If the stone be held up in the air, it will 
not fall down, etc. Thus the necessity of the laws of nature is 
not absolute, but hypothetical. The conditions must be verified. 

(b) Yet these laws are contingent. They have no absolute 
a priori necessity, but are discovered by experience. They might 
be otherwise than they are. In geometry, reason will discover 
certain properties, — e.g. of triangles — which are absolutely 
necessary, and cannot be otherwise. But, in physics or chemistry, 
no analysis of gunpowder will ever show that it is necessary for it 
to have the power of exploding; and no analysis of oxygen will 
ever reveal a necessary aflinity for hydrogen in certain proportions. 
Moreover, we can see no necessity why things themselves should 
exist, and, in fact, if certain conditions had not been verified, this 
individual man, horse, stone, water, etc., would not have existed. 
If certain other circumstances had been realized, other individuals 
would have existed. The laws of nature, therefore, are not derived 
from the essence of things, but rather the essence of things is 
inferred from their properties and laws. 

N.B. From this we may simply hint at the possibility of an 
intervention of the Creator and Ruler of the world, who can supply 
or withdraw the conditions necessary to the activity of various 
substances, and thus produce miraculous events. 

II. Efficiency and Teleology 

The chief laws of nature refer to the mode of activity or efficiency 
of physical agents, and this in turn implies teleology. Hence the 
present question. 

I. Efficiency. — (a) The senses perceive only the succession of 
phenomena, i.e. antecedents and consequents; hence for empiri- 
cism causality is nothing but succession. As soon, however, as 



LAWSOFNATURE 455 

we observe a regularity of succession, and an invariability of 
sequence, we are led to admit that there is not only a succession, 
but a real influence of the antecedent on the production of the 
consequent. If the consequent did not depend on the antecedent, 
there would be no reason why it should not appear without it, or 
after any other antecedent. As it is not so, the conclusion imposes 
itself that the consequent depends on the antecedent, and that the 
antecedent, by its activity, is the cause of the consequent. 

{h) There may be a series of subordinated causes; hence 
the distinction between proximate and remote causes. Causes 
may exercise a more or less direct influence, but the existence of 
true efficiency is attested for man by his own consciousness, and 
for other beings by the rational interpretation of external experi- 
ence. Many causes may and do contribute to the same result. 
Which will be called the cause will depend frequently on the point 
of view one takes. Thus, the photographer, the film, the light, 
the object, etc., are causes of the photograph. The decomposition 
of the blood, the bullet, the powder, the firing, the murderer, etc., 
are causes of death. Any effect is thus the result of a series of 
causes which contribute their share in various ways. The com- 
plete causation includes both a number of causes, and of conditions 
without which their activity could not be exercised. 

2. Teleology. — (a) Teleology or finality is opposed to mechan- 
ism. It affirms the existence of final causes, that is, of ends, or 
purposes, which efficient causes tend to realize. Mechanism affirms 
that everything is simply the result of mechanical forces acting 
without any presupposed direction, (i) The question is not 
whether there are efficient causes or final causes, but whether, in 
addition to efficient causes, there are also final causes; that is, 
whether the activity of efficient causes is directed to certain ends. 
The aeroplane flies because it is constructed in such or such a 
way; from this point of view, flying is but a result of mechanical 
causes. But at the same time, the aeroplane is built in this way 
in order to fly; from this point of view, flying is an end. The 
same is true of the works of nature, e.g. the wings of birds. (2) 
Again, the question is not that of conscious and intelligent finality 
such as is revealed in human purposive activities, but of physical 



456 COSMOLOGY 

finality, which is revealed by the constancy of the manner in which 
physical beings act. 

(b) FinaUty is extrinsic when the activity of a substance pro- 
duces results that are useful to other substances. Thus the 
mineral is utilized by the plant, the plant by the animal. Or 
again, the heat of the sxm is a source of growth and development. 
But we cannot see everywhere such an adaptation of means to an 
extrinsic good, for the good of one is frequently an evil for another. 
The plant is destroyed by the animal that eats it. The thriving 
of microbes may result in the death of the organism. Yet, in a 
general way, the order and harmony of the universe cannot be 
denied. But this order is realized by individual beings acting 
according to their own nature. 

(c) Hence primarily finaHty is intrinsic or immanent. This 
means that every being is endowed with an internal tendency 
to realize its own end, and to strive for its own good and perfec- 
tion. This finality manifests itself clearly in the organic world, 
where we see the ovum or primitive cell developing according to 
the general type of the species, and Uttle by little evolving into the 
complete organism. It also manifests itself in the struggle which 
the organism undertakes against destructive or harmful agents. 
Even in the inorganic world, the constancy of the laws of nature 
shows that nothing happens at random or by chance, for chance 
cannot explain stability, but that there is an internal principle of 
direction and orientation which is no other than the nature of every 
being. The existence of final causes is required to account for 
the orderly and harmonious sequence of phenomena, and for the 
convergence of diverse activities toward harmonious results which 
persist notwithstanding the manifold changes that take place in 
the world. 



CONCLUSION 

Cosmology leaves many questions without an answer. It as- 
sumes the existence of things, but why, how, and whence are they? 
What is the ultimate ground of reality, i.e. of things individual 
and of the totality of things? The beings of the world are many 
and diverse, and yet compose one universe. Every being exists 
only in dependence on other beings, for nothing in the world is 
absolute and self-sufficient. Since unity cannot come out of 
manifoldness without some principle which is itself one, where 
must we look for the principle of order and harmony? What is 
the ultimate reason of the laws of nature, and of the internal 
teleological principle which they manifest? How have differen- 
tiation and order arisen from the primitive nebular chaos? How 
have highly differentiated organisms evolved out of more general 
types? How did life itself arise? 

Thus many questions spring from the study, scientific or philo- 
sophical, of the material world. In general, has the world in itself 
a sufficient reason of its existence and laws, or must we look for 
a sufficient reason in some higher being above the world? When 
things have been explained by their immediate causes, there re- 
mains to explain these causes themselves. Hence the necessity 
to proceed to Theodicy, and examine whether the ultimate reality, 
the Absolute, or First Cause, is immanent in the world, or tran- 
scends the world. The method will be to go from the world to 
God: "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the 
world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are 
made; His eternal power also and divinity." (Rom. i, 20.) 



4S7 



RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY OR 

PHILOSOPHY OF THE 

HUMAN MIND 



INTRODUCTION 



1. Subject-Matter of This Treatise. — Psychology deals with 
the empirical study of the mental functions of cognition, affection, 
conation, and describes the various mental processes. We must 
now inquire about the nature of the principle of these functions. 
Mind and matter, subject and object, consciousness and motion, 
have irreducible characteristics, and yet are connected intimately. 
Hence the questions naturally arise: What is the mind? How is 
it related to the organism? On the solution of these two problems 
will depend the answer to be given to the questions: What is the 
origin of the human mind or soul? What is its destiny? 

Hence the following division: (i) Is the mind a substance? 
(2) Is it spiritual? (3) How is it united to the organism? (4) 
What is its origin? (5) Is it immortal? It is needless to 
insist on the importance of such questions, both from a merely 
speculative, and from a practical point of view. 

2. Method. — (a) The knowledge of the nature of the mind is 
not intuitive but must be inferred from facts of experience. Hence 
the method to be followed is chiefly inductive. It starts from 
facts, and assigns to them an adequate explanation. But once 
the nature of the soul is known, we may proceed deductively, in 
part at least, and base on its nature conclusions concerning its 
origin and destiny. The main principle to be used is that of 
sufficient reason. A cause must be assigned which will be sufficient 
and strictly required to explain all the facts. To avoid imperfect 
and one-sided conclusions, all facts must be considered. Erro- 

458 



INTRODUCTION 459 

neous views may arise from considering exclusively conscious 
processes, or exclusively physiological functions. This caution 
is important here owing to the great complexity of the subject- 
matter. 

(b) We cannot agree with Spencer and other agnostics when 
they assert the unknowableness of the nature, origin, and destiny 
of the mind, and consequently the futility of the present investiga- 
tion. It must be granted that our knowledge of the mind remains 
imperfect, but the same principles that are used in all other sciences 
will be used here, and will carry us beyond mere empirical facts. 
No science is possible without the use of the principle of causality 
and of sufficient reason, and it is this principle which we shall 
constantly appeal to: The effect is a sign of the power and nature 
of its cause. 



CHAPTER I 

SUBSTANTIALITY 

The existence of mental states, manifold and varied, is an obvi- 
ous fact of experience which has been the subject-matter of psy- 
chology. These processes are spontaneously ascribed to one mind 
as their permanent and active centre. What is the correct inter- 
pretation of the facts? Is the mind a reahty distinct from the 
mental states, or is the collection of mental states the whole mind? 
Phenomenalism asserts that the mind is but a common name, a 
genus logicum, an abstraction. The only reality is the series of 
mental processes. Whatever else we may add to these is illusory. 
Substantialism asserts that the mind is a deeper concrete reaUty 
of which mental states are only the surface. It is this latter 
position which we shall now explain and defend. 

I. Meaning of Substantiality 

I. What is a Substance? — (a) Beings are divided into sub- 
stances and accidents, i.e. into beings existing in themselves, and 
beings existing in others. Some realities are, as it were, weak; 
they need a support in which they are and to which they are 
attributed. This character belongs to mental processes; a mental 
process does not exist in itself, but in the mind. It is mine, or 
yours, or his, etc. Other realities stand by themselves, exist in 
themselves, are not attributed to any other, but are supports 
of quaUties or accidents. There is no "white" in itself, but 
"white " is a quahty attributed to some substance (paper, cloth, 
paint, etc.). 

(b) Hence primarily substance means that which subsists in it- 
self. It also has secondary characters, (i) It is a principle of 
activity. A substance without activity would be altogether un- 
knowable, meaningless, and unthinkable. If it is necessary to 
conceive the substance as a strong being, as a support, it is also 

460 



SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE MIND 461 

necessary to conceive it as a power, an active principle, which 
manifests its energies. (2) It is something more or less perma- 
nent, although this is not so essential. Here permanence means 
that the mind endures and remains identical notwithstanding the 
constant flux of processes. 

2. Further Deternunation. — To complete this explanation, it 
is necessary to make a few remarks as to what the assertion "the 
mind is a substance" does not mean. 

{a) The present question is not to be identified with other 
questions to be examined later: What is the nature of the mind- 
substance? Is it material or spiritual? What are its relations 
to the organism? 

(6) To assert that the mind is a substance is not to assert that 
it is a hidden substratum, inert and permanent, under the visible 
surface of conscious processes, or that it is a concrete being distinct 
from concrete accidents, and separable from them. There is 
only one concrete being composed of substance and accidents, and 
the mind-substance is known only through its accidents or activ- 
ities. The mind and its modifications are perceived in the same 
experience. To argue, with Spencer (Principles of Psychology, 
§59), that we can never know the unmodified substance of the mind 
is correct, but substantialists never made such a claim. Accord- 
ing to them, what is known is the modified substance of the mind. 
The surface is, as it were, transparent, so that to perceive actions 
at the surface is to perceive at once the mind as acting. In gen- 
eral, to perceive the accidents is also to perceive at once the 
substance in which they inhere and from which they proceed. 

II. Proofs of the Substantiality 

I. Facts. — We may first insist on some psychological facts 
which imply the substantiality of the mind. 

(a) Consciousness clearly testifies that I am the subject of sen- 
sations and of other mental processes, that I am the agent which 
produces certain actions, that I am distinct from everybody and 
everything else, and that I subsist in myself. That is, not only 
does consciousness manifest the surface, or mental processes, it 
also manifests that all converge to, and start from, the same 



462 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

identical centre, notwithstanding the manifoldness and the changes 
at the circumference. The same intuition reveals both the proc- 
esses — walking, thinking, feeling, etc. — and the subject to which 
they are attributed — my walking, thinking, and feeling. And 
not only the present, but the past, and, to some extent, the future 
are referred to the same substance. 

(&) Consciousness testifies that I am active, that I am the cause, 
not merely the witness, of certain activities; not a simple spec- 
tator, but an agent and an active source of energy. "I did this, 
and I shall do that, etc." 

(c) The mind is identical and permanent, as shown by the fact 
of memory. Mental processes succeed one another rapidly, yet 
memory preserves, reproduces, and recognizes them. Without 
a permanent subject, this would be impossible, for the reference 
of a present image or perception to a past experience supposes 
that the same mind is the witness of both. The act of memory 
implies the consciousness of self -identity, that is, of the sameness 
of the mind under the perpetual flux of its processes. ^ The same 
conclusion is reached from the various modes of thought which 
imply succession, and consequently memory. In judging and 
reasoning, the mind thinks successively several terms or proposi- 
tions, and holds them together so as to perceive their relations. 

2. Reality of the Substance of the Mind. — (a) These psycho- 
logical facts cannot be looked upon as illusory without falling into 
out-and-out scepticism. Since they are real, they require not 
merely an apparent or logical subject, but a real subject; not indeed 
a subject separable from conscious processes, but nevertheless a 
subject underlying the processes through which it is known. The 
"permanent possibility of sensations," of which phenomenalists 
speak, is a fact, but, as this possibility is real, it supposes some real 
being on which it is based. There can be no possibility with- 
out an agent on which the possibility depends. To say that 
an event is possible is to say that there are causes capable of 
producing it. 

(b) The concrete reality of the mind is therefore a substance 
plus its modifications, the two being indissolubly united both in 
reaUty and in our knowledge of them, yet being distinct. To 



SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE MIND 463 

refuse to accept this conclusion is to make of the processes them- 
selves so many substances, proceeding from no agent, inhering 
in no subject, and self-subsisting. It is to overlook the essential 
fact of the unity of the mind under its many processes. It is to 
make the supposed illusion of a substantial reality impossible, 
since this illusion itself presupposes the real unity of the onlooker. 

III. Phenomenalism 

The foregoing view will be made clearer by discussing phe- 
nomenalism in its various forms. In general, as its name indicates, 
phenomenalism is the theory reducing the mind to phenomena 
or appearances, and denying its substantial reality. It is a very 
common view to-day, owing to the prevalent fear of "metaphys- 
ical entities." A mind-series is substituted for the mind-sub- 
stance. The mind is reduced to the collection, aggregate, or 
succession of mental states. 

1. The Present Mental State. — The mind cannot be merely 
the present mental state, (i) This state itself must be explained, 
and there can be no thought without a thinking principle, no 
action without an agent. (2) The present state is transitory, 
and the facts of memory and recognition require something per- 
manent to account for the possibility of recall. (3) As far as 
experience informs us, we do not always think, but sometimes 
thought seems to be interrupted, e.g. in sleep, swoons, etc. Yet 
something must remain, since the past is known again when 
consciousness reappears. 

2. The Series of Mental States. — The mind cannot be merely 
the series of mental states, whether it be described as a "bundle" 
or " collection of different perceptions" (Hume), or as the "sum of 
our inner experiences " (Hoffding), or as "a thread of conscious- 
ness supplemented by beUeved possibilities of consciousness," 
"a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feelings " 
(Stuart Mill). Many modem psychologists hold similar views. 
Ebbinghaus illustrates his position by the following comparison. 
As the plant is composed of various parts (roots, branches, leaves, 
flowers, etc.) united into a whole, each one supported by, acting 
and depending on, the others, and their totality constituting the 



464 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

plant, which, however, is not a substance distinct from these 
parts, so the mind is simply a system of nimierous reaUties of 
consciousness, closely united, and causally related. James speaks 
of the mind as a stream of consciousness, in which the ego is 
nothing but the "real, present, onlooking, remembering, judging 
thought," which appropriates and embodies in itself all past 
experiences. 

(c) A series impUes three things, a multiplicity of elements, their 
succession in time or space, and the connection, real or logical, of 
the several units. One thing cannot form a series; nor is a bundle 
or heap of things a series; nor finally do disparate and disconnected 
things form a series, (i) The mind-series has to be explained, 
and, with it, the facts already mentioned of personal identity, 
memory, judgment, reasoning, etc. Each unit of the series re- 
quires a support and an active principle, since it is not a self-sub- 
sisting reality. (2) The awareness of the series as such supposes a 
permanent and identical subject, witness of the present and of the 
past. If there is no mind-substance, not only the series, but even 
the possibility of speaking of the mind as a series, is to be denied, 
since the awareness of manifoldness, succession, and connection 
supposes something distinct from the units that form the series. 
We do not deny that there is a mental series of processes, but at 
the same time we assert that something else is required to make it 
possible. (3) The addition of a "permanent possibihty" is not 
enough, since possibihty means the presence of an adequate cause 
by which certain effects become possible. There must be a reason 
for every possibility. 

(b) Taine says that, as two or three horses may be able to draw 
a cart which one horse is insufficient to draw, so several states to- 
gether may stand without a support or substance, even if one alone 
cannot do so. Or it may be said that, although one blade of grass 
by itself cannot stand up straight, a bundle of them will stand. 
Ebbinghaus's comparison mentioned above belongs to about the 
same type, (i) Horses taken individually are real powers, and 
each blade of grass has some power of resistance. The parts of the 
plant are material and substantial, and thus can support one 
another. But mental states are transitory processes, and in the 



SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE MIND 465 

line of substance every one of them is a zero. To add them will 
not make them able to stand by themselves. If a certain quan- 
tity is required to obtain a given result, the addition of positive 
quantities will eventually give the necessary amount. But the 
addition of ciphers will never give a positive quantity. (2) The 
plant is a "complex," as Ebbinghaus says, but not so much a com- 
plex of processes and functions as of parts or organs. So also the 
mental processes and functions do not form the "mental complex," 
except through the unity of the mind whose functions they are. 

(c) The mind may be a "stream of consciousness," but it must 
be more, (i) It cannot be proved to be an everflowing and never- 
interrupted stream. If it is interrupted, something must remain 
in the interval to connect the section preceding the interruption 
with the section that follows it. (2) The comparison with a stream 
would lead us to admit a source from which the stream originates. 
(3) To say that a mental state, i.e. a function, appropriates 
all those that have taken place before is to give it a substan- 
tiality which of itself it has not. It is true, as James says, that 
the same herd may be transmitted rapidly to different owners. 
But the difference between this and our case is that the herdsman 
and the cattle co-exist, whereas here the mental states are succes- 
sive. Moreover, the herdsman is a substance distinct from the 
cattle, not a mere process. (4) Appropriation, even if possible, 
would not yet be memory and recognition, and would offer no 
sufl&cient explanation of them. 

In conclusion we may state that phenomenalism, which may be 
sufficient for the psychologist, is not an ultimate or philosophical 
explanation. Either it cannot account for all the facts of mental 
life; or, against the testimony of consciousness and the common 
consent of psychologists, it makes of mental states so many sub- 
stances; or finally it surreptitiously introduces in fact what it 
denies in words, a mind-substance or something which is supposed 
to fulfil its functions. 

IV. Multiple Personality 

1. Facts. (See Psychology, p. 197). — (i) In some abnormal 
cases, persons have, as it were, two, or even more, different, suc- 
31 



466 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

cessive, and apparently independent existences which we may 
represent as A, B, Ai, Bi, A2, B2, ^3, B3, etc., the series A 
forming one continuous existence, and the series B another. In 
the state An, the subject remembers the whole series A, but knows 
nothing of the series B. In the state Bn, the series B is remem- 
bered, while all the A periods are so many blanks. In each series 
mental dispositions may be widely different; A will speak of B in 
the third person, etc. Hence the natural conclusion: The mind 
cannot be one substance identical with itself at all times. (2) 
The same conclusion is inferred from certain conditions in which 
two "persons " seem to appear simultaneously. Thus while a 
man is wholly intent on a rational conversation, his arm will 
write something else, also very rational, and the person himself 
will not even be conscious of this action. There are two groups of 
intellectual activity proceeding independently. 

2. Explanation of the Facts. — The facts themselves must be 
accepted. As to their explanation, it requires some general and 
some more special remarks. 

(a) General remarks, (i) It is admitted by all that these facts 
are extraordinary, rare, and abnormal. We must always be 
careful in basing any theory on such facts, and in leaving the clear 
testimony of normal consciousness for the obscure testimony which 
it may seem to give in abnormal cases. 

(2) The/ac/ (ontological) of identity must be distinguished from 
the consciousness (psychological) of identity. There may be a 
real, yet unperceived, identity, i.e. there may be at the surface 
different manifestations of the same deeper reality. The ego 
must be distinguished, although it cannot be separated, from the 
states of the ego. 

(3) We may compare these abnormal cases with normal cases 
to see if any hints can be found leading to the understanding of 
the former, (c) In normal cases, the conscious conflict of ten- 
dencies, and the ensuing struggle, rather go to prove the identity 
of the ego who witnesses the two impulses, and who experiences 
the conflict, {b) There are slow and gradual changes in charac- 
ter, and sometimes we may say of a man whom we knew formerly 
that he has changed completely, that he has reformed, that he is 



SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE MIND 467 

no longer what he used to be, etc. (c) There are also more sud- 
den and more radical changes for better or for worse, sudden con- 
versions and downfalls, (d) Many things are forgotten, either 
individual experiences or whole series of experiences, (e) At 
times, we may even assume different "personalities " which are 
illusory, e.g. in dream, somnambulism, hallucination, hypno- 
tism. (/) Actions and experiences during hypnosis may be for- 
gotten altogether in the normal state, but recalled in subsequent 
hypnosis. The hypnotizer may suggest different "personalities" 
to the subject. 

(b) More special remarks, (i) Even if the consciousness of 
identity disappears, we have reasons for saying that the fact itself 
remains, (a) Frequently in one of the series there is the memory 
of some of the things that have been experienced in the other. 
(b) Sometimes one of the series predominates and includes the 
knowledge of what happens in the other, (c) These series are not 
altogether strangers. Generally there is something common to 
both (knowledge of language, persons, objects, or localities). 
(d) Frequently also A will speak of J5 as a stranger and in the 
third person, and this is a sign that A knows B and is aware of the 
change, (e) The fact that ^ 2 is linked with A 1 after an interval 
during which B has appeared shows that something has persisted 
to link the present with the past. (2) Simultaneous manifesta- 
tions are automatic and due probably to the dissociation of cer- 
tain cerebral or spinal centres from the others. (3) Hence what 
we have here is in reality a disease of memory with illusions and 
hallucinations. These phenomena are due to organic causes which 
cannot as yet be assigned definitely. (4) What has disappeared 
is not the ego, but only the consciousness of identity. There are 
indications that the surface only has changed, not the deeper 
reality. 

Hence from these facts no objection can be derived against the 
unity, permanence, and substantiaHty of the mind. The term 
"personality" is wrongly applied here, and psychologists generally 
have come to recognize that, from these abnormal facts, nothing 
can be inferred against the unity of the mind. We adhere there- 
fore to the testimony of normal consciousness, and hold that the 



468 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

mind is not only the collection or series of conscious states, but 
their common centre, subject, and agent, a real substance known by 
the same indivisible act of consciousness which manifests the surface 
or circumference, i.e. the processes or accidents. 



CHAPTER II 

SPIRITUALITY 
I. The Question Stated 

1. Its Importance. — It is not enough to know that the human 
mind is more than the series of mental states, and that it is a sub- 
stantial and permanent principle. We must now examine its 
nature more closely. That it is bound to, and dependent on, 
the organism is an obvious fact. For the present we shall not 
examine the nature of this union, but only the question whether 
the mind itself is some form of matter or of material energy, and 
whether, in all its processes, it acts with the intrinsic cooperation 
of the organism. This question is of primary importance, for on 
it depends the answer to the questions of the origin and destiny of 
the soul. If in some of its actions the soul is found to act by it- 
self, and not through the organism, it will not necessarily share 
all the vicissitudes of the organism. 

2. Meaning of the Terms " Material " and " Immaterial." — (a) 
A thing is material when it has extension and is composed of sev- 
eral parts. This is matter itself. Or a thing is material when, 
although it is not matter itself, it cannot exist and manifest itself 
except through matter. Physicists oppose matter to energy, 
although, in this latter sense, energy itself must be called material 
since it is the energy of matter. The vital principle, as seen in 
Cosmology, must also be called material in this sense, since all 
functions of the living organism are exercised in and through 
matter. 

(b) Hence immateriality may mean: (i) Simplicity, i.e. the ab- 
sence of composition, of parts, and of quantity, even though there 
be an essential dependence on matter for existence and the 
exercise of activity. (2) Spirituality, i.e. simplicity plus independ- 

469 



470 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

ence from matter, or the aptitude to exist and act without mat- 
ter. It is important to keep this distinction in mind, for a thing 
may be immaterial in the first sense, and yet altogether depend- 
ent on matter in every respect. The characteristic features of 
the mind are generally accepted to be irreducible to those of mat- 
ter. The physical and the mental are acknowledged to be alto- 
gether dififerent. Yet, without identifying mind and matter, 
many psychologists do not admit a spiritual soul, independent of 
the organism in some of its activities. 

II. Simplicity of the Soul 

Little space will be given to the simplicity of the soul because it 
is not the exclusive characteristic of the human soul, and, while 
differentiating the soul from matter, it does not show whether or 
not it is so essentially bound to matter as to be imable to exist 
and act except in and through the body. 

1. Ideas. — (a) Thought is simple and indivisible. There is 
no half idea or third of an idea. The idea as a whole is either pres- 
ent in or absent from the mind. Even when it is composed of 
several logical elements, the idea is indivisible. If one of its essen- 
tial elements be absent, the idea ceases to be. The idea of "man " 
or "triangle," for instance, may be acquired and perfected by vari- 
ous mental processes; it is a synthesis of several essential notes. 
But, whether it be complete or imperfect, as an idea it is a single 
and indivisible mental process. 

(b) Were the mind composed of parts, this would not be possible. 
Suppose these parts to be A and B. Either A and B singly would 
apprehend the whole idea, and in this case there would be two 
ideas. Or A would apprehend some, and B other elements of the 
same idea, and this again is contrary to experience which testi- 
fies that the idea is one and indivisible, as well as the process by 
which it is made present in the mind. Even if this latter suppo- 
sition were accepted, we must go farther and deeper beyond A 
and B, to a simple and indivisible unity which gathers these 
elements into a single perception and apprehension. 

2. Judgment and Reasoning. — The same argument holds for 
judgment, reasoning, and volition. The same mind, or simple 



SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 471 

reality, must apprehend both the subject and the predicate, and 
their relation of agreement or disagreement. The same mind 
also must apprehend three judgments, and see that the conclu- 
sion follows from the premises. The act of choice is one and 
simple, although several alternatives are present in con- 
sciousness. 

3. Reflection shows that the mind is not composed of parts. 
A material substance is not capable of reflecting upon itself. A 
part may come in contact with, and act on, another, but not 
reflect totally upon itself. 

4. The Mind, not in Space. — Wherever there is matter, there 
are also spatial relations. But conscious processes are not in space. 
An idea or feeling is not on the right or on the left of another. It 
is not taller or shorter, greater or smaller, similar or different in 
shape, etc., because it is free from all quantitative determinations. 



SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL 

Not only the human, but also the animal mind is immaterial, 
for consciousness can never be reduced to matter. To examine 
the question whether the human soul is spiritual necessitates a 
comparison with the animal mind so as to ascertain if these two 
differ essentially, for we hold that the human mind alone is 
spiritual. 

I. Specific Human Activities 

I. General Remarks. — (a) Great caution is necessary in inter- 
preting the behavior of animals. Even when their actions are 
similar to human actions, it would not always be justifiable to 
suppose that they are prompted by the same motives. A dog may 
show signs of "remorse" because it remembers past experiences of 
punishment, whereas in man remorse springs from moral and reli- 
gious ideas. Again, the so-called education of animals is the result 
of sensory associations, whereas human education is due to per- 
sonal effort and the possession of universal ideas. The difficulty 
of knowing the animal mind is greater owing to the absence of 
language, for we know the mental processes of other men chiefly 



472 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

from what they tell us. The principle to be applied is that no 
faculties are to be attributed to animals unless they are necessary 
to explain their mode of activity. 

(b) We need not stop to consider the theory of Descartes, who 
denies that animals have any consciousness, and considers them 
as pure physical mechanisms. The presence of consciousness in 
animals is as clear as its presence in men other than ourselves. 
Although they cannot speak, they give unmistakable signs of per- 
ception, feeling, memory, etc., and by analogy we conclude with 
certainty that they are endowed with consciousness. Their 
organism also presents many analogies with the human organism, 
especially in regard to the nervous system, which is the physical 
accompaniment of consciousness. 

(c) The primary and fundamental difference between man and 
animal is the presence in the former, and the absence in the latter, 
of abstract, universal, and necessary knowledge. 

2. That Man Possesses Such Knowledge is evident from psy- 
chology, (i) No man, however ignorant and imcivilized, fails to 
recognize certain universal and necessary principles, e.g. the prin- 
ciple of contradiction, or the truth that two and two are four. 

(2) Language is not the expression of concrete feelings, but of 
thought and of universal ideas. However imperfect and, from 
our point of view, ungrammatical, such expressions may be, and 
even if they are but simple gestures, they nevertheless manifest 
universal ideas. They are rational in their origin and character. 

(3) Progress, realized by passing from principles to consequences, 
from laws to facts, from causes to effects, etc., manifests itself in 
many ways. CiviUzation, science, both speculative and practical, 
etc., are the results of combined processes of induction and deduc- 
tion. (4) Man is not a mere automaton. Even in many activ- 
ities that are cormnon to him and to animals, he can use self- 
control derived from reflection. (5) Morality and religion suppose 
the knowledge of fundamental principles, of universal laws, the 
sense of obligation, the demonstration of God's existence and of 
man's relations with Him. 

3. That Animals Do not Possess Universal Elnowledge is 
evidenced by the following facts: (i) They have no language. 



SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 473 

Although some are capable of articulate sounds, it is clear that the 
manner in which they use the few sentences which they have 
learned from man manifests only concrete associations. They do 
not know the meaning of what they say, but simply remember the 
result which is wont to follow. No other kind of rational communi- 
cation, e.g. by gestures or the use of signs and symbols, is ever used 
by animals. Their cries and movements express only concrete ideas 
and feelings. (2) The behavior of animals, their "progress" and 
"education," manifest no reason. They adapt means to ends, 
but there is not the slightest indication that they do so from 
any abstract knowledge of the end and of the aptitude of the 
means to reach it. Everything can be accounted for by sense- 
perception, memory, and association. The wonderful tales of 
animal "intelHgence" never require the power of reasoning, nor 
any abstract knowledge of cause and effect. (3) Moreover, ani- 
mals act in a uniform manner according to their species. They 
do not use tools or instruments, nor sow to reap a harvest, and, 
after many attempts to teach them, they do not even know how to 
light a fire to protect themselves from the cold. To a certain 
extent they may adapt themselves to their environment, but man 
alone knows how to adapt his environment to himself. (4) They 
manifest no morality or religion of any kind, no freedom, and, 
in fact, we do not hold them morally responsible, nor attribute to 
them right or wrong, virtue or vice, etc., in the moral sense of 
these terms. 

4. Conclusion. — Hence, after a period of great enthusiasm in 
favor of animal "intelligence." during which all human faculties, 
at least in a rudimentary form, were attributed to animals, a more 
accurate study of their behavior has led the most serious investi- 
gators to conclude that animals do not reason, that they have no 
"intellect," no abstract and imiversal ideas. We are therefore 
justified in saying that between the cognitive faculties of man and 
those of animals, there exists not only a difference in degree^ but a 
difference in kind. Similar in many respects, and having many 
activities in common, man and animal differ radically on some 
essential points. If, on this account, certain prerogatives must 
be attributed to man, they need not belong to animals. 



474 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

II. Spirituality of the Human Soul 

Two groups of activity, namely, intellect and will, show that the 
soul is spiritual. 

I. Intellect. — (c) It has been shown in Psychology that the 
fundamental function of the intellect is abstraction, and that the 
abstract nature of the concept is the source from which its other 
characteristics — necessity, universality, independence of space 
and time — flow (pp. 92 ff.). It has been shown also that this 
abstraction cannot be identified with a mere association or 
fusion of images by addition or subtraction. Now this function 
cannot be the fimction of a material organ. A material organ 
can perceive only that which acts upon it, i.e. that which is mate- 
rial, concrete, determined in space and time. It cannot perceive 
the abstract, universal, and immaterial, or the object divested of 
its material concrete conditions of existence. To the concrete 
function of a material organ can correspond only a concrete object. 
No material organ can perceive the general ideas of triangle, man, 
virtue, justice, beauty, love, friendship, freedom, relation, pos- 
sibiUty, etc., because these cannot act upon the organ. Still less 
could a material organ perceive an object purely spiritual like 
God or the hvmian soul. 

{b) The existence and nature of necessary judgments has also 
been examined in Psychology (p. 112 ff.). Now a material organ 
can perceive only what is. The necessity and universality of knowl- 
edge, the logical sequence of a reasoning, cannot be derived from 
concrete perceptions. Necessary judgments are not the result 
of material activity. 

(c) The human mind is self-conscious; it knows its own knowl- 
edge and its own knowing activity; it thinks its own thought and 
the thinking subject itself. Self-consciousness cannot be organic. 
A particle of matter acts on another particle, but not on itself. 
It cannot fold itself back so as to perceive itself and its own activ- 
ity. It cannot penetrate itself so as to be conscious of itself. 
Self-consciousness is therefore essentially spiritual, since it is 
directly opposed to what we know of matter. 

{d) The mode of exercise of the intellect is different from that 



SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 475 

of the senses. If stimulated by too great a stimulus (light, sound, 
heat, etc.), the senses are so fatigued as to become dull or impaired. 
The intellect never finds the evidence, clearness, or brightness 
of a conception or truth too great. 

2. Will. — (a) The will does not tend only to concrete goods, 
but primarily to abstract good, i.e. to the ratio boni incorporated 
in every concrete good; not only, for instance, to an individual 
good action, but to the general class of good actions. This ten- 
dency, like the corresponding knowledge in the intellect, is a sign 
of spirituality, for an organ could only tend to concrete sensible 
good. 

(b) The will tends to the immaterial, the possession of truth, 
virtue, justice, patriotism, etc. These are man's noblest aspira- 
tions which cannot be rooted in the organism and exercised through 
an organ. The fact of conscience, the sentiment of an obligation, 
also transcends every form of sense-experience. 

(c) Freedom is a sign of spirituality, for matter is governed by 
necessary laws, and the sequence of causes and effects is invari- 
able. Hence a free volition, a choice, cannot be the function of a 
material organ. The freedom of the will, known as a fact from 
psychology, finds its only possible explanation in the spirituality 
of the soul. 

3. Summary. — The human mind transcends matter. It has 
activities which are not merely different from those of matter, but 
are in opposition to the known properties of matter, and there- 
fore are not exercised through the material organism. These 
are therefore spiritual, and since every being necessarily acts as 
it is, and according to its own nature, that is, since there must be 
a proportion between a being and its activities, it follows that the 
soul which exercises certain activities independently of matter is 
itself independent of matter or spiritual. The nature of this spirit- 
uality, however, must now be explained more accurately, by 
indicating exactly what the above arguments prove. 

4. Nature of This Spirituality. — (a) The spirituahty of the 
soul is not manifested by all its operations, but only by those of 
intellect and will. Consciousness in general is no sign of spirituality, 
because certain forms of consciousness are essentially and intrin- 



476 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

sically bound to the organism so as to be the functions, not of the 
mind alone, but of the organism as well. Later on we shall see 
how the soul is related to the organism. 

(b) Even for intellectual and volitional activities, spirituality 
does not mean absolute and complete independence of the soul from 
matter. As was explained in Psychology (p. 98 ff.), intellectual 
processes start with the data of the senses which they elaborate. 
Common experience shows the influence of the organism even on 
the highest mental functions. (Cf. p. 190.) The intellect is, as it 
were, a new faculty grafted on the senses, and giving new products 
for which the senses are inadequate. Hence the spirituality of the 
soul means that the subject exercising the operations of intellect 
and will is not material, and consequently not organic; that its 
dependence on the organism is not a subjective, intrinsic, or imme- 
diate one, but a mediate and extrinsic dependence, due to the 
intellect's necessity of deriving its materials from the senses. 

III. Psychological Materialism 

1. Meaning. — {a) Materialism in general asserts that there is 
no other reality than matter and its essential forces. In psychol- 
ogy, materialism rejects the existence of the soul as a distinct 
reality, and claims that all mental processes are functions of the 
organism. The cruder and older forms of materialism denied 
even the simplicity of the mind. The more recent are satisfied 
with denying its spirituality. There are many forms, not only of 
obvious and avowed, but also of disguised, materialism, and to-day 
many theories that go by other names are materialistic. They 
assert an intrinsic dependence of the mind on the organism, 
especially on the brain, a dependence which is affirmed as the 
conclusion of scientific facts. 

ib) In ancient times may be mentioned Leucippus and Democ- 
ritus, Epicurus and Lucretius. The French materiaHsm of the 
eighteenth century is represented especially by De La Mettrie, 
Helvetius, D'Holbach, and Cabanis. According to the latter, 
"thought is a secretion of the brain." The German materiaUsm 
of the nineteenth century is represented especially by Vogt, who 
holds that brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile and as 



SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 477 

the kidneys secrete urine; Moleschott, who holds that thought 
is an inexpHcable motion of brain matter; and Bxichner, who denies 
that thought is anything material Uke a secretion, but claims that 
it is the activity itself of the brain. To-day this crude material- 
ism is commonly rejected; the irreducibility of mind and matter 
is recognized, and thought is not conceived as anything material, 
or as a product, movement, or activity of matter. We shall see 
later on, however, that some systems, like epiphenomenalism, 
parallelism, monism, are frequently materialistic. 

2. Criticism. — The fundamental argument of materialism as 
applied to the mind is as follows: Where there is no brain there is 
no thought. Where there is a brain there is thought. Varia- 
tions in consciousness depend on the quantity and quality of brain 
matter, and whatever affects the brain affects also even the high- 
est forms of intellectual thought. Moreover, certain forms of 
thought are localized in certain portions of the brain. What 
more, according to the rules of induction, is required to justify 
the conclusion that thought is essentially and intrinsically depend- 
ent on the brain? that it is a fimction of the brain? that the brain 
is the organ of thought? 

We shall begin with a few remarks on the general value of this 
argument, (i) If by Junction of the brain is meant "mathemat- 
ical" function, i.e. concomitance of variations, we may allow the 
expression, although even then a strict concomitance may be ques- 
tioned and cannot be proved. If "physiological" function is 
meant, i.e. production, nothing proves that thought is a function 
of the brain. On the contrary, sound reason disproves it. (2) 
The assertion that the brain is the organ of thought is true of sensi- 
tive functions, not of intellectual functions as such. Yet, even in this 
latter case, the brain is the organ which furnishes the intellect with the 
materials necessary to the exercise of its spiritual activity. (3) Con- 
comitant variations, even if they were proved to be always verified 
— they are not — show a dependence, but not necessarily an imme- 
diate and intrinsic one. The instrument by itself does not pro- 
duce the music, and yet the quaUty of the music depends on the 
quality of the instrument, that is, of the materials which are at 
the musician's disposal. In order to prove that thought is 



478 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

material it is not enough to show that it has material ante- 
cedents, concomitants, and consequents; its nature must be 
examined in itself. Beware of the fallacy: "Post hoc, ergo 
propter hoc." We may now come to the more specific assertions 
of materialism. 

(a) Although we must admit that, in a general way, intelli- 
gence depends on the brain, this fact, as already indicated, proves 
nothing in favor of materialism. Moreover, no strict parallelism 
can be asserted. Attempts to make the amount of intelligence 
dependent on the quantity of brain matter have failed mis- 
erably, both for the whole animal series and for different men. 
Intelligence is in proportion neither to the absolute weight of the 
brain, nor to its weight compared to the total weight of the organ- 
ism, or of the nervous system, or of the encephalon; nor finally is 
it in proportion to the dimensions of the brain. This is recog- 
nized to-day by all physiologists. The same is true of the attempts 
to make intelligence essentially dependent on the qualities of the 
brain, e.g. (the amount of phosphorus; the number, depth, and vari- 
ety of the convolutions). No equation is to be foimd. 

(6) The influence of the organism, especially the brain, on the 
intellect is certain, and has been outlined in Psychology (p. 102). 
It is accounted for by the fact that changes in the brain afifect the 
quality of the materials offered to the intellect. 

(c) Psychophysics and physiological psychology measure only 
the physiological concomitants of mental states. 

(d) Cerebral localization applies only to movements, and to 
sensory functions on which the intellect depends and from which 
it cannot be separated. In fact, higher mental functions are 
localized nowhere in the brain. 

3. Conclusion. — Hence we may conclude that the arguments of 
materialists are not proofs against the spirituality of the soul. 
They were known to all spiritualists, even those of the Middle 
Ages. Thus it is Saint Thomas who wrote that "it is necessary 
for man to have a brain larger in proportion to his body than all 
the other animals." Why? "To facilitate the activity of inter- 
nal senses that are necessary to intellectual activity" (Summa 
Theol., I, 91, 3 ad i). He knows that if, owing to organic troubles, 



SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 479 

memory or imagination be impaired, intellectual faculties are 
also impaired, even with regard to the use of the knowledge already- 
acquired (I, 84, 7). All this, because "the organism is necessary 
to intellectual activity, not as the organ through which such activ- 
ity is exercised, but on account of the materials on which it is 
exercised" (I, 75, 2 ad 3). These expressions sum up the main 
ideas and arguments of the present chapter. 



CHAPTER III 

THE UNION OF THE SOUL WITH THE BODY 

That the human soul is in some manner united with an organism, 
and that mind and body exist together and in mutual dependence, 
are obvious facts. The nature of this union and its consequences 
are the problems to be examined in the present chapter. 

II. THE UNION ITSELF 

I. The Question Stated 

I. Union Defined. — Several things are said to be united when, 
in some respect, they may truly be called one. According to the 
nature of the resulting unity there are several kinds of union. 

(a) If we consider the place in which things are located, their 
mere juxtaposition produces some unity; thus many stones or 
bricks together form one heap. This unity is more striking when 
the juxtaposition realizes a plan, like that of the stones or bricks 
which are used to build one house. 

(b) If we consider their activities, several things may again be 
united in several ways, (i) There may be several actions, all of 
the same kind, and, as it were, on the same level, and tending to 
the same result. Thus several horses unite their strength to pull 
a heavy wagon. (2) The several actions tending to the same end 
may be on different levels and subordinated. Thus we have the 
pilot steering his vessel, or the rider guiding his horse. (3) The 
union may consist in an interaction, each substance acting on the 
other. Thus the fire communicating its heat, or a man struggling 
with another. (4) There may be similarity or parallehsm of action, 
due to the fact that both actions result from, or are influenced by, 
the same causes. Thus the hands on several dials may be moved 

480 



UNION OF SOUL WITH BODY 481 

by the same clock-mechanism. (5) Causality and dependence 
also produce some unity, e.g. one family, one dynasty, etc. 

(c) If we consider the perfection or complement which one reality 
receives from another we have two kinds of union: (i) The union 
of a quality or attribute with a substance, e.g. the shape of a mate- 
rial substance, the science or virtue of a man. (2) The union of 
two principles to form only one substance, e.g. matter and form, 
as explained in Cosmology, or two elements forniing one chemical 
compound. 

{d) Here the problem will be restricted to this: Are body and 
soul united substantially, i.e. in such a way that only one sub- 
stance results from their union? Or are they united accidentally, 
i.e. in such a way that, being two distinct substances, they are 
united merely by their juxtaposition or their interaction? It 
is clear that this question is identical with the question: What is 
man? Is he primarily (i) a spirit united accidentally with an 
organism? Or (2) an organism with an accidental adjimct of 
consciousness and intelHgence? Or finally (3) both mind and 
organism united by interaction, or by a substantial union, or 
by the fact that both are only appearances or modes of the same 
deeper reality? 

2. Theories. — The opinions concerning the nature and mode of 
the union of body and soul are chiefly the following: 

(a) According to Malebranche (OccasionaUsm, or Theory of 
Divine Assistance) and Leibniz (Preestablished Harmony), the 
union is more apparent than real. Both agree on the general 
principles that body and soul are two distinct and complete sub- 
stances, and that no created substance can ever act on another. 

According to Malebranche, the apparent interaction is due to 
God's intervention in each and every case; according to Leibniz, 
to the internal evolution of body and mind respectively, an evo- 
lution which at every step corresponds in both substances, and 
proceeds harmoniously owing to the Creator's infinite wisdom. 
For Malebranche, soul and body proceed together like two inde- 
pendent clocks that keep the same time because, whenever the 
hands of one move, God moves the hands of the other correspond- 
ingly. On the occasion of some organic processes, God produces in 
32 



482 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

the mind the corresponding conscious process, and, on the occa- 
sion of some volition, God produces in the organism the correspond- 
ing change. For Leibniz, soul and body proceed together like two 
independent clocks that keep the same time because from the begin- 
ning they were so constructed, so regulated, and endowed with such 
an initial motion that they always agree, and that all the move- 
ments of both correspond. The soul and the organism have 
been set and regulated together from the beginning, and their 
apparent interaction is but a harmony, and a perfect agreement 
preestablished by God, the creator of both. 

To-day, psychophysical parallelism is the offspring of these 
views. Body and mind, or rather the bodily and the mental series, 
— parallelists are also phenomenalists — proceed like two parallel 
hnes, keep the same pace, and yet never come in contact by any 
interaction. Parallelism, as a psychological theory, is generally 
explained philosophically on a monistic basis: Body and mind 
are only appearances or modes of the same underlying reality. 

(b) According to Descartes, man is essentially the soul or 
spirit. The soul is essentially thought, and matter is essentially 
extension. How are body and soul united? Descartes's answer 
is not always consistent, (i) Sometimes, especially when answer- 
ing objections, he speaks of this union as substantial. (2) Some- 
times also he speaks of the interaction of two distinct substances. 
The soul, located in the pineal gland, receives impressions from 
the various parts of the organism, and sends back responses. 
(3) Sometimes, unable to understand the possibility of an inter- 
action between spirit and matter, he seems to give up the problem 
as hopeless. To-day by those who admit the substantiality and 
spirituality of the soul, interactionism is frequently given as the 
bond of union, although it is not explainable. 

(c) A few philosophers, like Cudworth (1617-1688) and Leclerc 
(1657-1736), advocate a third substance, or plastic medium, as a 
means of union. It partakes of both the spiritual and the mate- 
rial nature, and serves to unite these opposites. To-day, some 
spiritists also assume a body composed of a very subtle matter, 
which they call the astral body. 

(d) Psychological monism admits only one substance, which 



UNION OF SOUL WITH BODY 483 

manifests itself in two ways, consciousness and extension. These 
are only modes and appearances of one and the same reality which 
is unknown and unknowable, and which is neither body nor mind. 
Some, however, give preference to the mind: The one substance 
must be conceived rather as mind than as matter. Others give 
preference to the organism, which is a conscious automaton, and 
would act in exactly the same way, even without the accidental 
adjunct of consciousness which is an epiphenomenon, or a light 
thrown off by certain activities of the nervous system. Suppress 
this adjunct, and the world will go on just as before, since conscious- 
ness cannot act on the organism. 

(e) Aristotle and the scholastics hold that body and soul are 
two principles united in one complete substance, as matter and 
form. Like every other material being, man is a composite sub- 
stance, neither body nor soul separately, but the one substance 
resulting from the intimate union of both. This one substance 
is not, as in monistic theories, a primitive unknown substance with 
two manifestations, but the result of the union of two co-principles. 
This view is monistic in admitting a unity of substance; dualistic 
in admitting two principles necessary to constitute this substance. 
(Cf. above, pp. 428, 430, 436 ff.). 

II. Man One Composite Substance 

I. Man One Substance. — (a) Among the functions and activ- 
ities which man calls his own some are unconscious, at least 
generally, like digestion, secretion, and circulation. Others are 
conscious, either purely spiritual, or psychophysical, i.e. either inde- 
pendent of, or dependent intrinsically on, the organism. All 
these are attributed to the same subject: I live, walk, eat; I see, 
hear, feel; I think, understand, reflect. I speak of my body and 
of my mind, thereby implying that neither is my complete being. 
This fact of consciousness shows that the complete man is not 
simply the organism, nor simply the soul, but something one result- 
ing from the union of both. It may be admitted that the soul is 
the nobler part, but to say that it is the whole man, using the body 
as an instrument, guiding and directing it, is to overlook one part 
of the truth, for when we speak of ourselves or of other men, we 



484 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

also refer to the organism. The fact that all functions, material 
and spiritual, belong to the same person is inexplicable if the ego, 
including body and soul, is not one. 

(b) Moreover, the harmony of bodily and mental functions, and 
their mutual dependence, suppose that man is one being composed 
of body and soul, one nature tending to develop all its activities 
for the good of the whole ego. Why should an intense mental 
function affect organic processes, and vice versa, if mind and 
organism are distinct substances? Why should mental work after 
a meal interfere with the digestion if bodily and mental energies 
are altogether distinct? 

(c) These facts are overlooked by all theories of two distinct 
substances, (i) We need nqt stop at the theories of occasional- 
ism and preestablished harmony. Both are based on the false 
assumption that creatures are incapable of activity. The mar- 
vellous structure of the organism becomes meaningless, and all 
the facts of physiological psychology are imexplainable. (2) A 
plastic mediator will not restore man's substantial unity. Fur- 
thermore, it is an impossibility, for, in order to serve as a binding 
link between matter and spirit, it should be both spiritual and mate- 
rial, and this involves a contradiction. (3) As to interaction, su- 
perior though it is to the other theories, it does not explain man's 
real unity, and it makes of the body an instrument of the soul 
instead of an intrinsic part of man. Moreover, there is the insu- 
perable difficulty of understanding how a spiritual substance and 
matter can act on each other, since no contact is possible between 
them. The soul, therefore, is not united to the organism like the 
musician to his lyre, or the pilot to his vessel (Plato), and man is 
not simply an inteUigence that uses an organism. The imion of 
body and soul is more intimate, so as to form one substance which 
is man. 

2. Union of Body and Soul. — (a) The only mode of union 
which will account for this fact is that according to which the soul 
is the substantial form of the body. If body and soul are two 
complete substances, they may be brought close together, and 
conceived as acting upon each other, but they will always remain 
two distinct beings. Hence body and soul must be looked upon 



UNION OF SOUL WITH BODY 485 

as substantial principles, as primary matter and substantial form, 
each one incomplete in itself, and calling for the other. 

{b) Between the human composite and other material beings, 
however, there is an important difference. In man the "forma 
substantialis " is itself a spiritual substance, which is not altogether, 
and for all its operations, intrinsically bound to matter. Other 
forms, and inferior "souls," i.e. the vital principles of plants and 
animals, exercise no activity except in and through matter. All 
the activities of plants and animals are functions neither exclu- 
sively of matter nor exclusively of the vital principle, but of both 
together, i.e. of the animated organism, or, if you choose, of the 
animating soul. 

But, while the whole energy of the human body comes from the 
soul as substantial form, the soul is not altogether immersed in 
matter. In addition to vital and sensory activities which are 
exercised through the animated organism, the soul has also spirit- 
ual activities which are not exercised through any sense-organ. 
However, even for its spiritual activities, the soul is not a pure 
spirit. It requires the organism, since the senses are necessary 
to supply the materials of spiritual activities. (Cf. p. 475.) 
This union is not against, but in strict conformity with, the 
nature of the human soul. 

3. Double-Aspect Theory. — (a) Descartes estranged body and 
mind from each other, and united them only by an interaction. 
Spinoza made of them two attributes of one and the same sub- 
stance, and to-day monism or new Spinozism advocates the same 
view. There is, and there can be, no interaction of mind and mat- 
ter. Yet, as science shows the correspondence of both series of 
processes, they must be called parallel. As they are different in 
nature, they can never come in contact with each other. So far 
this view is psychophysical parallelism, at which many psychologists 
stop without going farther. 

(b) But philosophy asks the reason of this parallelism. The 
answer is given in the identity-hypothesis or double-aspect theory. 
Neither the body nor the mind are substances; they are only 
appearances of the same two-sided reality. They are like the 
two aspects of the same curve, which is concave from within 



486 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

and convex from without, or like the same story told in two 
languages, or the same sum of money which is a debt for 
one man and a credit for another. This psychophysical monism 
is connected with panpsychism, universal monism, evolutionism, 
and agnosticism. Frequently also it is but a covert material- 
ism, when the one reality is identified with some form of matter, 
and when a dependence is admitted of the mind on the organism, 
but not of the organism on the mind. 

Criticism, (a) The expression "psychophysical parallelism" is 
objectionable; how can we speak of two utterly different series as 
being parallel? They cannot be so in space since mental processes 
are not spatial, and nothing proves that they are so in time, since 
nothing proves that the mental series is continuous. If to every 
mental process corresponds an organic process, there are appar- 
ently many organic, and even cerebral, processes that are not 
accompanied by any consciousness. Many paralleUsts inconsist- 
ently admit that the psychical series is determined by the physio- 
logical. Moreover, if it is completed by the identity-theory, 
parallelism admits that parallels do meet in the unity of their 
common substance. 

(b) As to the "double-aspect" theory, it has to answer the ques- 
tion; Is the double aspect universal for all kinds of matter, or is 
the mental aspect to be found only in certain beings? If, with 
some monists, we admit panpsychism — without a shred of evi- 
dence — we have nevertheless to explain how two irreducible 
series can come from the same principle. If, with others, we 
reject panpsychism, the appearance of the psychical aspect 
remains unexplained. 

(c) To make of man a conscious automaton is opposed to con- 
sciousness, which testifies that certain movements are undertaken 
in consequence of visual, auditory, etc., perceptions, and of other 
states of consciousness. Moreover, the evolution of the individual 
and of the race, civilization, inventions, etc., are due to the desire 
of producing certain pleasurable feelings of comfort and pleasure, 
and of avoiding painful feelings. Finally, the existence of other 
minds is known only indirectly from the various organic expres- 
sions that are supposed to manifest mental states. 



CONSEQUENCES OF UNION 487 

(d) The expression "identity-theory" is also to be rejected. 
I am not conscious of a universal substance, identical with the 
one substance of all other things, but of my own substance, includ- 
ing body and mind. And I distinguish this substance from all 
other inanimate or animate substances. Here monists take ref- 
uge in an agnostic position. The one substance of all things is 
unknown and unknowable, and when safely intrenched there, 
monists are proof against all attacks, for no question can be asked 
them concerning what they declare to be unknowable. But is it 
logical to make the unknowable account for things known? Many 
things are in reality unknowable, but the unknowable must not 
be made contradictory either with itself or with known facts aiid 
the clear testimony of consciousness. This whole question will 
have to be touched upon again from a more general standpoint 
when we speak of monism as a world-wide theory. 

II. CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNION 

1. Only One Soul in Man. — The arguments presented above 
not only show that man is one substance, and that the soul is 
the substantial form of the body, but also that there is only one 
soul in man, which is at once the principle of spiritual activities, 
of sensitive processes, and of vegetative, i.e. vital functions. Some 
philosophers hold that there is a special vital principle, distinct 
from the principle of consciousness. This seems to break the sub- 
stantial unity of man as manifested in consciousness, and to offer 
no satisfactory explanation of the intimate relations between the 
two lives. A violent emotion may disturb the organism, and 
even destroy life. In a number of ways the dependence of life 
on the mind, and vice versa, is manifest. (See Psychology, pp. igo 
ff.) This strengthens the testimony of consciousness that one 
and the same substance lives and is also conscious. 

2. The Seat of the Soul. — We cannot speak of the locus, place, 
or seat of the soul in the same way that we speak of the place 
which a material being occupies, because the soul, being spiritual, 
has no spatial relations (right, left, between, surrounded by, etc.). 
Hence, when we ask where the soul is, we do not speak of a 



488 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

material localization, or of a contact, but simply of a substantial 
and active presence, which cannot be imagined — since the soul 
cannot be perceived by the senses — but only understood, and 
even this imperfectly, owing to our habits of thinking of every- 
thing in terms of matter. 

Since the soul is the substantial form and the principle of life 
of the human organism, it follows that it is not only in one part 
of the body, but in the whole body which it animates, not as water 
in a sponge, or blood in the veins, but as a co-principle, an indivis- 
ible substance exercising its activity through the organism. The 
soul, however, does not exercise its whole activity through the whole 
organism. Different functions require different organs, and hence 
are localized in these respective organs: vision in the visual, hear- 
ing in the auditory, organs; memory in the brain, etc. As to the 
spiritual activities, they are not exercised through the intrinsic 
cooperation of the material co-principle, but by the soul alone, 
as explained above. 

3. Faculties. — (i) The soul is one and, together with the 
organism, forms the human substance. (2) As it is simple and 
indivisible, faculties cannot be parts of the soul. (3) As it is the 
principle of all determinations and activities in the body, faculties 
cannot mean distinct agents, independent of the soul, acting and 
reacting upon one another like so many substances. But with- 
out meaning this, faculties may mean more than mere classifica- 
tions or labels of fimctions. They mean the various modes of 
activity of the soul, exercised either by the soul alone — spiritual 
faculties — or by the soul and the organism united in one 
common principle — faculties of the compositum. 

From what has been said on the seat of the soul in the organism, 
it is clear that organic faculties are classified according to the vari- 
ous functions of different organs. Hence some persons have 
the exercise of faculties lacking in others. Vision is absent 
in the blind because the necessary conditions are not verified. 
If these were restored, the radical faculty wovild become capable 
of exercise. It is impossible to determine the number of distinct 
faculties; we can only group them according to different points 
of view. Thus from one point of view we may have vegetative, 



CONSEQUENCES OF UNION 489 

sensitive, and intellectual faculties; from another, knowledge, 
feelings, and will; from another, faculties of immanent or of 
transitive activity, etc. 

4. Mutual Dependence of Organism and Mind. — In Psychol- 
ogy (p. 190 ff.) mention was made of the reciprocal influences of 
body and mind. We understand now how they must be conceived. 
Not as if body and mind were two distinct substances, or two 
distinct agents, acting upon each other. They rather act together. 
Their union does not consist in an interaction, or mutual influ- 
ence, but their mutual influence is the result of their substantial 
union. We have not so much an interaction as a "simulaction," 
since body and mind form one man and one complete principle of 
activity. Owing to this intimate union, whatever affects one also 
affects the other. 

5. Definitions. — (i) The human soul is not only thought, or 
the power of thinking, as Descartes claimed. It has other func- 
tions equally essential. It is a spiritual substance, in the sense 
already explained, destined, however, to be essentially united 
with, and to give life to, the body. (2) Man is not merely a spirit 
or inteUigence; nor simply an organism, but the one substance 
composed of two principles. He is body and mind united in one 
complete substance. 



CHAPTER IV 

ORIGIN OF THE SOUL AND OF MAN 

The Problem Stated. — (a) In the problem of origin several 
questions must be distinguished. Owing to its spiritual nature, 
the soul's origin must be studied apart from that of the organism. 
Moreover, the problem may refer either to the origin of individual 
men — organism or soul — now, in the present condition of man; 
or to the origin of the first man. Hence the following questions: 
(i) Origin of the human organism. (2) Origin of the human soul. 
(3) Antiquity and specific unity of mankind. 

(b) The main suppositions that can be made are the following: 
(i) The first man was created by God, both as to his body and as 
to his soul. At present, however, the organism arises by way of 
generation, and the soul (a) arises also by generation, or (b) is 
directly created by God. (2) The first man's soul was created 
by God — and subsequent souls originate in either way mentioned 
above. His organism was the result of an evolution from lower 
forms of animal life. (3) The whole man, body and soul, is a 
product of evolution. 

I. THE HUMAN ORGANISM 

It is clear that actually the human organism arises by a process 
of generation similar to that which takes place in other living 
beings. Arising from a primitive cell, it gradually develops into 
a complete organism. Hence the present question refers only to the 
appearance of the first human organism. We know that man did 
not always exist. Did his organism arise by a direct creation of 
God, or by an evolution from other types which existed before man 
appeared on the earth? 

I. The Evidence 

N.B. Transformists do not claim that man evolved out of any 
actually existing type, but that man and the higher apes, known 

490 



ORIGIN OF ORGANISM 491 

as anthropoid, sprang from a common ancestor less differen- 
tiated than either man or ape. 

1. Arguments for Descent. — It must be admitted that many of 
the arguments brought forward in Cosmology in favor of the the- 
ory of transformism apply also to man, and the remarks made 
there on the value of these arguments must be kept in mind. 
Thus there is a morphological resemblance — on the main lines — 
between the human and other vertebrate organisms. A similar 
chemical composition of the blood and the tissues may also be 
pointed out. Rudimentary organs may be indicated. Embry- 
ology may show that the human organism develops in a manner 
closely resembling that of other vertebrates. When all this has 
been done — and it has frequently been done in a one-sided way 
in order to prove a thesis — the fact of descent remains unproved, 
and transformism, when applied to man, as well as in the case of 
many other forms of life, is a mere hypothesis. 

2. Difficulties. — (a) Resemblances must not make us overlook 
differences, among which may be mentioned the vertical attitude, 
and the adaptation of the lower limbs for this purpose; the relative 
length of arms, much shorter in man than in the ape; the general 
morphology of the head; the absence of hair, etc.; and especially 
the quantitative and qualitative development of the brain. 

ib) The main stumbling-block of the theory of descent is the 
absence of paleontological evidence, notwithstanding the fact 
that man is of comparatively recent origin, hence that remains 
of forms of transition should be found more easily, and that dili- 
gent research has been made in this direction, in order to find the 
much sought for "missing link." That such "missing hnk " 
between man and ape does not now exist is admitted. As to its 
existence in the past, much ado has been made about the discov- 
ery of certain fossils, especially skulls, which, however, more calm 
and reflective science has shown to belong certainly either to apes 
or to well-developed races of men. 

II. Conclusions 

I. Scientifically, i.e. judging only from the facts at hand, the 
theory of descent as applied to the human body is not proved, 



492 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

but remains a mere hypothesis with insufficient evidence. This 
is acknowledged by the best scientists, who are not led by a priori 
conceptions, but want their conclusions to rest on established facts. 
To give more or less vivid pictures of "primitive man," and of 
his evolution out of inferior organisms to the present form, to 
indulge in numberless suppositions, is to pass from the realm of 
science to that of imagination, and to take dreams for realities. 

2. Philosophically there is nothing contradictory or unlikely 
in the theory of descent as applied to the human organism any 
more than in the general theory of evolution. It is a question of 
fact which is not to be answered a priori. 

II. THE HUMAN SOUL 

By zoologists man is classified — and rightly — as a vertebrate 
and a mammal with certain anatomical and physiological charac- 
teristics. Rightly, I say, because zoology considers only one aspect 
of man, namely, his organism. But there is something more in 
man. The reason for differentiating him essentially from animals 
is not his organism, but his soul. Zoology is not competent to 
pass a final judgment on the place of the whole man in nature, for 
it leaves out of consideration man's nobler part, namely, his mind. 

I. The First Human Soul 

I. Not a Result of Evolution. — (a) Starting either from zoolog- 
ical considerations or from monistic views of a universal evolution, 
certain philosophers are led to assert that the whole man, body 
and mind, is the result of evolution. Hence, for them, the necessity 
of admitting between the human and the animal mind, not a spe- 
cific difference, but only a difference of degree. Animals must 
have at least rudiments of whatever mental manifestations are 
found in man. Either the human mind is animalized, i.e. lowered 
so as to show that all its activities are reducible to sensory activ- 
ities, and that, in consequence, it is not spiritual; or the animal 
mind is humanized, i.e. raised so as to show that it possesses — ■ 
at least in some degree — the specifically human activities. By 
this twofold process the human mind is successfully (?) linked 
to the animal mind, and the obstacle to evolution removed. 



ORIGIN OF SOUL 493 

(b) But, as was shown when we spoke of the soul's spirituality, 
to interpret the actions of animals hutnano modo, i.e. to assert 
that animals act in the same way, and from the same motives as 
man, should not be done when we have evidence to the contrary. 
To any fact only the minimum of necessary cause should be as- 
cribed, since the surplus, i.e. that which is over and above the strict 
requisite, is asserted gratuitously. After a great deal of talk about 
animal intelligence, it is commonly accepted to-day that the power 
of abstract and universal thought remains the fundamental dis- 
tinctive feature of the human mind. It constitutes an impas- 
sable gulf between animal and man. 

2. Created by God. — How could this gulf be bridged over? 
How could a difference in kind arise? How could the first man's 
spiritual soul be produced? Some simply assert that they do not 
know, and that some cause unknown to science must have been 
at work. This is a strictly scientific position. Others, from the 
point of view of philosophy, recognize the intervention of God's 
creative power. Only an infinite cause can bring to existence some- 
thing out of nothing. The spiritual cannot arise from the mate- 
rial. Hence, whatever be said of the human organism, the human 
soul at least is the direct work of God. This view supposes, of 
course, what will be said in Theodicy concerning God's existence 
and nature. 

II. Subsequent Human Souls 

I. Various Opinions. — If God's creative act was necessary for 
the production of the first human soul, is it so for subsequent 
human souls? Or can the parents transmit to their offspring, not 
only organic life, but also the spiritual soul which animates the 
organism, and yet in some of its activities is independent of it? 
This problem is distinct from the preceding, for in the present case 
the parents are endowed already with a spiritual soul. Two 
main solutions are offered: (i) Every individual soul is created 
directly by God. (2) The soul of the offspring comes from the 
parents either (a) by the material organic process of generation, or 
(b) by a kind of spiritual generation in which the offspring's soul 
is derived from the parental soul. Of these solutions (i), or 



494 PHILOSOPHY or MIND 

creationism, is commonly accepted by Catholic philosophers and 
theologians; (2, a), or traducianism, was held by Tertullian; (2, 
i), or generationism, was held by a few Catholic theologians, 
especially Froschammer, who was reproved by the Church. 

2. Criticism, — (a) (i) Traducianism is impossible. Either it 
denies the spirituality of the soul; or, if it admits it, it does not 
assign to the soul an adequate cause, since spirit cannot arise from 
matter. (2) Generationism is also impossible. A spiritual semen 
would suppose the division of the parents' soul, and this is opposed 
to the very spirituality and indivisibility of the soul. (3) Hence, 
since the soul cannot originate from any preexistent reaUty, 
whether material or spiritual, the only possible mode of production 
of the soul is a production out of nothing, i.e. a creation. Is there 
any other possibility which the necessity in which we are of think- 
ing of spiritual substances according to material analogies pre- 
vents us from knowing? To this no answer can be given. 

{h) We may note that (i) the divine creation of every individual 
soul is not a miracle, but an action strictly in accordance with the 
laws of nature, since it is the nature of the soul to be unproducible 
in any other way; (2) the parents are really parents since their 
action is the cause of a human being, just as we say that the mur- 
derer kills a man although he does not destroy his soul, which, 
as we shall see, is immortal; (3) heredity is easily explained by 
the dependence of the mind on the organism. 

3. Time of Origin. — At what time does the soul begin to exist? 
Some suppose that souls exist before the organism. Thus Plato, 
many Origenists, and Leibniz. This theory of preexistence is 
frequently held in connection with metempsychosis (Pythagoras), 
or the doctrine of reincarnation advocated by Eastern thinkers, 
and by theosophists. But we say that the soul is produced only at 
the time of its union with the organism. Preexistence is a purely 
gratuitous assertion without the slightest evidence. Moreover, 
since the soul is naturally the form of the body, it follows that it 
must begin to exist when the time comes for it to "inform " the 
body. When is this time? Is it immediately at conception, so 
that the first principle of life is the spiritual soul? Or is it some 
time later so that at first the principle of hf e is of an inferior kind, 



MANKIND 495 

and animates the organism until it is suflficiently developed to 
receive the spiritual soul? This cannot be determined, but the 
former opinion is the more common to-day. 

III. MANKIND 

The questions of the specific unity and antiquity of mankind 
are to be answered by geological, ethnological, and anthropolog- 
ical sciences. Here we shall simply give the main conclusions 
without entering into the detailed account of the facts on which 
they are based. 

I. Specific Unity of Mankind 

The question of the specific unity of mankind is not identical 
with the question of the community of origin from the same first 
ancestors. Both questions, however, are closely connected. If 
all men belong to the same species, it is at once, if not demonstrated, 
at least highly probable, that all come from the same first parents. 
And, in fact, historically the two questions have been looked upon 
as correlative. 

I . Races. — Some differences are always found between indi- 
vidual men. Much more striking are the differences between cer- 
tain groups of men forming what has been called different races — 
e.g. differences in color, size, relative development of certain parts, 
hair, etc. Many attempts have been made to classify the vari- 
ous races of mankind according to some characteristic feature. 
As a basis some have taken the color of the skin; others the facial 
angle; others the peculiarities of the hair; others the geographical 
distribution; others the language, etc. It is admitted that none 
of these classifications is perfectly satisfactory, as there is no clear- 
cut distinction between the many human types. 

However, such classifications are useful, and among the main 
ones may be mentioned the following. Blumenbach distinguishes 
five races: Caucasian (white), Mongolian (yellow), Ethiopian 
(black), American (red), and Malay (brown). Cuvier distinguishes 
three races: Caucasian (white), Mongolian (yellow), and Negro 
(black). Huxley admits four races: Australioid, Negroid, Mongo- 
loid, and Xantocroic (white). Others have admitted many more 



496 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

distinct races, while those who admit a smaller number are obliged 
to subdivide them. 

2. Unity of Species. — While we must admit several races or vari- 
eties of men, there is absolutely no reason for admitting several 
species. Facts, on the contrary, show the specific unity of 
mankind. 

(a) All men have the same anatomical organization and physio- 
logical functions (upright attitude, blood temperature, number of 
teeth and bones, general structure, etc.). Interracial fecundity is 
also general, and the offspring of parents belonging to different 
races are also prolific. Finally all have the same essential and 
fundamental characteristics of intelligence, e.g. language, use of 
tools, religion, capacity for progress, etc. 

(b) The differences between human races are less important than 
the differences within certain animal and vegetable groups the 
common origin of which is beyond doubt. These differences can 
be explained easily by the influence of surroundings, climate, food, 
isolation from, or association with, other men, etc. The main 
differences between men do not indicate a specific diversity. 
Everywhere and at all times man is truly man, and has the same 
essential characteristics. 

II. Antiquity of Man 

I. The Question. — History cannot tell us how long man has 
existed on the earth, because it always refers to groups of men 
already in existence. Moreover, the chronology of early histor- 
ical documents is most uncertain. Hence recourse must be had 
to natural sciences, especially geology, so as to find traces of 
man in the form either of fossil remains or of tools and results of 
human activity. This can never lead to an accurate chronology, 
because geologists differ widely as to the time necessary for the for- 
mation of the various strata of the earth. The existence of man in 
the tertiary era is, to say the least, very doubtful. The first un- 
mistakable signs of the existence of man are found at the begin- 
ning of the quaternary era. How long a time has elapsed since then 
it is impossible to determine. Some give as high a number as 2 50,000 
or 300,000 years, but without sufficient foundation, as this lapse of 



MANKIND 497 

time does not seem necessary to explain the transformations of 
the earth. Nothing certain can be said on this point. 

2. Primitive Man. — There is no evidence that the primi- 
tive state of man was a state of savagery, but rather that the state 
of savagery is one of degradation and degeneration from a higher 
condition. Evolutionists generally hold the contrary. For them, 
the savage is the backward man, less evolved, nearer to primitive 
man, and therefore to animality. It is impossible to reach any 
general law applicable to all cases. We may, however, state the 
following facts. 

(a) Through the successive ages of man's existence, no essential 
physical differences are observed in human fossils, and the differ- 
ences between races now extinct and those existing to-day are not 
greater than the differences between the various actual races. 

(b) Unmistakable signs of true intelligence, and of a truly human 
mind, are found wherever primitive man existed. That he did 
not have so much science, comfort, or what we call civilization, is 
certain; but it is no less certain that he had the use of reason as 
well as we have, based on the same power of abstract and univer- 
sal knowledge. And even to-day, whether a child will be a simple 
countryman or a great scientist depends greatly on circumstances, 
and the countryman may have more intelligence than the scien- 
tist, even if he lacked the opportunity to develop or manifest it. 
Hence neither on the organic nor on the mental side can any 
transitional type be foimd between man and animal. 

(c) Some of the savage races actually existing are known 
historically to have come from more civilized races (e.g. the Fue- 
gians, Bushmen). Others give clear signs that they are degen- 
erates, either by the traces of an ancient civilization (monuments, 
paintings, etc), like those of the American Indians, especially in 
Mexico; or by their language, which, like that of the Australians 
and the Fuegians, is very rich in words, declensions, and gram- 
matical forms. When thrown into unfavorable circumstances, the 
most highly civilized man returns promptly to a kind of savage 
condition. 



33 



CHAPTER V 

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 

The last problem to be examined is that of the destiny of man, 
and especially of his soul. After stating the question, we shall 
examine successively the possibility and the fact of immortaUty. 

I. THE QUESTION STATED 

I. Death 

1. The Law of Death. — Common experience shows that, after 
a longer or shorter time, organisms cease to live. The law of 
death applies to all living beings, at least to all those that are more 
highly differentiated. Certain unicellular beings are reproduced 
by simple fission. Death does not occur, but the mother-cell, 
by fission, gives rise to two independently living cells. This, how- 
ever, cannot be called true immortality, because nothing proves 
that the individual mother-cell persists in its own hfe; it may 
disappear when giving rise to two different individuals. At any 
rate, although this kind of immortality would be "natural," death 
would result from a number of accidental causes. Limiting our- 
selves to higher organisms, and with special reference to man, we 
see that, sooner or later, life disappears, and the organism becomes 
a corpse. 

2. The Duration of Life varies greatly with the different species 
of organisms, both vegetal and animal. Although there is more 
constancy within the same species, yet, even there, great varia- 
tions are observed. It must also be noted that physiologists 
agree that comparatively few men die a natural death. The major- 
ity die of some special disease before the system is worn out. 
If we ask why, apart from accidental death, one man lives longer 
than another, we find that the length of life depends on many 

498 



IMMORTALITY 499 

factors. Among the most important are natural endowments 
and heredity: a man is born with a strong or a weak constitution; 
the struggle for life (climate, food-supply, labor, struggle against 
micro-organisms, etc.); the mode of life (kind of work, use and 
abuse of certain foods and drinks, drugs, pleasures, etc.); mental 
life in its various aspects; the rest or unrest of organic and 
mental activity: some live "faster" than others. 

But when this has been said, the question remains: Why is 
death a necessity of nature? Why cannot the same organism that 
has grown and developed hold its own instead of decaying? Why 
cannot the same vital principle or soul continue the work which it 
was formerly capable of doing? It must be confessed that death, 
like generation, is a mystery. When we have said that it is a law 
of nature hardly anything more can be said. We simply note 
that no objection can be drawn from this fact against the exist- 
ence of the vital principle or soul. Vital functions are essentially 
dependent on matter. It is matter that lives, and the difficulty 
confronts not only those who admit a principle of life, but also 
those who try to explain life simply by physical and chemical 
forces. Why cannot these forces do always what they do in the 
beginning? 

3. The Main Signs of Death are the lividity of the face; the cold- 
ness and rigidity of the muscles; the absence of certain reflexes 
(e.g. of the contraction of the pupil when a light is brought near 
the eyes); the absence of muscular contraction, respiration, and 
circulation; in a word, the cessation of characteristic vital functions. 
These signs, however, are not infalUble, for there are cases in 
which life remains latent without manifesting itself; hence the pre- 
cise time of death cannot be determined. The only certain sign 
of death is the decomposition of the organism, first into cells that 
may for some time continue to live independently, and lastly 
into inorganic particles, which again may enter into the composi- 
tion of new organisms. In the first stage, certain vital functions 
may still be performed: secretion, digestion, reflexes, nutrition 
(e.g. by blood transfusion), growth of hair and nails, etc. But the 
principle of unity in the organism is absent, and after a relatively 
short time all manifestations of life cease. 



SOO PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

II. The Question of Immortality 

1. Meaning of Immortality. — (a) At death, the principle of 
life in plants and animals disappears, since it was only an essential 
part of the compositum, and had no existence or activity except 
in and through matter. It simply ceases to be, as the spherical 
shape of a wax ball disappears when the wax is given another shape, 
or, more properly, as the substantial form of any substance dis- 
appears when this substance is changed into another. Hence the 
present question of immortality applies only to the human 
soul. 

(b) The assertion that the human soul is immortal means that 
the soul does not cease to exist with the body, but that, after death, 
it continues to exist forever as an active and conscious reality, (i) 
We are not satisfied, therefore, with the poor substitute offered 
by materialists and positivists who admit only a metaphorical 
immortality, consisting in a man's enduring works, his influence, 
glory, good name, the love and admiration of mankind. What is, 
for us, the use of all this, if we are no longer? And can we say 
that future glory given by posterity is in proportion to man's worth? 
(2) Nor are we satisfied with the pantheistic conception of immor- 
tality^ according to which, it is true, the soul survives forever, 
but without its consciousness and personality being absorbed in 
the Great All, a part or emanation of which it is, or engulfed 
in the great ocean of unconsciousness and inactivity like the 
Buddhistic Nirvana. 

2. The Attitudes Regarding Immortality are aflBrmation, nega- 
tion, and doubt. 

(a) The affirmation of immortality may be based on (i) purely 
rational grounds: the nature of the soul, and its aspirations; (2) 
chiefly ethical grounds: the fact of morality and the necessity of a 
future sanction; (3) religious gronnds: the existence and nature of 
God, and (4) the fact of a divine revelation; (5) empirical grounds: 
the facts of spiritism, in which the departed souls are supposed to 
manifest themselves. The first two Unes of argument go together. 
The third also completes them as far as the rational knowledge 
of God is concerned. The argument from divine revelation. 



THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL 501 

which does not belong to philosophy, is distinct altogether. So 
also is the empirical argument. 

(b) The denial of immortality may be based on an analogy 
with the general laws of nature, e.g. the law of death for every 
organism; the nature of the soul, its dependence on the organism, 
and its consequent incapacity to exist and act by itself. 

(c) The agnostic position is an attitude according to which neither 
the aflSrmation nor the negation of immortality is sufficiently 
justified. We do not know; at most we may be allowed to have 
hopes. This view may be based on many grounds, among which 
the positivistic claim that nothing is certain except what 
experience can verify. 

N.B. (i) The present problem is closely related to ethical prob- 
lems and to the existence and nature of God. Here we assume 
the theistic position which will be justified in Theodicy, that 
is, the existence of a personal God, creator of the world, infinitely 
wise, good, and just. (2) The various reasons for immortahty 
must not be considered separately as complete and independent 
arguments, but rather as forming together one whole and com- 
plete argument. 



II. POSSIBILITY AND FACT OF IMMORTALITY 

I. Possibility 

I. Dependence of the Soul on the Organism. — (a) An objec- 
tion is suggested immediately by the fact that the soul is the sub- 
stantial form of the organism, that the two together form only 
one complete nature, and have only one existence. How, then, 
can the soul survive the organism? Moreover, does not the soul 
share all the organic changes and vicissitudes? It begins with 
the organism, grows with it, becomes old with it. It must also 
cease to exist with it. 

(b) We must remember that, if the soul is the substantial form 
of the organism, it is nevertheless a spiritual substance. All that 
the organism is, it owes to its union with the soul. But it is not 
true to say of the human soul that all it is, it owes to its union 



502 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

with the organism. This is true of the soul only as the 
principle of life and sensation, not as the principle of intel- 
lectual and volitional activities which, in themselves, are spirit- 
ual. In this sense alone is it true to say that the soul shares the 
fate of the organism. Owing to their dependence on the senses, 
intellectual activities seem to grow with the organism, and they 
may be impaired for the same reason. But frequently intellec- 
tual activities are exercised as perfectly as ever when the organ- 
ism has become old, weak, and diseased. 

2. Activities of the Soul. — (a) The dependence of the soul on 
the organism, whether it be extrinsic or intrinsic, must make it 
impossible for the soul to act at all once it is separated from the 
organism. If it remains, it cannot be said to survive, that is, to 
outHve the organism, since life, i.e. activity, consciousness, intel- 
lection, becomes impossible. And what would be the good of such 
a bare and dead persistence? 

(b) We admit that such a persistence is not what we seek, nor 
what we claim. We want a living and active survival. It is cer- 
tain also that the functions which the soul exercises in common 
with the organism cannot remain, except, we may say, "in radice"; 
i.e. the soul retains these faculties as mere "potentiae." Suppos- 
ing that the essential conditions of their exercise be verified again, 
the soul will be able to exercise them. 

But what about its own spiritual activities? The soul separated 
from the body cannot acquire ideas in the same way that it does 
now, by elaborating materials furnished by the senses; nor can it 
express ideas by language. We must remember that the depend- 
ence of the spiritual soul on the organism is only extrinsic, and that 
intellectual activity itself is spiritual. Hence if materials can be 
secured elsewhere, this activity can be exercised. 

Where can these be found? The soul can preserve ideas acquired 
in the present life. Moreover, by reflection it can know itself and 
its own processes, and from these acquire many ideas. By the 
elaboration of these ideas many others may be inferred. Finally, 
by communication with other souls and spirits, much knowledge 
may be acquired. The love of the good, and admiration for 
perfection, will follow knowledge. Moreover, it may safely be 



THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL 503 

said that, if God keeps the soul in existence, He will give it the 
means of knowing all that interests it, even things and events of 
this world. Of course, reason alone cannot carry us very far, 
since our knowledge of spiritual substances is very imperfect. 
It can show only that it is not impossible for certain activities of 
the soul to be exercised, although we do not understand positively 
the manner of this exercise, nor the mode of communication 
between spirits. 

II. Proofs of Immortality 

The proofs of immortahty may be reduced to three: teleolog- 
ical, ethical, and ontological. To these some secondary proofs 
are added. 

I. Teleological. — The end, purpose, and destiny of any being 
are known from its structure, aptitude, tendency, and activity. 
Man has capacities, aspirations, tendencies, and activities which 
are not realized or fulfilled in this life. Therefore they point to a 
future life. 

(a) The major of this argument is the principle of teleology or 
finality, which is used extensively, especially in biological sciences. 
It states the universal law that a being's destiny is known from its 
activity. In organisms there is always a correlation between an 
organ and its function and the mode of this function. The 
presence of an organ is always taken as a sign of an appropriate 
activity, and of an adaptation of all other organs in conformity 
with this activity. From one single fossil bone, the structure of 
the whole animal to which it belongs may be inferred by the nat- 
uralist. If one organ is modified, others are modified accordingly. 
The organization manifests the mode of life, the kind of food used, 
the various instincts, and so on. Man must be included in the 
same law, and his destiny will be known from his activities. 

(b) The minor of the argument states that man has aspirations 
which are not fulfilled here on earth. It rests on psychological 
facts of intellect and will. 

(i) Intellect. In the first place human thought is not enclosed 
within any temporal or spatial limits, nor within the limits of con- 
tingent, actual, finite beings. It rises above space and time. 



S04 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

Beyond the present it foresees the future, and has the idea of an 
endless duration. It longs for what is perfect, necessary, and uni- 
versal. It conceives the possibility of a life free from the many 
physical and moral evils of the present life. Moreover, the human 
intellect seeks for truth, and will never be satisfied with fragments 
of truth. And yet how little is known now! The knowledge which 
we acquire moves a little farther the boundaries of our ignorance, 
but opens new unexplored regions and increases our desire to know. 
Sciences are not sufficient, we want science, full, complete, and 
perfect, free from incertitude, and all-embracing. If the human 
intellect has a destiny, it is the possession of such truth. 

(2) Will. Man inevitably seeks happiness, not partial, but 
complete. No goods satisfy him; he wants the good, the perfect 
and unmixed good, the fulness of life, the satisfaction of all human 
desires. Evidently such happiness is found nowhere in this 
life. Neither wealth, nor art, nor science, nor anything else can 
give it. We find only aspects or parts of happiness, which increase 
our craving for a more perfect happiness. 

(c) (i) The conclusion is that, if man's mind moves in the per- 
fect, the eternal, and the infinite, it is because it is destined to the 
perfect, the eternal, and the infinite. Otherwise man is an exception 
on the earth. The animal's instincts and cravings find their own 
satisfaction in nature. How can man's highest aspirations be 
baflfled? Is he alone in creation endowed with aimless tenden- 
cies and with needs which he cannot satisfy? (2) The argument 
is more forcible if we consider that these higher aspirations are 
stronger in proportion as man is more perfect. As man acquires more 
knowledge and happiness, it would seem that he should be better 
satisfied, and that his cravings should decrease. We know that 
the reverse takes place. The greatest scientists, artists, and saints 
are those whose aspirations and desires are the strongest for truth, 
beauty, and virtue. (3) This merely rational consideration is 
strengthened when we look upon God as the author of human 
nature. Since He is all wise and all good. He must satisfy the 
yearnings which He has given to man. 

{d) This argument points to a future life, conscious and per- 
sonal, and without end — since no happiness is perfect if there is 



THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL 505 

the fear of losing it. It does not apply to infants, and applies 
less perfectly to men whose minds are less developed. It also 
leaves out of consideration the punishment for the wicked, whose 
aspirations after happiness will never be satisfied if their chastise- 
ment is eternal. Here, however, we touch upon the ground of 
apologetics and theology. 

2. Ethical. — There is a moral order. This order requires a 
future life. Therefore the soul survives after death. 

(a) The existence of the moral order, including the sense of obli- 
gation, the essential distinction of right and wrong, the categor- 
ical imperative, the fact of conscience, etc., has been shown in 
Ethics. 

(b) How does this order require a future life? (i) Because 
otherwise it would not be order, but disorder; not a rational, but 
an irrational condition. Obedience to the dictates of conscience 
cannot ultimately have an evil result. Compliance with the moral 
law cannot ultimately result in man's unhappiness; otherwise man 
would be a contradiction to himself. Right conduct cannot 
be man's condemnation to misery. The accomplishment of duty 
cannot be the cause of man's unhappiness. In other words, 
honesty and dishonesty, the practice of justice and of injustice, 
virtue and vice, cannot have the same final issue, otherwise moral- 
ity itself is but an illusion, and the natural conclusion is: "Enjoy 
yourself here on earth, no matter by what means; the rascal's 
and the saint's final condition is the same." The sacrifices which 
a man has to impose on himself to obey the voice of conscience 
cannot make his lot worse than that of the debauchee. (2) We 
have seen in Ethics that no satisfactory sanction is found in this 
life. Yet, if there is justice and reason in the world, good must 
be rewarded and evil punished. 

(c) Hence the conclusion that, if the moral order is rational, 
a future life is necessary. This conclusion becomes still more 
forcible in the theistic conception of an infinitely just God on 
whom ultimately morality rests, and who will not fail to give to 
every man according to his merits. 

(d) This argument shows the necessity of a future life, conscious 
and personal, but it does not show that such a life must be 



5o6 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

endless. Temporary rewards and punishments might suffice. Nor 
does it apply to infants, or to those who, owing to mental defects, 
are not capable of morality. 

3. Ontological. — The human soul, either in itself or on account 
of its dependence on the organism, has no principle of destruc- 
tion. Moreover, no external cause will destroy it. Therefore it 
will endure forever. 

(a) In itself the soul is a simple and spiritual substance, hence 
not divisible. It cannot be resolved into parts or principles. Its 
dependence on the organism is not intrinsic. Being spiritual, the 
soul can exist and act without the organism. It does not, there- 
fore, perish on account of its union with the organism. This is 
but a consequence of what was said above (pp. 501 S., 474 ff.). 

(b) The only external cause that could destroy the soul is God. 
Although this is, absolutely speaking, possible to God, we have 
reasons to assert that it will not take place. In His wisdom. He 
will not annihilate a substance which He has made incorruptible 
by nature. In His goodness. He will not frustrate man's highest 
and noblest aspirations. In His justice. He will not leave man 
without retribution for his deeds. In His holiness, He will not 
suffer vice to be finally equal to virtue. 

(c) This argument shows the soul's ability to survive the 
organism, and when completed by considerations from theodicy, 
psychology, and ethics, it acquires its full force. 

4. Secondary and Insufficient Proofs. — (a) Notwithstanding 
the lack of empirical evidence for immortality it is a fact that 
belief in it is universal among men, past and present, civilized 
and barbarous, ignorant and learned, as their writings, practices, 
funeral rites, etc., show. This belief is a sign of truth, as it can 
be explained only by the naturalness and necessity of immor- 
tality. This consideration is important, but only secondary, 
because this common belief is ultimately based on the arguments 
given above, explicitly or implicitly recognized. Moreover, the 
unanimity is only moral. Numerous individual exceptions are 
to be found, and some nations, especially in the East, do not seem 
to admit a personal, perhaps not even a conscious, immortality. 

(ft) The organism is not annihilated; how can the nobler part 



THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL 507 

of man perish? It is true that the law of the conservation of mat- 
ter must be admitted, but the organism as such is destroyed. Its 
elements are changed and enter new combinations. To be worth 
anything, this consideration must be based on the soul's substan- 
tiality and spirituality. 

(c) The proof from a natural desire of perpetual life is included 
in the proof from the aspirations of man. 

(d) Plato's argument from the eternal preexistence of the soul 
must be rejected, as has been said when speaking of the origin of 
the soul. 

(e) We cannot admit the empirical proof given by spiritists, 
as the nature of spiritistic manifestations is far from known. 
Do any spirits manifest themselves, and, if so, who are they? 
These questions are not answered satisfactorily at present. 

5. Cumulative Value of the Arguments. — We cannot here 
speak ex cathedra and state what absolute value these arguments 
have, and how they must be received by everybody. Evidently 
they produce no mathematical certitude. They do not give a 
direct and immediate knowledge of the soul's immortality. But, 
when taken together, they give more than a mere probable hope. 
The more we look upon it, the more wisely and rationally con- 
structed this universe seems to be, and the more impossible it ap- 
pears that the soul should perish. It may be added that the 
three main arguments presented separately show the same thing 
from different angles, namely, the nature of the soul; hence 
all centre around the ontological proof to which they may be re- 
duced. There is, however, a reason for distinguishing them, as 
the first two are more easily understood, and do not presuppose 
so many abstract reasonings on the nature of the soul. They seem 
to be more living and more practical. 

6. Conclusion. — But how many questions these arguments 
leave without answer, especially concerning the future state of 
the soul. They show that this life is only a preparation; but a 
preparation for what? What is the nature of the happiness which 
the soul is destined to enjoy, and of the retribution for the good and 
the wicked? Here divine revelation completes the proofs of rea- 
son, and tells us what reason cannot see. The very dogma of the 



508 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 

resurrection of the body is in perfect accordance with the exi- 
gencies of the human soul as the substantial form of the organism. 
God has lifted the veil that covers the great beyond. We know 
whither we are going, and the meaning of this life becomes clearer. 
It is a time of trial and probation, short, and yet all-important. 
Time is a preparation for eternity. We now live in the shadows, 
grasp only parts and fragments of the truth, enjoy only partial 
happiness, meet unjust treatment, etc. None of our highest fac- 
ulties is fully satisfied. The full reality will come in the posses- 
sion of the Infinite Truth, Goodness, and Justice. 



CONCLUSION 

HUMAN PERSONALITY 

As we concluded Psychology by some general considerations on 
character and personality, we may also conclude this treatise by 
a more accurate definition of the meaning of person and person- 
ality. Strictly speaking, although the distinction is not always ob- 
served, person and personaHty stand in the same mutual relation 
as white and whiteness, animal and animaUty, etc. One is con- 
crete; the other, abstract. Personality includes the distinctive 
characteristics of a person. 

(a) For common experience, (i) Person is practically the same 
as, and coextensive with, human being. Only men are persons, 
and all men are persons. Infants are looked upon as persons in 
somewhat the same manner that a tiger-whelp is looked upon 
as a carnivorous animal, i.e. inchoatively. (2) Hence a person 
includes both body and soul. A wax figure or a corpse is not a 
person; nor is a disembodied soul a person, at least completely. 
Yet some current expressions refer chiefly to the body, and others 
to the mind (e.g. personal charms, a strong personality). (3) 
Personification consists in attributing to things distinctly human 
features, especially mental features. Might and power (thun- 
der), usefulness or necessity (sun), mysteriousness (automata), 
motion and apparent purpose (animals), order and harmony 
(nature), are among the most important causes of the process 
of personification. 

(jb) In psychology, which insists on the mental factors of per- 
sonality, the main elements of a person are (i) self-consciousness; 
(2) self-conscious memory, i.e. the awareness of personal iden- 
tity; (3) activity, purpose, and will. 

(c) In ethics, a person is (i) an agent, (2) having the knowledge 
of right and wrong, and (3) a certain autonomy, freedom, and 

509 



5IO PHILOSOPHYOFMIND 

responsibility. Hence not all men are persons, since not all have 
these faculties (e.g. children, insane people). Nor are all actions 
of persons always personal (e.g. actions performed during a blind- 
ing passion). 

(d) In law. (i) Person includes both body and mind (e.g. 
murder and assault, slander and calumny are personal wrongs). 
(2) Infants are persons, at least for certain rights which they 
possess (e.g. life, property). (3) Some men are not persons with 
regard to certain rights (e.g. outlaws). (4) Several men together 
may be looked upon as one person in certain cases and for certain 
purposes (e.g. corporations). 

(e) Philosophically a human person is not merely consciousness 
and memory, for these are personal activities, and hence already 
suppose a person as the agent. It implies (i) a concrete human 
nature, i.e. body and soul united in one complete substance, to- 
gether with the activities springing from this nature; (2) an in- 
communicability of essence, i.e. the distinction from everything 
and from every other person. 



THEODICY OR THE STUDY 
OF GOD 



INTRODUCTION 



I. Subject -Matter of Theodicy. — (a) We must now rise above 
the visible or sensible world to the ultimate cause, principle, and 
lawgiver of the world. We see that beings depend on one another, 
are caused by one another, rest on one another, and this naturally 
suggests the question: What is the first source of dependence and 
causality? Is it in the world itself, or outside of it? This is 
the problem of God, for by God has always been meant the 
independent being, the cause and the ruler of the world. 

Analogically with the names of many other sciences, this inves- 
tigation would aptly be called "Theology" (^eos, God, and A,oyos) 
were not this term appHed almost exclusively to a special mode of 
the study of God and of divine things, namely, that which is based 
on a revelation from God himself. The present investigation is 
carried on with the exclusive Ught of reason. It may be called 
"Rational," or "Natural Theology," but is more frequently called 
"Theodicy" (^£os, and Sikt;, justification or judgment). It 
starts from facts, and with the help of principles, estabUshes 
(i) the existence of God, (2) His nature, (3) His relations to 
the world. 

(b) It is impossible at the outset to give a definition of God, 
since this would suppose already the knowledge of God. We want 
to find the sufficient and necessary explanation of the world, to 
determine whether it must be looked for within or without the 
world, and what nature belongs to this first principle. To start 
with the supposition that God is an infinitely perfect being, dis- 
tinct from the world, is to limit the range of the question, and also 



512 THEODICY 

to anticipate the answer. Moreover, the only reason that could 
justify such a starting-point would be the common use of the term 
"God," and we know that the meaning of this term has not always 
been the same, and is not always the same to-day. The gods of 
ancient and modern polytheism, the god of India, the God of 
Christians, etc., are not identical. Hence, as the term "God" is 
not univocal, we abstain now from giving a definition. Here God 
means the ultimate explanation of the whole universe of matter and 
mind. 

2. The Importance of Theodicy is evident from the nature of its 
subject-matter, for, as long as we have not reached the ultimate 
cause of the world, we have no final explanation. It completes 
the sciences of the world of matter (physical and cosmological), 
and of the world of mind (psychological and ethical), and 
indicates the duties of man toward God. 

Theodicy is a branch of metaphysics, and supposes what has been 
said above on the possibiUty of metaphysics, and on the theory 
and value of knowledge. Positivists and agnostics deny that such 
an investigation is of any utility, since they claim that no knowl- 
edge is possible except that of phenomena which is acquired 
through experience. But we know that positivism is a one-sided 
view, and that, while admitting the validity of experience only, it 
is unable to account for this experience without implying and using 
principles transcending experience. Science is the arrangement 
and interpretation of experience by reason. Physical science, 
not only leads to, but essentially implies in itself, some metaphysics. 

N.B. This treatise should be supplemented by courses in 
Apologetics and Religion. For this reason we shall limit ourselves 
here to the statement and explanation of the most fundamental 
principles. 



CHAPTER I 

THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD 

These Two Problems are Closely Related. — (a) The two 

questions of the existence and of the nature of God are intimately 
related to each other, and can hardly be considered separately. 
If the world is self-sufficient and self-explaining, there is no reason 
for asking either question. Both become useless, and the vari- 
ous physical sciences give the final answer to the problems which a 
complete explanation of the world suggests. But, if it is found 
that science does not give an ultimate explanation, and that the 
existence and laws of the world postulate something beyond the 
visible world itself, it seems impossible that the same principles 
and arguments which lead us to admit the existence of a first cause 
and lawgiver should not also manifest something of its nature. 
In ottier words, the answer to the question of the nature of God is 
but the unfolding of the conclusions by which His existence is 
known. 

{h) And, for this reason, an essential inconsistency is found in the 
agnosticism of the Spencerian type, admitting the existence of 
the unknowable. We shall see later in what sense we may admit 
the unknowableness of God, but we remark now that we can, 
neither directly nor indirectly, acquire the knowledge of the exist- 
ence of any reality without acquiring at the same time some knowl- 
edge — however limited and vague — of its nature. The "power 
behind the phenomena," to use Spencer's expression, must have 
some proportion to the phenomena. I may not know who rings 
the door-bell, but I know that, in the causal series ending with 
the ringing of the bell, every consequent has its raison d'etre in the 
immediately preceding antecedent, and, no matter how far back I 
go in this regressive series, that every antecedent — the person 
who rings the bell included — is a cause which must be adequate 
to explain the subsequent phenomenon. In every Hne of thought 
34 513 



514 THEODICY 

by which God's existence is inferred, some aspect of His nature, 
power, causality, intelhgence, or will is also manifested. 

(c) For clearness' sake, however, we shall first examine the exist- 
ence of God, and secondly make the conclusions concerning His 
nature and attributes more explicit. Let us keep in mind that this 
is only a logical expedient and that the two questions are in reaHty 
intimately connected. 

I. EXISTENCE OF GOD 

I. The Question Stated 

I. Meaning of the Question. — (a) The question of the exist- 
ence of God is not merely the question whether all phenomena 
in the world must be given a satisfactory explanation, for this is 
admitted by everybody. But the question is whether the mate- 
rial and mental world, both of the plain man and of the man of 
science, finds in itself a sufficient explanation, i.e. whether we are 
compelled or not to go beyond science in order to find, in the world 
itself or out of the world, some reality which science cannot reach 
with its methods, and which is nevertheless necessary to account 
for scientific facts and laws. 

(b) So again the question is not whether science leaves an unex- 
plained residue; or whether, beyond its own field, there are found 
imexplored regions; or whether science must leave certain prob- 
lems without solution. This leads simply to the unknowable of 
the agnostic. But the question is whether the known facts and 
laws of science do or do not require some other specific reality 
without which they could not themselves exist. 

That scientific equations include many an unknown X is ad- 
mitted by all. As science progresses, the value of these imknown 
quantities becomes known Uttle by little; the limits of science are 
widened, and beyond these ever-receding limits is the unknown. 
This is not enough. What we want to find out is whether all 
scientific equations, with their many X's, do not of necessity 
imply some higher reaHty without which the equations themselves, 
with their known and vmknown quantities, could not be given. 

(c) Hence it is seen that the question of the existence of God is 



EXISTENCE OF GOD 515 

that of the existence of a reality superior to the world of phenom- 
ena with which science deals, either immanent in it or transcending 
it, i.e. either identical in reality with the phenomena the substance 
of which it would be, or distinct from both the phenomena and 
their substances. The question of identity or distinction will be 
examined later. 

Atheism denies the existence of God, and asserts the self-suffi- 
ciency of the scientific universe. Pantheism and monism assert 
that God is in reality the one substance of the world. Theism 
admits the existence of a personal God distinct from, superior to, 
and ruler of, the world. 

N.B. The question of atheism is an unimportant one. The 
problem to-day — as at all times — is not so much whether there 
is a God, as what God's nature is, and whether God is distinct 
from the world. Atheism has sometimes been vmderstood as the 
negation of a personal God distinct from the world, and then it 
seems that pantheism and atheism coincide although the terms are 
etymologically opposed. 

2. Method. — (c) The method to be used is the inductive 
method, starting from facts and interpreting them with the help 
of the essential principles of reason. We shall not renew the 
discussion with scepticism, empiricism, and criticism; we pre- 
suppose the validity of rational knowledge as vindicated in 
epistemology. We shall use chiefly the principle of causality with- 
out which empirical science itself cannot advance one step. To 
reject this principle is to fall into contradiction with the fundamen- 
tal laws of thought. It is to make, not only metaphysics, but 
physical science itself, impossible. And with sceptics no argument 
is possible. 

! (b) The existence of God is not known directly, immediately, 
and intuitively. It is true that the mere contact with the external 
world and its succession of phenomena governed by constant laws, 
as well as the aspirations and feelings of the mind, easily lead to 
a spontaneous ascent of the mind to God. This, however, is not 
intuition, but demonstration, at least imphcit, and our present task 
is to make it explicit, i.e. to test by reflection the spontaneous 
admission of God's existence. 



5l6 THEODICY 

(c) A fact confronts us, namely, that many phenomena formerly 
ascribed to the direct intervention of divinities now come within 
the range of scientij&c explanation. Will not God be pushed, as 
it were, farther and farther, and finally disappear from the world 
as a useless agent, postulated formerly owing to the ignorance of 
real scientific explanations? We repeat again that it is not from 
the unknown that we prove God's existence, but from the known. 
His existence is inferred not from the supposition of an unexplored 
beyond, but from facts and laws of which we are certain. That igno- 
rance has caused men to see the direct action of God where it was 
not will be for us a warning not to argue from our ignorance of 
causes, but, on the contrary, from the causes and laws which we 
know. We shall not say: "The action of God is seen behind 
phenomena which we cannot explain"; but: "The action and 
presence of God are seen in phenomena themselves whose scientific 
explanation — as far as it can go — is at hand." 

II. The Argument 

I. General. — (a) The terms "actus" and "potentia" were 
used by the scholastics to translate Aristotle's cvepyeia or IvTeXixava. 
and Suva/its. No single word in EngHsh is an adequate rendering 
of either. "Actus" includes the meanings of act, action, actual- 
ity, perfection, determination; "potentia," those of potency, 
potentiality, faculty, power, capacity. In general potentia means 
an aptitude to change, to act or be acted upon, to give or receive 
some new determination. Actus is the fulfilment of such an apti- 
tude, the actual exercise or possession of that which before was only 
in potentia. In a word, both in the physical and the mental world, 
potentia is the determinable being, actus the determined being. 
Since potentia means the actual non-existence of some determina- 
tion and the capacity for acquiring it, it follows that it cannot be 
known in itself, but only through the corresponding actus. The 
aptitude to see, walk, understand, melt, solidify, etc., has no 
meaning until the actus, vision, walking, etc., is known. 

{b) A change of any kind whatsoever is the passage from poten- 
tia to actus and vice versa, and the existence of manifold changes 



EXISTENCE OF GOD 517 

in the world is an obvious fact. Beings come to existence or dis- 
appear, and those that exist undergo many changes as to size, place, 
color, shape, temperature, activity, etc. Hence in every being 
there are actus and potentia, i.e. actual determinations or perfec- 
tions, and capacity for further determinations and perfections. 

(c) It is true that in the same being the state of potentiality 
precedes that of actuality. Before acquiring a determination, a 
being must be capable of acquiring it. But, absolutely speaking, 
actus must precede potentia, for, in order to change, a thing must 
be acted upon, or actualized, i.e. it supposes a being which is in 
actu. In other words, nothing passes from potency to act of it- 
self, but only imder the influence of something else. Hence change 
supposes an antecedent actus. 

(d) Now, since no being in the world has in itself a sufficient 
reason of the actus which it possesses, if the world is to be explained 
at all, we must proceed to another being in actu. If this being 
is also mixed with potentiality, and subject to change, we must 
go higher till we reach an "actus purus," without any potential- 
ity. For, since no individual phenomenon or change has in itself 
its raison d'etre, but is always "relative" to something else, the 
whole series cannot have within itself such a raison d'etre. It 
remains not only unexplainable, but impossible and contradic- 
tory until somewhere, — behind, under, or above the changes, — 
we find the unchangeable; beyond the imperfect, the perfect; 
beyond the relative, the absolute; beyond potentiality, the "actus 
purus." 

(e) This general argument, in some form or other, is generally 
admitted. But there are many controversies concerning the 
nature of the Absolute and actus purus. We shall now indicate 
a few appHcations of the general argument. 

2. Causality. — (a) There are in the world many kinds of 
efficiency, activity, movement, and causaHty. The appearance 
of every new reality, whether substantial or accidental, is always 
conditioned by, and dependent on, something else. Hence no- 
where in the world do we find a self-siifficient reality; nowhere con- 
sequently a sufficient explanation. Therefore, since in the world 
causes are only intermediary, i.e. caused as well as causing, we 



5l8 THEODICY 

must reach an unconditioned and independent Reality, a first 
uncaused cause. 

(b) This is true, no matter how great the nmnber of interme- 
diary causes may be, no matter how far back in the past we may 
proceed. The length of a river does not dispense with the neces- 
sity of a source, and to push back a difficulty farther and farther 
is not to give a solution. Science refers us back to a primitive 
nebula out of which the world evolved. The fact remains that 
there was activity, hence a first source of activity; there was depend- 
ence, hence somewhere the independent; there were relations, hence 
somewhere the unrelated; there were conditions, hence somewhere 
the unconditioned and the absolute. 

(c) The world, they say, is eternal; from all eternity the same 
processes went on, and these processes originate in the very nature 
of things. We have nothing to do here with the eternity of the 
world; nothing to say against its eternity. But to lengthen time 
is not to assign a cause. If the time during which the cosmic 
processes have been taking place had a beginning, the existence of 
a first cause to explain their appearance is, of course, an absolute 
necessity. If it had no beginning, the first cause is required from 
all eternity, since, without it, there can be no other causes, and con- 
sequently no sufficient reason for existing reahties. A being, or a 
series of beings, no matter how long it may be, which is not self- 
sufficient, requires a self-sufficient principle, for its existence 
always remains contingent and conditioned. 

(d) We know from science that certain forms of existing real- 
ities had a beginning. Life did not always exist, and man appeared 
a long time after other forms of life. We have seen elsewhere that 
life has no sufficient explanation in the preexistence of inorganic 
matter, nor consciousness in unconsciousness, nor the spiritual 
soul in any material activity (pp. 442, 492 ff.). Some higher 
principle, therefore, is required to explain these new appearances 
which cannot be explained by antecedents in nature. 

N.B. This argument again is general, and special aspects 
of it might be emphasized, e.g. movement, origin, contingency, 
etc., and these new proofs would proceed in a direction parallel 
to the one just indicated. 



EXISTENCE OF GOD 519 

3. Teleology. — (a) There is order and harmony in the world; 
the universe is not a chaos, but a cosmos. (See Cosmology, pp. 448, 
455.) The various beings that compose it act according to de- 
termined laws, and from this manifold interaction results a per- 
manent order. We do not speak here so much of extrinsic finality, 
that is, of the usefulness and adaptation of one being to another, 
as of intrinsic finality, that is, the determination of a being by its 
own nature to unfold its specific energies, every part contributing 
to the existence and functions of the whole. Examples could be 
multiplied in the inorganic as well as in the organic world, from the 
smallest atom, and chiefly the cell in the organism, to the harmony 
of heavenly bodies. 

Efficient causes, it is true, explain the world, but only from one 
point of view. They are not opposed to, but completed by, final 
causes, ends, and purposes, as explained in Cosmology (p. 455). 
Everywhere in the world we find manifold interaction, and the more 
science progresses, the greater also the evidence for the existence 
of order. The world, therefore, manifests an intention, a design, 
hence an intelligence, a mind. Otherwise, what explanation can 
be offered? 

(b) They say: The cosmos is a result, not an end; it is what it 
is, and acts as it does, because of the necessary laws that govern 
it. True; but there is no opposition between the result of efficient 
causes and the end or realization of a plan. The clock keeps time 
as a result of its mechanism, and yet keeping time was the end 
the clock-maker had in view in making it. Without ends and pur- 
poses efficient causes acting at random will not produce stability 
and order. Without ends and purposes the world will act as it 
does supposing it to be what it is, but why is it what it is? Laws 
govern the world, it is true, but a law is not an explanation; it is 
only a systematic expression, or a formula of the facts. 

We need not stop to consider the position that order is the result 
of hazard or chance. Chance is but an avowal of ignorance as 
to the coming together of several causes. It is without laws, and 
essentially without stability, constancy, and regularity. 

(c) There are also apparent disorders, it is true. I say apparent, 
because they may belong to a more general and wider plan and 



520 THEODICY 

order. But even if they are real, they are exceptions, and simply 
prove that the world, though orderly, is not perfect. One mis- 
print does not destroy the order of the letters in the whole page; 
and dissonant chords, when resolved properly, contribute to the 
beauty of the harmony. 

{d) Again many say: The world is harmonious, and progresses 
harmoniously, because of the general law of evolution. This law 
is universal; it is the great ruler which dispenses with any higher 
intelligence. Let us repeat here that a law is not a cause; that 
evolution is not a source, but only the mode according to which the 
stream runs. And precisely this progressive and orderly evolu- 
tion from a primitive nebula supposes a directive principle of evo- 
lution. Evolution or no evolution, a principle of order is required. 
If it is said that the world evolves unconsciously, like the plant 
which grows and develops into an organism out of a simple seed, 
we reply that unconscious finality is itself possible only on condi- 
tion that there be somewhere a consciousness of the plan to be 
realized. 

(e) Appeal to nature and to natural laws is always legitimate; 
science can go no farther. But nature and laws are not self-suffi- 
cient, and must find elsewhere their explanation. We discover 
meaning in the world, and do not put it there. The scientific and 
philosophical study of nature is in fact a constant attempt to find 
this meaning. If there is meaning in nature, there is a mind dis- 
tinct from our own, with which our own tries to come in contact. 
(Compare, for instance, the meaning of speech, of works of art 
or machines for the student who, through them, endeavors to 
know the author's mind.) 

4. Morality. — As a special application of the preceding con- 
siderations, we may say that the moral order also is not self-suffi- 
cient. Man, as was seen in Ethics (323 ff.),is not his own lawgiver, 
and yet is subject to the moral law which it is not in his power 
to change. The author of the moral order is therefore elsewhere. 
Moreover, a sanction is required, and, as no sufficient sanction is 
found in this life, there must be a judge to whom man is account- 
able. God is the ultimate principle of the moral order as He is 
the principle of human nature itself and of the physical world. 



NATURE OF GOD 52I 

5. Universal Consent. — A last, but secondary, argument is 
taken from the consensus of mankind in admitting the existence 
of God. Everywhere and at all times, the existence of God is 
and has been admitted, although the conceptions regarding the 
nature of God vary greatly. This shows at least the natural pro- 
pensity of the human mind to rise from the world to the cause and 
ruler of the world. 

6. Conclusion. — In conclusion we may say that the material 
world as known by common experience and scientific investiga- 
tion, and the mental and moral world, are not self-sufficient. The 
universe requires a ground on which it may rest, which is inacces- 
sible to experience and to physical science, and is a self-sufficient 
reality. In this there is scarcely any dissension among philos- 
ophers. But divergences become accentuated when questions 
concerning the nature of God, and His distinction from the world, 
are raised. 

II. THE NATURE OF GOD 

We shall now endeavor to outline — it can only be a short out- 
line — the main points concerning the nature and attributes of 
God. We shall first examine the distinction of God from the 
world; secondly. His primary attributes, i.e. those that are looked 
upon by us as constituting the divine nature; thirdly, the second- 
ary attributes. Then we shall vindicate our conclusions against the 
attacks of agnosticism. Hence the four following sections. 

I. The Distinction of God from the World 

I. The Question Stated. — (a) When we assert that God is 
distinct from the world, we do not mean that God is estranged 
from the world, far away from it, and that He has nothing to 
do with it. The omnipresence of God, and His providence — to 
be mentioned later — imply that God is present and acts every- 
where. But nevertheless His being is not to be identified with 
that of the world. The world is not the whole reality, and the 
being of God is transcendent. 

(b) The two opposed systems here are Theism and Pantheism 
or Monism, Theism admits the existence of a personal God, 



522 THEODICY 

distinct from, yet cause and ruler of, the world. Pantheism in 
general identifies God's being with the being of the world, so that 
God and the world are one and the same substance. Hence the 
term Monism (/aovos, one only), by which it is frequently called 
to-day. Historically it had many forms and expressions which 
cannot be discussed here. We shall limit ourselves to those forms 
which are found at present. 

(c) Monism is idealistic or realistic, (i) Idealistic monism 
denies the objectivity of the conception of God as absolute and 
infinite. God is an ideal which the world, through its successive 
evolutions, little by little reaHzes without ever reaching it. He is 
not to be found at the beginning of the world, but at the end; 
not in the past, but in the future. Starting from indetermination 
and imperfection, i.e. from a minimum of reality, the world pro- 
gresses, and tends toward determination, perfection, and maxi- 
num of reality, i.e. toward the realization of God. (2) Realistic 
monism admits the actual existence of the absolute, but identifies 
it with the universe, asserting either that the material elements 
of the world are self-existing, and obey essential and self-sufficient 
laws (materialistic and mechanical monism); or that the world as 
we know it is only the surface, the phenomena, the modes or 
aspects of the one common underlying substance (pantheistic 
or monistic evolutionism). 

(d) It may be noted here once more that extremes meet. Pan- 
theism is close to atheism; to identify God with all things is 
very nearly the same as to deny His reality. Pantheism must 
naturalize God or divinize nature. 

(e) The main reasons advanced by monism are the impossibility 
of creation, the necessity for the infinite of including all things in 
itself, and the existence of evil in the world, for evil cannot come 
from a supposedly all-perfect and all-good cause. 

2. Idealistic Monism. — The assertion that God is merely an 
ideal is directly opposed to the proofs for the existence of God, 
since these, starting from real facts, show the real existence of a 
first cause and of an actus purus, whereas the ideal God is prima- 
rily potential. To start from indetermination or potentia is 
to fall into the impossibility of ever reaching an actus, since the 



NATURE OF GOD 523 

passage from potentia to actus supposes a previous actus. The 
progress and evolution of the world, its manifold changes, and its 
activity require a sufficient principle, an actus purus, which exists 
not only in the mind, but in reaUty. Becoming supposes being. 
The order of the world requires a mind which unfolds a plan. We 
need not be detained longer by this view which to-day is looked 
upon by most philosophers and scientists as a dream, a confusion 
of the logical with the real order, and a contradiction in terms and 
in reality. 

3. Mechanical Monism, which admits only material elements 
and their "actual" motions, has already been touched upon in 
the proofs given for the existence of God, and in Cosmology (pp. 
428 £f., 436 ff., 454 ff.). The main objections against it are the fol- 
lowing: (i) What is self-existing and necessary cannot change, 
and all material elements are subject to many changes. (2) The 
atom or material element is always dependent, relative, and con- 
ditioned. Its location, the exercise of its activity, its movement, 
etc., are contingent, since they constantly change dependently 
on external conditions. The dependent, the conditioned, and the 
relative suppose the independent, the unconditioned, and the 
absolute. (3) The atom is indifferent in itself to this or that 
combination, this or that motion, and as a consequence to this or 
that result. How were the primordial chaotic elements — I say 
chaotic in comparison to what they are now — of the nebula deter- 
mined to arrange themselves so as to form the present world? 
How were they placed in such positions, and endowed with such 
movements as to lead to the present order? (4) If atoms exist 
from all eternity, the present state of the world should have been 
realized sooner. Why only now, and not yesterday or last year? 
Or why did not the first differentiations of the nebula take place 
earlier? (5) Mechanism looks only at efficient causes and neg- 
lects teleology which is also real. (6) It is unable to account for 
the origin of life, and chiefly for the origin of intelligence which is 
spiritual. Mental ideals, true morality, freedom, etc., find no 
place in such a system. 

4. According to Pantheistic Evolutionism, or Monism, the abso- 
lute, unconditioned, and necessary substance actually exists. It 



524 THEODICY 

is the only substance, and the various beings of the world are its 
phenomena or manifestations. This substance is the one cause of 
all realities, the one principle of energy, unfolding itself in diverse 
ways — especially as matter and as mind — not intelligently or 
freely, but according to its own essential, necessary, and intrinsic 
law of evolution, like the germ evolving into the complete organ- 
ism. Against common experience and scientific evidence, this 
doctrine must deny all forms of interaction between bodies, and 
between body and mind, since the One is also the whole energy. 
(Hence the theories of parallelism and of double-aspect, with 
their consequences, as mentioned in the Philosophy of Mind, 
pp. 481 ff.) 

(c) If the term "substance" is used to mean that which is neces- 
sary and self-existing, it is clear that there is only one substance, 
namely, the Absolute or God. But this is not the usual meaning of 
substance. Substance is not that which exists from itself, or a se, 
but that which exists in itself, or in se. As such it is opposed to 
accidents which require a subject in which they inhere. It denotes 
a being which, although it is dependent, conditioned, and relative, 
yet is not inherent in something else. In this sense there may be 
many substances. 

(b) Among substances is found the human person, as conscious- 
ness clearly testifies. Its esse-in-se, and non-in-alio, appears as 
a fact, as well as its activity and autonomy. Distinct person- 
ality and freedom find no place in monism. 

(c) The absolute, self-existent, and necessary being cannot be 
identified with the world because it is necessarily all that it is, and 
hence cannot change, whereas changes in the world are evident 
facts, and every change impHes a dependence on certain condi- 
tions necessary for it to take place. 

(d) Why are not the cosmos and the actual order of the world 
eternal? The only answer of science is that the conditions of the 
present state were not always verified. But we cannot speak of 
anything external conditioning the one reality. Since this reality 
is the only one, it can depend on nothing different from itself. 
Since then the absolute has in itself the totality of being, why did 
it begin with the part? i.e. since it has the superior reality, why 



NATURE OF GOD 525 

did it begin with the inferior? Why is evolution a law of the 
world? 

(e) The comparison with the seed that develops into a complete 
organism does not favor the monistic position. The germ is not 
the whole plant. It has the power to develop into a plant, but 
always dependently, for it requires other substances external to itself 
which it assimilates, the influence of light, heat, moisture, etc. 
Without these the evolution of the germ would be impossible. 
The germ's change and development become intelligible precisely 
by reason of this manifold dependence on external agencies. Either 
the world depends on external conditions, and then it is not the 
one substance, nor the absolute; or it is the absolute and neces- 
sary substance, and then to speak of its change and evolution is 
contradictory. 

(/) Perhaps it will be said that the condition is not extrinsic, 
but intrinsic to the one substance; that it is to be found in the very 
nature of the absolute; that the obstacle is not from without but 
from within. This supposition introduces into the one substance 
a dualism of antagonistic and irreconcilable tendencies: the essen- 
tial tendency to the realization of a state, and the essen- 
tial obstacle to such a realization. Here, therefore, monism seems 
to depart from its fundamental position. 

We may conclude that the being of God is not to be identified 
with that of the world, and that the first cause is not identical 
with the world, but transcendent. 

II. Fundamental or Primary Attributes 

I. Self -Existence. — The proof of the existence of God shows 
that there must exist an absolute being, i.e. a being existing by itself, 
a se, as the scholastics used to say, and independently of any higher 
principle. A dependent cause cannot be the adequate explana- 
tion of its effect, since that on which it depends also contributes 
to it. The absolute, independent, and unconditioned cause alone 
can be the final explanation of all things. All others are inade- 
quate. And the absolute cause is self-existing, necessary, and 
eternal, otherwise it would necessarily depend on something else 
for its existence, and would involve a contradiction. Its only 



526 THEODICY 

sufficient reason is in itself. In one word again, God is the actus 
purus, without any admixture of potentiaUty or dependence. 

2. Perfection. — (a) God is perfect and cannot acquire more 
perfection, otherwise He would be in potentia with regard to the 
perfections which He actually lacks. Moreover, God, as the first 
cause, must possess in Himself all the perfections found in the 
world, since He is their source. As we shall see, these perfections 
need not be foimd in God in the same way as in beings of the world 
where they are always accompanied by imperfection. But God 
must possess at least something equivalent or analogical to 
the perfections of the world. Finally, as the actus purus and the 
plenitude of being, God must be infinite. He cannot be limited 
by any other being without implying dependence on them; nor by 
Himself, since He is essentially and from Himself all that He is. 

ib) But if God is not all, how can He be really infinite? The 
world is a reaUty, and if God is not the very substance of the world, 
there are realities other than God. Hence a God who does not 
include all things is not infinite, since His reahty would be 
increased if the beings of the world were added to Him. 

This difficulty rests on a misunderstanding, which itself is due 
to our incapacity of understanding the nature of God completely. 
We use the same expression "to be" of God and of creatures, 
but "being" does not apply uni vocally to God and to the world. 
God alone "is" fully, i.e. by himself: "I am who am" (Exod. 
iii, 14), that is, God is the fulness of being and of perfection. The 
world "is" as a participation, a derivation, a shadow of the being of 
God. Hence we cannot speak of the addition of the world to God, 
since units of different kind cannot be added to each other. God 
stands alone as the fulness of being, surpassing infinitely everything 
else, containing all perfections eminently, and this infinite perfec- 
tion is precisely what isolates God and forbids His identification 
with the world. They are not on the same plane, nor in the same 
genus even remote, but God stands alone on a higher plane, as the 
first absolutely independent cause. With the addition of the 
world, were this possible, there would be more "beings," but there 
would not be more "being." 

We have here something similar to the imparting of a science 



NATUREOFGOD 527 

to ignorant pupils by a great scientist. After they have learned a 
few imperfect rudiments, there are more " knowings," but there is 
not more " knowledge," and the addition of the pupils' science to 
that of the master would not increase it, but rather make it less 
perfect. The Infinite is transcendent. He is neither increased 
nor decreased by the existence or non-existence of other realities 
to which He gives their derived being. 

3. Simplicity. — There can be no composition in God; He is 
absolutely simple. Hence He is not material, but a pure spirit. 
The reason is that every composition implies potentiality which 
must be excluded from God. (i) God cannot be material because 
the changes in matter always occur in dependence on some agent, 
whereas God is the first cause. (2) God cannot, like man, be 
composed of two co-principles, matter and form, or body and soul, 
because matter is essentially a potential and determinable principle. 
(3) Nor can God be composed of substance and accidents, because 
accidents rest on the substance and are dependent on it. The 
human soul, for instance, has certain capacities which it exercises 
successively. By the passage from potentia to actus it acquires 
new perfections, and this is not possible for God. 

Briefly, wherever there is composition there is also potentiality 
and subsequent determination. The compound always depends 
on its components and on the cause of their union. All forms of 
potentiality must be excluded from the actus purus. We have to 
speak of God and of His attributes as if they were distinct, but 
this is owing to the imperfection of our understanding which 
cannot grasp at once God's one and simple reality. 

4. Unicity, — God is one, because if there were several gods, 
none of them would be the plenitude of being and perfection. 
One would have some being not possessed by the others. The 
tendency to unity is so marked to-day, both in philosophical and 
natural sciences, that it is useless to insist on this point. No one 
ever speaks of the " absolutes " in the plural. If there were several 
first causes, the question would immediately be raised: How did 
they act as one, and harmoniously, unless there were a higher cause 
and principle of unity on which all others depended? These 
several causes therefore would not be first causes, and we would be 



528 THEODICY 

led back to one first cause. The existence of evil, which is some- 
times alleged as a proof for the dualism of causes, will be examined 
later. 

III. Derived or Secondary Attributes 

1. Negative. — (a) God is absolutely unchangeable or immutable, 
because change imphes acquisition, or loss, or both. Hence it 
implies composition, since something remains permanent while 
something is added to, or subtracted from, the substance. It 
also implies potentiality with regard to the new acquired condi- 
tion. But both composition and potentiality are excluded from 
God. 

{b) God is eternal, not only in the sense that He had no begin- 
ning and will have no end, but in the sense that, existing at all 
times. His existence is not, like ours, subject to a successive series 
of elements, changes, activities, etc., i.e. to past and future, because 
succession implies change and potentiality. God is free from all 
temporal relations. 

(c) God is immense, i.e. free from spatial relations. Being a 
pure spirit, God cannot be "localized" like material substances. 
He is omnipresent in the sense that His being and activity cannot 
be restricted or limited. He is present wherever there is something, 
present to every existing reality, for, wherever there is something 
contingent and potential, there is required also its necessary 
support, the absolute and pure actus. 

These negative attributes exclude from God all "relations," 
since relative and absolute are essentially opposed. 

2. Positive. — (a) God is intelligent, because (i) He is not only 
the principle of the material world, but also of the world of minds; 
(2) we have seen that the world manifests an intelligence. But 
God does not know like man by successive processes which imply 
imperfection, but intuitively and without acquisition or passage 
from potentia to actus. 

Hence God's science is not (i) the exercise of an activity, but 
it is identical with the activity itself, which, in turn, is not really 
distinct from God's being, which is simple; nor (2) dependent on 
the objects of knowledge, for there can be no dependence in the 



NATURE OF GOD 529 

absolute being; nor (3) discursive, for this implies successive 
acquisition. 

God knows perfectly and intuitively His own essence, and, in it, 
everything that was, is, will be, or can be, since all finite existences 
are but participations of the divine essence. In His eternal pres- 
ent, God knows all things, past, present, and future, although He 
knows them actually with their temporal modality. To say that 
God acquires the knowledge of things only when they come to pass 
would again introduce succession, dependence, and potentiality. 
God, therefore, knows everything from all eternity. 

(b) The same reasons that oblige us to attribute intelligence to 
God also obhge us to attribute a will to Him. (i) The existence 
of man, intelligent and free, requires that the first cause should 
also have these perfections. (2) The world is a realized plan. 
As the object of the will is always the good, the object of God's 
will is primarily His own essence, which is the infinite goodness, and, 
secondarily, whatever is a participation of the divine goodness. 
God's freedom does not imply, as it does for us, changeableness, 
fickleness, caprice, or disorder, but exists together with immutabil- 
ity, sanctity, the knowledge of all things, and omnipotence. 

(c) God is omnipotent, i.e. whatever is not intrinsically impos- 
sible can be done by Him. Things that have no reality at all, 
like a square circle, a triangle whose angles taken together are 
not equal to two right angles, are intrinsically impossible, and, 
hence are called impossible for God because in themselves they 
involve a contradiction; and as they have no potential reality, it is 
clear that they are not actually realizable. Since God is infinitely 
perfect. He is also infinitely powerful. Since He is absolutely 
simple, His power is identical with His will. 

IV. Value of These Conclusions 

What is the value of our conclusions? It is objected that our 
finite minds cannot know the Infinite (agnosticism), and that to 
speak of it at all is necessarily to apply to it our human finite 
concepts, and to conceive God as a perfected man (anthropomor- 
phism). A few remarks on these objections will make the 
preceding doctrine clearer. 
35 



530 THEODICY 

I. Agnosticism. — (a) The absolute exists, says Spencer, and 
the beUef in it "has a higher warrant than any other whatever"; 
but nothing more can be said of it, since human knowledge is essen- 
tially relative. It "cannot in any manner or degree be known in 
the strict sense of knowing." Yet its existence is certain as the 
"fundamental reality which underHes all that appears," "the real- 
ity which is behind the veil of appearance," and as the "omni- 
present causal energy or power of which all phenomena, physical 
and mental, are the manifestations." It is the "inscrutable power 
manifested to us through all phenomena." (First Principles, 
p. I, ch. 3, 4, 5.) 

(Z>) It must be admitted that (i) God cannot be known per- 
fectly or comprehensively. What we claim to know about God 
is infinitely inferior to the reality. Our knowledge is largely 
negative, i.e. the knowledge of what God is not and cannot be. 
In its positive aspect this knowledge is analogical, i.e. we know 
that there must be some proportion between the cause and the 
effect. (2) God cannot be known apart from His manifestations, 
and we know Him only in so far as He manifests Himself in the 
world. All other aspects of His reality are unknown to us. (3) 
God is known by our finite minds successively, disjunctively, and 
relatively. 

Hence we must admit that the little knowledge which we have of 
God is as nothing when compared to the being itself of God. Yet 
we claim that our concepts truly represent, though very imperfectly, 
something of the divine reality. "That which is uncaused cannot 
be assimilated to that which is caused," and there is between them 
"a distinction transcending any of the distinctions existing be- 
tween different divisions of the created." (First Principles, §24.) 
We admit this. But without assimilating God as "imcaused," 
to the world as "caused," we may compare God as "cause" 
to the world as "caused," and thus acquire some knowledge of 
God from His works. 

(c) Spencer's inconsistency is glaring. God cannot manifest 
Himself without manifesting some aspect of His reality. A 
"power" behind the phenomena implies continuous efficiency. 
A "first cause" means self-existence, eternity, and activity. And, 



NATURE OF GOD 531 

if the same reality is behind both physical and mental phenomena, 
how can Spencer speak of it merely as power, and not also as con- 
sciousness, intelligence, and will? If God manifests Himself as 
power or energy in the physical world, He must also manifest 
Himself as mind through the mental phenomena. 

{d) So God, it is true, is not definable. But between compre- 
hensive knowledge and unknowableness there is an intermediary 
term, namely, true, though imperfect and analogical knowledge. 
Human works manifest some of the attributes and thoughts of 
their authors; imperfectly, yet truly; incompletely, yet without 
essential alteration. In the same way, the world bears the trace 
of God's attributes, and, no matter how far beneath the reality our 
interpretation must remain, it leads to the knowledge of God. 

Spencer professes that he does not know whether the first 
cause is conscious because it might have an attribute distinct 
from both unconsciousness and consciousness, and infinitely supe- 
rior to both. But between consciousness and unconsciousness there 
is no middle term; we have to choose between the one and the other. 
God must have something analogical to consciousness, though 
infinitely above our consciousness. The only name we can give 
it is consciousness, but we recognize that it applies to God with- 
out the imperfections found in ourselves, and in a manner which 
we cannot understand. 

2. Anthropomorphism. — (a) The agnostic urges again: What 
do you do in all this but conceive God as a magnified man, and 
attribute to Him human perfections, even if you do enlarge them? 
You call them infinite, but cannot, with your finite mind, know 
even the meaning of this term. In other words, we are accused 
here of anthropomorphism: we predicate of the infinite essen- 
tially human concepts, finite, and out of proportion to God. "Is 
it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much tran- 
scending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical mo- 
tion? " It is an erroneous assiunption to suppose " that the choice 
is between personality and something lower than personality; 
the choice is rather between personality and something higher." 
(First Principles, § 31.) 

(6) It must be admitted that, in our mode of conceiving God, 



532 THEODICY 

anthropomorphism is a real danger which has not always been 
avoided with sufficient care. Sometimes human passions and 
emotions, for instance, have been attributed to God without suffi- 
cient discrimination. Moreover, some anthropomorphism is unavoid- 
able. As we have no direct knowledge except of the external world 
and of our own conscious states, it follows that we can think only 
with the concepts acquired from these realities. 

(c) However, when the philosopher applies these concepts to 
God, he is aware that he cannot do so univocally, but only in an 
analogical way, and that they are realized in God in a manner 
which is transcendent and supereminent, yet not altogether 
unlike the manner in which they are found in finite beings. He 
does not simply enlarge the finite, but also recognizes a qualita- 
tive difference which he can neither express nor conceive. The 
agnostic's concepts of force, power, and cause are also derived 
from experience, and yet applied to the absolute; this objection, 
therefore, applies to him as well as to us. But the analogy used 
by Spencer starts only from the lowest beings, those of the phys-r 
ical world, instead of including also, as it should, the highest beings, 
those endowed with intellect, will, and personality. 

3. The Personality of God is but a corollary of what precedes. 
But it must be attributed to God only in an analogical way. It is 
the best conception we can form of God's being; yet His personality 
is as far above ours as His other perfections are above all those of 
the world. Why is man a person? Because he is a complete 
substance, sui iuris, and a conscious free agent. Now, God is 
the Substance, distinct from other beings, it is true, yet supporting 
them. Complete in His fulness of being and of perfection, abso- 
lutely independent and unconditioned. He realizes in Himself the 
plenitude of perfection. Infinite mind and free agent. He has 
in Himself all that is required to be called personal, but personal 
in a transcendent and incomprehensible sense, distinct from every- 
thing else by His very infinity. 

How poor are the substitutes that are offered for a personal 
God. First, we are offered the Divine, i.e. a pure psychological 
feeling to which nothing real corresponds; an adjective without a 
substantive. How absurd to speak of the Divine, as some do, 



NATUREOFGOD 533 

if there is no God! Or will God be replaced by Nature, personified 
with a capital initial, or by an indefinite World-Ground, or some 
similar term? Of course nature and its laws explain the world, 
but also need explaining. They give an immediate, not a final ex- 
planation. Or shall we speak of the indefinite, the indetermined, 
progress, evolution, and what not? All these are insufficient, as 
we have seen. God exists, distinct from the world, infinite in all 
perfections, perfectly independent; and yet, while acknowledg- 
ing our incapacity to name Him, with the full conscious- 
ness that the expression appUes to Him in an infinitely superior 
degree than it is possible for us to conceive, we rightly speak of 
Him as a personal God. 

4. Conclusion. — (a) The knowledge we have of God is imper- 
fect in many respects, (i) We have been obliged to analyze that 
which is one and simple, and, owing to the very nature of our 
mind, to consider as distinct, attributes which are in reality iden- 
tical with the divine essence. (2) We have reached chiefly a 
negative knowledge, the knowledge of what God is not, and we admit 
that our positive knowledge of His nature is very imperfect. (3) 
We have tried with our finite ideas to reach the infinite, but evi- 
dently these ideas remain infinitely distant from their object. 

{h) This knowledge, however, is not without value. Although 
it is only analogical, it manifests something of the divine real- 
ity. We have a positive starting-point, the perfections of the world, 
and we know that the first cause must be adequate to accoimt 
for all these. This gives us a positive, though inadequate knowl- 
edge. No matter how great we conceive God's perfections to be, 
we must always remember that our conception remains infinitely 
beneath the reality of the divine perfection. Yet there is in God 
"something like" these perfections. As St. Gregory says: "Bal- 
butiendo, ut possumus, excelsa Dei resonamus." Here below we 
have to be satisfied with a knowledge which St. Paul calls "through 
a glass," and "in a dark manner," but we live in the hope of one 
day seeing God "face to face," and "as He is." 



CHAPTER II 

GOD AND THE WORLD 

We rise to God from the visible world. There now remain 
to be examined two questions: (i) What are the relations of God 
to the world? and (2) What are and must be the relations of the 
world to God? 

I. GOD IN RELATION TO THE WORLD 

Two points of view may be considered, being and becoming, i.e. 
the being of God compared to the being and to the becoming of 
the world. Hence two questions: (i) Those referring to the 
"esse," especially the distinction of God from the world. (2) 
Those referring to the "fieri," i.e. the origin and government of the 
world. As the distinction of God from the world has already been 
established, there remain only the questions of Creation and 
Providence. 

I. Creation. — (a) The distinction of God from the world leads 
to the conclusion that the world was created by God. Pantheism 
makes of the world a manifestation of God, i.e. God produces 
— if we can use the word "produce" — the world out of His own 
substance. We have said already that this substantial identity 
is impossible. 

(b) Philosophical dualism, admitting eternal and increated 
matter, coexisting with God, who thus becomes simply an intelli- 
gent designer and architect using preexisting materials, is also 
impossible, and finds no advocates to-day. The essential char- 
acteristics of matter, its contingency and dependence, show that 
it cannot be self-existent. In the dualistic hypothesis, God would 
no longer be unconditioned, since His activity would depend on 
preexisting matter. 

534 



GOD IN RELATION TO WORLD 535 

(c) Hence there remains only creation, which means the produc- 
tion of a thing out of nothing, i.e. the production of a thing which is 
not simply a modification of some preexisting reality, but which 
begins to exist as a reality. The workman or artist requires apt 
matter on which to exercise his activity. Everything that is 
produced now in the world, either by nature or by art, is produced 
out of preexisting materials endowed with certain potentialities. 
From nothing, nothing comes. When it is said that creation is a 
production out of nothing, it is not meant that "nothing" is the 
material out of which something is made, but simply that in His 
creative act God is independent of any preexisting matter and 
potentiality. 

We cannot, it is true, comprehend the act of creation, but we 
find an analogy in works of art, in which the artist realizes his 
mental ideal. The greater the art and skill, the more perfect also 
is the result obtainable from the same matter, and hence the less 
the dependence on matter. We are thus led to conceive of a 
supreme cause, and an infinite art of God, who is altogether 
independent of matter. 

2. Providence. — After creation, God does not abandon His 
works, but "provides" for His creatures the necessary conditions 
for being and acting, and governs them. This divine government 
is chiefly what is meant by Providence. It has been rejected by 
Deists, who deny that, after creating, God has anything to do with 
the world. 

(a) Even when existing, the creature is contingent and dependent. 
The first moment of its existence does not necessarily imply the 
second and those that follow. Hence every being in the world 
is at all times dependent for its very existence on the first self- 
existent being. Not for its existence alone, but also for the exer- 
cise of its activity, the creature depends on God. The motor 
secundus depends on the motor primus immobilis; and the contin- 
gent activity, on the first cause. 

{b) Divine providence or God's government of the world is 
but a consequence of what was said above. In the cosmos, every- 
thing has its place in harmony with the rest, its own end in har- 
mony with the general end of the world. This place and end are 



536 THEODICY 

assigned to it by the wisdom of the Creator, who thus reaHzes the 
plan of creation. The infinite mind does not act without a plan and 
purpose, and the infinite power is adequate to realize this plan 
in all its details. So every being individually is subject to God, 
who assigns to it its place and role. 

But, if we speak of the actual direction or government of the 
world, it must be said that God's action is rather general and 
mediate with regard to individuals. God governs beings by one 
another, subjects by superiors, physical beings by general laws 
which contribute to produce and preserve order and harmony 
in the world. The order of the world results immediately from 
the efl&ciency and intrinsic finality of secondary causes. (Cf. 
pp. 454 ff.) 

3. Evil. — The existence of evil in the world is urged as an 
objection against creation, for, how can God, infinite in goodness 
and power, produce or allow evil? and against providence, for, 
how can a wise ruler tolerate evil which it is in his power to 
eliminate? (Cf. above, teleological argument for the existence 
of God.) 

(a) The existence of evil cannot be denied, at least from our nar- 
row point of view. There are destructions of inorganic and organic 
substances by others. There is suffering in conscious beings. 
There are uneasiness, affliction, and unsatisfied desires in the 
human heart. There are disorder, perversity, and sin in the human 
will. In general, it may be noted that evil manifests the good, 
that disorder is a derogation from order, and hence that evil supposes 
good, order, and harmony. 

(b) Moreover, evil is se^n frequently to serve a good purpose, 
namely, a general higher order. For instance, if the reproductive 
functions in plants and animals always obtained their results, 
if the majority of seeds were not wasted, the means of subsistence 
and co-existence of all living organisms would not be found. Yet 
this co-existence is itself a perfection and a harmony. Again, the 
animal, simply by walking, may destroy a number of plants and 
insects, but walking is life, activity, and perfection. Where 
there is manifold activity, there is antagonism, and can we 
say that a lifeless, inactive, crystallized world would be better 



GOD IN RELATION TO WORLD 537 

than a living and active world? Evil is thus subordinated to a 
higher good. 

ic) Evil is an inevitable result of imperfection, and a creature is 
necessarily imperfect. The finite is essentially imperfect, and the 
present order freely chosen by God, good and harmonious though 
it may be, could not be realized without iinperfection and evil. 
For instance, the death of some is the sine qua non of the existence 
of others. 

{d) More specifically, suffering is the inevitable lot of sensi- 
tive beings whenever antagonistic activities are exercised on them. 
Frequently suffering is caused by man's disorderly conduct, and 
by the wrong exercise of his faculties. Finally, suffering has its 
advantages; it is a warning against impending or existing disease; 
it atones for sin, fortifies, purifies, and elevates the soul to higher 
purposes, to a higher destiny, to God himself, since this life is only 
a preparation for a future life. 

(g) Moral evil is the consequence of freedom, which is a perfec- 
tion. It is not God's, but man's, doing. Without freedom, man is 
incapable of sin, but also of merit and virtue. Freedom is a good 
which it is in man's power to use or misuse, but self -direction is 
superior to determinism. 

(/) Could not God have created a world in which there would 
be less evil, less suffering, and less sin? We do not know. Let 
us admit the mystery, and confess our ignorance of the divine 
plan. God reigns supreme. The world, man, society, depend 
on Him, and we have no right to investigate His secret ways. The 
world is good without being the best possible. It has evils without 
being the worst possible. God chose the present order; let us try, 
as far as lies in our power, to preserve it. We know little of the 
whole universe, and our knowledge of the divine plan, like that of 
God himself, is only fragmentary. An ignorant man might find fault 
with the most ingenious mechanism, and criticise some details from 
his limited point of view. This would be due to his ignorance of 
the complete plan and harmony. He would be an object of ridicule 
for those who know better. And yet he would have more reason 
for finding fault with human works than any man has to find fault 
with the works of God. 



538 THEODICY 

II. THE WORLD IN ITS RELATIONS TO GOD 

We shall briefly examine here the general relations of the uni- 
verse, and more especially those of man, to God. 

■ I. The Universe 

The various relations of dependence and subordination have 
been indicated already. The world holds its existence from God 
as its ultimate principle, and its preserver. It obeys the laws 
given to it by the Creator. Only one more question may be 
touched upon rapidly: The various beings of the world have ten- 
dencies, and work toward ends. What is the ultimate end of the 
universe as a whole? It may be summed up in these words: "The 
Lord hath made all things for Himself" (Prov. xvi. 4), and "The 
heavens shew forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth 
the works of His hands" (Ps. xviii. i). The only end which is 
worthy of God is God Himself. The world, it is true, adds 
nothing to God's perfection, excellence, and intrinsic glory. Yet 
it is an external manifestation of the divine attributes in which 
creatures participate. 

But the tribute which creatures give to God, except that which 
is given through man, is, as it were, dumb in itself. Man is the 
spokesman of creation. His intelligence leads him from the con- 
sideration of the world to the knowledge of the Creator. And as 
he is endowed with reason and will, he can and must effectively 
recognize the glory of God and his own dependence and subjec- 
tion. Hence we must speak now of his main duties toward God. 

II. Man 

I. General Duties Toward God. — However imperfect our 
knowledge of God may be, it sufl5ces to show that we have cer- 
tain duties toward Him. These duties constitute what is called 
religion. God is known as creator, providence, ruler, goodness, 
wisdom, sanctity, etc., and this is enough to create in man cer- 
tain corresponding obligations. It is true that God needs nothing 
and is ever self-sufiicient. But we need God, and must obey the 
dictates of reason. The natural order of things requires that 



WORLD IN RELATION TO GOD 539 

we should know our place in the world, and fulfil our duties toward 
God. 

As He is the supreme being, infinitely perfect, we must recog- 
nize our dependence. We must adore Him and revere His 
name, love Him as the infinite good, respect Him as the infinitely 
great, be thankful for what we have and are, since all comes 
from Him, respect and obey conscience which is the divine voice 
within ourselves, try to know God, the infinite truth, place Him 
above all creatures in our thought, will, and love. Above, infi- 
nitely above all creatures is His real place, and it is the place 
which must always be assigned to Him in our minds and hearts. 

2. Prayer. — By prayer the soul rises to God to adore and 
thank Him, to ask His help and assistance and to beg forgiveness 
of offences. 

(a) However natural it may seem for man to have recourse to 
the infinite goodness and power of God, this aspect of prayer has 
been objected to on the ground that (i) God knows all our needs, 
(2) He is infinitely good, and must give the needed assistance 
without being asked, (3) He is immutable, and prayer cannot 
change His eternal decrees. 

To this we answer: (i) We do not pray to God simply to make 
our needs known to Him, but to acknowledge our insufiiciency 
and God's supreme power. This recognition of our dependence 
is an expression of the truth, and therefore agreeable to God. 

(2) God is infinitely good, but He requires our activity, intelli- 
gence, will, and freedom, which are means and conditions of merit. 
God does not work alone; He requires our humble cooperation. 

(3) God's decrees are eternal and immutable, but formed in pre- 
vision of the free actions of men, among which are his prayers. 

(b) Prayer, then, in its general sense, is the natural and uni- 
versal manifestation of man's feelings, the communion of man's 
will with God's will, by which man submits to the decrees of the 
infinite wisdom; acknowledges this wisdom even when it seems to 
hide itself; accepts suffering and affliction in the hope of future 
happiness; asks God to help him to wipe away sin and destroy its 
evil consequences. 

3. External Worship. — (a) The internal worship of our intel- 



540 THEODICY 

ligence, feelings, and will naturally manifests itself by external 
actions, attitudes, gestures, vocal prayers. It is a law of psychol- 
ogy that mental attitudes tend to express themselves through the 
organism. Moreover, these bodily actions tend to foster and 
develop corresponding mental attitudes. Finally, not only the 
mind, but the whole man, body and soul, must acknowledge God's 
supremacy and excellence. 

(b) It may be added that man, being essentially social, must 
worship God, not only privately, but as a member of society. 
Individual religion is strengthened by association with others, 
PubHc worship unites men, places them above earthly things 
by making them recognize more fully their commimity of origin 
and destiny, and profess the supreme authority of God not merely 
over individuals, but also over societies. 



CONCLUSION 

We need not repeat how little we know about God. Before the 
Infinite, the proper attitude of the human mind is that of awe, 
as it feels incapable of formulating the little knowledge it pos- 
sesses; and that of astonishment at God's greatness and its own 
littleness. This ought to make us readier to accept the mani- 
festations of God, not merely through the mirror of His creatures, 
but through His own revelation. Faith helps human reason, 
and manifests in what way God wants to be served. We have 
spoken only of natural religion ; positive revealed religion completes 
it. As the infinite truth, God must be believed; as the infinite 
ruler, He must be obeyed. 

The little knowledge which we have of God shows enough to 
make us understand that the greatness of God is above all that 
we can think. It is much even to acknowledge that God is 
incomprehensible and ineffable. Chiefly negative, this knowledge 
contains, nevertheless, positive data concerning God's nature, 
and it would be unreasonable to look upon it as valueless because 
it is not complete. 

God is the necessary solution of the enigmas of the world, the 
supreme principle of truth and goodness, the necessary basis of 
morality, the fulfilment of the aspirations of the human heart. 



541 



OUTLINES OF HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY 



INTRODUCTION 



1. Importance. — The history of philosophy is the natural 
complement of a course in philosophy, because it shows the prog- 
ress of human thought in regard to both the statement and the 
solution of philosophical problems, and it reveals the various 
influences at work in the development of philosophy. Philosophy 
is not crystallized, but living. It grows, and modifies its points 
of view. Hence it is important to see the causes of this growth 
and development, and the various relations of philosophical sys- 
tems to one another. Moreover, this study, while revealing 
the many struggles of thinkers, will enable the student to under- 
stand better the different systems of philosophy, to see the part 
of truth which they include, and to judge where error begins, 
and what causes led to it. We shall find frequent instances of 
the axiom that extremes meet, that thought passes easily from one 
extreme to another, and that here, as in physical science and in 
political history, action brings about an equal reaction, till later 
the equilibrium is reestablished. 

2. Method. — (a) Only a short outline of the history of phi- 
losophy will be given. The principal names alone will be men- 
tioned, and the main systems examined. While learning this 
general summary, the student will do well to complete it by col- 
lateral reading from the best historians of philosophy. This is only 
a sketch, a skeleton. The various parts must be connected, so as 
to give life and fulness to this outline. Our purpose is merely 
to enable the student to place historically the various names and 
systems mentioned in this course. 

543 



INTRODUCTION 543 

(b) The method followed will be both logical and chronolog- 
ical. Logical, tracing out the relationship and filiation of the vari- 
ous systems. Chronological, following generally the successive 
appearance of schools and philosophers. 

(c) We shall divide the history of philosophy into three chap- 
ters: (i) Ancient philosophy. (2) Mediaeval philosophy. (3) 
Modern philosophy. 



CHAPTER I 

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 

I. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 

Oriental philosophy is originally and essentially religious, i.e. 
connected with religious beliefs and practices. Speculation, 
especially in India and China, developed from mythological leg- 
ends and religious tenets. 

1. Egypt. — The Egyptians had two sets of doctrines: one 
esoteric, hidden from the people and known only to the priests 
— what this mysterious wisdom consisted in is not known; the 
other exoteric, common and public. According to this, there was 
a multitude of gods; yet in this polytheism many indications of 
an essential monotheism are found. One of the gods, different 
according to different centres, was held to be superior to, or 
even the principle of, the others. The world is their work, and 
various gods produced various classes of beings. Besides his 
body and soul, man also includes some kind of genius 
which after death dwells in the statue or mummy of the dead, 
and receives the offerings of the living. After death, the human 
soul is judged according to its good and evil deeds, and either 
receives its reward, after due purification, or is sent back to the 
earth into other organisms, human or animal, or even into inani- 
mate objects, to again go through a series of migrations. This 
doctrine of metempsychosis is connected with the animistic be- 
Uefs of the Egyptians which made them attribute souls to the vari- 
ous objects of nature, and also with their fetichism and animal- 
worship. The moral precepts of the Egyptians seem to have been 
of a high character, and recommended the practice of virtue, 
both internal and external. 

2. Babylonia and Assyria. — In Mesopotamia, as in Egypt, 
under polytheistic forms of worship may be found a form of mono- 

544 



ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 545 

theism. Among the Babylonians, Anu exercises dominion over 
the other gods, and when Assyria had conquered Babylonia (about 
1300 B.C.) Ashur was looked upon as the king and father of the 
other divinities. The divinities participate in different ways 
in the creation and government of the world. As early as 
twenty-two or twenty-three centuries B.C. the Babylonians had 
a code of high morality, the code of Hammurabi. 

3. Persia. — The sacred books of the Persians, still preserved 
and used by the Parsees of Western India, form the Zend Avesta 
{Avesta = sacred text; Zend = commentary). They were not 
all composed at the same time, and their date is uncertain. A 
part of them must be ascribed to Zoroaster or Zarathustra, the 
great priest and reformer, who lived in the seventh and sixth cen- 
turies B.C. A number of good and evil spirits were admitted, which 
constantly struggle to prevail, the result being the many antin- 
omies and oppositions of elements in the inorganic and the organic 
world. Zoroastrianism reduces this multitude to a stricter dual- 
ism. The chief deity is the principle of good, Ahura Mazda 
(Ormuzd or Ormazd; hence Mazdeism), who is the god of light, 
goodness, and holiness. The principle of evil is Anra Mainyu 
(Ahriman), who is the spirit of darkness. From both proceed a 
number of spirits, among which the evil ones produce moral and 
physical disorder and suffering. The conflict will come to an end 
after twelve thousand years, when the good will triumph, the world 
will be purified, and a new era will begin. The human soul is 
judged after death, and rewarded or punished for longer or shorter 
periods of time according to its deeds. 

4. India. — (a) Among the sacred books of the Hindus the most 
important are the Vedas (Rig-Veda, Sama-Veda, Yagur-Veda, 
and Atharva-Veda). They include Hymns (Mantras), ritualistic 
treatises (Brahmanas), and philosophical commentaries (Upan- 
ishads). The commentaries were not composed at the same time, 
but the oldest parts of the Vedas seem to date from fifteen or 
twenty centuries B.C., although they were not written till much 
later, being first transmitted by oral tradition. The philosophy 
contained in the Vedas is based on a cosmic pantheism, (i) 
Brahma or Atman is the absolute and infinite being who gave 

36 



546 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

rise to all other beings by an emanation from his own substance. 
He is the only reality, so that everything conceived outside of 
Brahma can only be an illusion. (2) The soul is immortal, and, 
after death, migrates from one organism into another. Any 
human deed (or karma) has an eternal value, and its consequences 
endure forever. Every man is thus the maker of his own condi- 
tion which corresponds to his deeds. (3) Ultimately the soul and 
every other being are reabsorbed in Brahma, and again merged 
into his universal being. Mortification and asceticism are neces- 
sary as a preparation for this reabsorption. (4) Men are divided 
into four classes or castes: priests (who came from the head of 
Brahma); soldiers (from his chest); merchants (from his abdo- 
men); slaves (from his feet). The rights and duties of every one 
of these differ according to their relative dignity. 

(b) From these doctrines arose several schools of rational and 
speculative philosophy, which are based on the Vedas and try to 
interpret them. The Sutras are maxims or aphorisms which 
sum up these philosophical doctrines. There are found six main 
schools of philosophy, which, however, go two by two, i and 2, 
3 and 4, 5 and 6, thus forming three distinct groups, and both 
schools of each group having essential points in common, (i) The 
Purva-Mimamsa (= prior investigation), attributed to Jaimini 
(place and date uncertain), is chiefly a system of apologetics refer- 
ring to the authority of the Vedas and to casuistic ethics. (2) 
The Uttara-Mimamsa (= posterior investigation) or Vedanta 
(= Veda-end), composed or compiled by Badarayana, with com- 
mentaries by Qankara (eighth and ninth centuries of our era), is 
even to-day the most important system, and adheres closely to 
the Upanishads. It admits the identity of all things, and espe- 
cially of the soul, with Brahma; the illusory nature of our knowl- 
edge of the phenomenal world; the transmigration of souls, and 
the final absorption in Brahma. (3) The Sankhya, whose Sutras 
bear the name of Kapila (place and date unknown), in its present 
form, dates from the fourteenth century of our era. It recognizes 
the essential dualism of spirit and matter. The world is real and 
pluralistic, and knowledge (sense-perception, induction, authority) 
is valid. This philosophy tends to, and perhaps professes, atheism. 



ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 547 

(4) The Yoga of Patanjali (probably second century B.C.) is 
rather theistic. (5) The Vaiceshika, attributed to Kanada (of 
whom nothing is known), is essentially a philosophy of nature, 
recognizing six padarthas (= world- things), or categories: sub- 
stance, quality, action, genus or community, species or partic- 
ularity, and coherence or inseparability. Substances are com- 
posed of eternal, indivisible, and unalterable atoms. (6) The 
Nyaya (= going back, hence syllogism), attributed to Gotama, is 
essentially a system of logic, destined to lead man to happiness by 
the possession of knowledge. 

(c) Buddhism was founded in the sixth century B.C. by Gotama, 
a member of the Sakya clan, whence his name Sakya muni (muni 
= solitary). Buddhism became popular largely owing to its 
abolition of castes, but was finally driven out of India about the 
fourteenth century. It flourishes chiefly in China, Thibet, Mon- 
goUa, etc. Although it denies the divine authority of the Vedas, 
it borrowed largely from the atheistic Sankya of Kapila, and from 
other common brahmanistic doctrines. Its main distinctive 
philosophical tenets are the following: (i) A pessimistic view of 
life. Suffering comes from the illusion of personal and separate 
existence which inclines man to satisfy his personal desires. (2) 
Hence the natural craving for individuality must be eradicated 
by ascetic practices. (3) The supreme end to which man must 
tend is Nirvana, which, if it is not complete annihilation, is at 
least the loss of personality and individual consciousness. 

(d) We simply mention the Jains, who still form a com- 
munity in India, and whose doctrines have many points of 
contact with Buddhism and with the Sankya and Vaiceshika 
philosophies. 

5. China. — In the earliest traditional religion of the Chinese, 
the supreme source of all things is the animated sky (Tien), person- 
ified under the name of Shang Ti, or supreme ruler. Many spirits 
were also worshipped, especially those of ancestors. The two 
great philosophers of China, Lao-tsze and Kong-fu-tse, or Kong- 
tse (Confucius), were almost contemporary. 

(a) Lao-tsze (born about 604 B.C.) insists on the doctrine of 
Tao (= way, hence course of nature). The Tao is the one sub- 



548 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

stance, neither conscious nor unconscious, neither personal nor 
impersonal, but transcending both modes of existence. He is 
the source of all things, and also the moral type or ideal. To-day 
Taoism is a popular form of religion in China, implying many 
superstitious practices. 

(b) Confucius (551-478) was a religious and political reformer. 
He revised the sacred books of kings and composed some himself. 
He insisted on the old Chinese traditions and developed an essen- 
tially conservative system of ethics referring to the relations of 
man with his fellowmen. His doctrine is still prevalent among 
the higher classes of China. 

(c) Among other Chinese philosophers must be mentioned 
Yang-chu (fifth century B.C.) who advocates the ethics of pleas- 
ure; Mih-tsze (fifth century B.C.), who recommends a imiversal 
love of men; Meng-tsze (Mencius, 372-289), who contributed much 
to the influence of Confucianism. 



II. GREEK PHILOSOPHY 

We shall leave out the first rudiments of philosophy found in 
the poems of Homer and Hesiod, and begin with the appearance 
of philosophy proper. Greek philosophy may be divided into three 
periods, (i) Pre-Socratic, devoted exclusively to the study of 
the external world. (2) Socratic, adding subjective studies, i.e. 
psychological and ethical. (3) Post-Aristotelian, neglecting al- 
most entirely the philosophy of nature and giving predominance 
to ethical problems. 

N.B. The Romans did not develop any original philosophy, 
but borrowed from the Greeks. The few names to be mentioned 
will come under the respective schools to which they belong. 

I. Pre-Socratic Schools 

The early speculations of Greece were cosmological. 

I. Early Ionian Philosophy. — The earlier lonians (Ionia, a 
Greek colony of Asia Minor) endeavor to give an answer to the 
question: What is the ultimate substance of things? They agree 
that matter is endowed with some kind of life (hylozoism), and 



GREEK PHILOSOPHY 549 

attempt to determine the nature of this first or primordial matter. 
Tholes of Miletus (born about 640 B.C.) claims that it is water. 
Anaximander of Miletus (born about 610 B.C.) admits an eternal 
and infinite matter from which all things were produced by 
processes of condensation and rarefaction. For Anaximenes 
(born about $88 B.C.), the primordial principle of all things is 
air, which is an infinite substance from which all things come 
and to which all return. 

2. Pythagoreans. — Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.) was born 
at Samos, and founded, at Crotona in the Greek colony of Italy, a 
school in which he taught his religious and scientific doctrines. 
The basis of all things is number, and the whole world is a har- 
mony of odd and even numbers, which are all derived from the 
unit. The one, unit, or monad, is God, from whom emanates 
the dyad, i.e. matter and spirit. Pythagoreans admitted the trans- 
migration of souls, and their doctrine included an elaborate code 
of morality. Little is known with certainty about the meaning 
of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, as we have but scant, 
fragmentary, and second-hand references. 

3. The Eleatic School. — The Eleatic school takes its name from 
Elea, a city of southern Italy (then a Greek colony). Eleatics 
tend to identify the world with God and hence to attribute to the 
world unity, eternity, and unchangeableness. Xenophanes (bom 
about 570 at Colophon in Asia Minor) admits only one God, 
whom he identifies with the world. Hence the substance of the 
world is immutable, and the changes affect only its surface. Par- 
menides (born about 540 at Elea) denies the fact of change; the 
testimony of the senses on this point is illusory. Real being is 
one and absolutely immutable and unproduced; hence becoming 
and change are impossibilities. Zeno (born about 490 at Elea) 
was the disciple of Parmenides, and by his dialectics defended his 
master's position. 

4. Later Philosophers of Nature. — (o) Heraclitus (bom about 
500 at Ephesus) opposes Parmenides. Far from being absolutely 
unchangeable, the world is on the contrary always changing and 
perpetually flowing. Nothing is, everything is becoming. The 
primordial element is fire, out of which all things were made. 



5SO HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

This is the turning-point in Greek speculation, shifting the prob- 
lem of nature from the question: What are things? to the question: 
How did things come to be what they are? 

(b) Empedoeles (born about 495 at Agrigentum, Sicily) admits 
four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. Two antagonistic 
forces, love and hatred, tend to combine and dissociate these 
elements; hence the becoming. 

(c) Anaxagoras (born about 500 at Clazomenae in Ionia) admits 
an infinite number of elements which at first formed a chaos. 
But the Spirit or Mind, endowed with knowledge and power, 
gives them their orderly and harmonious motions. 

(d) Leucippus, and Democritus of Abdera (about 460-370), pro- 
fess a mechanistic atomism. Atoms are homogeneous in nature, 
dissimilar in size and shape, infinite in niunber, and indivisible. 
They move in an infinite vacuum, and, by their motions, every- 
thing, even thought, must be explained. 

5. Sophists. — (a) The name "sophist," which etymologically 
signifies a wise man, was at first honorable, but later, owing to 
the abuse of dialectics leading to scepticism, it acquired a disrep- 
utable meaning. The sophists dwelt little on metaphysics and 
science, but chiefly on grammar, rhetoric, and logic. They came 
to dispute in order to prove any proposition, lost sight of objective 
truth, and were led to scepticism. On the contradictions found 
among early philosophers they based their arguments to show 
that nothing can be known with certitude, and that the only useful 
science is that which enables us to convince others. This method 
already included a beginning of reflection on the value of knowl- 
edge. It accustomed the people to philosophical discussions, 
and thus formed a transition to the following period. 

(b) The most important sophists are Protagoras of Abdera 
(bom about 480) and Gorgias (about 480-375). According to 
the former, human knowledge ^deals only with appearances and is 
essentially relative, since what is true for one man is false for an- 
other. According to the latter, nothing exists really; if anything 
existed, we could not know it; and, supposing that we knew it, this 
knowledge could not be communicated to other men, since the word 
or sign, which is different from the idea, is the only thing that can 



GREEK PHILOSOPHY ,1 

be perceived by others, and they interpret it according to .eir 
own minds. 

II. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle 

These three names represent the most perfect epoch Greek 
philosophy. 

1. Socrates. — (a) Socrates of Athens (469^399) opposed the 
Sophists and showed the method of true kiiowledge. Ee left no 
writings, and we know his method and doctriix,e especial'y through 
his disciples, Plato and Yerophon. His method is essentially 
inductive, starting from concrete data, and from 'vsm leading 
to a general idea or definition. He frequently consulted men of 
all ages and conditions, and in his discussions with them employed 
a twofold process: one destructive (irony), consisting in showing 
that a definition given by an adversary led to absurd and ridicu- 
lous consequences; the other positive or constructive (maieutic), 
consisting in finding the true definition by an analysis and com- 
parison of common concrete ideas. His doctrine is no longer con- 
cerned with nature, but primarily with man, and is chiefly ethical. 
Man is created for happiness, and he must first ascertain where 
true happiness is to be found, for, as no man does wrong know- 
ingly, to know the right is to be virtuous. Virtue is knowledge. 

(b) Socrates exercised great influence, both by his example and 
his teaching. Among the philosophers who were influenced by 
him must be mentioned Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope, and the 
other Cynics, who claimed that man must live according to nature, 
practice virtue, and neglect conventional culture and customs; 
Aristippus of Cyrene and the other Cyrenaics,v^}io advocate hedon- 
ism, i.e. the theory that pleasure is the sole basis of morality; 
Euclid of Megara and the other Megarian philosophers, who used, 
developed, and frequently abused the Socratic method. In meta- 
physics they continue the tradition of the Eleatic school. 

2. Plato. — (a) Plato (427-347) is the most illustrious dis- 
ciple of Socrates. After his master's death, he travelled through 
Egypt, Sicily, Italy, etc., and went back to Athens, where he 
taught philosophy in the gymnasium of Academus. Hence the 
name of "Academy" given to his school. He wrote a great num- 



552 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

ber of works, in the form of dialogues. His doctrine may be clas- 
sified under the three headings of dialectics, physics, and ethics. 

(b) Dialectics, (i) True science deals not with the world of 
the senses, which is concrete, changing, and unstable, but with the 
universal, common, and unchangeable essences, independent of 
their concrete reaUzation in space and time. (2) These essences 
or ideas are the real prototypes which concrete beings participate. 
There are, for in2^.^;ice, individual beautiful beings, persons, 
statues, landscapes, etc:; therefore there must exist from all eter- 
nity a beauty-in-itself which the^c objects participate. Again, a 
triangle may disappear, but the nature ,Xnd properties of the tri- 
angle are eternal and unchangeable. To every one of our ideas 
corresponds a real prototype. (3) The world of suprasensible 
ideas exists really, since sensible objects are real, and the sensible 
world is but a reflection of the intelligible world. There could 
be no good, virtuous, just, beautiful, etc., objects or actions, if 
there did not exist really goodness-itself, virtue-itself, justice- 
itself, beauty-itself. Thus universal ideas as such are objective; 
they are principles not only of knowledge, but also of exist- 
ence. (4) How does the mind pass from sense-knowledge to 
intellectual knowledge? Since the ideas are not realized in the 
sensible world, the mind cannot find them there. Plato explains 
true knowledge by the theory of reminiscence. Before being 
imprisoned in the body, the soul has preexisted in the suprasensible 
world of ideas, from which it was expelled in consequence of some 
sin. Sense-perception is the means by which the soul is led to 
recall some of the ideas acquired before its union with the body. 
(Cf. p. 100.) (5) The highest idea is God, the supreme good and 
source of all perfection. 

(c) Physics (including the science of the human soul), (i) The 
three principles of the world are God, the soul of the world which 
participates the divine nature, and matter which is eternal, and is 
the principle of Umitation and multiplicity. Matter is also de- 
scribed as the immense receptacle of sensible phenomena. (2) 
The soul is immortal, and its union with the body is against its 
nature. (3) In addition to the intelligent soul, Plato seems to 
have admitted two other souls, the sensitive and the vegetative. 



GREEK PHILOSOPHY 553 

(d) Ethics, (i) The supreme good is the contemplation of 
pure ideas, the true, the good, and the beautiful. (2) Virtue is 
identified with knowledge. (3) The individual exists for the state, 
and the state has absolute rights over the citizen. 

(e) Plato and his immediate disciples form the school known as 
the Old Academy. The Middle Academy shows a tendency to 
scepticism. It is represented especially by Arcesilaus (about 
316-241), who claims that true knowledge or certitude is impos- 
sible. In the Third Academy, Carneades (about 210-129) asserts 
that certitude is impossible, and that man must be satisfied with 
probability. The New Academy (second and first centuries b.c.) 
with Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon returned to Plato's 
dogmatism, which they combined with Aristotelian and Stoic 
doctrines. 

3. Aristotle. — {a) Aristotle (384-322) was born at Stagyra 
in Chalcidice, a Greek colony in Macedonia (hence the name of 
Stagyrite frequently given him), and for twenty years studied 
under Plato. In 342, Philip of Macedon called him to his court 
and intrusted him with the education of his son Alexander (the 
Great). In 335, Aristotle returned to Athens and, in the Lyceum, 
opened a school of philosophy known as the Peripatetic School 
(TreptTraretv, to walk about) from the master's habit of walking with 
his disciples while teaching. Aristotle wrote a large number of 
works, logical, metaphysical, physical, and ethical. He agrees 
with Plato in defining the scope of science, which is to deal with 
the universal, the eternal, and the unchangeable, but differs from 
him in claiming that these characters can be found by the mind 
in the sensible world. Hence his philosophy is more inductive 
and more scientific. 

{b) Logic. Aristotle is the founder of scientific logic, and, 
apart from the development which is given to induction owing to 
the growth of empirical science, our logic to-day is essentially 
that of Aristotle, (i) Scientific demonstration based on the 
syllogism tends to find the universal causes and principles of things. 
(2) It assumes some indemonstrable principles, which are not 
innate, but acquired from the consideration of the world, and 
applies them to concrete facts. (Cf. p. 383.) (3) Categories 



554 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

are the general concepts under which we classify our knowledge. 
There are ten categories (cf. p. 211), namely, substance, and 
nine accidents. The categories are not simply classes of concepts, 
but also classes of things. 

(c) Metaphysics, (i) In every reality of the world there is 
being and becoming, something stable and something changing. 
(2) Change is the passage from one state to another. It implies 
the distinction of "act" (evTeXe'xeta) or actual possession of a deter- 
mination, and "potency" (8wa/u,ts) or capacity for acquiring such 
a determination. (3) The universal and necessary as such has 
no existence apart from individual and contingent realities in which 
it is found, not "actually," but "potentially." Actually it exists 
only in the mind which elaborates sense-perception. (4) There 
are four causes, material, formal, eflScient, and final. The first 
two are intrinsic and constitute the being itself; the latter two, 
extrinsic, the productive cause calling forth a being from potency 
to act, and the end being the motive for which the agent exercises 
its activity. (5) Act precedes potency, for, although in an indi- 
vidual being the capacity for acquiring a determination precedes 
the acquisition of it, yet the passage from potency to act always 
requires a preexisting act. (6) Hence Aristotle is led to admit 
the existence of the "Actus purus." (Cf. pp. 516 ff.) 

{d) Physics (including the philosophy of mind), (i) All mate- 
rial substances are composed of two principles, primary matter 
and substantial form. (Cf. pp. 428 ff.) (2) The soul is the substan- 
tial form of the human body. (Cf . pp. 483 fl.) (3) It is endowed 
with five faculties, nutritive, sensitive, intellectual, appetitive, 
and locomotive. (4) Intellectual knowledge reaches the object 
apart from its individual features in space and time. (5) The 
intellect is immortal. 

ie) Ethics, (i) The supreme good of man is happiness. It 
consists essentially in the harmonious development of all his 
faculties, especially of the highest, i.e. the intellectual. (2) Vir- 
tue is a habit consisting in avoiding excess and defect. (3) The 
highest virtues are intellectual virtues. 

(/) Among the most important peripatetic philosophers must 
be mentioned Theophraslus of Lesbos, contemporary of Aristotle, 



GREEK PHILOSOPHY 555 

and later Apollonius of Rhodes (first century B.C.) who edited 
Aristotle's works. 

III. Post-Aristotelian Philosophy 

1. Stoics. — The main Stoic philosophers (from o-roa, porch, 
the place where Zeno taught) are Zeno of Citium in the island of 
Cyprus (born about 340), the founder of the school; Cleanthes 
(born about 300), his immediate successor, and Chrysippus (bom 
about 280), who, by his dialectics, contributed to the defense and 
spread of the school. Later, the Stoic doctrines were propagated 
among the Romans, especially by Seneca (3-65), Epictetus (died 
about 117), and Marcus Aurelius (121-180). 

According to the Stoics, (i) The only principle of knowledge is 
sensation. (2) Matter alone is real, and what we call spirit — 
God and the soul -7- is but a form of more subtle matter. (3) God 
is the soul of the world, and must be conceived as a primordial 
fire, principle of all activity and intelligence. The human soul 
is but a transitory emanation from the divine spirit, or a spark 
of the divine fire. (4) The whole world, including man, acts 
according to an absolute determinism. (5) Virtue for man consists 
in living according not only to his rational nature, but also to all 
cosmic laws. This is man's end and true happiness, the only good 
and its own reward. The wise man must be absolutely apathetic, 
i.e. indifferent to all motives of action which do not spring from 
pure reason. All passions and emotions, therefore, must be sub- 
dued and annihilated. Bear patiently and without feeling what 
cannot be avoided. Abstain from everything distinct from pure 
reason: Ahstine et sustine, sums up this ethical doctrine. (Cf. 
p. 320.) 

2. Epicureans. — Epicurus (342 or 341-270) opened a school of 
philosophy at Athens. His disciples added nothing important 
to the master's doctrines, which were soon propagated in the Greek 
and Roman world, their main representative at Rome being 
Lucretius (95-51). The aim of philosophy is to procure happiness 
for man, and everything is subservient to this end. (i) As the 
world obeys necessary laws, man need not fear the gods. They 
exist, but have nothing to do with the world or with man. The 



556 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

deliverance from this fear will contribute to man's happiness. 
Epicurus admits the essential principles of the mechanical atom- 
ism taught by Democritus, (2) Knowledge is reduced to sen- 
sation, and sensation is the only test and criterion of certitude. 
(3) The soul is a subtle form of matter, originating and ceasing to 
exist with the body; hence death is not to be feared. The will, 
however, is free. (4) Personal happiness and pleasure is the 
supreme good. It does not consist so much in anything positive as 
in the absence of pain and the repose of the mind. Sensual pleas- 
ure must be tempered and guided by reason. Not only the pres- 
ent enjoyment, but also the future, must be considered. (Cf. 

P- 314-) 

3. Sceptics and Eclectics. — (a) The earlier sceptics of the third 
and second centuries agree with the Stoics and Epicureans that 
the chief purpose of philosophy is to show the way to happiness, 
and that happiness consists essentially in the peace and repose of 
the mind. Hence man must abstain from researches and studies, 
since they are not necessary to practical happiness, and disturb the 
riiind. The main sceptics of this period are Pyrrho of Elis (about 
360-270), who holds that the wise man abstains from passing judg- 
ment on anything; Arcesilaus and Carneades, already mentioned 
as leaders of the Academy. (Cf. pp. 373 If.) 

(b) The Eclectics, like the Sceptics, do not pretend to reach 
speculative certitude, but only to frame a working hypothesis on 
which a system of practical conduct may be based. The knowl- 
edge which they claim to have is sufficient for practical purposes; 
it is felt instinctively rather than based on demonstration, and 
is therefore more subjective than objective. Among the most 
important eclectics are Seneca, already mentioned as a Stoic; 
Fhilo of Larissa (of the Academy) ; Andronicus of Rhodes (of the 
Peripatetic school), and, to some extent, Cicero (106-43). 

(c) Eclecticism led again to scepticism, represented by JEnesi- 
demus (first century B.C.), who denies the value of both sensitive 
and intellectual knowledge, and asserts that all our mental 
representations are subjective, and by Sextus Empiricus, who 
gathered in his treatises all the objections of sceptics against 
certitude. 



GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 557 



III. GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 

The main centre of this period is Alexandria, where the western 
world had frequent intercourse with the eastern world. Although 
this movement occurred in the beginning of the Christian era, it 
belongs to ancient philosophy, as Christianity had no influence 
on it. In the present period, the most important doctrine is Neo- 
Platonism, but we must speak first of Neo-Pythagorism and of 
the Greco-Jewish philosophy that preceded Neo-Platonism. The 
feature common to these is a mystical tendency to an ecstatic 
union with the Divinity. 

I. Greco- Jewish and Neo-Pythagorean Philosophy. — (a) The 
Jews endeavored to harmonize the views contained in their sacred 
books with those of Greek philosophy. They had recourse to an 
allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures in order to find therein 
symbols and figures of the Greek philosophical doctrines. The 
main attempt was made by Philo, an Alexandrian Jew (30 b.c- 
50 A.D.), according to whom (i) God, the first cause, so tran- 
scends the world that, although we can know His existence, nothing 
can be known of His nature and attributes. He is, however, good 
and almighty. (2) The world was created by God, not immedi- 
ately, but through certain intermediary "powers," which may be 
identified with ideas, angels, demons, etc. They proceed from 
God, yet are distinct from Him. (3) The primordial divine 
"power" is the Logos, a kind of world-soul the nature of which is 
not explained clearly. (4) The human soul is a divine principle, 
or angel, united with a body which is a hindrance to its higher 
activities. (5) By withdrawing itself more and more from the 
influences of the organism, the soul may enter into immediate 
communication with God by a mystical ecstasy. 

(b) Neo- Pythagoreans also took their doctrines from the Greek 
schools of philosophy, and combined them with the Pythagorean 
symbolism and mystical aspirations. The main representatives 
of this movement are Plutarch of Chseronea (about 46-120), 
Maximus of Tyre, and the works collected under the name of 
Hermes Trismegistus (end of the third century). 



558 HISTORY or philosophy 

2. Neo-Platonism develops the doctrine of religious mysticism, 
or the union of man with the Infinite, based on a pantheistic 
monism, God being the source from whom all things proceed 
by emanation. With Plato's teachings as a basis, it combines 
doctrines from the main Greek schools. 

(a) Plotinus (205-270) holds that (i) All things emanate from 
the One, i.e. the supreme being, world-transcending, indetermined 
principle, without any attributes, without even intelligence and 
will. (2) The first reality which emanates from the One is the 
Mind (vovs), or pure intelligence; from this intelligence emanates 
the soul of the world; from the soul of the world, particular souls; 
and from these, matter. (3) The human soul is free and immortal, 
but goes through a series of transmigrations. (4) The soul finally 
returns to God by successively purifying and almost annihilating 
itself, and ascending to the contemplation of the Mind, and the 
ecstatic union with the One. Porphyry of Tyre (233-304) was 
Plotinus's immediate disciple, and spread his master's doctrine. 

(b) lamblicus of Syria (died about 330) also holds a theory of 
emanation with a polytheistic and demonistic doctrine. 

(c) At Constantinople the chief representative of Neo-Plato- 
nism is Themistius (latter half of fourth century). At Athens, 
Proclus (410-485) and Simplicius also teach the doctrine of a series 
of emanations from the One. 



CHAPTER II 
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 

Transition. Patristic Philosophy 

The Fathers of the Church are primarily apologists. They 
endeavor to explain Christian dogmas and to defend them against 
both heresy and paganism. Hence whatever philosophy is found 
in their writings is not presented systematically, but scattered 
here and there as circumstances require. Two periods may be 
distinguished. The first, ending with the council of Nice (325) 
includes the first three centuries, during which the main dogmas 
were established and defined. The second extends to the seventh 
century, during which time theology became more systematic, 
and consequently more attention was given to philosophy as an 
auxiliary. 

I. First Period. — (c) The question of the origin of evil gave 
rise to two heresies, Gnosticism in the second century, and Mani- 
cheism (founded by Manes in the third century). Manicheism 
holds an essential dualism of principles, one of good, the other of 
evil, and a doctrine of emanation. Gnosticism had recourse to a 
supposed esoteric doctrine of Christ, higher than revelation and 
to which the name of yvSo-is was given. According to this (i) God 
is the principle of all good, and from God emanates a series of ^Eons. 
(2) Matter is the principle of evil, and the world results from the 
union of the divine with the material principle. (3) All things 
will ultimately return to God. (4) The Scriptures are to be inter- 
preted allegorically. It is easy to see in this teaching a mixture 
of elements borrowed from Philo and Plotinus. 

(b) Among the Fathers of this period must be mentioned two 
names, both belonging to the Christian school of Alexandria: 
Clement of Alexandria (died about 216) and Origen (185-254). 
Both insist on the doctrine that God is not to be identified, 

SS9 



560 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

with, but transcends, the world. The world is not an emanation 
from God, but was created by Him. The soul is spiritual and 
immortal. 

2. Second Period. — (a) We simply mention in passing the 
names of Gregory of Nyssa (331-394), Basil (died 379), Ambrose 
(340-397), and Gregory Nazianzen (born 330). 

{h) Saint Augustine, bom 354 at Tagaste in Numidia, was 
converted by St. Ambrose. He became bishop of Hippo in 395, 
and died in 430. The following works especially are of interest 
for philosophy: " Conf essiones " ; "Retractationes"; "Contra 
Academicos"; " Soliloquia " ; "De immortalitate animae"; "De 
anima et eius origine"; "De libero arbitrio"; "De civitate Dei." 

Augustine borrows from the Greek philosophers, especially from 
Plato, but adapts their teaching to Christian dogmas, (i) God 
exists as the one supreme being, simple, eternal, omniscient. He 
is the creator of all things, and brought them out of nothing accord- 
ing to His plan, ideas, or exemplars. (2) The soul is spiritual and 
immortal. (3) Its main activity is intellectual knowledge. Cer- 
titude is possible, and Augustine defends it against the probabil- 
ism of the Academy. God is the source of all truth, and the first 
light which illumines the human mind. (4) God is the supreme 
good, hence man's ultimate end. Virtue is essentially the con- 
formity of the human with the divine will, the fulfilment of God's 
law, especially the law of love, in view of man's eternal destiny. 

(c) Some works formerly attributed to Dionysius the Areop- 
agite, the disciple of St. Paul, are now known to have been writ- 
ten at the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century. 
The philosophy of Pseudo- Dionysius is essentially Neo-Platonistic, 
and reproduces the mysticism of Neo-Platonism, although it rejects 
its pantheism. 

Mediaeval or scholastic philosophy (thus called because it was 
taught in the schools), although it was frequently systematized 
along with theology, is nevertheless distinct from it, as it proceeds 
on merely rational grounds. We shall divide it into three periods: 
(i) The period of formation and growth (from the ninth to the 
end of the twelfth century). (2) The period of perfection (thir- 



FIRST MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 561 

teenth century). (3) The period of decline (from the fourteenth 
to the sixteenth century). 

I. FIRST PERIOD 

I. Beginnings 

1. The Schools. — (a) Before Charlemagne, the invasion of 
the barbarians and the dismemberment of the Roman Empire 
made it impossible to acquire and develop any branch of learning. 
From the time of Charlemagne schools were founded: (i) palace 
schools, at the court of rulers, especially of the French kings; 
(2) monastic schools, annexed to monasteries, for the education 
of both the religious and strangers; (3) cathedral schools, estab- 
lished in the most important diocesan sees. The seven liberal 
arts were taught in these schools, namely, the trivium (grammar, 
rhetoric, and dialectic), and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, 
astronomy, and music). Little by little natural sciences, his- 
tory, theology, and philosophy were added. Among the first 
** scholastici " or masters of the schools may be mentioned Alcuin 
(735-804) at the court of Charlemagne, and Rhabanus Maurus 
(784-856) at the Benedictine school of Fulda. 

{b) The teaching in the schools was chiefly in the form of com- 
mentaries on the works of Greek philosophers (mostly in Latin 
translations) and of Latin philosophers. Among these works the 
most important were the Organon, i.e. the logical works of Aris- 
totle, part of which only was known then; the Timaeus of Plato; 
the Isagoge, i.e. the introduction to Aristotle's Categories, by 
Porphyry, and other commentaries of Plato and Aristotle; some 
of the writings of Cicero, Seneca, and Lucretius; those of St. 
Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and some Fathers. 

2. John Scotus Eriugena (born between 800 and 815) is the first 
who tried to systematize philosophy. The doctrine contained in 
his main work "De divisione naturae" is a mixture of Christian- 
ity, Oriental pantheism, and Alexandrian mysticism. There is 
only one being, namely, God, from whom all things proceed by 
emanation. God remains the one substance of all things. In 
this process of emanation, four stages must be distinguished. 

37 



562 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

(i) Uncreated and creating nature, i.e. God as the origin of all 
things, unknowable both for us and for Himself. (2) Created 
and creating nature, i.e. God as the principle and exemplar of all 
things. (3) Created and not-creating nature, i.e. the world of 
phenomena in space and time, all of which are participations of 
the divine substance, and theophaniae, i.e. manifestations of God 
and of the divine becoming. (4) Neither created nor creating 
nature, i.e. God as the end of all things, to whom all things 
ultimately return. 

Other important names of this period are Remi of Auocerre 
(died 904) and Gerberi (died 1003). 

II. The Problem of Universals 

I. The Problem Stated. — (a) Toward the middle of the elev- 
enth century the problem of universals becomes the centre of 
scholastic discussions. It is not the only problem, as we shall 
see; from it radiate other psychological and metaphysical inqui- 
ries, but it is the chief one. Nor is the discussion of this problem 
an idle one, for it is the very question of the value of our universal 
ideas, a question which, in some form or other, reappears through- 
out the whole history of philosophy, and is still a vital one at the 
present time. 

(b) A passage in Porphyry's Isagoge which, in Boethius's trans- 
lation, was the text-book of logic used in the schools, was the 
starting-point of the discussion. Porphyry asks whether genera 
and species exist in themselves as realities, or only in the mind that 
conceives them. Are they objective things or mental abstractions? 
Hence two answers are suggested, (i) Absolute realism: Uni- 
versal concepts as such correspond to objective extramental 
realities, which are universal independently of the mind. (2) 
Conceptualism : The idea alone is universal, and there is no extra- 
mental reality corresponding to it. Later on, a distinction was 
made and two new systems were evolved. (3) Nominalism, more 
radical than conceptualism, denies even the conception of the 
universal by the mind, and attributes universality only to the 
common name. (4) Moderate realism answers that, as such, 
the universal exists only in the mind, that existing things are 



FIRST MEDIEVAL PERIOD 563 

always individual, but that there is in things a " f undamentum " 
for this universality, namely, their essence which the mind, by a 
process of abstraction, may conceive apart from individual 
features. (Cf. p. 398.) 

2. Realism. — (a) Scotus Eriugena and Remi of Auxerre, \C, 
already mentioned, were realists. 

(b) In the twelfth century, William of Champeaux (1070-1120), 
a disciple of St. Anselm and of Roscelin, whose teaching he op- 
posed (see below, p. 564), held — according to Abelard, his oppo- 
nent, on whose authority we have to depend for this account — that 
universals are present in individual things. Hence individuals 
are identical as to their essence and differ only in their accidents. 
In other words, the essence of man, for instance, is one and iden- 
tical in all men, and contained totally in every individual man. 
In consequence of the ridicule heaped on this doctrine by Abe- 
lard — who objected that in this case Socrates at Rome, since he 
contains the whole human essence, should also be at the same time 
at Athens, where Plato, who also contains the whole human es- 
sence, is — WiUiam modified his view, and finally seems to have 
abandoned realism altogether. 

(c) A more reserved realism, called indiferentism^ was taught 
by Adelard of Bath (in the beginning of the twelfth century) and 
Gauthier {Walter) of Mortagne (died 1174). In every individual 
we must distinguish two classes of realities. Some constitute its 
essential differences; others are specific and generic, i.e. common 
to all individuals (indifferentes) , hence universal. It would seem 
then that, according to the point of view one takes, the same 
being may be looked upon as individual and as universal, but 
the theory, as presented, is vague, and may receive various 
interpretations. 

(d) The school of Chartres — Bernard of Chartres (died about 
1 125), Thierry of Chartres (died 11 55), William of Conches (about 
1080-1154), a disciple of St. Bernard — teaches an absolute realism 
similar to that of Plato. The true reality is universal, and the 
sensible world is composed only of fleeting shadows. However, 
this doctrine endeavors to avoid pantheism, and admits 
creation. 



564 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

3. Anti-Realism. — (a) At the end of the eleventh century, 
Roscelin of Compiegne affirms that reality belongs primarily to 
the individual, and that universals are only names, "voces" 
(nominalism), or at most mental conceptions to which nothing 
real corresponds. 

(b) In the twelfth century Abelard (1079-1142), a disciple of 
Roscelin and of William of Champeaux, is the main figure in 
philosophical and theological discussions, (i) He opposes both the 
realism of William of Champeaux and the nominalism of Roscelin. 
He does not seem to look upon universals as mere mental ideas 
without any reality whatsoever in things. While he claims that 
individuals alone exist, his doctrine seems to be that of a moderate 
realism not yet formulated clearly. (2) He is essentially a ration- 
alist, even in regard to Catholic dogmas and mysteries which, he 
claims, can be understood and demonstrated by reason. (3) In 
his " Sic et Non " he presents pros and cons on a number of ques- 
tions, but stops at these statements without giving any posi- 
tive answer. (4) He also gives some attention to cosmological, 
psychological, and ethical problems. 

(c) Gilbert de la Porree (1076-1154) admits that universal es- 
sences exist only in individuals, and become universal in the mind 
when the similarities between them are discovered by a process of 
comparison. 

4. Saint Anselm (1033-1109) deserves special mention on 
account of the many questions which he touched upon, and of 
his efforts to systematize the results reached by his predecessors. 
He was influenced greatly by St. Augustine, (i) Faith is superior 
to reason, yet reason is an independent source of knowledge. 
(2) The real existence of God is proved by the idea which we have 
of an infinitely perfect being, to whom, therefore, existence, as a 
perfection, must belong. (This argument has been discussed and 
found wanting as passing from the ideal to the real order.) (3) 
Truth is eternal and unchangeable, and therefore based ultimately 
on God. (4) Universals exist in things; yet St. Anselm does not 
seem to teach an absolute, but a moderate reahsm. (5) Abstract 
ideas are not innate, but have their origin in the data of the 
senses. 



FIRST MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 565 

5. Eclectics and Synthetics. — Efforts to sum up and coordi- 
nate various doctrines were made by John of Salisbury (died 11 80), 
and Alanus of Lille (about 11 28-1 202). The former is a humanist, 
historian, critic, and philosopher. The latter insists on dialec- 
tics and applies himself chiefly to cosmology, psychology, and 
metaphysics. 

III. Mysticism and Pantheism 

1. Mysticism. — In general mysticism admits that, at least 
under certain conditions, there is for man a mode of knowledge of 
God and of divine things higher than logical demonstration, namely, 
the direct communication and union of the soul with God through con- 
templation and love. The purpose of life is to develop these higher 
faculties, and to make the immediate union with God closer and 
more perfect. The main mystics are found in the abbey of Saint- 
Victor (Paris), and among them especially the two abbots, Hugh 
(1096-1141) and Richard (died 1173). Without despising reason 
and dialectics, they look upon them only as a step to contemplation 
which alone gives true science. 

2. Pantheism. — In the latter half of the twelfth century there 
was a revival of pantheistic doctrines, (i) The pantheism of 
the school of Chartres is represented by Bernard of Tours, who, 
about 1 1 50, wrote his "De mundi universitate," in which he 
follows the Neo-Platonistic doctrines, and admits a theory of 
emanation. (2) The pantheism of Amaury of Benes and his 
disciples admits that God is immanent in all things, and that all 
tilings are substantially identical with God. (3) The material- 
istic pantheism of David of Dinant asserts that God is the primary 
matter identical in all things. Three classes of substances are 
distinguished, God, the soul, and . matter, but they are only 
one and the same being. 

IV. Oriental Philosophy 

I. Arabian Philosophy is based chiefly on Aristotle, whose works 
were translated into Arabic from Syriac versions. Naturally 
such translations were very defective. Arabian philosophers also 



566 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

borrow doctrines of emanation and ecstasis from Neo-Platonism. 
In the discussions which were raised about the Koran toward 
the end of the eighth century, the MutaziHtes were rationaHsts, 
the Mutakallimun defended orthodoxy, and the Sufis gave promi- 
nence to mysticism. Arabian philosophy proper is divided into 
eastern and western. 

(a) Main oriental Arabian philosophers, (i) Alkendi (died 
about 870) wrote on logic, physics, metaphysics, medicine, magic, 
etc. (2) Alfarabi (died 950), at the school of Bagdad, wrote 
commentaries on Aristotle's logical works. In metaphysics he 
admitted an emanationistic pantheism. (3) Avicenna (Ibn 
Sina, 980-1036) wrote a great number of works in which he 
abandons many of the Neo-Platonistic interpretations of Aristotle, 
but still admits a theory of emanations or processions from God. 
The last emanation is the "intellectus agens," which governs our 
world. Matter is eternal and increated. (4) Gazali (Algazel, 
1058-1111) opposed the philosophers and stood for the Koran. 
He was one of the Sufis or mystics. 

(b) Occidental Arabian philosophers Hved in Spain, The most 
important was Averroes (Ibn Roshd, 1126-1198), born at Cordova; 
died at Morocco. He wrote many commentaries on Aristotle's 
works, and also original works on philosophy, medicine, and 
astronomy: (i) Primary matter is eternal and contains all 
forms in a germ-Hke fashion. (2) Human reason is impersonal, 
one and identical in all men. Hence there is no personal immor- 
taHty. 

2. Jewish Philosophy developed chiefly in Spain under the influ- 
ence of Arabian philosophy. Avicebron or Avicebrol (Ibn Gebirol, 
1020-1070), born at Malaga, reproduces many tendencies of the 
Neo-Platonists. God is one and unknowable. All things, even 
spiritual, are composed of matter and form. The soul must imite 
itself to God by contemplation. Moses Maimonides (113 5-1 204) 
tries to combine the teachings of Aristotle with Judaism. On many 
points he agrees with the interpretation of Aristotle by Averroes. 
Matter is not affirmed to be eternal. The human intellect is partly 
innate (one and the same for all) and partly acquired (personal 
and individual). 



SECOND MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 567 

II. SECOND PERIOD 
I. General 

I. Influences. — The thirteenth century is the period of per- 
fection of scholastic philosophy. An attempt is made to coordi- 
nate all preceding doctrines in a complete synthesis. The main 
influences at work were the introduction of hitherto unknown phil- 
osophical writings, especially those of Aristotle; the foundation 
and growth of imiversities, and the institution of religious orders. 

(a) Before this time only the logical works of Aristotle were 
known to the schoolmen. Now his other philosophical and scien- 
tific works were translated into Latin, sometimes directly from the 
Greek, more generally from Arabic translations. The translations 
from the Arabic were frequently very imperfect, and, together 
with Arabian commentaries, were causes of the misrepresentation 
of the master's doctrine in a way which was often irreconcilable 
with Catholic dogma. Hence prohibitions to read Aristotle's 
works were enacted by the provincial council of Paris (12 10) and 
by the Pope's legate (1215). This prohibition, however, appHed 
only to the University of Paris. Little by little, when Aristotle 
became better known through more accurate translations, this pro- 
hibition ceased to be applied, and Aristotle became the undisputed 
master in the University. 

(b) Universities gave to philosophy an important place in their 
teaching. The University of Paris was founded early in the thir- 
teenth century, or rather grew out of the union of the cathedral 
schools. The University of Oxford, which already existed, was 
definitely organized in the thirteenth century, and, to a great 
extent, modelled after that of Paris. The University of Cambridge 
was founded in the latter half of the thirteenth century. 

(c) It is also at this time that the Dominicans and Franciscans 
were founded. Their teaching, both in their monasteries and in 
universities, had a stimulating influence on account of the learn- 
ing of the men who gave it, and of the controversies which arose 
between seculars and regulars, and between the various religious 
schools. 



568 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

2. Division. — We shall consider successively (i) the philoso- 
ophy of the earUer part of the thirteenth century; (2) Thomistic 
philosophy; (3) Scotistic philosophy; (4) some other more or less 
independent schools and philosophers. 

II. Philosophy in the Earlier Part of the Thirteenth 

Century 

In general, the beginning of the thirteenth century is a period of 
transition. The influence of Aristotle is already very important, 
but far from exclusive. Many elements are borrowed from other 
sources, especially from St. Augustine, (i) William of Au- 
vergne (died 1249), professor at the University of Paris, and later 
bishop of Paris, attempts to reconcile Aristotle with Plato and 
St. Augustine. (2) Among the Franciscans must be mentioned 
Alexander of Hales (died 1245) and St. Bonaventure (1221-1274). 
Alexander's philosophy is essentially Aristotelian, although it still 
retains some traditional Augustinian elements. St. Bonaventure 
was Alexander's disciple. In his metaphysics, psychology, theod- 
icy, etc., the growing influence of Aristotle is manifest. He also 
taught a form of mysticism akin to that of the Victorine school. 
The world presents to the mind the "vestiges" of God, and the 
soul is an "image" of God. The knowledge of God's vestiges 
and image must lead to the immediate contemplation of God 
Himself. 

III. Thomistic Philosophy 

1. Albert the Great (i 193-1280), a Dominican, professor at 
Cologne and Paris, was St. Thomas's master, and began the great 
synthesis completed by his disciple. He contributed to spread 
the influence of Aristotle. Remarkable as a theologian and phi- 
losopher, Albert is still more remarkable as a scientist. He was 
famihar with all the sciences of his time, zoology, botany, phys- 
iology, medicine, geography, astronomy, mineralogy, and even 
alchemy. His philosophy, except on some minor points, is essen- 
tially the same as that of St. Thomas, but less perfectly elaborated. 

2. Saint Thomas of Aquino or Thomas Aquinas, called the 
AngeUc Doctor (12 25-1 274), entered the Dominican order in 1243, 



SECOND MEDIEVAL PERIOD 569 

was the disciple of Albert the Great at Cologne and Paris, 
began his public teaching at Paris about 1257, and later taught 
at Rome, Bologna, Perugia, Naples, and other places. 

(a) Besides a number of commentaries on Holy Scripture, 
Aristotle, etc., he wrote "Opuscula," "Quodlibeta," "Quaesti- 
ones disputatae," and especially "Summa contra gentiles" and 
"Summa theologica." These constitute a theological and phil- 
osophical encyclopaedia in which Aristotelian philosophy and Cath- 
olic dogma are harmonized. Thomistic philosophy is essentially 
Peripatetic, but on many points Aristotle's doctrine is modified. 
Reason is a source of knowledge distinct from revelation, but 
aUied with it, and St. Thomas always distinguishes natural from 
supernatural truth, and philosophy from theology. 

(6) We shall mention only the fundamental points in the phi- 
losophy of St. Thomas, (i) Material substances are composed of 
matter and form, potentiality and actuality. (Cf. pp. 426 ff.) The 
world was created by God. (2) Man is also composed of matter 
and form (cf . pp. 480 ff ) , but the form or soul is substantial and 
spiritual, hence directly created by God and immortal. (3) The 
soul has faculties, some of which it exercises through the organism, 
while others are spiritual. The intellect is spiritual, but depends 
extrinsically on the senses. From sensory knowledge we arise to 
intellectual knowledge by the abstractive activity of the intel- 
lectus agens. (Cf. pp. 98 ff.) Intellectual or universal knowledge 
alone constitutes true science. Universals exist in things "funda- 
mentahter," i.e. in their concrete essence, but in the mind "for- 
maHter." (Cf. p. 398.) (4) The existence of God is known a 
posteriori from the world, as also whatever may be known concern- 
ing His nature. But no finite mind can ever have a comprehensive 
knowledge of God. (Cf. pp. 529 ff.) (5) The ultimate end of man 
is perfect happiness which is to be found in the possession of God, 
the infinite good. The moral character of actions is to be derived 
from their relation to the ultimate end. 

3. Thomists and Adversaries. — Some of St. Thomas's doc- 
trines were opposed very strongly, and the opposition succeeded 
even in having some of them condemned at Paris and Oxford. 
But, in 1278, the whole Dominican order accepted Thomism, which 



570 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

thenceforth gained in favor. Among the main opponents of St. 
Thomas are the Dominican Robert Kilwardby at Oxford and the 
Franciscan Richard of Middletown at Paris. Among his main 
partisans on the controverted questions are Giles of Lessines, and 
some philosophers who were eclectics, but kept Thomism as a 
central doctrine: Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, and Henry 
of Ghent. 

IV. ScoTiSTic Philosophy 

John Duns Scotus, the Doctor Sub tills (i 266 or 12 74-1308), a Fran- 
ciscan, taught at Oxford (1294), Paris (1304), and Cologne (1308), 
where he died. His philosophy is primarily critical and negative, 
secondarily constructive. He attacks the main contemporary 
systems of St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Giles of Rome, Henry 
of Ghent, and others, (i) Philosophy and theology not only are 
distinct, but may be opposed. The field of reason is narrowed 
more than in St. Thomas. (2) All created beings are composed 
of matter and form. Even spiritual substances have a common 
and homogeneous substratum, the materia primo-prima. As to 
the substantial form, it is not necessarily one in the same being, 
but there may be together several subordinated forms. (3) Scotus 
defends a moderate reaHsm. However, the individual as such is 
not made individual by its matter, as St. Thomas asserted, but by 
a special reality called haecceitas or "thisness." In general, under 
the name of formahties, Scotus distinguishes a number of prin- 
ciples within the same individual, to which he attributes reality, 
although their distinction seems merely logical. (4) Both in God 
and in man, the will is superior to the intellect. It may be noted 
that, notwithstanding the differences, Scotus's philosophy agrees 
with that of St. Thomas on many fundamental points. It found 
many exponents and defenders, especially among Franciscans, but 
Scotus's influence never equalled that of St. Thomas, who remains 
the greatest of all scholastics. 

V. Other Schools and Philosophers 

I Averroism. — The commentaries on Aristotle by Averroes 
were introduced at Paris at the same time as Aristotle's works. 



THIRD MEDIEVAL PERIOD 571 

Condemned in 12 10 and 12 15, Averroism revived especially with 
Siger of Brabant (died at the end of the thirteenth century), and 
was again condemned in 1270 and 1277. At this period, Averroism 
holds that the active intellect is impersonal and identical in all men. 
Hence there is no personal immortality. It also denies the provi- 
dence of God and asserts a mediate creation, God having first 
created separate intelligences who, in turn, created material sub- 
stances. Finally it divorces reason from faith, so that a philo- 
sophical truth may be a falsehood in theology, and vice versa. 

2. Roger Bacon (about 1210-1294) was a Franciscan who 
taught at Oxford and Paris. He attaches great importance to 
natural sciences and uses experimental methods. He appeals to 
observation and experience against authority and a priori deduc- 
tions. His learning was very extensive and embraced physics, 
mathematics, geography, astronomy, alchemy, and linguistics. In 
philosophy he borrows from Aristotle, early Franciscan tradi- 
tions, and Arabian philosophers. His violent polemics against 
acknowledged authorities contributed to lessen his influence. 

3. Raymond Lully (1235-13 15) was also a Franciscan, and 
opposed Averroism. He held that reason and faith, far from being 
opposed, always go together. Faith is essentially rational, and 
reason can demonstrate all revealed truths. Thus the difference 
between the natural and the supernatural is suppressed. His 
''Ars Magna" contains a kind of logical mechanism in which 
various letters and symbols representing ideas are combined in 
different ways so as to lead to formulas and conclusions that are 
supposed to correspond to reality. 

III. THIRD PERIOD 

I. General Causes of Decline. — The third period of scholastic 
philosophy, including the fourteenth and the first half of the 
fifteenth century, is a period of decline. Several causes con- 
tributed to this decline. As, on the one hand, Albert the 
Great and Roger Bacon had failed in their attempt to 
foster the scientific spirit and develop experimental methods; 
and as, on the other hand, the work of harmonizing philos- 



572 HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY 

ophy and theology, reason and faith, had been perfected, 
philosophers indulged in mere verbal questions, abused dialectics, 
and discussed idle subtleties. They ceased to think for them- 
selves, and limited themselves to commenting on the works of their 
predecessors. Hence frequently arose animated discussions on 
points of Uttle or no importance. Moreover, these obscure thoughts 
were often expressed in more obscure terminology. All this con- 
tributed to a general decline of studies, and the high level which 
universities had attained in the thirteenth century was consider- 
ably lowered. Two main movements characterize this period, the 
revival of nominalism and of mysticism. 

2. Tenninism, — (a) The formalism of the Scotistic school 
multiplied metaphysical entities, and led to an extreme reaction in 
which everything was simplified as much as possible. Thus was 
revived nominalism which had generally been abandoned in the pre- 
ceding century. Durandus of St. Pourqain (died about 1332) and 
Peter d'Auriol {Aureolus, died 1322) are the precursors of Ockham 
(about 1 280-1347), who taught at Paris and was the true author 
of the revival of nominahsm. According to him, only individuals 
exist, and to universal notions no reality whatever corresponds in 
nature. Ideas are signs or terms of the things which they signify, 
but intuitive knowledge alone represents things that have any 
reality outside the mind. Abstract concepts have no objective 
value whatsoever. They are termini, conceptions of the mind, 
and substitutes for a number of individual reaUties. This theory 
is neither Roscelin's nominalism nor Abelard's conceptuaUsm, but 
rather tenninism. In addition to this, Ockham manifests sceptical 
tendencies, and professes an extreme volimtarism. 

(b) Ockham's terminism was in great favor during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries. Notwithstanding many prohibitions by 
the University of Paris, it became predominant at Paris, Vienna, 
Cologne, and Heidelberg. The most prominent followers of Ock- 
ham were John Buridan (died about 1358), rector of the University 
of Paris, Marsilius of Inghen (died 1396), rector of the University 
of Heidelberg, and Peter d'Ailly (1350-1425). 

3. Mysticism. — The abuse of dialectics brought about, as a 
reaction, a revival of mysticism and the distrust of reason. Among 



THIRD MEDIEVAL PERIOD 573 

those who professed a mysticism consistent with Catholicism are 
John RuyshrcBck (1293-1381), Gerard Groot (1340-1384), Thomas a 
Kempis (1380-1471), Denys the Carthusian (1402-1471), and 
especially John Gerson (1364-1429), chancellor of the University of 
Paris, whose doctrine has many points in common with that of 
St. Bonaventure. Among those who professed a mysticism in- 
consistent with Catholicism, on account especially of a leaning 
toward pantheism, are Eckhart (about 12 60-1 3 2 7), who holds that 
God is the very existence and actuality of the world, but tries to 
defend himself from accusations of pantheism; Henry Suso (about 
1300-1366); John Tatder (1290-1361). 



CHAPTER III 

MODERN PHILOSOPHY 

Transition. Renaissance 

I. General Features. — The philosophical doctrines that suc- 
ceeded scholasticism have Httle in common besides an opposition 
to scholastic philosophy. They develop in many different direc- 
tions, show much confusion and little originality. Some tendencies, 
however, manifest themselves; a separation of philosophy from 
dogmatic teaching, a complete independence of theology and 
revelation, an aUiance of philosophy with natural sciences, and a 
return to antiquity. 

Among the causes which brought about this break with the past 
the most important were the following: 

(fl) The movement known as humanism, i.e. the study of Greek 
and Latin classics, especially from the point of view of the per- 
fection of the form which was contrasted with that of the scholas- 
tics. Naturally this artistic renaissance affected philosophical 
thought, for it is not possible to attend to the form without feeling 
the influence of the ideas. The contact of Italy and the western 
world with Greece contributed to develop this tendency, especially 
as a number of learned Greeks fled to Italy when Constantinople 
was captured (1453) and Europe was threatened by the Turks. 
The invention of the art of printing faciUtated the spread of 
Uterature. 

{h) Religious reformation, which imphed essentially a doing away 
with the authority of the Church, and an advocating of the 
supremacy of individual thought. 

ic) The progress of natural sciences, in which new discoveries 
gave rise to new problems. The heliocentric system replaced the 
geocentric view (Copernicus, 1473-1543; Tycho-Brahe, 1546- 
1601; Kepler, 1571-1631; GaUleo, 1564-1642). The laws of the 

574 



RENAISSANCE 575 

movements of heavenly bodies were discovered. Anatomy, 
physiology (VesaUus, 1514-1564; Servet, 1509-1553), and mathe- 
matics (Galileo, Tartaglia) made a rapid advance. America was 
discovered, etc. All these opened new horizons, suggested new 
questions, and necessitated the use of new methods. 

(d) The formation of nationalities out of a formerly united Chris- 
tian empire, and the abohtion of the feudal system. Hence ques- 
tions concerning individual and national rights and Uberties grew 
in importance. 

(e) The failure of scholastic philosophy, which had weakened 
considerably in its period of decline, to adapt itself, as it could 
and should have done, to these new circumstances and needs. Its 
dry verbal discussions could not withstand the opposition which 
raged against it. Many important problems had been raised, and 
there was no time to lose in idle discussions. 

2. Revival of Greek Schools. — (a) The revival of Platonism, 
favored by the beauty of form and diction found in Plato's writings, 
was encouraged especially by the Platonic Academy of Florence 
founded by Cosmo de' Medici in 1460. Plato, frequently with a 
Neo-Platonic interpretation, was preferred to Aristotle, especially 
by Gemistus Pletho (1355-1450), a Byzantine scholar. Cardinal 
Bessarion (1403-147 2), and Pico delta Mirandola (1463- 1494), who 
combined Neo-Platonism with the Jewish Cabala. 

{b) Pomponatius (1462-1524) is the chief Aristotelian of this 
period, but Aristotle's doctrine is frequently misinterpreted, and 
becomes again the subject of many discussions. 

(c) Stoicism finds a great number of advocates, especially 
Justus Lipsius (1547-1606). E/jJcwreawww in its essentials is revived 
by Gassendi (i 592-1655). 

3. Naturalism. — The study of natural sciences was based 
largely on observation. But at this early stage of scientific investi- 
gation, whenever real causes were not at hand, occult forces were 
frequently called in to explain facts. Hence a tendency to magic 
and astrology. A tendency to pantheism was favored by the 
admiration of the order of nature, (i) Bernardino Telesio (1508- 
1588) is an opponent of Aristotelian philosophy, and devotes his 
life to the study of natural sciences. According to him, the uni- 



576 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

verse results from the combination of matter with two immaterial 
forces, heat and cold. The principle of life, or spiritus, is a mani- 
festation of heat. (2) Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) was 
influenced chiefly by Telesio, and added metaphysical and political 
doctrines to his master's teaching. (3) Paracelsus (1493-1541), a 
physician, mingles science with alchemy, magic, and astrology, 
(4) Nikolaus of Cusa (1401-1464) manifests a tendency to mysti- 
cism, and his doctrine, although it avoids pantheism, contains the 
germs of it. (5) Giordano Bruno (i 548-1600) teaches that the 
imiverse, infinite in time and space, is but an unfolding of the 
being of God. The universe is one Hving organism, vivified by an 
intelligence or anima mundi. There is no freedom and no personal 
immortality. 

4. Mysticism. — The private interpretation of Scripture, which 
is a fimdamental tenet of Protestantism, cannot fail to lead differ- 
ent individuals to contradictory behefs, which, in turn, must be 
harmonized with philosophical ideas. Hence the rise of Protestant 
philosophies and mysticism. Luther (i 483-1 546) irreducibly 
opposes reason, as a function of the flesh, to faith, as a fimction of 
the spirit, and thus professes an exaggerated psychological dualism. 
Zwingli (1484-1531), in his pantheistic doctrine of the immanence 
of God in all things, combines Neo-Platonic and Stoic elements. 
Melanchthon (1497-1560) follows chiefly Aristotle. The mystics 
proper are Sebastian Franck (1499-1542) and Jakoh Boehme (1575- 
1624). The latter explains the existence of evil by assuming that 
in God Himself the opposition of good and evil is essential and 
necessary. 

5. Political Philosophy. — (i) Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), 
in Italy, professes a sort of political utilitarianism. The ethical 
distinction of justice and injustice, of right and wrong, is not valid. 
Whatever means are useful to the state must be adopted. Not 
only Christian ethics, but even natural law is worthless. (2) 
Thomas More (1478-1535), in England, besides advocating a kind 
of communistic view of property, professes the mutual indepen- 
dence and indifference of church and state. (3) Hugo Grotius 
(de Groot, 1583-1645), in the Netherlands, claims that human 
society originated from a social contract by which individuals 



FIRST MODERN PERIOD 577 

transferred their rights to the state. Natural rights are those 
which reason discovers to be essential to man. 

6. Scholasticism. — Among the scholastic philosophers of this 
period are the commentators of St. Thomas, F error a (1474-15 28) 
and Cajetan (1468-1534); the Spanish philosophers Banez (1528- 
1604) and John of St. Thomas (i 589-1644), both Dominicans; 
the Jesuits Fonseca (1528-1597) and Suarez (1548-1617). But, 
notwithstanding their efforts, scholastic philosophy soon lost all 
prestige and succumbed to the attacks directed against it. It 
failed to adapt itself to new needs, to keep abreast of scientific 
progress, to modify itself according to new discoveries. Hence 
its downfall. 

7. Scepticism. — The confusion of ideas and contradictory 
systems soon brought about a revival of scepticism represented by 
Montaigne (1533-1592), Charron (1541-1603), and Sanchez (1562- 
1632). All this in turn opened the way to the philosophical 
reforms of Bacon and Descartes. 

In the modern period of philosophy, the work of construction 
begins anew. New systems appear, and original syntheses are 
completed. The break with the past and with dogmatic authority 
becomes more and more accentuated; problems and schools are 
multipHed. 

We shall divide the history of modern philosophy into two 
periods, (i) The Pre-Kantian period, in which a rational current 
starts from Descartes, and an empirical current from Bacon. (2) 
The Kantian and Post-Kantian period, in which criticism, i.e. the 
problem of the origin and value of knowledge, becomes central. 



I. FIRST PERIOD 

I. Bacon and Descartes 

With Bacon and Descartes originate two distinct movements 
which, in a more or less direct manner, influence subsequent 
philosophy, namely, empiricism and rationalism, the supremacy 
of experience and the supremacy of reason. 
. 38 



578 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

1, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), baron of Verulam, after 
occupying several high political positions, was condemned for 
receiving bribes, and deprived of his office. His two works, "De 
dignitate et augmentis scientiarum," and "Novum organon" (the 
latter incomplete), were the first two parts of the Instauratio magna 
which he had planned. After proposing and expounding a classi- 
fication of sciences based on a tripartite division of mental faculties 
(memory, imagination, and reason), he insists on the necessity of 
method, and opposes his Novum organon to the Organon, or logical 
works, of Aristotle. 

The method which he proposes consists essentially of the fol- 
lowing points: (i) The syllogistic method is absolutely worthless, 
and experience alone is a sure criterion (cf. p. 382); respect for 
antiquity is an obstacle to progress. (2) The sources of error, or 
"idols," must be eliminated, namely, "idola tribus," based on 
human nature itself and common to all men; "idola specus," 
arising from individual tendencies; "idola fori," arising from the 
contact with other men through language; "idola theatri," arising 
from the various systems of philosophy and the authority which 
they exercise. (3) The constructive work is based on scientific 
induction, in which facts are classified in three groups, called 
tabulae praesentiae, absentiae, graduum. From the facts, gradu- 
ally, and always with great caution, the passage is effected through 
theories and probabilities to certitude as to the causes of the 
facts. One must beware of prejudices, and all judgments must 
be based only on the comparison of facts. — N.B. Most of these 
rules were applied before Bacon without being formulated; Bacon 
was the first clearly to state the inductive methods. 

2. Rene Descartes (Cartesius, 1 596-1650) travelled extensively, 
and entertained relations with the most prominent scientists of 
his time. His main philosophical works are the "Discourse on 
Method"; " Meditationes de prima philosophia"; "Principia 
philosophiae." 

(a) Method, (i) Descartes begins with a imiversal methodic 
doubt bearing on whatever knowledge he had acquired previously, 
and looks for a truth the evidence of which is so clear that doubt 
about it will be impossible. (Cf. pp. 243, 369 ff.) (2) He finds 



FIRST MODERN PERIOD 579 

this truth in the intuition of his own thought, and consequently 
of his existence: "Cogito, ergo sum," As this idea imposes itself 
as true on account of its clearness, he infers that, in general, the 
clearness of an idea is the criterion of its truth. (Cf. p. 405.) 
(3) Finding in his mind the idea of an infinitely perfect being, 
Descartes concludes that God exists, because existence, being a 
perfection, must belong to the Infinite, and also because this idea 
itself of the Infinite can come only from God Himself. Moreover, 
the idea of an infinite perfection includes that of infallible verac- 
ity. Hence God, being the principle of all things, cannot deceive 
man who invincibly believes in the reliability of his faculties. The 
perceptions of the mind are therefore truthful. (4) Descartes 
is now ready for his constructive work, which he undertakes with 
the help of four guiding precepts: Require clearness and evidence; 
proceed first by analysis; then by synthesis; always proceed 
gradually and cautiously. 

(b) Psychology, (i) From his starting-point: "Cogito, ergo 
sum," Descartes infers that he is a thinking spiritual substance, 
the essence of which is thought. (Cf. p. 489.) (2) Ideas are of 
three kinds, innate (especially that of God), acquired, or formed 
by the imagination. The first two classes are objective. (Cf. 
pp. 100, 102 ff.) (3) The organism is a mere automatic machine 
which the soul, located in the pineal gland, moves, and from 
which it receives external impressions. 

(c) Cosmology, (i) Matter consists essentially in extension, 
and is thus opposed to thought or spirit. (2) Movement is always 
mechanical, and we know nothing of final causes. Its first source 
is God, who in creating the world endowed it with a certain 
quantity of movement which remains invariable, 

II. Development of British Empiricism 

I. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), a friend and disciple of Bacon, 
advocates Bacon's empiricism. Yet his philosophy is also influ- 
enced by Descartes, with whom he became acquainted at Paris. 
His main works are "Leviathan" and "Elementa philosophiae." 
(i) Sensation is the only source of knowledge; hence whatever 
exists is material, and universals are only names. As a conse- 



58o HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

quence, science and philosophy can deal only with matter. (Cf, 
pp. 380 ff.) (2) Qualities perceived by the senses have no reality 
outside of the mind. They are simply mechanical motions in things 
and in the brain. (3) The natural condition of man is not to. live 
in society, but to live in a state of war against everybody else. 
The disadvantages of this condition brought about a social compact 
by which individuals transferred absolutely all their rights to the 
authority of the state. This authority is therefore absolute and 
unUmited. Right and wrong result only from positive laws. 
(Cf. pp. 355 ff-) 

2. John Locke (163 2-1 704) in the four books of his main work, 
"An Essay concerning Human Understanding," examines the 
human faculties of knowledge, (i) There are no innate ideas, 
since there are no ideas that are present in the minds of all men. 
All ideas are acquired by experience. (2) This experience is two- 
fold: sensation, i.e. the mental representation of the external 
world, and reflection, i.e. the consciousness of mental activities. 
By combining simple ideas derived from these two sources, the 
mind forms complex ideas. (Cf. pp. 99, 103 ff.) (3) The qual- 
ities which are attributed to bodies are either primary, like exten- 
sion, figure, motion, etc., or secondary, like color, odor, sound, etc. 
Primary qualities exist really in things; secondary qualities exist 
only in the mind. (4) We do not know directly external things, 
but mental representations or ideas. (Cf. pp. 369, 387.) (5) 
Among complex ideas is found that of substance. Substances 
exist (bodily, spiritual, and divine), but their nature is unknown 
and unknowable. (6) Generality and universality belong only 
to names. (7) Reason alone cannot prove the spirituality of the 
soul. 

3. George Berkeley (1685-1753), bishop of Cloyne in Ireland, 
in his "New Theory of Vision," "Principles of Knowledge," and 
"Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," starts from Locke's 
assumption that we know directly only our ideas, and, from this, 
endeavors to refute scepticism, materialism, and atheism, (i) 
Not only secondary, but also primary, qualities are mere ideas. For 
instance, the shape (primary) is known through visual sensations, 
and is no more objective than color, which is perceived through 



FIRST MODERN PERIOD 581 

the same sensations. Extension, far from being the essence of 
matter, as Descartes held, is not objective at all. (2) All ideas, 
even abstract and universal, are derived from concrete impressions 
which are products of the mind alone. (3) Matter is not per- 
ceived directly by the senses, for these perceive only qualities; 
nor is its existence known by demonstration, since, on the one 
hand, passive matter cannot be the active cause of sensations, 
and, on the other, ideas cannot result from an inert substance 
such as matter. Matter is a contradictory notion leading to scep- 
ticism. (4) The external world, therefore, is not material. The 
cause of its order and harmony is God, since this order shows that 
the world is but an idea of God manifesting itself to the human 
mind. The world is a mental representation — esse est percipi — 
it is not matter, but spirit. (Cf. pp. 387, 389 ff.) 

4. David Hume (1711-1776), especially in his "Treatise on 
Human Nature," and his "Enquiry concerning Human Under- 
standing," carries the consequences of empiricism to their extreme 
limits. (Cf. pp. 98, 113, 382.) (i) Nothing exists except what 
is given in experience, and as experience manifests no substances 
at all, it follows that no substance exists. Hume denies not only 
the existence of material substances, as Berkeley had done, but of 
spiritual as well. As matter is but a collection of phenomena, so 
the mind is but a collection of mental states. (Cf. pp. 460, 463 
ff.) (2) As experience does not manifest any causality, but only 
the succession of phenomena, the idea of cause is not objective, 
and the regular sequence of cause and effect is not one of ontolog- 
ical dependence. It is owing to habit that we expect this 
sequence. Hume's position is thus phenomenalistic and sceptical. 
(Cf. p. 454.) 

5. Moralists. — As a reaction against Hobbes, many moral- 
ists admit a universal moral law, natural to all men, and altruistic 
as well as egoistic. Among them are Ralph Cudworth (161 7-1688) 
and Richard Cumberland (163 2-1 7 18). Others base morality on a 
special innate feeling (cf. pp. 309 ff.), which is either an aesthetic 
sense (Shaftesbury, 1671-1713), conscience (Joseph Butler 1692- 
1752), or a moral sense distinct from reason (Francis Hutcheson, 
1 694-1 747). Others, finally, apply empiricism to morals (cf. p. 



582 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

311) and are led to utilitarianism {Mandeville, 1670-1733; Adam 
Smith, 1723-1790). 

III. Development of Cartesian Rationalism 

1. Direct Influences. — From Descartes's principles Arnold 
Geulincx (1625-1669) and Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) deduce 
the doctrines of occasionalism and ontologism, which, however, 
are neither so clearly expressed nor so fully evolved in the former 
as in the latter. According to Malebranche, (i) God alone can 
be a cause; hence the activity of creatures is only apparent. In 
the various changes that occur there is only a coincidence which 
is due to God's direct intervention. This also explains the union 
of body and soul (occasionalism; cf. p. 481.) (2) Since finite 
beings do not act, our ideas cannot be caused by them. They 
come from God, in whom we see everything (ontologism; cf. p. 

405)- 

2. More Remote Influences. — Spinoza and Leibniz are influ- 
enced by Cartesianism, but introduce many new elements and 
develop the system in new directions. 

(a) The main works of Baruch Spinoza (163 2-1677) ^^^ "Ethica 
more geometrico demonstrata," "De intellectus emendatione," 
"Tractatus poUticus." In them is revealed the influence of Car- 
tesianism, Neo-Platonism, and of the pantheism of Bruno and 
Maimonides. (i) The Cartesian substantial dualism, and oppo- 
sition of extension and thought, is reduced to a dualism of attri- 
butes of one and the same substance, namely, God. (2) The 
divine substance, indetermined and unknowable in itself, unfolds 
itself through attributes, two of which are known to us, viz., 
extension and thought. (Cf. pp. 521 ff.) (3) These attributes are 
manifested through a number of modes, which are the finite deter- 
minations of the divine infinite substance. (4) Everything in the 
physical and the mental world takes place necessarily, and there 
is no room at any stage for freedom. 

{h) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-17 16) is an eclectic who bor- 
rows from Descartes, Plato, Aristotle, and adds many personal 
ideas. His main works are "Essais de theodicee," "La monado- 
logie," "Nouveaux essais sur I'entendement humain " (an answer to 



FIRST MODERN PERIOD 583 

Locke's Essay), (i) Descartes was wrong in identifying spiritual 
substances with thought, and material substances with extension. 
There are in the soul perceptions which are almost imconscious, 
and which cannot be called thought in the Cartesian sense. As 
to extension, it is the principle of multiplicity and composition. 
But composition ultimately supposes simple and indivisible units. 
Substance means essentially a principle of activity, a force. 
Thought and extension are modes of substances. (2) The sub- 
stantial unit is the monad, immaterial, eternal, and active. Bodies 
are aggregates of simple monads, while souls are simple monads. 
(3) The activity of the monad consists essentially in representa- 
tion, i.e. every monad is Hke a mirror reflecting the whole universe 
more or less perfectly according to the degree of its perfec- 
tion. In the lowest monads this representation is unconscious; 
in the highest it is conscious, and the degrees of clearness vary 
with the perfection of every monad. God, the increated monad, 
knows everything perfectly. (4) Monads do not act on one an- 
other; their development is only from within, every monad unfold- 
ing its own energies. The order of the world is the result of a 
divinely preestablished harmony, (cf. p. 481) working in the best 
possible world, since God, infinitely perfect, would have acted 
without a sufficient reason if He had not created the best possible 
world. (5) Every monad is different from every other. There 
is a gradual transition by infinitesimal differences from one degree 
of perfection to another. (6) There are no innate actual ideas; 
yet, in a certain sense, all ideas are innate, namely, in the innate 
power of acquiring them. (Cf. pp. 100 ff.) 

Christian von Wolff (1679-1754) expounded and systematized 
the philosophy of Leibniz. 

3. A Reaction against Rationalism was due largely to the influ- 
ence of British empiricism, and contributed to the changes 
which took place at this time in French political and reUgious 
conditions. 

(a) Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (17 15-1780) follows Locke and 
teaches a psychological sensationalism. Instead of two sources 
of ideas admitted by Locke (sensation and reflection) he admits 
only one. External sensation is the primitive mental fact which 



584 HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY 

by various successive modifications gives rise to the most complex 
mental states. (Cf. pp. 98, 103 ff.) 

(6) Materialistic empiricism is represented by La Mettrie (1709- 
1751), who attacks especially the existence of the soul, and by the 
Encyclopedists (editors of, or writers in, the Encyclopedic), namely, 
Diderot (1713-1784), d'Alembert (1717-1783), d'Holbach (1723- 
1789), Cahanis (1757-1808). (Cf. p. 476.) 

(c) These views opened the way to atheism, or at least deism, 
which is represented especially by Voltaire (1694-1778). 

{d) Ethical sensualism, which reduces morality to egoistic pleas- 
ure, has for its main advocate the mater,*alist Helvetius (1715- 
1771). 

(e) Political philosophers of this period are chiefly Montesquieu 
(1689-1755) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). The lat- 
ter refers the origin of society to a social contract. (Cf . pp. 355 ff.) 



II. SECOND PERIOD 

I. German Philosophy 

I. Kant. — Immanuel Kant (i 724-1804), bom at Koenigsberg, 
was successively a student and a professor in the university of his 
native city'. In the first period of his philosophical life, he studied 
and taught the leading ideas of Leibniz, Wolff, Newton, and later 
became acquainted with the writings of Locke and Hume. Owing 
to these manifold influences, Kant's own doctrine was evolving 
gradually. It was made public in the second period of Kant's 
life, by the publication of his main works: "The Critique of Pure 
Reason," (1781), "The Critique of Practical Reason," (1788), 
"The Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" (1790). Here we 
shall deal only with this latter period, or period of Kant's critical 
philosophy, in which, he says, he was aroused from his dogmatic 
slumber by Hume's scepticism. 

(a) Critique of pure reason. Knowledge consists essentially 
in judgment, not analytic, since in analytic judgments the predi- 
cate is already contained in the subject, and therefore such judg- 
ments have no scientific value; nor synthetic a posteriori, since 



SECOND MODERN PERIOD 585 

such judgments refer only to concrete experience, and therefore 
cannot give the universal and necessary knowledge, which alone is 
scientific. It consists in synthetic a priori judgments, in which 
the predicate is neither contained in the subject, nor af&rmed of 
the subject simply on the ground of experience, but on account 
of the very structure of our faculties, hence necessarily and uni- 
versally. (Cf. pp. loi, 106, 109, 395 ff.) Kant passes now to 
the three parts of his work, transcendental aesthetic, transcen- 
dental analytic, and transcendental dialectic. 

(i) Transcendental (Esthetic (i.e. study of sense-knowledge). 
External objects alwe s appear to us in space, and internal experi- 
ences always in time. Space and time are a priori forms of our 
minds, and cannot be appUed to things-in-themselves (cf. p. 
394). Things are only the matter of knowledge, unknowable 
in themselves, since, in order to be known, they must reach the 
mind, and can reach it only through its a priori forms. 

(2) Transcendental analytic. Sense-knowledge is elaborated by 
the understanding which perceives manifold relations between 
various sense-experiences, and thus makes them scientific. These 
relations also depend on a priori forms or categories, twelve in 
number: imity, plurality, totality (referring to the quantity of 
judgments), reaUty, negation, limitation (referring to their quality); 
subsistence and inherence, causality and dependence, reciprocity 
(referring to their relations); possibility, existence, necessity, 
and their opposites (referring to their modality). Here again 
the conclusion is that we know only phenomena, but not nou- 
mena, i.e. things-as-they-appear, but not things-in-themselves. 
(Cf. pp. 396 flf.) 

(3) Transcendental dialectic. This knowledge in turn is re- 
duced by reason to three ideas, the world, the soul, and God, 
which are also a priori ideas. To take them for realities leads to 
antinomies or contradictions. 

{b) Critique of practical reason. The critique of pure reason led 
Kant to assert the impossibility of knowing the noumena. He 
turns now to practice and action, which is different from, and 
independent of, pure reason, (i) The moral law is absolute, 
universal, and necessary. It is expressed in conscience by the 



586 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

categorical imperative that dictates independently of any condi- 
tion and of any utilitarian or agreeable motive. (Cf. pp. 320 fiE.) 
(2) The existence of the moral law postulates freedom, since "Thou 
must" implies "Thou canst"; immortality, since virtue requires 
an adequate sanction; and the existence of a personal God as 
perfect holiness and justice. (3) Although these are noumena or 
things-in-themselves, and although they are unknowable for 
pure reason, they are nevertheless certain, because without 
them the moral law is impossible. (Cf. pp. 407 ff.) 

(c) Critique of the faculty of judgment. This faculty is inter- 
mediate between pure reason and practical reason. It applies to 
the phenomena of pure reason some a priori forms of practical 
reason, special to free agents, (i) Teleological judgments refer 
external phenomena to a purpose, and look upon them as adapted 
to an end. They serve to order and unify experience. (2) Es- 
thetic judgments refer external phenomena to our own subjective 
feelings of the beautiful and the sublime. All these judgments 
depend on the structure of the human mind. 

{d) Influence of Kant; immediate disciples and opponents. Of all 
the influences exercised on philosophy in the nineteenth century 
that of Kant is certainly the greatest, and most of the currents 
of thought that subsequently appeared were either developments 
of the Kantian theories or reactions against them. Among the 
immediate disciples of Kant are Reinhold (175 5- 1823), and the 
poet Schiller (1759-1805), the latter upholding especially Kant's 
aesthetic doctrines. Among his opponents are Herder (1744- 
1803), and Jacobi (1743-1819). 

(e) Kant admitted two elements in knowledge, one material, 
the thing-in-itself ; the other formal, the a priori form or category. 
But how can the phenomenon come from the noumenon? How 
can the objective and the subjective be reconciled? This dualism 
gave rise to two currents, critical idealism reducing even the thing- 
in-itself to a mental product, and critical reahsm reasserting the 
existence of the thing-in-itself. 

2. Idealism. — Three names especially are prominent, Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel. 

(a) Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) places the whole reality 



SECOND MODERN PERIOD 587 

in the subject, which is essentially activity and consciousness, 
(i) The ego, i.e. the universal self-consciousness, posits itself, 
that is, knows itself as existing and self -identical (thesis). (2) By 
reflection on its own activity, the ego posits the non-ego within 
itself, merely as an object of mental representation (antithesis). 
(3) The ego is aware that it is limited by the non-ego, and that 
the non-ego is limited by the ego (synthesis). In this whole 
process, the ego is the only reality, since the non-ego is but a 
modification of the ego. 

(b) Friedrich SchelUng (17 75-1 854) taught at Jena with Fichte. 
His thought varied in the course of his life, and he seems to have 
defended successively no less than five different systems. The 
most important and characteristic of these is the philosophy of 
identity, in which the subject and the object are identified in the 
same common reality, or Absolute, which is of itself indifferent to 
both the objective and the subjective point of view, and evolves 
into both. 

(c) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (i 770-1831) was Schelling's 
disciple at Jena, but soon abandoned his master's doctrine to 
develop his own absolute idealism. The object is not derived 
from the ego, as Fichte supposed, but from the absolute. This 
absolute is not indifferent, as Schelling claimed, it is thought and 
idea, since the rational element is the whole reality of things. 
This idea, however, is not necessarily, but only accidentally, 
conscious. In its abstract state it is the object of logic; in its exte- 
riorization, the object of the philosophy of nature; in its self-con- 
scious aspect, the object of the philosophy of mind, which studies 
the individual manifestations of the universal spirit, the evolu- 
tion of mankind and society (objective mind), and art, religion, 
and philosophy (absolute mind). Everything becomes, and the 
Idea or Spirit unfolds its potencies according to laws that are 
absolutely necessary. 

Among Hegel's followers some belong to the right party (Goe- 
schel, Rosenkranz, Erdmann), and admit the existence of a per- 
sonal God and the soul's immortality; others belong to the left 
{Strauss, Feuerbach), and are pantheists. 

3. Realism reasserts the existence of the thing-in-itself. (a) 



588 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

Herbart (1776-1841), professor at Gottingen, teaches the exist- 
ence and irreducible manifoldness of things. One of these Real- 
ities (Realen) is the individual human soul whose essential function 
is representation. Things external are unchangeable and iden- 
tical. It is the mind alone that establishes between them the many 
relations which we perceive. Prominent among the Herbartians 
are Drobish, Steinthal, and Lazarus. 

(b) Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), professor at Berlin, 
admits a priori forms of knowledge, namely, space, time, and 
causality. The thing-in-itself is essentially will, which is one and 
independent of a priori forms. In everything the fundamental 
reaUty is the will-to-be, or the will-to-live, and this will unfolds 
itself through existing things. In addition to this, Schopenhauer 
develops a pessimistic philosophy. One of his most important 
disciples is Von Hartmann. 

4. Materialism, as a reaction against idealism, was defended 
by Karl Vogt (1817-1895), Jakob Moleschott (1822-1893), and 
Ludwig Biichner (1824-1899), while Ernst Hceckel (bom 1834) 
defends an evolutionary monism. (Cf. pp. 476, 521.) 

5. Lotze (1817-1881) and Paulsen are Neo-Kantians, and 
Trendelenburg (1802-1872) tends to Aristotelianism. Baader, 
Froschammer, Gilnther, Gorres, who flourished in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, were Catholic philosophers, though they dif- 
fered on many important points. The distinctly neo-scholastic 
movement is represented by Kleutgen, Stockl, Tilmann Pesch, 
etc., in Germany. 

II, Scottish Philosophy 

Like Kantian philosophy, Scottish philosophy was a reaction 
against Hume's scepticism and Berkeley's idealism. Scottish 
philosophers base their dogmatism and their ethics on some innate 
sense or instinct, and claim that we know external things. Thomas 
Reid (1710-1796) asserts that "common sense" is the basis on 
which philosophy must be built, and common sense is not compat- 
ible with scepticism or idealism. Dugald Stewart (i 753-1828) 
holds essentially the same view, as also Thomas Brown (1778- 
1820) and James Mackintosh (1765-1832). William Hamilton 



SECOND MODERN PERIOD 589 

( 1 788-1 856) tries to combine the doctrines of Reid with those of 
Kant. (Cf. pp. 405, 310.) 

III. French Philosophy 

1. Spiritualism and Eclecticism. — The French materialism 
of the latter part of the eighteenth century was followed by a 
spiritualistic reaction. The distinction of reason from sense-knowl- 
edge, the spirituality of the soul, the existence of a personal God, 
and the spiritual basis of morality were recognized. The main 
representatives of this school were Maine de Biran (1766-1824), 
who emphasizes the importance of the will; Royer-Collard (1763- 
1845), who introduced into France the leading principles of the 
Scottish school; Victor Cousin (1792-1867), who sought to combine 
the main systems of philosophy into one harmonious synthesis, 
and hence gave a prominent part to the history of philosophy. He 
was thus the head of the school known as Eclecticism. Among 
his main followers were Theodore Jouffroy (1796-1842), Damiron 
(1794-1862), Gamier (1801-1864), Paul Janet (1823-1899). 

2. Traditionalism was a Catholic reaction against materialism 
and rationalism. It minimized the value of personal reason and 
advocated the common consent of mankind, based on a divine 
revelation, as a safer basis of certitude. Joseph de Maistre (1754- 
1821) dealt chiefly with political and religious problems. De 
Bonald (i 754-1840) is looked upon as the founder of the tra- 
ditionalistic school. Besides expounding the Catholic doctrine 
of society in opposition to the principles of the French Rev- 
olution, he claimed that language is absolutely prerequired 
for thought, and as a consequence, that it must have been revealed 
by God, and together with it, the truths which it expresses. Hence 
the criterion of truth is tradition based on primitive revelation. 
Felicite de Lamennais (1782-18 54) holds that the criterion of truth 
is universal tradition or collective reason. Traditional principles, 
sometimes in a mitigated form, were also held by Bautain (1796- 
1867), Bonnetty (1798-1879) and others who mingled it with some 
tenets of ontologism, that is, of a system developed chiefly in Italy, 
and according to which we know all things in God. (Cf. pp. 105, 
126, 403.) 



590 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

3. Positivism is but a slightly modified form of sensational- 
ism and empiricism, insisting chiefly on the epistemological aspect 
of knowledge. Its founder is Auguste Comte (i 798-1857), who, in 
his "Cours de philosophic positive," claims that human thought 
passed through three successive stages: (i) The theological stage, 
in which phenomena are explained by the activities of divinities 
and supernatural agents. (2) The metaphysical stage, in which 
they are explained by abstract principles, such as essences, causes, 
substances, forms, souls, etc. (3) The positive stage, in which 
they are explained by their concrete antecedents and laws. This 
is the only valid knowledge, limiting itself to facts and their rela- 
tions. Metaphysical, religious, and moral questions are idle 
when they try to transcend facts. Later on, Comte founded 
a pojntive religion, or religion of humanity. Among the main 
positivists are Littre (1801-1881) and Taine (1828-1893). 

4. Various Tendencies. — (i) Social questions are in the fore- 
ground to-day. Among the precursors of modern socialism (cf. 
pp. 347 ff.) may be mentioned Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Charles 
Fourier (177 2- 183 7), Pierre Leroux (1797-1871), who propose 
more or less radical, social, and industrial reforms. (2) Neo- 
scholasticism finds many representatives, and its influence is 
felt even where it does not predominate. (3) Neo-criticists 
(Renouvier, Secretan, etc.) modify Kant's doctrine in a dogmatic 
direction, at least with regard to certain metaphysical truths. 

IV. Italian and Spanish Philosophy 

In Italy, Galuppi (17 70-1 846) professed a kind of criticism which, 
on many points, is akin to that of Kant. Rosmini (1797-1855) 
teaches that the intuition of the ideal and universal being is the 
form of thought. Hence it does not come from experience, but 
is innate. Although Rosmini rejects ontologism and pantheism, 
his system seems to lead to these consequences. Ontologism is 
the doctrine that we have a direct primitive intuition of God, by 
means of which all other things are known. It is represented 
especially by Gioherti (1801-1852). Among the pioneers of neo- 
scholasticism are Liberatore (1810-1892), Cornoldi (1822-1892), 
Sanseverino (1811-1865). 



SECOND MODERN PERIOD 591 

In Spain, Balmes (1810-1848) and Donoso Cortes (1809-1853) 
defend spiritualistic philosophy, and harmonize philosophy and 
religion. 

V. English and American Philosophy 

1. Associationism. — Among associationists are David Hart- 
ley (1705-1757) and Joseph Priestly (1733-1804), whose doctrine 
shows a marked tendency toward materialism; James Mill (1773- 
1836) and his son John Stuart Mill (1806-1873); Alexander Bain 
(181 8-1903). All reduce even the highest forms of knowledge 
to associations of images. (Cf, pp. 96 ff., 99, 112 ff.) As we 
can know nothing which is not given in experience, associationism 
leads to empiricism and positivism. (Cf. p. 382,) Moreover, 
whatever transcends experience is unknowable; hence agnosti- 
cism. In addition to their theory of knowledge, Stuart Mill and 
Bain advocate a utilitarian morality, as had been done before by 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). (Cf. pp. 315 ff.) 

2. Evolutionism. — The theory of evolution started with La- 
place (i 749-1827) for the inorganic world (nebular hypothesis), 
and Lamarck (1744-18 2 9) for the organic world. Both were 
French. But it was in England that the main impetus was given 
to transformism (cf. pp. 444 ff.) by Charles Darwin (1809-1882) 
and his followers, Alfred Russell Wallace (born 1822), George Ro- 
manes (1848-1894), Thomas Huxley (1825-1895), Saint George 
Mivart (1827-1900) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). 

Spencer, in his ''Synthetic Philosophy," covers a far wider 
ground, (i) Under the phenomena lies an unknowable reality, 
whose modes only are knowable (agnosticism. Cf. pp. 376, 
513, 530.) (2) The same universal force manifests itself through- 
out all phenomena. Sensation is ultimately a nervous shock, 
and the highest knowledge is but an association of ideas (asso- 
ciationism. Cf. pp. 96, 99, 112.) (3) Not only are physical 
and mental processes results of a universal evolution, but to 
evolution must also be reduced all social moral, and religious 
developments (evolutionism). 

3. Idealism is represented by Thomas Carlyle (i 795-1881), 
John Caird (1820-1898), Thomas Green (1836-1882). 



592 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

4. American Philosophers. — Among American philosophers, 
exclusive of those now existing, mention must be made of Jona- 
than Edwards (i 703-1 758); Benjamin Franklin (i 706-1 790); 
James McCosh (1811-1894) who defended a theory of knowledge 
akin to that of Reid; Noah Porter (1811-1892), who also adheres 
to many tenets of the Scottish School; Orestes Brownson (1803- 
1876), who, after being successively a member of several Protes- 
tant denominations, became a Catholic; John Fiske (1S42-1901), 
who adheres to cosmic evolutionism. 



CONCLUSION 

(a) The history of philosophy, presenting, as it does, a succes- 
sion of so many systems, frequently completing one another, fre- 
quently also antagonistic and irreconcilable, might well make one 
doubt whether philosophical truth can ever be reached. Are so 
many efforts fruitless? Is the human mind condemned forever 
to seek the truth without ever finding it? From this point of view 
it is true that the constant conflict of philosophical schools is rather 
disheartening. But there is another point of view. Light comes 
from the friction of two stones. So also in philosophy, the conflict 
of systems tends to show in what respect they may be defective or 
exaggerated, and to make the element of truth which they con- 
tain more secure. Without asserting that every error is but an 
incomplete truth, it may safely be asserted that every erroneous 
system contains a great many truths. 

(b) Notwithstanding, or rather owing to, the incessant clash of 
systems, philosophy progresses, and, slow as it is, its advance is 
nevertheless real. Throughout the ages, the same problems 
come back incessantly, and the attempts to solve them present 
the same divergences. Any actual system or theory can be traced 
back to past systems and theories, but every reappearance of a 
view and tendency shows a development. The human mind does 
not turn around like a squirrel in its cage to come back to exactly 
the same point. Its movement is rather spiral-shaped, always 
widening, embracing more and more, and yet ever turning so as 
to face again the same problems. 

(c) Will philosophy ever be one? Will philosophers ever agree 
at least on a group of essential principles? If we forecast the 
future by what we know of the past, this is not likely. Too many 
influences are at work. As the highest science, philosophy receives 
contributions from too many sources, and these respective contri- 
butions affect different minds in too many different ways to make 

39 593 



594 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

the epoch of philosophical agreement one whose near advent 
can be predicted. Conflict will remain as a proof of the weakness 
of the human mind, but also as an element of progress. It con- 
tributes to the accuracy of expression, and to the revision of opinions 
which were not sufficiently examined nor subjected to a thorough 
criticism. 

(d) Hence historical contradictions, while showing errors of the 
human mind, should also be a source of encouragement toward a 
sincere and honest search for truth. They can frequently be 
traced back to prejudices, one-sided views, and exclusive atten- 
tion to one aspect of a complex problem. To recognize the source 
of an error is the first step toward correcting it. To free the mind 
from error, to proceed farther and farther, and to rise higher and 
higher, must be the aim of every man. The unwearying search 
for truth must be the endeavor of every human intelligence, with 
the help of the "true light which enlighteneth every man coming 
into this world." 



GENERAL CONCLUSION 



The problems outlined in this course of philosophy are so nu- 
merous, so complex, and so varied that it is impossible to view 
them at one glance. Yet it is interesting to retrace the general 
lines of this vast panorama. The observer on the top of a hill 
has on all sides a wide horizon within which a mmiber of objects 
are visible: a forest, a town, a road, a field, a meadow, etc. But 
only the main outlines are seen, and in a general way; the details 
cannot be perceived. The observer may go down, and observe 
a group of objects more in detail, e.g. the general appearance of the 
forest or city, by moving around or through it. Again, one tree 
may be selected for a more special examination; then each part of 
it, till, through the help of the microscope and other instruments, 
its finest details are known. What we want now is to observe 
from the summit of the hill, so as to glance at the most general 
outlines of the philosophical horizon, including the physical 
universe, man, and God. 

I. The Universe 

I. Unity Amid Diversity. — How little man knows about the 
universe, about those millions of worlds in which our earth is but 
an atom! To look at the stars fills the mind with amazement, 
and yet we see nothing of their details, and a great number are 
altogether invisible. How little we know even about the planet 
on which we live! We see only its surface. Its past and future 
are hidden from us, and every one of the various beings that 
compose it, or live on it, includes countless mysteries. 

Yet what we know is enough to manifest at the same time a most 
harmonious variety and a most diversified unity. Variety in 
the inorganic and the organic world. Unity because we see every- 
where harmonious action and interaction, and gradual transitions. 

595 



596 GENERAL CONCLUSION 

Far as it is from the other planets and from the sun, the earth is 
in close relation with them and with the rest of creation. Nothing 
in the world is isolated, but everywhere all things are related. 
On the earth these relations are seen more in detail. Things 
change more or less rapidly, but they change constantly. In- 
organic matter is assimilated by organisms to return again to 
the inorganic world. Everything serves a purpose. Everywhere 
activities are exchanged. 

2. Laws and Causes. — All changes take place according to 
fixed laws which govern their occurrence. These laws are expres- 
sions of the mode of causality of various beings. What is a cause? 
It is a being applying, consciously or unconsciously, its energy to 
the production of some result. Here again, how narrow the 
point of view of man who is obliged to place certain stops 
in the uninterrupted flux of things. Why did A die? Because 
B shot him, we say, and we are satisfied with the answer. Yet 
the immediate cause of death was the internal hemorrhage, or 
some other similar organic result due to the presence of the bul- 
let. The pulling of the trigger, the explosion of the powder, the 
impulse given to the bullet, etc., are so many intermediaries be- 
tween the murderer and death. And beyond the murderer, in 
his feelings at the time of the deed, and away back in his past, in 
his early education, in the dispositions which he inherited, etc., 
many causes have contributed to the present result. 

The same is true of every occurrence. We are obliged to look 
at things from the point of view from which they interest us most, 
and according to the limitations of our knowledge as to time and 
space; limitations which make man incapable of seeing all 
influences, of tracing back the series of causes in nature, and of 
following all their results. The list of "whys," "wherefroms," 
"wheretos," even of the smallest events is inexhaustible, and 
hence our necessity of stopping without ever knowing anything 
completely. 

Natural laws and causes are utilized by man for his own 
purposes. Freedom does not change them, but simply adapts 
them. Art always supposes and is based on nature, without 
ever modifying its intrinsic energies and laws. 



THE UNIVERSE, MAN, GOD 597 

II. Man 

1. In Himself. — Not only does nature present many mysteries 
to man ; man is the greatest mystery to himself, so complex in struc- 
ture, so manifold in activity, that the study of self is a never-end- 
ing task, and yet the condition of true progress. Physiological 
and mental functions, lower and higher faculties, organic and 
mental complexity, make of him one harmonious whole, different 
from everything else. Faculties of knowledge, feeling, and activity 
are intimately correlated, all originating from the same substan- 
tial unity composed of matter and spirit. Earthly by his organ- 
ism, heavenly by his soul, man is obliged to cling to the earth, 
and yet cannot help feeling that his destiny is higher and nobler 
than that of other organisms. 

2. In the Universe. — The earth is small when compared to the 
rest of the imiverse; man is small on the earth. What is one man 
among the countless men who now exist or who have existed in 
the past? Yet how great when we consider his faculties, and his 
spiritual soul which is a spark of the Eternal Light. Man, it is 
true, is the plaything of nature, powerless in the face of its tremen- 
dous energies. And yet man is able, in many things, to conquer 
and subdue natural agencies, and make them serve his own ends. 
Rising above space and time, his intelligence reaches abstract and 
universal laws, and it is this mode of knowledge which is the basis 
of specifically human activities. Similar to animals in his physio- 
logical functions, he is different from them because some of his 
activities escape the determinism of matter. Hence man alone is 
capable of morality, for he alone can know the distinction between 
right and wrong conduct, and he alone is responsible for his actions. 
And all these activities point to the fact that this life on earth is 
not complete, but calls for a complement hereafter. It is chiefly 
this hope which in all circumstances gives to life its full value, and 
truly makes it worth living. 

III. God 

I. Supreme Cause. — (a) God is the first cause of nature and 
of its laws, distinct from it and transcending it. And not only 



598 GENERAL CONCLUSION 

must He be placed at the beginning of the world, but He is still 
governing and ruling His works whose activity and energy sup- 
pose His, and are derived from His. Whatever exists in the uni- 
verse, whatever is real, is a derived reality, and this derivation 
from the common source of all things leads man to some knowledge 
of God's perfections, however imperfect such knowledge must 
remain. Yet the beauty and perfections of the effect must evi- 
dently be attributed to the cause, even when this cause is so far 
above its effects that these present only dim indications of its 
infinite perfection. 

(b) God is the first principle of truth. Not in the sense that 
truth depends exclusively on God's will, as Descartes claimed, 
in such a way that if God had willed it otherwise, two and two 
would not be four; but in the sense that true and real are identical, 
and that God being the principle of reality is also the principle of 
truth. God could not make two plus two to equal five because 
this supposed relation expresses nothing real. It is not so, and 
hence cannot be derived from the principle of reality. God knows 
Himself first, and in Himself, the various realities or truths that 
are finite realizations of the divine mind's exemplars. 

(c) It is also God who is the first principle of the moral law. All 
essences, including man, are ultimately based on the divine es- 
sence. The moral law, therefore, which governs man according 
to his rational nature, is based on God, the author of nature, and 
the infinite good from which every other good is derived. 

{d) Finally, God is the cause of the social order, since man 
naturally lives in society, and society requires an authority. Yet 
no man has of himself the right to give orders to his fellowmen. 
For a man to obey another man is to debase himself. But "let 
every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is no power but 
from God, and those that are ordained by God" (Rom. xiii. i). 
When those who command are looked upon as representatives of 
God, submission to them becomes honorable, 

2. Ultimate End. — In creating, God could propose to Him- 
self no other end but Himself. "The heavens shew forth the 
glory of God." Even inanimate creation manifests the divine 
perfections, but man is the spokesman of creation. He can know 



THE UNIVERSE, MAN, GOD 599 

his maker, and must entertain toward Him the feelings of rever- 
ence, praise, thanksgiving, etc., which are due to Him. Reason 
shows only in an imperfect way the final relations of man to God, 
but revelation completes the data of reason; the supernatural order 
is added to the natural, and perfects it; man knows his higher 
destiny and is given the means to reach it. Of the whole universe 
in general, and of man in particular, God is the First Cause and 
the Ultimate End, "Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the 
beginning and the end" (Apoc. xxii. 13). 



APPENDIX 

IT is important that the student's mind should be trained to 
personal thinking. For this reason the following thoughts are 
suggested as topics for papers and discussions. Many of them are 
true; others are false; all must be explained and interpreted. A 
number of other subjects can easily be found in connection with 
the different lessons of the text-book. Some of those that are 
given here may be found too difficult, but, however imperfect at 
first the student's attempt to treat them may be, they will oblige 
him to think for himself, and thereby contribute to his mental 
development. 

From time to time the whole class may be given the same sub- 
ject, thus affording an opportunity for the comparison of different 
viewpoints. Generally it will be found profitable to assign the 
paper to one student — perhaps two — who should be given ample 
time to think it out and write it. He should then read it in class 
and, under the professor's direction, the other students should 
express their views on both the paper and the subject itself. 

Special attention should be given to clearness of thought and 
expression, logical sequence of ideas, careful preparation of the 
plan, etc. 

1. Studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines 
senserint, sed qualiter se habeat Veritas rerum. — St. Thomas, In lib. 
I de Coelo, lect. XXII. 

2. Nee vero probate soleo id quod de Pythagoreis accepimus: quos 
ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex eis quaereretur quare 
ita esset, respondere solitos: Ipse dixit; "ipse" autem erat Pythagoras. 
— Cicero, De nat. deor. I, 5. 

3. Errare malo cum Platone quam cum istis vera sentire. — Cicero, 
Tusc. Quaest. I, xvii, 39. 

Though both [Plato and truth] are dear to me, it is my duty to prefer 
truth. — Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I, vi, i. 

601 



6o2 APPENDIX 

4. I think ... I can make it plain . . . that there are at least six per- 
sonalities distinctly to be recognized as taking part in that dialogue 
between John and Thomas. 

1. The real John; known only to his Maker. 

2. John's ideal John; never the real one, and often 
Three Johns. very unlike him. 

Thomas's ideal John, never the real John, nor 
John's John, but often very unlike either. 

II. The real Thomas. 
2. Thomas's ideal Thomas. 
3. John's ideal Thomas. 
— O. W. Holmes, The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table, III. 

5. NoU nimis in sensu tuo confidere, sed veUs etiam hbenter aliorum 
sensum audire. — Imit. Christi, I, ix, 2. 

6. Qui bene seipsum cognoscit sibi ipsi vilescit. — Imit. Christi, I, ii, i. 

7. lUud yvw0L a-cavrSv noH putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solixm 
esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus. — Cicero, Ad Q. 
fratrem. III, 6. 

8. Ita natura comparatum est ut altius iniuriae quam merita des- 
cendant, et ilia cito defluant, has tenax memoria custodiat. — Seneca, 
De benef. 1, i. 

g. Things without aU remedy 

Should be without regard; what's done is done. 

Shakespeare, Macbeth, III, 2. 
What's gone, and what's past help, 
Shovdd be past grief. 

Id. Winter's Tale, III, 2. 

10. Pleasure and action make the hours seem short. — Shakespeare, 
Othello, II, 3. 

11. A man shovdd never be ashamed to own he has been in the wrong, 
which is but saying in other words that he is wiser to-day than he was 
yesterday. — Swift, Thoughts on Various Subjects. 

12. Tell (for you can) what is it to be wise? 
'Tis but to know how little can be known. 
To see all others' faults, and feel our own. 

Pope, Essay on Man, IV, 261. 

13. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando, quam raticnis, 
momenta quaerenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis qui discere 
volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur. — Cicero, De nat. 
dear. I, 5. 



SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 603 

14. (Hi non viderunt) hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad 
intelligendum et ad agendum esse natum. — Cicero, De fin. II, 13. 

15. I find the great thing in this world is not so much where we stand 
as in what direction we are moving. — Holmes, The Autocrat oj the 
Breakfast Table, IV. 

16. Onerat discentem turba [Ubrorum], non instruit; mul toque 
satius est paucis te auctoribus tradere quam errare per multos. — 
Seneca, De tranquil, an. IX. 

Non refert quam multos [libros], sed quam bonos, habeas; lectio certa 
prodest, varia delectat. — Id. Epist. 45. 

17. Read not to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for 
granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. — 
Bacon, Essays, Of Studies. 

18. A man may have a great mass of knowledge, but if he has not 
worked it up by thinking it over for himself, it has much less value than 
a far smaller amount which he has thoroughly pondered. — Schopen- 
hauer, Essay On Thinking for One's Self. 

19. Homo autem (quod rationis est particeps per quam consequentia 
cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones 
non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit 
atque annectit futuras) facile totius vitae cursum videt, ad eamque 
degendam praeparat res necessarias. — Cicero, De offic. 1, 4. 

20. Scilicet et fluvius, qui non est maximus, ei est 
Qui non ante aliquem maiorem vidit; et ingens 
Arbor, homoque videtur, et omnia de genere omni, 
Maxima quae vidit quisque, haec ingentia fingit. 

Lucretius, De rerum nat. VI, 674. 

21. Neque hoc quidquam est turpius quam cognitioni et per- 
ceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere. — Cicero, Acad. 
I, 12. 

22. The heart has its own reasons of which reason has no knowledge. 
— Pascal, Pensees, P. H, art. xvii, 62. 

23. Causarum ignoratioinrenova mirationemfacit; eadem ignoratio 
si in rebus usitatis est, non miramur. — Cicero, De divinat. II, 22. 

24. A great mistake: for a man to think himself greater than he is, 
and to value himself less than he deserves. — Goethe, Maxims. 

25. There is danger in showing man his equality with animals with- 
out showing him his greatness. There is danger also in insisting too 
much on his greatness without showing him his littleness. There is 
a still greater danger in leaving him in the ignorance of both. But 



6o4 APPENDIX 

there is a great advantage in showing him both. — Pascal, Pensies, P. I, 
art. iv, 7. 

26. Quid importat sollicitudo de futuris contingentibus? . . . Vanum 
est et inutUe de futuris conturbari vel gratulari quae forte nunquam 
evenient. — Imit. Christi, III, xxx, 2. 

27. Past, and to come, seem best; things present, worst. — Shake- 
speare, // Henry /F, I, 3. 

28. With regard to the estimation of a man's greatness, mental 
nature obeys a law which is the reverse of that of physical nature. The 
former is increased, the latter decreased, by distance. — Schopenhauer, 
Parerga und Paralipomena, II. 

29. Self-love ... is not so vile a sin as self-neglecting. — Shakespeare, 
Henry V, II, 4. 

30. To business that we love we rise betime, 
And go to 't with delight. 

Shakespeare, Anthony and Cleopatra, IV, 4. 

31. If all the year were playing holidays. 
To sport would be as tedious as to work. 

Shakespeare, / Henry IV, I, 2. 

32. Two principles in hiunan nature reign: 
Self-love to urge, and reason to restrain. 

Pope, Essay on Man, II, 54. 

33. Communi fit vitio naturae ut invisis, latitantibus atque incognitis 
rebus magis confidamus, vehementiusque exterreamur. — CiESAR, De 
bello civ. II, 4. 

34. Plus dolet quam necesse est qui ante dolet quam necesse est. — 
Seneca, Epist. 95. 

35. Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis, 
E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem. 

Non quia vexari quemquam est iucunda voluptas, 
Sed quibus ipse maUs careas quia cernere suave est. 

Lucretius, De rerum nat. II, i. 

36. Hoc modo magnanimitas est circa honores, ut videlicet studeat 
ea facere quae sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut pro magno aestimet 
humanum honorem. — St. Thomas, Sum. theol. II-II, Q. 129, art. 
i, ad 3. 

37. Male enim respondent coacta ingenia; reluctante natura, irritus 
labor est. — Seneca, De tranquillit. animi, VI. 

38. Maiora cupimus quo maiora venerunt . . . ut flammae infinito 
acrior vis est quo ex maiore incendio emicuit. Aeque ambitio non 



SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 605 

patitur quemquam in ea mensura honorum conquiescere quae quondam 
eius fuit impudens votum. . . . Ultra se cupiditas porrigit, et felicitatem 
suam non intelligit, quia non unde venerit respicit, sed quo tendat, — 
Seneca, De benef. II, 27. 

39. Endeavor to conquer yourself rather than fortune, and to change 
your desires rather than the order of the world. — Descartes, Discours 
de la mSthode, P. Ill, 3d maxim. 

40. Obstinacy is the result of the will forcing itself into the place of 
the intellect. — Schopenhauer, Essays, Psychological Observations. 

41. Men's thoughts are much according to their inclination; their 
discourse and speeches according to their learning and infused opinions; 
but their deeds are after as they have been accustomed. — Bacon, 
Essays, Of Custom and Education. 

42. Qui blandiendo dulce nutrivit malum 
Sere recusat ferre quod subiit iugmn. 

Seneca, Eippolytus, I, 134. 

43. For every animal, and more especially for man, a certain con- 
formity and proportion between the will and the intellect is necessary 
for existing or making any progress in the world. — Schopenhauer, 
Essays, Psychological Observations. 

44. Efficiendum est ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque neque 
praecurrant nee propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque 
tranquilli atque omni perturbatione animi careant. — Cicero, De 
offic. I, 29, 

45. Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules 
Passions, desires and fears, is more a king. 

Milton, Paradise Regained, II, 466. 

46. Resiste in principio inclinationi tuae, et malam dedisce consue- 
tudinem, ne forte paulatim ad maiorem te ducat difficultatem. — Imit. 
Christi, I, xi, 5. 

47. Ad istud dUigenter tendere debes . . . ut sis dominus actionum 
tuarum et rector, non servus nee emptitius. — Imit. Christi, III, 
xxxviii, I. 

48. Use almost can change the stamp of nature, 
And either curb the devil or throw him out 
With wondrous potency. 

Shakespeare, Hamlet, III, 4. 

49. A little fire is quickly trodden out, 
Which, being suffered, rivers cannot quench. 

Shakespeare, /// Henry VI, IV, 8. 



6o6 APPENDIX 

50. Certa viriliter; consuetude consuetudine vincitur. — Imit. 
Christi, I, xxi, 2. 

51. 'Tis education forms the common mind; 
Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclined. 

Pope, Moral Essays, I, 149. 

52. The will of man is by his reason sway'd. — Shakespeare, A 
Midsummer Night's Dream, II, 3. 

53. Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret, 
Et mala perrumpet furtim fastidia victrix. 

Horace, Epist. I, x, 24. 

54. He that compHes against his will 
Is of his own opinion still. 

Butler, Hudihras, III, 3, 547. 

55. Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur 
Cum mala per longas convaluere moras. 

Ovid, Remed. Amor. 91. 

56. Discipulus est prioris posterior dies. — Publius Syrus. 

57. Viamque insiste domandi 
Dum faciles animi iuvenum, dum mobilis aetas. 

Vergil, Georg. Ill, 164. 

58. A man's nature is best perceived in priyateness, for there is no 
affectation; in passion, for that putteth a man out of his precepts; and 
in a new case or experiment, for there custom leaveth him. — Bacon, 
Essays, Of Nature in Men. 

59. Vita hominum altos recessus magnasque latebras habet. — Pliny 
THE Younger, Epist. Ill, 3. 

60. No man can justly censure or condemn another, because indeed 
no man truly knows another. — Browne, Religio Medici, P. II, 4. 

61. Children have neither past nor future; but, as scarcely 
ever happens to us, they enjoy the present. — La Bruyere, 
Caracteres, II. 

62. Oportet te igitur aliorum graviora ad mentem reducere ut levius 
feras tua minima. — Ijnit. Christi, III, xix, i. 

63. They say best men are moulded out of faults. — Shakespeare, 
Measure for Measure, V, i. 

64. Some are born great; some achieve greatness, and some have 
greatness thrust upon them. — Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, 11, 5. 

65. Men are the sport of circumstances, when 
The circumstances seem the sport of men. 

Byron, Don Juan, Canto V, St. 17. 



SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 607 

Man is not the creature of circumstances. Circumstances are the 
creatures of men. — Disraeli, Vivian Grey, B. VI, ch. 7. 

66. Ita vita est hominum, quasi cum ludas tesseris; 
Si Ulud, quod maxime opus est iactu, non cadit, 
Illud, quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas. 

Terence, Adelphi, IV, vii, 21. 

67. The fire in the flint shows not till it be struck. — Shakespeare, 
Timon of Athens, I, i. 

68. Thoughts are but dreams tUl their effects be tried. — Shake- 
speare, Lucrece, St. 51. 

69. The moon being clouded presently is missed, , 
But little stars may hide them when they list. 

Shakespeare, Lucrece, St. 144. 

70. Indeed man is a being wonderfully vain, complex and vacillating. 
It is difficult to find in him a basis for a constant and uniform judgment. 
— Montaigne, Essais, I, i . 

71. (Montaigne recommends traveUing in order that we may) "rub 
and poUsh our brains against the brains of others." — Montaigne, 
Essais, I, 24. 

72. Nimiimi altercando Veritas amittitur. — Publius Syr us. 

73. 'Tis with our judgments as our watches; none 
Go just aUke, yet each believes his own. 

Pope, Essay on Criticism, 9. 

74. What's in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet. 

Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, II, 2. 

75. Give every man thine ear, but few thy voice; 
Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment. 

Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1, 3. 

76. Veritatis simplex oratio est. — Seneca, Epist. 49. 

77. It is not enough to have a good understanding; the main thing 
is to apply it properly. — Descartes, Discours de la methode, I. 

78. Nescire quaedam magna pars scientiae. — Publius Syr us. 

79. Videndum est non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid 
quisque sentiat, atque etiam qua de causa quisque sentiat. — Cicero, 
De offic. I, 41. 

80. Idem enim vitii habet nimia quod nuUa divisio; simile 
confuso est quidquid usque in pulverem sectum est. — Seneca, 
Epist. 89. 

81. One must know how to doubt where necessary, affirm where 



6o8 APPENDIX 

necessary, submit where necessary. To do otherwise is to misvinder- 
stand the role of reason. — Pascal, Pensees, P. II, art. vi, i. 

82. If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but 
if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties. — 
Bacon, Projicience and Advancement of Learning, B. I. 

83. Where men of judgment creep and feel their way, 
The positive pronounce without dismay. 

CowPER, Conversation, 145. 

84. The will is one of the main instruments of behef ; not that it is 
the source of behef, but that things appear true or false according to the 
point of view from which they are seen. — Pascal, Pensees, I, vi, 13. 

85. Veritati ahquid extremum est; error immensus est. — Seneca, 
Excerpta. 

86. Quod fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt. — CiESAR, 
De bello Gall. Ill, 18. 

87. Veritas visu et mora, falsa festinatione at incertis valescimt. — 
Tacitus, Annal., 11, 39. 

88. Words are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them; 
but they are the money of fools. — Hobbes, Leviathan, I, iv. 

89. Nothing is so easy as to deceive oneself, for a man readily beheves 
what he wishes, but this behef is frequently in opposition with the facts. 
— Demosthenes, Olynth. Ill, 19. 

90. Be calm in arguing; for fierceness makes 
Error a fault, and truth discourtesie. 

G. Herbert, The Temple, The Church Porch. 

91. Qualis unusquisque intus est, taUter iudicat exterius. — Imit. 
Christi, II, iv, 2. 

92. The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself 
to be a fool. — Shakespeare, As You Like It, V, i. 

93. Sic est vulgus: ex veritate pauca, ex opinione multa aestimat. — 
Cicero, Orat. pro Q. Rose. Com. X. 

94. Qviid maiore fide porro quam sensus haberi 
Debet? An ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit 
Dicere eos contra, quae tota ab sensibus orta est? 
Qui nisi sint veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis. 

Lucretius, De rerum nat. IV, 483. 

95. Ut necesse est lancem in hbra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic 
animum perspicuis cedere. — Cicero, Acad. II, 12. 

96. Non enim tam auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta 
quaerenda simt. — Cicero, De natura deor. I, 5. 



SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 609 

97. Assiduitate quotidiana et consuetudine oculorum assuescunt 
animi, neque admirantur, neque requirunt rationes earum rerum quas 
semper vident; proinde quasi no vitas nos magis quam magnitudo rerum 
debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare. — Cicero, De nat. deor. II, 38. 

98. Ipsa consuetudo assentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. 

— Cicero, Acad. II, 21. 

99. Duo cum idem faciunt, saepe ut possis dicere: 
Hoc licet impune facere huic, illi non licet; 

Non quod dissimilis res sit, sed quod is qui facit. 

Terence, Adelphi, V, iii, 37. 

100. Nescimus saepe quid possumus, sed tentatio aperit quid sumus. 

— Imit. Christi, I, xiii, 5, 

loi. Mane propone, vespere discute mores tuos. — Imit. Christi, 
I, xix, 4. 

102. Saepe malum facilius quam bonum de alio creditur et dicitur; 
ita infirmi sumus. — Imit. Christi, I, iv, i. 

103. Nam qualitercumque ordinavero de pace mea, non potest esse 
sine bello et dolore vita mea. — Imit. Christi, III, xii, i. 

104. When men are friends there is no need of justice, but when they 
are just, they still need friendship. — Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VIII, i. 

105. If our virtues 
Did not go forth of us, 'twere all ahke 
As if we had them not. 

Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, I, i. 

106. The ruhng passion, be it what it wUl, 
The ruling passion conquers reason still. 

Pope, Moral Essays, Ep. Ill, 153. 

107. There is some soul of goodness in things evil. 
Would men observingly distil it out. 

Shakespeare, Henry V, IV, i. 

108. Reputation is an idle and most false imposition; oft got without 
merit, and lost without deserving. — Shakespeare, Othello, II, 3. 

109. To thine own self be true; 
And it must follow, as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man. 

Shakespeare, Hamlet, I, 3. 
no. Fine art is that in which the hand, the head, and the heart go 
together. — Ruskin, The Two Paths, lect. 2. 

III. Omnis ars imitatio est naturae. — Seneca, Epist. 65. 

Art is the perfection of nature. — Browne, Religio Medici, I, 16. 
40 



6lO APPENDIX 

112. Beggars mounted run their horse to death. — Shakespeare, 
/// Henry VI, I, 4. 

113. Were man but constant, he were perfect. — Shakespeare, The 
Two Gentlemen of Verona, V, 4. 

114. Striving to better, oft we mar what's well. — Shakespeare, 
King Lear, I, 4. 

115. Know thou this, — that men 
Are as the time is. 

Shakespeare, King Lear, V, 3. 

116. There is no vice so simple but assumes 
Some mark of virtue on his outward parts. 

Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, III, 2. 

117. That in the captain's but a choleric word 
Which in the soldier is flat blasphemy. 

Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, II, 2. 

118. Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui 
Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. 

Horace, Epist. I, vi, 15. 
1x9. The laws of conscience, which we say are born of nature, are 
bom of custom. — Montaigne, Essais, I, 22. 

120. Est modus in rebus; sunt certi denique fines 
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum. 

Horace, Sat. I, i, 106. 

121. Quot homines tot sententiae; suus cuique mos. — Terence, 
Phorm. II, iv, 14. 

122. Gloria nostra est testimonium conscientiae nostrae. — St. Paul, 
II Cor. I, 12. 

123. Mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam omnium sermo. — Cicero, 
Ad Attic. XII, 28. 

124. Lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum. . . . Regula autem 
at mensura humanorum actuum est ratio. — St. Thomas, Sum. theol. 
I-II, Q. 90, art. i. 

125. Omnino si quidquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam 
aequabUitas universae vitae timri singularium actionum; quam conser- 
vare non possis si aUorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. — Cicero, 
De offic. I, 31. 

126. Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas; ab hac enim est 
actio. Rursus voluntas non erit recta nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit; 
ab hoc enim est voluntas. — Seneca, Epist. 95. 

127. Maximum hoc habemus naturae meritum quod virtus in omnium 



SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 6ll 

animos lumen suum permittit; etiam qui non sequuntur illam vident. — 
Seneca, De benef. IV, 17. 

128. Aequam memento rebus in arduis 
Servare mentem, non secus in bonis 

Ab insolenti temperatam 
Laetitia. 

Horace, Odes, 11, 3. 

129. Ira furor brevis est; animmn rege, qui, nisi paret, 
Imperat; himc frenis, hunc tu compesce catena. 

Horace, Epist. I, ii, 62. 

130. Non est, crede mihi, sapientis dicere: vivam. 
Sera nimis vita est crastina; vive hodie. 

Martial, Epigr. I, 16. 

131. Ut quisque est vir optimus, ita difficUlime esse alios improbos 
suspicatur. — Cicero, Ad Q. frairem, 1, i, 4. 

132. Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. — Vergil, Georg. II, 
490. 

133. Prudens interrogatio quasi dimidium scientiae. — Bacon, De 
augmenlis scientiarum, V, 116. 

134. Tamdiu discendum est quamdiu nescias, et, si proverbio credi- 
mus, quamdiu vivas. — Seneca, Epist. 76. 

135. It is much easier to detect error than to find truth. The former 
Ues at the surface, and therefore is easily got at; the latter lies in the 
depth, and to search for it is not every man's business. — Goethe, 
Maxims. 

136. Errors like straws upon the surface flow; 

He who would search for pearls must dive below. 

Dryden, All for Love, Prologue. 

137. Nil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore ut uti 
Possemus; sed quod natum est, id procreat usum. 

Lucretius, De rerum nat. IV, 833. 
Nature adapts the organ to the function, and not the function to the 
organ. — Aristotle, De part, animal. IV, xii. 

138. What we train is not a soul, nor a body, but a man; the two 
must not be separated. — Montaigne, Essais, I, xxvi. 

139. Ratio et oratio. . . . conciliat inter se homines, coniungitque 
naturali quadam societate. Neque ulla re longius absumus a natura 
ferarum, — Cicero, Definib. I, 16. 

140. Sufl&cit ad id natura quod poscit. — Seneca, Epist. 90. 

141. Modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus omnino minis est, 



6l2 APPENDIX 

nee comprehendi ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo est. — St. Augus- 
TIKTE, De civitate Dei, XXI, lo. 

142. Ipsi animi magni refert quali in corpore locati sint; multa enim 
e corpore existunt quae acuant mentem, multa quae obtundant. — 
Cicero, Tusctcl. I, 33. 

143. Mutat enim mundi naturam totius aetas, 
Ex alioque alius status excipere omnia debet; 
Nee manet uUa sui similis res; omnia migrant; 
Omnia commutat natura, et vertere cogit. 

Lucretius, De rerum nat. V, 826. 

144. Intrandum est in renmi naturam, et penitus quid ea postulet 
pervidendum. — Cicero, De finib. V, 16. 

145. Non est causa efficiens, sed deficiens mali, quia malum non est 
effectio, sed defectio. — St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, 7. 

146. Omnia profecto cum se a coelestibus rebus referet ad humanas, 
excelsius magnificentiusque et dicet et sentiet. — Cicero, De Oratore, 
XXXIV, 119. 

147. The course of Nature is the art of God. — Young, Night 
Thoughts, Night 9. 

148. 'Tis but a base ignoble mind 
That moimts no higher than a bird can soar. 

Shakespeare, // Henry VI, 11. i. 

149. A little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth 
in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion: For while the 
mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes 
rest in them, and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of 
them, confederate and Unked together, it must needs fly to Providence 
and Deity. — Bacon, Essays, Atheism. 

150. Thy desire, which tends to know 
The works of God, thereby to glorify 

The great Work-Master, leads to no excess 
That reaches blame, but rather merits praise 
The more it seems excess. 

Milton, Paradise Lost, III, 694. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abelard, 564. 

Absolute, existence of, 516 ff. 

idea of, 132. 
Abstraction, nature of, 93, 94 ff 
Academy, 551, 553. 
Accident, in logic, 209, 211. 
Action, 17 ff., 166 ff. 

automatic, 169, 172. 

conscious and unconscious, 167. 

impulsive and instinctive, 171, 172. 

modes of, 167 ff. 

moral aspect of, 281 ff. 

motives of, 177. 

personal and impersonal, 167. 

random, 169, 172. 

reflex, 170, 172. 

rules of, 303. 

volitional, 173. 
Activity, love of, 147. 
Actus, 516. 
Adelard of Bath, 563. 

^NESIDEMUS, 374, 556. 

Esthetic sentiment, 155, 270. 
^Esthetics, 265 ff. 
Affective life, 137 ff. 

importance and culture of, 160 ft. 
Agnosticism, 376. 

andknowablenessof God,5i3,529 ff. 
d'Ailly, Peter, 572. 
Alanus of Lille, 565. 
Albert the Great, 568. 
Alcuin, 561. 
d'Alembert, 584. 
Alexander of Hales, 568. 
Alexandria, school of, 374, 557. 
Alfarabi, 566. 
Alkendi, 566. 
AMAtniY of Benes, 565. 
Ambrose, St., 560. 
Analogy, argument from, 247. 

and the knowledge of God, 529 ff. 
Analysis and synthesis, 117, 250. 

in judgment, no. 

in psychology, 29 ff. 
Analytic judgments, 109, 395 ff. 
Anaxagoras, 550. 



61s 



Anaximander, 549. 
Anaximenes, 549. 
Andronicus of Rhodes, 556. 
Anger, 148. 
Anselm, St., 564. 
Anthropomorphism, 529 ff. 
Antiochus of Ascalon, 553. 
Antisthenes, 551. 
Apollontus of Rhodes, 555. 
Appetite, 137. 
Appetitus, 28, 138. 
Approbation, love of, 146. 
Apriorism and origin of concepts, 

100, 105. 
Arabian Philosophy, 565. 
Arcesilaus, 374, 553, 556. 
Aristippus of Cyrene, 314, 551. 
Aristotle, 553. 
Art, 275. 

classification of fine, 279. 

nature and, 275, 276. 

science and, 275, 278. 

works of, 277 ff. 
Association of ideas, 34, 76, 115, 
Associationism 

and necessary judgments, 113. 

and origin of concepts, 99, 104. 

and principle of induction, 253. 

and the moral law, 297, 317, 318. 
Assyria, philosophy of, 544. 
Atheism, 515. 
Atomism, 427, 428. 
Attention, 31 ff. 
Augustine, St., 560. 
d'Auriol, Peter, 572. 
Authority, 417 ff. 

argimient from, 249. 

as a criterion of truth, 417 ff. 

civil, 357, 598. 
Averroes, 566. 
Avicebron, 566. 
Avicenna, 566. 

Baader, 588. 

Babylonia, philosophy of, 544. 

Bacon, Francis, 578. 



6i6 



INDEX 



Bacon, Roger, 571. 
Badarayana, 546. 
Bain, 99, 591. 
Balmes, 591. 
Banez, 577- 
Basil, St., 560. 
Bautain, 589. 
Beauty, 155, 270 ff. 

and goodness, 268. 

and truth, 267. 

realization of, 277 ff. 

types of, 273. 
Being, idea of, 131. 
Belief, 120, 418. 
Benevolence as basis of morality, 

311- 
Bentham, 315, 591. 
Berkeley, 580. 
Bernard of Chartres, 563. 
Bernard of Tours, 565. 
Bessarion, 575. 
BiRAN, Maine de, 589. 
Bcehme, 576. 

DE Bonald, ioi, 403, 589. 
Bona VENTURE, St., 568. 
bonnetty, 589. 
Brahmanism, 545. 
Brown, 588. 
Brownson, 592. 
Bruno, Giordano, 576. 

BUCHNER, 477, 588. 

Buddhism, 547. 
Buridan, 572. 
Butler, 581. 

Cabanis, 476, 584. 
Cairo, 591. 
Cajetan, 577. 
Calumny, 346. 
Campanella, 576. 
Cankara, 546. 
Carlyle, 591. 
Carneades, 374, 553. 556. 
Category, in logic, 211.^ 
Cause, 132. 

efl&cient, 454, 596. 

final, 455. 

first, S17, 597. 
Certitude, 205, 366, 367, 372, 380. 

kinds of, 367. 

of facts and principles, 378, 381. 
Character, 203. 
Charity, duties of, 342. 
Charron, 577. 
Childken, duties of, 354. 



China, philosophy of, 547. 

Chrysippus, 555. 

Cicero, 556. 

Citizens, rights and duties of, 359. 

Clairvoyance, 199. 

Cleanthes, 555. 

Clement of Alexandria, 559. 

Common Sense as criterion of truth, 

405- 
Comprehension (see Intension). 
CoMTE, 590. 
Conation, 28, 29, 166. 
Concept, 93, 94 ff. 

and image compared, 96 ff. 

and judgment, 108. 

genesis of, 98 ff. 

objectivity of, 398. 
Condillac, 99, 583. 
Conditional 

argimient, 230. 

proposition, 220. 
Confucius, 548. 
Conjunctive 

argument, 231. 

proposition, 220. 
_ ^j3NNaTATi©N-(see-iisrroNSiQN). 
Conscience, 283, 299. \^ 

^ as the rule of action, 300. / 
■^--education of, 301. 
Consciousness, 23 ff. 

as criterion of truth, 415. 
Continuity of mental processes, 36. 
Contract, social, 355. 
Contraposition of propositions, 224. 
Controversy, rules of, 262. 
Conversion of propositions, 223. 
CoENOLDi, 590. 
Cortes, Donoso, 591. 
Cosmology, 423. 
Cosmos, 448. 
Cousin, 589. 
Creation, 535. 

of human soul, 493, 494. 

of world, 534. 
Criterion, 402. 

derivative, 414. 

ultiniate, 403. 
Criticism and objectivity of knowl- 
edge, 388 ff. 
Cud worth, 581. 
Cumberland, 581. 
Curiosity, 153. 
CuviER, 444. 
Cynics, 551. 
Cyrenaics, 551. 



INDEX 



617 



Damiron, 589. 
Dar\\in, 444, 591. 
David of Dinant, 565. 
Death, laws and signs of, 498, 499. 
Deduction, 116, 250, 254 ff. 
Definition, 215 ff. 
Deism, 535. 

Democritus, 98, 476, 550. 
Demonstration, 244. 
Denotation (see Extension). 
Denys the Carthusian, 573. 
Descartes, 578. 

methodic doubt of, 243, 370. 

on criterion of truth, 405. 

on origin of ideas, 100. 

on union of body and soul, 482, 484. 
Desire, 174. 
Determinism, and freedom of the 

will, 177 ff. 
Detraction, 346. 
Diderot, 584. 
DiPiTERENCE, specific, 209. 
Dignity, duties concerning, 332, 345. 
Dilemma, 232. 
Diogenes of Sinope, 551. 
DiONYSius, Pseudo-, 560. 
Discretion, 347. 
Discussion, rules of, 262. 
Disjunctive 

argument, 231. 

proposition, 220. 
Disposition, physiological and psy- 
chical, 72, 73, 84. 
Distraction, 31. 
Division, 217. 
Divorce, 353. 
Dogmatism, 377 ff. 
Doubt, 205, 366. 

methodical, 243, 370. 
Dream, 195. 
Drobisch, 588. 
Duel, 345. 

Durandus of St. Pourgain, 572. 
Duty, and right, 328 ff. 

toward God, 538. 

toward men, 341. 

toward self, 331. 
Dynamism, 427, 429. 

ECKHART, 573. 

Edwards, 592. 

Efficient Causality, 454, 596. 
Egypt, philosophy of, 544. 
Eleatic school of philosophy, 549. 
Emotion, 137, 144. 



altruistic, 148. 

self-regarding, 145. 
Empedocles, 98, 550. 
Empiricism, 113, 297, 382. 
Enthymeme, 232. 
Epicheirema, 232. 
Epictetus, 555. 
Epicurus, 98, 314, 476, 555. 
Epistemology, 362. 

problems and method of, 368, 369. 
Erdmann, 587. 

Eriugena, John Scotus, 561, 563. 
Error, 205, 260. 

causes of, 260, 413. 

remedies of, 261. 
Essence, meaning of, 96, 209. 
Ethics, 281 ff. 
Euclid of Megara, 551. 
Evidence, 411. 

as criterion of truth, 412. 

self-, 376, 378, 412. 
Evil and divine providence, 519, 536. 
Evolution, 439, 440. 

of inorganic world, 441. 

of man, 490, 492. 

of organic world, 441. 
Example, argument from, 247. 
Experience 

as source of knowledge, 382. 

in judgment, in. 
Experiment, 251. 

in psychology, 57 ff. 
Extension, and intension, 95, 211. 

law of, 96, 212. 

of terms in propositions, 221. 

point of view of, in syllogism, 233 
ff-, 255. 

Facts, certitude of, 249, 381, 418. 
Faculties, 27 ff., 488. 
Fallacies, 256 ff. 
Family, 353. ^ 

Fear, 147. 
Feeling, 28, 29, 137. 

and morahty, 157, 161, 288, 309. 

and will, 188. 

as criterion of truth, 405. 

classification of, 138. 

importance and culture of, 160. 

of pleasure and pain, 139. 
Ferrara, 577. 
Feuerbach, 587. 

FiCHTE, 586. 

Figures of syllogism, 227. 
FiSKE, 592. 



6i8 



INDEX 



FONSECA, 577. 

Form and matter, 428, 430, 438, 483. 
Fourier, 590. 
Franck, Sebastian, 576. 
Franklin, 592. 
Freedom of will, 177 ff. 

condition of morality, 290. 
Froschammer, 494, 588. 

Galuppi, 590. 
Garnier, 589. 
Gassendi, 427, 575. 
Gauthier of Mortagne, 563. 
Gazali, 566. 
Gemistus Pletho, 575. 
Generationism, 494. 
Genus, meaning of, 209. 
Gerbert, 562. 
Gerson, 573. 
Geulincx, 582. 
Gilbert de la Porree, 564. 
Giles of Lessines, 570. 
Giles of Rome, 570. 
GiOBERTi, 590. 
Gnosticism, 559. 
God, 511, 597. 

attributes of, 525, 528. 

basis of moral order, 324 ff., 598. 

distinct from the world, 521. 

duties toward, 538. 

existence of, 514 ff. 

first cause, 517, 597. 

knowableness of, 513, 529, 533. 

nature of, 521. 

personal, 532. 

providence of, 535. 

ultimate end, 538, 598. 
Godfrey of Fontaines, 570. 
GcESCHEL, 587. 
Goodness, and beauty, 268. 
GoRGiAS, 550. 
Gorres, 588. : 
Gotama, 547. 

Government, forms of, 357. 
Green, 591. 

Gregory Nazianzen, 560, 
Gregory of Nyssa, 560. 
Groot, Gerard, 573. 
Grotius, Hugo, 576. 
Gunther, 588. 

Habit, 34, 175. 
and morality, 289. 
genesis of, 175. 
importance of, 176, 188. 



H^CKEL, 443, 588. 
Hallucination, 89. 
Hamilton, 588. 
Happiness, 163. 

first motor of the will, 177. 
Hartley, 591. 
VON Hartmann, 588. 
Hearing, sense of, 51, 65. 
Hedonism, 314. 
Hegel, 587. 
Helvetius, 476, 584. 
Henry of Ghent, 570. 
Heraclitus, 549. 
Herbart, 588. 
Herder, 586. 

Hermes Trismegistus, 557. 
History of Philosophy, 542. 
Hobbes, 355, 579. 
d'Holbach, 476, 584. 
Honor, 333. 

as basis of morality, 312. 

due to others, 346. 
Hugh of St. Victor, 565. 
Hume, 310, 463, 581. 
Husband and wife, duties of, 354. 
hutcheson, 311, 581. 
Huxley, 591. 
Hylomorphism, 428, 430. 
Hylozoism, 434. 
Hypnotism, 199. 

and freedom of the will, 182. 
Hypothesis, 248. 
Hypothetical 

argument, 230. 

proposition, 220. 

Iamblicus, 558. 
Idea, 72, 93. 

association of, 34, 74, 76, 115. 

genesis of fundamental, 131. 

in logic, 208. 

intension and extension of, 95, 211. 

kinds of, 212. 
Idealism, 387. 

and knowledge of external world, 

391- 

and knowledge of ideal truths, 396. 

in aesthetics, 276. 
Ignorance, 205, 366. 

and morality, 287. 

sentiment of, 153. 
Illusion, 89. 
Image, mental, 71 ff. 

and cpncept compared, 96 ff. 

as motor, 75. 



INDEX 



619 



Image, — continued. 

as representative, 73. 

physiological basis of, 73. 

retention, reproduction, and recog- 
nition of, 84. 
Imagination, 33, 78. 

and memory compared, 83. 

importance and culture of, 79. 

types of, 82. 
Immortality of the soul, 500 ff. 
Imperative, categorical, 157, 294, 

320. 
India, philosophy of, 545. 
Induction, 116, 250, 251. 

fallacies of, 260. 

methods of, 252. 

principle of, 253. 
Inference, 115 ff. 

immediate, 224. 

mediate, 226. 
Infinite, idea of, 132. 

God is, 526, 531. 
Innatism, and origin of concepts, 

100, 105. 
Insanity, 194. 
Intellect, 92. 

and imagination, 80. 

and senses, 102, 130, 474. 

and will, 188. 

cultivation of, 133 ff., 333. 

in man, not in animals, 471 ff. 
Intellectual sentiments, 153. 
Intelligence, 93. 
Intension, and extension, 95, 211. 

law of, 96, 212. 

of terms in propositions, 221. 

point of view of, in syllogism, 

233, 255- 
Interaction of body and soul, 482, 

484, 489. 
Interest, and attention, 32. 
Intuition of necessary judgments, 

113, 412. 
Ionian school of philosophy, 548. 

Jacobi, 405, 586. 

Jaimini, 546. 

Janet, 589. 

John of St. Thomas, 577. 

John of Salisbury, 565. 

JouTFROY, 589. 

Judgment, 107, 219. 

analysis and synthesis in, no. 

analytic and synthetic, 109, 395, 
396. 



and concept compared, 108. 

experience and reason in, in. 

genesis of, no, 117. 

kinds of. 108, 219. 

rash, 326, 346. 
Justice, duties of, 342. 
Justus Lipsius, 575. 

Kanada, 547. 
Kant, 584. 

on analytic and synthetic judg- 
ments, 396. 

on knowledge of external world, 

394- 

on morahty, 320. 

on objectivity of knowledge, 388. 

on origin of concepts, loi, 106. 
Kapila, 546. 
Kleutgen, 588. 
Knowledge, 17, 28, 40, 385, 399. 

and belief, 1 20. 

and morahty, 287. 

conditions of, 386. 

development of intellectual, 133. 

faculties of, 41, 42, 129. 

intellectual, and senses, 102. 

limits of, 400. 

objectivity of, 386. 

of external world, 389. 

of ideal truths, 395. 

qualities of, 133. 

relativity of, 399. 

scientific, 238. 

Lamarck, 444, 591. 
Lamennais, ioi, 403, 589. 
Language, 122, 124. 

acquisition of, 125. 

and thought, 126. 
Lao-tsze, 547. 
Laplace, 441, 591. 
Law, 292. 

civil, 283, 292, 294, 359. 

moral, 282, 285, 293 ff. 

of thought, 235. 

physical, 285, 292, 452 ff., 596. 
Lazarus, 588. 

Leibniz, 100, 427, 481, 484, 582. 
Leroux, 590. 
Leucippus, 98, 476, 550. 

LiBERATORE, 590. 

Life, 432 ff. 

and physical energies, 436. 

duties referring to one's own, 337 ff. 

duties referring to, of others, 344. 



620 



INDEX 



Life, — continued. 

in plants and animals, 435. 

nature of, 436. 

origin of, 442. 

origin of forms of, 443. 
Litte6, sqo. 

Localization, cerebral, 192. 
Locke, 580. 

on knowledge, 370, 387. 

on origin of concepts, 99, 104. 
Logic, 206. 

LOTZE, 588. 

Love, 151, 343. 

of activity, 147. 

of approbation, 146. 

of truth, 153. 
Lucretius, 476, 555. 
LuLLY, Raymond, 571. 
Luther, 576. 

McCosH, 592. 
Machiavelli, 576. 
Mackintosh, 588. 
Maimonides, 566. 
DE Maistee, 589. 
Malebranche, ioi, 481, 484, 582. 
Man, 489. 

antiquity of, 496. 

greatness and smallness of, 597. 

one substance, 483. 

origin of, 490 S. 
Mandeville, 582. 
Manicheism, 559. 
Mankind, 

antiquity of, 496. 

primitive condition of, 497. 

specific unity of, 495. 
Marcus Aurelius, 555. 
Marriage, 353. 
Marsilius of Inghen, 572. 
Material, meaning of, 469. 
Materialism, 476, 523. 
Matter, and form, 428, 430, 438, 483. 

constitution of, 426 ff. 

idea of, 132. 

properties of, 425. 
Maximus of Tyre, 557. 
Mechanism, 427^ 428, 455, 523. 
Melanchton, 576. 
Memory, 33, 83 S. 

and imagination compared, 83. 

as criterion of truth, 415. 

culture of, 85. 

kinds of, 34, 84. 
Mencius, 548. 



Mental, 22, 24. 

attitudes regarding truth, 205, 366. 

classification of, processes, 27 ff. 

general laws of, processes, 35 ff. 
Merit, 360. 
Metaphysics, 422. 
Method, 237. 

DE LA MeTTRIE, 476, 584. 
MlH-TSZE, 548. 

Mill, James, 591. 

Mill, John Stuart, 99, 255, 316, 591. 

Mind, 13, 17, 19, 22, 24. 

and organism, 190, 489. 

general laws of, 29, 35. 

human and animal compared, 
471 ff. 

philosophy of, 458. 

spiritual, 469, 471, 474. 

substantial, 21, 39, 460 ff. 
MiVART, 591. 
Moleschott, 477, 588. 
Monism, 515, 522. 

forms of, 522. 

psychophysical, 482, 485. 
Montaigne, 577. 
Montesquieu, 584. 
Moods of syllogism, 228. 
Moral, 284. 

law, 282, 285, 293 ff. 

sanction of, law, 326. 

sense, 310. 

sentiments, 157. 

standard, 303 ff. 
Morality, 281, 284, 

and feelmgs, 288, 309 ff. 

and habit, 289. 

and knowledge, 287. 

and pleasure, 313. 

and utihty, 313. 

and will and freedom, 289, 290. 

based on human nature and reason, 

307, 319, 323- 
based ultimately on God, 323, 520, 

598. 

concrete sentiment of, 158. 

determinants of concrete, 302. 

existence of, 295 ff. 

standard of, 303 ff. 
More, Thomas, 576. 
Motives of action, 177, 178. 
Mltrder, 344. 
Mysticism, 565. 

Nature, 449, 452. 
and art, 275, 276. 



INDEX 



621 



Nature, — continued. 
human, as basis of morality, 307, 

319, 323- 
laws of, 452. 
NiKOLAUs of Cusa, 576. 
Nominalism, 99, 104, 398. 

Observation and experiment, 251. 

Obveesion of propositions, 223. 

Occasionalism, 481, 484. 

Ockham, 572. 

Ontologism, ioi, 105, 406, 590. 

Opinion, 205, 366 

Opposition 

of terms, 214. 

of propositions, 222. 
Organism and mind, 190, 480, 489. 

origin of human, 490. 
Origen, 559. 
Origin, problem of, 439. 

of human organism, 490. 

of human soul, 492. 
Oft'NERSHiP, 347. 

private, 348 ff. 

Pain (see Pleasure). 
Pantheism, 515, 521 ff. 
Paracelsus, 576. 
Parallelism, psychophysical, 482, 

485. 
Parents, duties of, 354. 
Parmenides, 549. 
Passion, 137. 
Patanjali, 547. 
Patriotism, 152, 359. 
Paulsen, 588. 
Perception, 44, 62. 

analysis of, 62. 

auditory, 65. 

genesis of, 64. 

of external world, 65, 67, 69 ff., 

389- 

of time, 88. 

olfactory and gustatory, 64. 

tactual, 66. 

validity of, 389 ff., 414. 

visual, 67. 
Peripatetic school of philosophy, 553. 
Persia, philosophy of, 545. 
Personality, 204, 509. 

double or multiple, 197, 465. 
Pesch, 588. 
Phenomenalism, and the human 

mind, 460, 463. 
Philo of Larissa, 553, 556. 



PiHLO the Jew, 557. 
Philosophy, 7 ff. 

division of, 9. 

history of, 542. 

method of, 11. 

of mind, 458. 

relation of, to sciences, 3 ff., 8. 
Phrenology, 192. 
Pico della Mirandola, 575. 
Plato, 100, 387, 551. 
Pleasure and pain, 139. 

importance of, 142. 

laws of, 140. 
Plotinus, 558. 
Plutarch, 557. 
Polysyllogism, 232. 
Pomponatius, 575. 
Porphyry, 210, 558. 
Porter, 592. 

Positivism, 590 (see EMprRiciSM). 
Potentia, 516. 

Practice, as criterion of truth, 407 ff. 
Pragmatism, 408, 410. 
Prayer, duty of, 539. 
Predicable, 209. 
Predicament, 211. 
Preestablished Harmony, 481, 484. 
Prejudices, 118, 135. 
Priestley, 591. 
Principles, knowledge of, 133, 378, 

381, 396. 
Probability, 246, 366, 375. 
Proclus, 558. 
Property, 

duties referring to, 347. 

in logic, 209. 
Proposition, 219. 

contraposition of, 224. 

conversion of, 223. 

immediate inference of, 224. 

kinds of, 219. 

ob version of, 223. 

opposition of, 222. 
Protagoras, 550. 
Providence of God, 535. 
Prudence, 334. 
Psychology, 22, 25, 26. 

analysis in, 29 ff. 

division of, 27 ff. 

experimental, 56 ff. 
Pyrrho, 374, 556. 
Pythagoras, 549. 

Races of mankind, 495. 
Rationalism and certitude, 383. 



622 



INDEX 



Realism, 388. 
and knowledge of external world, 

389- 

and knowledge of ideal truths, 395. 

in aesthetics, 276. 
Reason, 

morahty based on, 307, 319, 323. 

practical, as criterion of truth, 407. 

validity of, 416. 
Reasoning, 115, 116, 226. 

inductive and deductive, 116. 

uses of, 121. 
Reflection, 471, 474. 

in philosophy, 11, 12. 

in psychology, 26. 
Reed, 310, 405, SS8. 
Reinhold, 586. 
Relativity of knowledge, 399. 
Religion, 538. _ 
Religious sentiments, 158. 
Remi of Auxerre, 562, 563. 
Renoxa^er, 590. 
Reputation, 

of others, 346. 

personal, 355. 
Responsibility, moral, 326. 
Rhabanus Maurus, 561. 
Richard of Middletown, 570. 
Richard of St. Victor, 565. 
Right and duty, 328 ff. 
Robert Kilwardby, 570. 
Romanes, 591. 
roscelin, 564. 
Rosencranz, 587. 

ROSMLNI, lOI, 590. 

Rousseau, 355, 584. 
Royer-Collard, 589. 
Rule of human actions, 303. 
ruysbrceck, 573. 

Saint-Simon, 590. 
Sanchez, 577. 

Sanction of moral law, 326. 
Sanseverino, 590. 
Scepticism, 373. 
schelling, 587. 
Schiller, 586. 
Scholastic philosophy, 560. 
Schools in Middle Ages, 561. 
Schopenhauer, 588. 
Science, 238. 

and art, 275, 278. 

classification of, 240. 
ScoTus, Duns, 570. 
S£cr£tan, 590. 



Secrets, obligation to keep, 347. 
Self, 13 ff. 

-condemnation, 148. 

-consciousness, 130. 

-control, 185, 336. 

-defence, 344. 

duties toward, 331. 

idea of, 131. | 

-importance, 146. 

-knowledge, 26, 337. 

-love, 14, 331. 

-neglect, 340. 

obvious characteristics of, 19. 

relations of, to external world, 13, 

17- 

-respect, 331, 332. 
Seneca, 555, 556, 
Sensation, 44 ff. 

auditory, 51. 

external, 45, 46 ff. 

internal, 45, 46. 

measurement of, 56 ff. 

muscular, 50. 

of smell and taste, 47. 

of temperature, 50. 

of touch, 49. 

perceptible difference of, 56, 59 ff. 

threshold of, 57, 59. 

visual, 52. 
Sensationalism, 99, 104. 
Senses, 44, 45. 

and intellect, 102, 130, 474. 

comparison of external, 55. 

education of, 62, 64. 

nvunber of external, 53. 

perception of (see Perception). 

value of knowledge of, 414. 
Sensism, 98, 103. 
Sentiment, 137, 152. 

aesthetic, 155. 

intellectual, 153. 

moral, 157, 309. 

religious, 158. 
Series, mind as a, of processes, 

463 ff. 
Sextus Empiricus, 374, 556. 
Shaftesbury, 310, 581. 
SiGER of Brabant, 571. 
Sign, meaning and division of, 122, 
123. 

of mental processes, 123. 
Simplicity of the mind, 469, 470. 
SntPLicius, 558. 
Sincerity, 334, 346. 
Slavery, 345. 



INDEX 



623 



Sleep, 195. 

Smell and taste, 47, 48, 64. 
Smith, Adam, 311, 582. 
SocL\L Contract, 355. 
Socialism, 348. 
Society, nature of, 352. 
Socrates, 551. 
Solidarity, 

in ethics, 319. 

of mental processes, 35. 
Somnambulism, 196. 
Sophists, 373, 550. 
Sorites, 232. 
Soul, 489. 

inunortality of, 500. 

one in man, 48 7. 

origin of, 492. 

seat of, in organism, 487. 

spiritual, 471. 

union of, with body, 480. 
Space, 132, 449. 
Species, 209. 

evolution of (see Transformism). 

unity of human, 495. 
Speech, and writing, 125. 
Spencer, 591. 

on criterion of truth, 406. 

on knowableness of God, 513, 
530 ff. 

on morality, 318. 

on origin of concepts, 99. 
Spinoza, 582. 
Spiritism, 201. 

Spirituality of the soul, 469 ff. 
State, 354. 

functions and rights of the, 358. 

origin of the, 355. 
Statistics, 247. 
Steinthal, 588. 
Stewart, Dugald, 588. 
Stockl, 588. 
Stoics, 320, 555. 
Strauss, 587. 
Suarez, 577. 
Substance, 131, 460, 524. 

man is one, 483. 

mind is a, 460. 
Suggestion, mental, 198, 200. 
Suicide, 337. 
Suso, Henry, 573. 
Syllogism, 227. 

figures and moods of, 227. 

hypothetical, 230. 

imperfect forms of, 232. 

principles of, 233. 



quantitative, 234. 

rules of, 228. 
Sympathy, 150, 151. 

as basis of morality, 311. 
Synthesis and analysis, 117, 250. 

in judgment, no. 

in psychology, 30. 
Synthetic judgments, 109, 395 ff. 



Taine, 99, 590. 
Taste and smell, 47, 48, 64. 
Tauler, 573. 
Teleology, 455. 

and existence of God, 519. 

and immortality of soul, 503. 
Telepathy, 200 
Telesio, 575. 
Temperament, 191, 203. 
Temperance, 336. 
Temperatueie, sense of, 50. 
Term, 211. 

intension and extension of, 95, 211, 
221. 

kinds of, 213. 

supposition of, 211. 
Thales, 549. 
Theism, 515, 521. 
Themistius, 558. 
Theodicy, 511. 
Theophrastus, 554. 
Thierry of Chartres, 563. 
Thomas a Kempis, 573. 
Thomas, St., Aquinas, 568. 
Thought, 92. 

and language, 126. 

primary laws of, 235. 
Time, 132, 451. 

-perception, 88. 
Touch, sense of, 49, 66. 
Tradition, validity of oral, 419. 
Traditionalism, ioi, 105, 403, 589. 
Traducianism, 494. 
Transcendentalism, and origin of 

concepts, loi, 106. 
Transformism, 443, 445. 

appHed to man, 490 ff. 
Trendelenburg, 588. 
Truth, 364, 380. 

and beauty, 267. 

knowledge of ideal, 395. 

love of, 153. 

moral, 334, 346. 

personal and impersonal, 120. 
Truthfulness, 334, 346. 



624 



INDEX 



Union, 480. 

of body and soul, 481 ft, 
Universals, problem of, 398, 562. 
Universe, 448, 595. 
Utilitarianism, 297, 298, 314, 316. 

Veracity, duty of, 334, 346. 
Virtue, 326, 360. 
Vision, 52, 67. 
VOGT, 476, 588. 
Voltaire, 584. 

Wallace, 591. 
Walter of Mortagne, 563. 
Wife and husband, duties of, 354. 
Will, 173 ff. 

and desire, 174. 

and feelings, 188. 

and intellect, 188. 

and morality, 289 ff. 



freedom of, 177 ff. 

importance and culture of, 185, 334. 
William of Auvergne, 568. 
William of Champeaux, 563. 
William of Conches, 563. 
VON Wolff, 583. 
World, 448. 

knowledge of external, 389. 

obvious characteristics of, 15 ff. 
Writing, and speech, 125. 
Written documents, authority of ,420. 

Xenophanes, 549. 

Yang-chu, 548. 

Zeno of Citiimi, 555. 
Zeno of Elea, 549. 
Zoroaster, 545. 
Zwingli, 576. 



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